Battle Drills: Simplifying the Challenge

In the pre-dawn gloom, Team Tank crosses the line of departure in column. Winding through low ground, weapons probing for a flash of gunfire or the glow of a thermal image, tanks lead Bradleys in silence. Reaching the point where the enemy threat exceeds the attractions of simple column movement, the team commander deploys his platoons: "Yellow, this is Yellow Six, over." "Red, over." "Blue, over." "Green, over." "This is Yellow Six. Execute Vee, out." Instantly, Red, the lead platoon, shifts in column a hundred meters left, then blossoms into a wedge. The trail Abrams darts out automatically to its wing position, using speed to cover the extra distance. Blue, the second platoon, simultaneously accelerates and shifts right, unfolding into a wedge running abreast of Red. Green's Bradleys, also in a wedge, move roughly centered and behind the tanks. Team Tank, on the two-word command of execution, "Execute Vee," has completely reconfigured. In doing so, it has maintained momentum and control. (See Figures 1-3) An armored force must move resolutely and coherently. It must use its speed and mass to bring overwhelming fire to bear on the enemy. Battlefield realities, in combat or on exercise, tend to fragment mass, retard s p e d Battle drills make it le' IAPL H easier to keep the team together and moving. American leaders are historically given great freedom to maneuver their forces. Given their training, equipment, and plain Yankee ingenuity, they should be capable of reacting correctly to situations. OPFOR doctrine, with its un-imaginative approach, tends to earn our condemnation. OPFOR leaders are not allowed the flexibility so important in an environment of constant change. In our censure of OPFOR technique we have, however, discounted a tool that will assist us in executing our doctrine. Our platoons and companies cannot train frequently enough to master complex techniques, or gain the expertise needed to fully exploit the freedom they enjoy. Too frequently, companies get split up, mired down, or misdirected in their maneuver. Combat multipliers get neglected by commanders too busy just keeping formations together, their units a loose collection of independent teams. All this is evidence of techniques too complex for available training resources, including time. The problem is much greater for our reserve component. A tightening budget assures yet less time for practice. The key to success is simplicity. The Soviets, with their high soldier turnover, face a similar challenge. Part of their solution is to use battle drills through battalion level. The NTC OPFOR uses drills. U. S. veterans of WWII armored combat express disbelief that the drills they lived by in Europe languish today. Battle drills became away of life in Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, during a 1987 manuever and vulnerability test of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle at Fort Hood, Texas. Tasked to portray the tank company of a Soviet motorized rifle battalion, my Abrams crews practiced battle drills the NTC OPFOR and the Warsaw Pact currently use. Battle drills streamlined formation changes and dramatically eased command and control at each echelon. The simplicity of drills did tend to belie their effectiveness. Gun crews were initially dismayed at their reduced latitude. OPFOR drills are straightforward and discount terrain, although not to the extent we commonly believe. While our crews were right to condemn terrain blindness, the crews' widely shared disapproval of set drills proved unwarranted and soon faded. Drills gave us the necessary structure to retain unit cohesiveness and exploit opportunities quickly. We could immediately respond to any situation. As we improved, we experimented with variations, increasing our flexibility. The improvement in our maneuver prompted the adoption of modified OPFOR drills into our tactical SOP. We moved fast and hit violently as a solid force. We overwatched with entire platoons, simplifying what could be a complex maneuver, while maintaining our momentum. The same battle drills employed in the sweeping maneuver possible at Fort H d served as well in the congested marsh and woodland of NORTHAG during REFORGER

