The Mystery of “Tiger Jack”

This is the extraordinary story (1. 2 remarkable general who figuratively commanded his division in combat, while sitting at a desk at Fort Knox, Kentucky, nearly 3,000 miles away from the action. His division was the Fourth Armored Division. He was Major General John Shirley Wood, nicknamed "Tiger Jack" and 'P' Wood. He picked up the ttP'' at West Point, where he had spent endless hours tutoring fellow cadets. His habit of nervously pacing was reflected in his other nickname, one the Germans found accurate enough to use routinely. Of his division: Gen. Patton declared, "The accomplishments of this division have never been equaled. And by that statement I do not mean in this war, I mean in the history of warfare. There has never been such a superb fighting organization as the 4th Armored Division." Freed American PWs reported, "The 4th Armored Division is both feared and hated by German front line troops because of its high combat efficiency." GIs themselves said, "It is the best damned armored division in the European Theater of War. '' Liddell Hart, eminent British historian, military writer, and critic, said Wood was, "The Rommel of the American armored forces... one of the most dynamic commanders of armor in World War I1 and the first in the Allied Armies to demonstrate in Europe the essence of the art and tempo of handling a mobile force." Lieutenant General Willis D. Crib tenberger said, "He far exceeded in his leadership capabilities any man I have ever known." And General Jacob L. Devers simply stated, They would follow him to hell today." Yet, this man, commander of that division, who had achieved outstanding and unprecedented success in the employment of armor, who was at the height of his success, at the very apex of his fame in Europe, was relieved of his command and sent home, after little more than four months in combat. ARMOR - January-February 7990 25

"Impossible," you say, "Thii could not happen!" Why, this would be heresy - almost like trading off a star NFL quarterback at the height of an undefeated season. After all, division commanders are relieved because their troops will not move, will not tight, are not aggressive; their tactics are poor, and they suffer unnecessary and heavy losses, or they don't seize objectives or accomplish assigned missions. But highly successful division commanders relieved - never! Never say never, for it happened to Major General John S. Wood. Air Force General O. P. Weyland had admiringly stated, 'Whereas more cautious division commanders occasionally warranted some prod-ding, " P just as often had to be restraincd." Yet, this man was gone from the combat arena before word of his great accomplishments ever filtered back to the American public. Today, one will not find him listed among Eisenhower's lieutenants. Moreover, historians, military buffs, even the keenest students of World War I1 hardly know of him. Tragically, he was a great man, but virtually unknown. I began my connection with the man and his division in August of

1942. As a cavalry officer in probably the last horse regiment, I had recently had to give up my mounts. The powers that be found me anew home and mounts of a different type at Pine Camp, New York. Shortly after my arrival there, one of the first questions I asked was, "How is our division commander?" The answer, "He's kind of weak." "Why do you say that?," I asked. Well," came the reply, "We recently had a division review and after it, he made a speech and ended it by saying 'God bless you men'." Weakness? That man was to utter those words in his remarks to his troops endless times, so fervently, so emotionally that he sometimes brought tears to the eyes of his listeners. Initially, he was not liked or admired. There was plenty of bitching and griping at Pine Camp. The men referred to him as "Paper and Butts," because he insisted on immaculate unit areas. His troops trained hard all day and had to attend schools at night. All were restricted to camp, except for Wednesday evenings and brief weekends. Such actions did not stimulate popularity. When he had his commanders and staff together, he announced, "I don't expect much - all I expect is perfection." As his listeners recoiled, he continued, "Of course we'll not achieve perfection, but that's what we'll always be striving for." He was recognized early as warm and caring. He stopped wherever he observed groups of his troops. He talked to them and showed concern. "When have you last written home?n 26 ARMOR - January-February 7990

