The Scout-Emplaced Abatis

Effective Op Orders by Captain John L. Buckheit The operations order (OPORD) is an important tool for the Army officer at any level. OPORDs direct our efforts in war as well as in peace. We learn to write the five-paragraph

OPORD

in Army schools at all levels. Then, we refine our skills during training exercises and much of our normal day-to-day business. But, are we learning to write and use the type of OPORDs needed to win on a modern battlefield? OPORDs are a controversial subject. Almost all officers have written at least one, and each has his own particular style. Officers love to discuss the merits and flaws of different types of OPORDs. I have argued about OPORDs in both the basic and advanced courses, at the club, in officer professional development classes, and at ARTEP after-action reports. Through debate after debate, one criticism remains constant: the typical operations order at the battalion or company level is too long and unwieldy. During World War I, American division-level attack orders were often 20-pages long. In the 1920s, battalion orders at the Infantry School were three or four pages in length. General Marshall criticized this as excessive. Studying German Army maneuvers during the 1930s, General Marshall learned that the Germans relied on brief orders, ision ;iana - _ _ . often only oral, up to the div level. During the h u h -c i n ~ n L- ____--- -1. IIlaIlUGVGrS VI I Y W , IIG sur;r;eeued ill cutting the division order down to a simple statement based on the five-paragraph field order. Battalion-and company-level orders were no longer than a page, and often oral. When the 1st Infantry Division attacked Oran, during the North African Campaign, the OPORD was only a page long, with accompanying graphics. Through World War 11, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War most units relied on oral OPORDs. Written orders were drawn up after the fact for historical purposes. The demands of combat did not allow sufficient time to draft and distribute lengthy orders. Commanders personally briefed subordinates on their intent whenever possible. At times, assistant S3s simply delivered graphics with the scheme of maneuver and a brief written order. This written order supplemented, Reproduction of the terse fiveparagraph field order issued by MG Terry Allen to men of the 1st Infantry Division prior to the attack on Oran, North Africa, in 1942. The order is from the files of the First Division Museum - Cantigny, Wheaton, 111. 38 ARMOR - January-February 7990

“When we write OPORDs for a grade, we write as much as possible in order to demonstrate our competence. We learn this at service schools, and it follows us to service with units.” and did not repeat, the graphics. A well-trained unit with sound standard operating procedures could efficiently operate in this manner. Unfortunately, we have lost some of these skills. All too often, modern battalions depend on lengthy written orders. Much of the information is redundant or restates the obvious. Staffs are taxed to produce these verbose documents, but subordinate commanders seldom read the entire order. Long orders briefings waste valuable time. Painfully detailed OPORDs cannot compensate for a poorly-trained unit. Dynamic plans become flat. Arterward, some commanders will need to personally review crucial points with key personnel. The system is inefficient and robs units of flexibility. Why do units operate this way? Some officers respond that in wartime, they‘d do it differently. That logic defeats the purpose of training. We need to review our training. Officers write OPORDs in three situations. Army schools, specifically the basic and advanced courses, instruct and grade us on writing orders. Then, we write orders for grade or critique during training exercises. Finally, we write orders to accomplish our day-to-day business in the field and garrison. Of the three, the third circumstance may -be the best training. That is the on!v instance where we routinely write only what we need. I am not criticizing the five-paragraph field order. The format is logical and designed to avoid accidentally omitting anything. Any reader knows where to look for whatever information he seeks. But too often, we abuse this format by providing excessive information. When we write OPORDs for a grade, we write as much as possible in order to demonstrate our competence. We learn this at service schools, and it follows us to service with units. Also, commanders give in to the temptation to micromanage through finely detailed OPORDs. Unfortunately, such orders will not suffice during the next conflict. Commanders at all levels must implement sound standard operating procedures. This will allow for more streamlined OPORDs. The two must complement one another in an efficient system. Then, commanders must use brief OPORDs during field exercises, so that units can become accustomed to them. Also, they must encourage subordinates to use brief OPORDs. Obviously, micro-management does not create the necessary environment. Throughout the Army, we need to stress the concise OPORDs that will be efficient tools in time of war. We will only be combat ready when such OPORDs become the norm. The basic and advanced courses must teach officers to write this type of OPORD. Small-group instruction lends itself to writing a lot of OPORDs. Obviously, we must start by teaching long written orders. The Armor OTficer Advanced Course does so. Also, it stresses mission-oriented orders with a solid commander’s intent. Students write battalion OPORDs and brief company OPORDs for a grade. This is a solid base, but it is only a start. Instructors normally grade with a checklist. This tempts students to be as verbose as possible in order to cover everything. To combat this, students should have to write OPORDs under extreme time constraints, forcing them to prioritize information. Then, instructors could critique what was included and what was not. Also, the instruction should stress OPORDs consisting solely of operations graphics with brief instructions. This would train students in the type of orders that have worked in wartime. Finally, all officers should use the OPORD format whenever possible during day-to-day business. This constant practice will teach officers to become terse. Like any other skill, writing OPORDs requires constant practice. Once we start doing this, we will institutionalize a concept that has worked for our Army in three major conflicts. Captain John L Buckheit graduated from USMA in 1984 and received an Infantry commission. After attending the Infantry Officer Basic Course, he served with 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 1st ID (F) in the FRG. He was successively assigned as rifle platoon leader, company XO, battalion support platoon leader, and assistant S3. After attending the Armor Officer Advanced Course and the Cavalry Leaders’ Course, he was selected for the Funded Legal Education Program. He is currently attending the Columbia University School of Law. ~~ ~~ ARMOR - January-February 7990 39