87. This "hide and seek" environment is conducive to loss of initiative and momentum. The discipline, responsiveness, and cohesiveness we gained with drills kept us together and ready to respond. The platoons were used to keeping a close eye on each other and reacting quickly - two products of drill mastery. Benefits spilled over into defensive operations. Our displacements were snappy. The platoons sped from position to position with high regard for terrain, but unmistakably as teams. Control of a company did-placement, normally a fairly busy time under the best of circumstances, got quite a bit easier. As was the case in the offense, subordinates had a much simpler time controlling their units in the absence of their leaders. As defined by AR 35041, "A drill is a collective task at squad or platoon level that has been identified as one of the most vita1 tasks performed by that unit for success in combat. Drills are totally or largely METT-T independent, require minimal leader actions to execute, and are standardized for execution throughout the Army. Drills are usually executed or initiated on a cue, such as a specified enemy action or simple leader order." I would expand the definition to include company use of drills. Our Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test is a collection of drills. Battle drills give responses to tactical situations and facilitate tactics, any tactics. The Armor Officer Basic Course teaches battle drills outlined in FM 17-15. The problem is to accept a lessened degree of small unit freedom and force the rote performance of drills to a much greater degree. In 1981, the Army Research Institute (ARI) published its report on tests measuring the impact of Warsaw Pact OPFOR maneuver on a friendly force's performance. The tests took place at what was to become the National Training Center with the 194th Armored Brigade fighting the fledgling OPFOR. Com- 34 ARMOR - January-February 7990 ments from tankers of the 194th clearly endorse drills: There is a need to learn battle drill. Crews need to operate more by using SOPS...." "We need to practice like a football team and stop thinking that we are so flexible that we can perform any task without practicing..." "We need more emphasis on battle drill that includes less reliance on radio..." "U. S. forces must be able to move fast with decisiveness by utilizing rapid dashes from position to position."' Bravo company learned OPFOR drills, but units using standard U. S. drills would realize the same benefits. FC 17-15 teaches the basic drills for the wedge, vee, echelon, line, column, coil, and herringbone. It details the contact and action drills, which embody the basic drills. It adequately describes each drill's use and methods of control. Company drills are described in FC 17- 16-1. I cite these publications specifically, because they are the ones now in use at the Armor School, and standardization is a keystone of simplicity. OPFOR doctrine emphasizes keeping a tightly formed unit moving without interruption. Overwatch is left up to following echelons, if used at all. OPFOR formations, however, are similar to formations in U. S. doctrine. The OPFOR does not use vee or wedge formations below company level, but has two line formations, one with the platoon leader a tank length ahead and centered, the other with him a tank length behind and centered. Invariably, the minor variations in vehicle speeds result in these line formations resembling either a shallow wedge or vee. Like ours, OPFOR formations are variations on either the line or the column. An OPFOR company can move in a column, vee, wedge, echelon, or aline with platoons themselves formed in line, column, or echelon within the company. Each formation is a separate battle drill. Red Thrust, the Army's trainer of OPFOR techniques, uses a superb method to teach OPFOR drills. It will work with any drills. It embodies the crawl, walk, run concept and results in skills gained quickly and relatively cheaply. Bravo Company's experience serves as an example: After a brief class on OPFOR doctrine and formations, hands-on work began. The OPFOR uses a triple number code and flag signal for each formation. Thus, an OPFOR commander sending his unit into aline formation would call "One, one, one" and raise a red flag. The entire code system was intrcF duced in the classroom and hammered home thereafter. The Red Thrust team first used v35 scale vehicle models, each with a distinctive numbcr on it, to simulate a task organized tank company. Taking one battle drill at a time, they deployed the models as a demonstration, thcn had the students do so. Within an hour all drivers and vehicle commanders (loaders and gunners were not present due to space restrictions) could place the models in each of several formations. All the while, the team shot questions out at students, reinforcing the instruction. When students could take the models out of a pile and configure them in