- If the answer was not satisfactory, he would tell them, "Do something for me when you're in the barracks tonight. Please write home - tell them you're alright, tell them what you're doing." In the early fall, we cut our ties to Pine Camp and headed for maneuvers in Tennessee. While there, General Wood was reprimanded, ridiculed, and rebuked by more senior officers during weekend maneuver critiques. They chastised him for being too bold, too unorthodox, for moving too fast, too far, covering too much ground, and forcing problems to end prematurely. They informed. - him that he just could not do it in combat with the enemy shooting, fighting, attacking, so why was he doing it in Tennessee? General Wood stood his ground, and quietly told them, "We can do it, and we will do it." (What a prophet he was.) It was during these maneuver crili-ques that General Wood, on two separate occasions, challenged - actually called the hand of - Lieutenant General Ben bar, 2nd Army and maneuver commander, who reputedly ruled by fear and commanded "by the book." Wood objected to certain criticism of his actions, and passionately and emotionally defended his troops, who had been the targets of critical remarks he considered totally unfair. A witness later stated, "This was the greatest act of cold courage I have ever observed or have known of, and also the finest act of loyalty from the top down imaginable.... This man.... had actually put his career in the United States Army on the line...." (A harbinger?) Word of this exchange spread quickly throughout the division, and General Wood instantly became a great hero to his men, for they now knew he would always stand up for them, and between them and difficulty. It was during these maneuvers that a bonding took ARMOR - 27

"Once the division was finally turned around, we began what was to be an epochal sweep through France. General Patron plotred the strategy, and General Wood executed it. 'I place that has lasted to this day. General Wood and the 4th Armored Division became inextricably entwined, a marriage forever. The man and the division became one. It has been said that the great divisions of history have been known by the names of its commanders. One of the best examples is the 4th Armored Division, with which "P" Wood's name will be permanently and forever linked. The Mojave Desert was the next stop for the division. Despite the intense heat of the desert, he required his men to wear their fatigues with sleeves rolled down and collars buttoned - certainly far from a popular requirement, but one he deemed necessary in the development of his division his way. As we expected, his training was innovative and realistic. Two of his tank companies, buttoned up with live.30 caliber rounds in the coaxial machine guns, would start at opposite ends of a wadi and soon have a meeting engagement. In one of these problems I rode in one of the tanks, commanded one of the tank companies. I can assure you there was plenty of activity and excitement when we spotted an "enemy" tank moving from cover, fired live bursts at him, saw our rounds "splash" against his sides or turret, knowing instantly we had scored a "kill." How more realistic can you get, what better preparation for combat than that? Then it was on to Camp Bowie, Texas, and more insights into this fellow, Wood. Not long after his division had settled in, a great hue and cry arose from the nearby civilian community. We were in the dry belt of Texas, and Wood had authorized the sale of beer in the Post Exchanges. Community leaders screamed in anguish, preachers pounded their fists in their pulpits, and letters of protest flooded Congressmen and other influential officials. Wood held fast, declared his soldiers would have beer if they wanted it, and beer remained at Camp Bowie as long as the 4th was there. By this time, every man in the division was beginning to feel that General Wood was a personal friend. The men knew that their commander was genuinely, sincerely interested in them, that he identified with them, and had an emotional involvement in their lives. They knew he referred to them as "my people". Whenever he traveled by jeep in the presence of his troops, he stood in the jeep constantly saluting. The troopers marveled, "He saluted me before I saluted him." Soon the men were trying to salute their division commander as far as they could see him, to beat him to the draw. He trusted his men. They treasured this trust. He obviously believed in the credo of Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Trust men and they will be true to you; treat them greatly and they will show greatness themselves." Before the division embarked for England, Wood informed his troops, "This division will attack and attack, and if an order is given to fall back, that order will not come from me." By this time, other divisions were acquiring nicknames. When pressed to come up with one for his, General Wood declared, "The 4th Armored Division will have no nickname - they shall he known by their deeds alone." Those words from that day forward became the division's motto. Although never with a formal nickname, the division in the months ahead was often known as the "Name Enough Division" and "Patton's Best," and was variously