Tand An App~ vaw I To Mounted Surveillance by Captain Walter F. Ulmer 111 It is 0200. As yori begin to slip into a riiiiclt needed sliuitber, your XO taps you on tite shotilder. Battalion Itcadquarters ltus radicwd a riiission change, and your company needs to be re.@ to move in 45 minutes. As you gather yoiir senses and clothing those routine tasks begin that will rally the company into a REDCON I staftis. Wse!v, you Itad ptilled the company into a tight nigitttinie as-seritb!v area, placed tite unit on 50 percent sectirity, and established niotinted anitored OPs at tite most dangerous eneni-v ar~eniies of ap-proaclt. As the coiiipaitv ltiistles to get readv, the XO reftinis. He Itas a fi-antic look about him. Apparentlv, tite nortiient OP, a tank section front tlie third platoon, had placed its vehicles in hide positions about 200 meters apatt. As a resiilt of nirtning tlie vehicle's radios without stamhg tiie engine pen-odicalfv, it will not start. Its wing tank has titrown a track enroiite to slaving it. At the other OP, a section front tiie first platoon, things are not ntticlt better. llte enlire crew on one of the vehicles Itas fallen asleep. llie wing tank coiiintander, suspecting what had happened sent Itis loader to wake the sleeping crew. Soritewitere between tlie two vehicles the loader has becorite lost. Yotir XO coritpletes his lipdate by pointing orit there is no way tlie coritpart-v will be read\? to move ut the appointed tirite. Yoii begin the walk to yoiir rvhicle to radio the battalion coiitritander. .. Few of us have been in units where all of the situations described above have occurred simultaneously. Most of us, however, have had similar mettle-testing sessions happen at one time or another. Obviously, much of what transpired can be attributed to leadership failures. At the same time, recurring errors in the establishment and recovery of mounted observation posts (or armored OPs), might lead one to believe that there exist systemic shortcomings in our current approach to this important combat function. Few field manuals address the specifics of conducting armored OPs, yet we find ourselves using them frequently as one important form of stationary surveillance. There are many advantages associated with conducting stationary armored OPs. Not only do they make best use of the vehicle's onboard sighting, weapons, and communication systems, they provide the crew enhanced protection from enemy direct and indirect fires. If the situation dictates, they can be augmented with dismounted OPs. For the sake of this discussion, define an armored OP as a mounted, stationary OP, which has the primary mission of conducting surveillance on an enemy mounted or dismounted avenue of approach. While primary surveillance is conducted from the vehicle, this capability can be enhanced with dismounted OPs' as required. Doctrinal missions traditionally associated with OPs remain the same, as does the sequence of tasks practiced during OP occupation, execution, and recovery. There seems to be a dearth of information regarding the conduct of armored OPs. While many manuals cite the necessity for observation posts as part of a larger mission, few outline a specific methodology involving mounted OP execution. Most doctrinal literature addresses conventional dismounted OPs. ARTEP 17-57-10 MTP (December