formations, they began to deploy the models in and out of formations using the drill procedures. Here, the distinctive numbers were critical. The crews quickly mastered this last skill of Phase I. The importance of this phase cannot be overemphasized. The scale models and methodical approach laid solid groundwork for the next phase. Phase I1 was literally the walk phase. Each commander/driver "crew," simulating an entire vehicle assembled on the PT field. Section leaders carried a flag set, as did the company commander. After a brief review and orientation, the trainer announced the code for company column. Shouting the column code and displaying the flag signal, the CO and his driver set off toward the far end of the field with the platoon leaders echoing his command and falling in, their crews taking up their positions. Everyone felt a little foolish at first. With the column formed and moving, the trainer announced a different code, and we repeated the process. With each drill, the transition from models to walk-through brought minor and short-lived confusion. Embarrassment gave way to a feeling of progress as the crews quickly learned to recognize codes and flags and "do the drill." And the trainers kept up their quizzing. We kept each Phase I1 session under two hours. As soon as possible, the commander. issued his own instructions, and when he was comfortable, let platoons practice separately. Phase I1 training lasted about three days, culminating in walking attacks across open training area ground. We tried to use actual vehicle intervals. With the absence of radios, the flag signals came in handy. (In actual maneuver, we found flags difficult to manage and hard to see.) Phase 11 taught crews ARMOR - January-February 7990 35 what they should see and do in the drills. Use of real training areas doubled as terrain appreciation classes, all at low cost. Every line company does PT three or four times a week when in garrison. That's a golden opportunity for Phase I1 training. We formed the company into three platoon columns, with each platoon's men lined up by crews. Thus, the platoon leader was up front, followed by his crew and so on. From there, it was simple to execute drills as we ran. Granted, forming a company line can get tricky in the width of a street, but imagination makes all things possible... Phase 11 is a necessary link in battle drill training, not unlike the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer in gunnery training. It will certainly complement SIMNET. Phase 111, actual maneuver, began slowly, l i e the preceding phases. At this point, all crews knew the drills. The company began with basics. Under the company commander's control, it formed into a column. It then moved back and forth across the training area until each crew was positioned correctly. The company then did simple line deployments and returned to column. It quickly became apparent that tanks moving to the wings would never make it if the inner vehicles did not slow about 30 percent. Gradually, we added more drills, always returning for review to the basics. (Phase 111 training could begin with platoons drilling separately under the guidance of the CO, XO, and first sergeant. As they learned the basics, they could be pulled together in company maneuver. This platoon training would take about one day to get the platoons to the point permitting company drill. They wouldn't be masters, but capable enough to permit the company to.train as a whole.) From the first moment of Phase 111, we pushed weapon orientation. The driver and tank commander positioned their vehicle; the driver's Sample Initial Battle Drill Training Program Phase I (Half Day) -Classroom (1 hour): Theory and description of drills -Practice with models (2-3 hours): until each crew is capable of performing each drill Phase II (Minimum 2-3 Days) -Platoon Drills supervised by CO, XO, and first sergeant (w/AAR) -Company drills as a whole (w/AAR) -"PT" drill (optional) -Advanced Phase II using scenarios when unit is capable (It is not necessary to wait for mastery) Phase 111 (Minimum 3 4 Days, all activities wlAAR) -Subcaliber with low cost vehicles (Not a 100% substitute) -Platoon drills supervised by CO. XO, and first sergeant -Company drills as a whole when platoons are capable -Advanced Phase 111 using scenarios when unit is capable -Return to basic drills and Phases I and II for review Figure 4 goal was to do so alone, just as he sought sound terrain. We went slowly at first, 5 to 10 mph was suflicient. We gradually added more complex drills, then bypasses, left and right, and turns while in aline.