labeled, "Breakthrough," "Whirlwind," "Glorious," "Irrepressible," "Immortal." The division did win its military immortality in the Normandy breakout, when it slashed rapidly and aggressively out of a depressingly stalemated situation to seize the tactically and strategically important city of Avranches, a decisive objective that gave access to Brittany on the south and west, and to Le Mans, Chartres, and Paris on the east. For us, the action in Normandy was strongly reminiscent of Tennessee. We shouted excitedly at one another, "Just like maneuvers!" (except that our ammunition was live, the incoming fire was real, and the prisoners did not have "aggressor" armbands, but strange uniforms). Wood's troops were obviously seasoned from the outset. General Woods quickly established his leadership literally, figuratively, and every other way. Near Coutances on the way to Avranches, 28 ARMOR -

Wood marched into town under fire, captured a German soldier, found a path through a mined area, picked his way through on foot, and sent back a cryptic, classic message. It was scrawled in pencil on a message blank and ordered, "General Dager (his combat commander) send the Infantry through after me." Later, he was to say, "If you can't see it happen, it is too late to hear about it back in a rear area and meet it with proper force." From Avranches, his division was ordered southwest to seize the Atlantic ports of Lorient, Vannes, and St. Nazaire. While his units were moving in that direction, he protested such employment to his senior commanders long, loud, and vehemently. He reminded them, in no uncertain terms, that the enemy was to the east, that the war was not going to be won by going west. But the plans had been conceived before the invasion and, because of strategic inflexibility, were being doggedly carried out. The high command did not like Wood's reminding them that they were winning the war the wrong way. By the time they reoriented their thinking, Wood had already reached the outskirts of the Atlantic ports and had lost much valuable time. In the process, he won few friends and undoubtedly picked up resentment, for it must have been galling for his superiors to know that he was right. Once the division was finally turned around, we began what was to be an epochal sweep through France. General Patton plotted the strategy, and General Wood executed it. He was a bold and daring commander who was willing to take risks and was really the architect of the rampage through France. For weeks, as the 4th Armored Division went, so went Third Army. Wood's vision set the pattern for armor operations in Europe. Accomplishing the impossible prescribed by Patton became routine. We moved too rapidly, were too widely scattered for the conventional gathering of commanders for the typically detailed, specific orders. Wood resorted to "mission type" orders. These consisted of aline of departure, abroad, directional arrow (axis of advance), a goose egg (objective), and the terse order to "get going at first light." That's all we had; that's all we needed. (See "Effective Op Orders," page 38.) The hallmarks of his division were rapid flanking movements, deep penetration, constant momentum and violent execution of fire and maneuver. Like cavalry, Wood slashed and side-stepped with speed and surprise. He echeloned in depth and did not worry about his flanks. After two and a half months of intense and constant action and, by now, deep in France, the division halted in the October mud and rain for its first "break." On the second day, word came that General Wood would visit our battalion early the next morning. We arose at dawn and assembled quickly. As the battalion S3, I spent many minutes getting the overshoes off and hidden and endeavoring to line up the men without getting their boots muddy. Shortly after I had made a final check of their appearance, and had them dressed in straight lines, we looked up and there suddenly was our commanding general. We watched fascinated as his large, bulky, tank-like form bounded lightly upon the temporary platform we had built for him. With legs spread, he glanced momentarily at his smartly assembled troops, and then called out, "Gather 'round, men." (Find that command in any drill manual.) In an instant, the carefully formed ranks were broken as the men rushed to get as close to their commander as they could. They jammed in a tight circle around him, eager to be near him, to hear his words. He related all that they had done. He told his men how very proud he was of them and how very humble he felt to be in the presence of those who had accomplished so much. His voice broke, and tears rolled. He was obviously very moved, and so were his troops. He concluded with, "God bless you, men." About this time he began to receive recommendations for the Presidential Unit Citation for platoons, companies, and battalions, which had distinguished themselves during the weeks of