1988) outlines FM 17-98 and FM 21- 40 ARMOR - January-February 7990

75 standards for the priorities of dismounted OPs. (See Figure 1, tasks and conduct of dismounted below.) scout OPs. FM 17-15, 771c Tank It depicts dismounted OPs posi-Plutooti, (October 1987), provides a tioned forward of the platoon's diagram (figure 4-9) of a tank vehicles. It also shows the platoon's platoon defensive position utilizing vehicles arrayed at some distance Figure 1. A tank platoon defensive position, using dismounted OPs (from FM 17-15). from one another, with hills between the section's vehicles. FM 17-98, rite Scout Platoon, provides the most extensive narrative concerning OP occupation. It discusses dismounted OP operations and OP integration with crewmembers maintaining positions on board the vehicles. None of these publications discusses the conduct of mounted OPs in any detail. This article will describe one method of conducting armored observation posts, applicable to both scouts and tankers. Setting Up the OP The concept behind 'tandem OPs" is simple: mutual support and teamwork between vehicles in a section will result in a better product. In terms of the establishment of OPs, it will provide redundancy and reduce the probability of errors commonly associated with observation posts. Once the unit has chosen the appropriate site for the observation post, routine tasks associated with OP occupation begin. They are executed in that order which doctrine and unit SOPS dictate. However, vehicle positioning in tandem OPs is different. Instead of vehicles routinely placed 100-200 meters apart, the vehicles are directly adjacent to one another. One of the vehicles backs into a hide position, but no farther back than allows crewmembers to step from one vehicle to the other without having to get on the ground. This vehicle becomes the "passive' vehicle. Throughout the occupation of the OP, the passive vehicle shuts down completely, and its crew sleeps, performs maintenance, conducts personal hygiene, etc. The vehicle in the forward position, or 'active' vehicle, is fully manned and ARMOR - January-February 7990 47