A. our skill improved, and it did quickly, we increased speed and threw in some combat scenarios. The scenarios gave the drills meaning - a connection to real life. We kept them simple, one platoon providing a base of fire, while the other two attacked around a flank. Simple and realistic. Crews must learn to move quickly. This is a lesson tougher to learn than the drills themselves. One of the hallmarks of an unskilled crew is that it fears speed and consistently moves with hesitation. Speed equals security. Figure 4 shows a sample training program. Drill training does not require a lot of land, although the more, the better. A single platoon can train all drills in a box 1/2 km by 1 km. It might get repetitive quickly, but the idea is rote performance, and you use what you have. A company needs a 1-1/2 km by 3 km box. That will barely be wide enough for a full company line. Open terrain is best. As skill builds, congested broken terrain will be a natural challenge. You will find that your crews keep coherent formations moving through ground that would have caused trouble earlier. You can execute Phase 111 training in the "subcaliber" mode. The HMMWV and APC are natural low-cost substitutes for tanks and Bradleys. You will eventually want to work crews in their combat vehicles. but time spent in a HMMWV will decrease time required in an M1. A word about brevity codes: We used the standard OPFOR codes and drills. Due to our extensive ex- 36 ARMOR - January-February 7990 posure to these techniques in the Bradley test, we kept them through a subsequent company ARTEP, rather than retrain hurriedly to Armor School standards. The results were impressive, and other companies have since adopted the drills in one form or another. Success was not a product of fancy codes or OPFOR drills; it came through the practiced ability ol crews to execute drills that were standard for them. A platoon that surges into a U. S. wedge at the command, "Execute Wedge!" is as deadly as one that explodes into an OPFOR line at the command, "One, One, One!" This gets right to the heart of the drill. As Gen Polk. (Ret.) maintained in his May-June 1988 Anitor article, "The Criticality of Time in Combat,"2 speed is essential. FM 71- 21, written with AirLand Battle in mind, stresses speed and concentration as two of five operational concepts for the attack. Just as well-honed gunnery drills will propel tank crews to lightning times and devastating accuracy, a mastery of battle drills will help them move quickly, decisively, and hit as a concentrated team. Command and control will be simplified and, contrary to conventional wisdom, the adaptability of drills will increase flexibility. Team Tank, now moving in vee, makes contact on its right with Blue Platoon: "Yellow Six, this is Blue One. Contact, TANKS, east, engaging, Out!" 'This is Yellow Six. Blue Ti. Green report set on Blue's left. Red action right!" Team Tank's commander has responded quickly and decisively to the enemy, fixing him with Blue (in contact), setting up additional overwatch with Green (whose Bradleys are not the best assault vehicles against the reported tanks), and attacking on his left flank into the enemy's right with Red. He is free to talk to his combat multipliers, report higher, and control his unit. To open his attack, Red's platoon leader has only to command, "Red, this is Red One. Execute wedge, Action right, Follow me!" Team Tank's commander cannot allow the engagement to slow his momentum. On the enemy's destruction, he gets his team moving, but with an added note OK caution: "Green and Blue, execute line. Red, move to checkpoint one zero, orient east, report set." The team moves out with Green and Blue in line. Red, already in line due to its attack, moves to checkpoint 10, a nearby overwatch position. As Red is bypassed and masked, the commander details Blue to the overwatch on the right: "Blue One, This is Yellow Six. Overwatch from checkpoint two zero, report set. Red and Green, execute line, orient east, Out." With battle drills, the commander can quickly reconfigure to the original vee, or any other appropriate formation. Like Team Tank, the unit that has a solid inventory of drills always has a base from which to respond. The unit that relies on a more complex or less disciplined system, regardless ol the expertise of vehicle commanders, risks confusion and loses time reacting, if only in telling the driver where to go. In combat, that is a waste we cannot tolerate. Our challenge is to hit the enemy hard and fast - and then hit him again. The concept is simple. The execution isn't. There lies the real challenge; battle drills simplify that challenge. Notes 'William K. Warnick and Norman D. Smith, Battlefield Realism: The ImDact of Omosina Force (OPFOR) on Friendlv __- Force Task Performance ImDlications for the National Trainina Center, (Alexandria, Va.: US. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and the Human Resources Research Organization, 1981), Volume 2, pp. 8, 10. 2General James H. Polk, Ret., The Criticality of Time in Combat," Armor, MayJune 1988, p. 10-13. Captain Jeffrey E. Phillips was commissioned in Armor from the University of Massachusetts in 1979. He served in USAREUR as a tank and support platoon leader with 3-35 Armor and as an assistant division operations officer (1AD). After AOAC and JOMC, he joined 2AD as an assistant division plans officer. He served with 1- 67 Armor as battalion maintenance officer, assistant battalion S3, and commander of B Company, winner of the 1987-88 2AD Draper Award. Prior to his current assignment as media relations officerlas-sistant public affairs officer, 111 Corps, Ft. Hood, he was assigned to the U. S. Military Observer Group, U. N. Truce Supervision Organization, headquartered in Jerusalem, Israel. ARMOR - January-February 7990 37