"Crews shot? of personnel especially liked the idea, because it gave them the edge for sustained operations, while increasing the efficiency of their rest periods. Also popular was the concept of active and passive vehicles. Crews liked the idea of being 700 percent at work or 700 percent at rest." than two crews operating independently at 50 percent. The ability to conduct sustained operations is enhanced, better overall surveillance results, and the quality of rest received by the passive crew increases. 0 Occupation. Occupation of the OF or assembly area is quicker. Both crews "gang tackle" occupation driIIs for essentially one OF. personnel Utilization. In an era when 3-man tank crews and Cman Bradley crews abound, the concept of tandem OPs allows manning the active vehicle with a full crew at all times. This mutual support applies to maintenance and resupply functions as well. Shared duties enhance efficiency. 0 Asset Use Minimization. The use of precious assets is minimized. The amount of wire run between OPs or positions in an assembly area is reduced, and hours logged on vehicles, radios, and ancillary equipment are minimized. 0 System redundancy. More than one vehicle located directly at an OP site reduces the risk of that position becoming ineffective as a result of either vehicle breakdown or crew error. 0 Resupply efficiency. Resupply operations are streamlined. Classes I, 111, and V are supplied to two vehicles at a time, when using "tailgate" resupply techniques, (that which is routinely used when resupplying deliberate observation posts positioned for extended periods). During resupply, there is no lapse in OP operation: the passive crew can perform resupply functions for both vehicles, while the active crew continues to provide surveillance. Responsiveness. In ;he event of a short-fuzed change of mission, or during routine recalls of OPs, responsiveness increases, and havoc is reduced. The necessity for one vehicle to move to another's location to provide a slave or to wake up a sleeping crew is essentially eliminated, (unless both vehicles require assistance simultaneously, which is rare). There are disadvantages as well: 0 Vulnerability. The proximity of vehicles in tandem OPs increases susceptibility to indirect lire. ocoverage. By doubling the number of vehicles at each OP, a unit's surveillance capability is halved. 0 Concept Acceptability. Many are initially uncomfortable with the idea of pairing vehicles in the tandem OP configuration. Initial training of crews must focus on the advantages, while realistically addressing the disadvanlages. Crewmembers may take time to become accustomed to tactically positioning vehicles in a manner that resembles garrison motor pool parking. Soldier movement around vehicles must, as always, be monitored carefully to reduce potential increased safety risks associated with transitioning to a new way of business. Response by soldiers who have used tandem OPs has been favorable. Crews short of personnel especially liked the idea, bccause it ARMOR - January-February 7990 gave them the edge for sustained operations, while increasing the efficiency of their rest periods. Also popular was the concept of active and passive vehicles. Crews liked the idea of being 100 percent at work or 100 percent at rest. Those difficulties routinely associated with maintaining 50 percent security within a single crew were reduced significantly. With the reduction in this area, other failures associated with OP execution ebbed. Via tandem OPs, opportunities for sections to operate together increased, thereby increasing section cohesion. In an Army where we routinely train with undermanned crews, and where skeleton MTOEs fail to recognize the redundancy required in order to conduct sustained operations, tandem OPs might just provide an additional edge on the battlefield. Captain Walter F. Ulmer 111 was commissioned in 1979 from the USMA and has attended

AOBC,

AOAC, CAS3,

Airborne, and Ranger Schools. He served as a tank platoon leader, cavalry troop XO, and S3 Air with the 3d ACR, Fort Bliss, Texas; and as squadron motor officer and cavalry troop commander in the 11th ACR, FRG. He was also S3 of the 4-67 Armor, 3d AD, in Germany. He is currently a personnel readiness officer at PERSCOM, Alexandria, Va. 43

44 ARMOR - January-February 7990

The Scout-Emplaced Abatis by First Lieutenant (P) Steven G. Unfreid and First Latenant (P) Michael Eller 'Red 1 - lltis is Black 6 - Frago Follows - Over." "Black 6 - lltis is Red 1 - Roger - Over." "Execiite 'Woodciifter' Grid NB 679943 - NLT 0500 - to tie in witli precliainber HED 1309 - Over." litions-constructed abatis, which will reinforce the troop's GDP obstacle plan. Both L15 and L16 move into overwatching positions and begin separate, yet complementary tasks. The Bradley commander (BC) for L15 begins to calculate the required demo (to be drawn from his onboard basic load), recon the obstacle, and mark trees for cmoli-tion. The Bradley commander for L16 begins to test burn the OD green and yellow plastic-covered time fuse and cut line mains and branch lines. Each crew member executes his assigned tasks in sequence. Little "7ltis is Red 1 - Wilco - Oiit." 1LT Wilson (RED 1) looks at his watch - 0240, should be enough time - then enters his platoon net and barks out mission orders to his Ll5 and L16 crews. His orders are brief - codeword, grid, time, and intent. In 12 minutes the two tracks have pulled out of their positions on the troop's wide screen and have arrived two kilometers away at a narrow, winding heavily-wooded pass on B468. 1LT Wilson readjusts his remaining four vehicles to cover the now-thinned screen. The joint engineer/scout training conducted at home station and at Grafenwoehr begins to pay its dividends. The section starts battle drill "WOODCUnER" - a demo-Abatis Drill - Two-Scout Section Vehicle I Figure 1

BCI

Gunnac I Redvo mlniar DlrectMctlon Man25mm into mer-watch poaltlon prscs LPm Calculate demo Reconobstacle Man25mm Mark trees for dcmolhlon S u p e ~ . WlSt lay!ng Man25mn llne mains Imps* pl-ment of charger. Ghrs order to detonate. Raturn Man 25mm to vehicle. Accountformen/ equlpment.Move. Man25mm to safedhtama Report. Man 25 mm hhsrl hhs

PMCS

-w driver's hatch Fropara IO mova Turn uehlcle arOUnd hhs soout1 Air Guard

M B C I

Lay llne mains with 8CI Bring In LPKIP mount Hhkk Account for sensklve Items AC guard ARMOR - January-February 7990 45

"Our experience shows that 14 inches is a good average tree size for planning. This will still make an effective obstacle. Time and materials estimates can be adjusted for different sizes of abatis." time is wasted. Scout 1 from L15 lays line mains with his Bradley commander, scout 2 lays the land line to his LP/OP, the driver pulls PMCS, and the gunner mans his 25mm. At 0455 a bright flash lightens the still dark morning sky. A moment later, the shock wave of 90 Ibs of exploding C-4 rocks L11. "Black 6 - ntis is Red 1 - Over." "Red 1 - ntis is Black 6 - Owr." "ntis Is Red I - 'Woodcutter' Es-carted Time 0455 - Over." This is Black 6 - Roger, Oiit." This scenario, although fictitious, is a realistic one for cavalry scouts. In this article, we give a battle drill for a demolition abatis. CPT Ed Cardon expressed the need for battle drills in the June 1988 issue of A n y Magazine: "Units do well only those things that have been ingrained into their activities. There is little time to plan a play in the huddle or train soldiers in each subtask. Drills are ideal and essential in sur-mounting the nature of combat operations." Once the need for battle drills is identified, the next step is to design and proof them. The 58th Combat Engineer Company and L Troop 3/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment dcvelopcd the following demolition-constructed abatis battle drill for a two-scout sec-Sty, 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Abatis Drill - Two-Scout Section Vehicle II Figure 2 0c II Gunner II Dtrect vehlcle Man 25mm Into overwatch Prepare demo. Test bum fuze Cui line mains, Man 25mm branch lines, time fuze. Fix charges to marked trees. Attach branch Man 25mm lines to main. Connect M60 fuze igniter and non-elec blasting cap Man 25mm to time fuze. Attach cap to time det cord. 010 of section leader, Man 25mm light fuze. Return. Account for men1 equipment. Move Man 25mm to safe distance. Drtver iI scout 1 D h Air guard

PMCS

Assist BC II Occupy drhrcr's hatch Assist EC II Prepare to move Assist BC I1 Turn vehicle Acc.~unt for around sensitive items Driva Air guard scout 2 Rear security Assisl BC II Assist BC I1 Return and mount vehlcle Rear security Rear security tion. Each scout platoon has a demolition set by TOE. This drill can also be modified for use with chain saws. Chain saws are not TOE equipment, but are often available. Figures 1 and 2 show the duties of the first and second Bradley crews. Figure 3 provides a rollup of time and materials required to emplace an abatis, either with demolitions or chain saws. We have included comparison data for an engineer squad to emplace the same obstacles. We used a standard 75-m abatis consisting of 15 trees of 14-inch diameter on each side of the road. Although FM 5-125, Dentolitioris, recommends trees of 24-inch diameter, trees in Germany are normally harvested before they reach that size. Our experience shows that 14 inches is a good average tree size for planning. This will still make an effeciive obstacle. Time and materials estimates can be adjusted for different sizes of abatis. These estimates were made by emplacing an abatis using training aid demolitions, and by cutting logs to simulate live trees. Fuel use is an important consideration for chain saws (see Figure 3). We recommend carrying a five-gallon can of MUGAS/ oil mix on any vehicle carrying a chain saw. There are never enough engineers; scouts frequently plan to emplace some of their own obstacles. By using drills such as this one for training, we can draw together the individual and collective tasks required to do the mission, and give our soldiers and leaders the confidence and skills to accomplish the mission in war. 46 ARMOR - January-February 7990