combat. He refused to approve any, and declared that he would not single out any unit within his division. He said that if such an award were granted, he would wait until the entire division received it as a unit. Again, he showed great prescience and faith in his division because later, the 4th Armored Division became the only tank division and the second entire division to be so decorated by order of the President. There was an added and unexpected bonus. The French Government twice cited the whole division with the Fourragere. October soon became early December, with the rain heavier and the mud deeper and stickier. The attacks continued down narrow roads in atrocious weather. The war became a slugfest. "Penny-packet" tactics had rcplaced massed armor employment. And then, without warning, the 4th Armored Division received an almost mortal blow. For the first time since entering combat it was stunned, reeling, demoral-ARMOR - January-February 7990 29 ked; it recoiled, was severely wounded. Word, like winds before a tornado, instantly reached every last man in the division that their beloved commanding general had been relieved of his command and sent home. All were shocked, disbelieving. This just could not happen, was not true, was not possible. When the news had finally sunk in, and some semblance of composure returned, the first word universally uttered was the question, "Why?," the same question that persists to this day. Almost immediately, answers in the form of rumors and speculation swept the division like a prairie fire. The "real reason" soon reached us. General Wood, we were told, was relieved because he was tired and sick, and was being sent home for a rest. BUNK! we all agreed. We knew that he was every bit as tired as we were, but not more so. If he was sick, so were we. So speculation about 'the true story' intensified and in some sources continues to this day. Wood, himself, speculating in later years rejected the medical verdict and declared, "I suppose I will never know the entire story...." Within the division, we also universally rejected the medical version, and continued to speculate. Was he relieved because: 0 In his desire to press the attack, he had crossed the boundary between Third and Seventh Armies, and had, for a period, operated in the Seventh Army sector? 0 He was openly critical of the misuse of armor and of his division, particularly? 0 He pleaded with General Eddy, his corps commander, for a little rest for his exhausted men and vehicles, and for time to reorganize? There was a severe personality clash between Wood and Eddy, two very strong and dominant commanders, undoubtedly exacerbated by the three reasons above? Comment upon each of these items of speculation is necessary to flesh out this most fascinating combat episode. General Wood, in typical fashion, most certainly crossed the army boundary. He later wrote, '....such lines meant little to me, and I went where the going was good." However, in this. case, he received permission to cross the boundary with XV Corps of Seventh Army to turn the enemy's positions facing the Xl1 Corps. He not only helped his own situation, but did the XV Corps a great big favor by destroying the salient that a German counterattack by the Panzer Lehr Division had sliced into the XV Corps flank. So, this excursion surely did not cost him his command. Most assuredly he complained of the misuse of his armor. Initially and briefly, the division had been held back pending an exploitation situation, but the corps infantry divisions were bogged down, and the armor was soon committed to "retrieve the setback." Thereafter, because of rain, mud, and terrain, the division had to operate almost on a one-tank front. Some of the tanks were badly shot up by 88s, causing numerous casualties. Although the division ground ahead slowly, it took its lumps. The armored divisions were not concentrated. The only armor breakthrough at that time occurred at the Saverne Gap by the 2nd French Armored Division, and that success was not exploited. A corroborating voice came later from German General von Mellenthin: "....the armored divisions were committed too early and....[ LTG] Eddy [commanding XI1 Corps] would have done better to wait until his infantry had eaten away more of our main defense zone." All of this certainly aggravated General Wood, who saw his division being whittled away because of poor tactics. Certainly, Wood's criticism didn't set well with his superiors, some of whom undoubtedly still smarted from being embarrassed by Wood, who had been so very correct about Brittany. General Wood deeply believed in the unceasing endeavor to spare the men he had the honor to lead unnecessary hardships and useless losses, and possessed the willingness and desire to share their hardships and face the same dangers. He tried to do the most with the least possible cost in the blood of his men. Stupidities and mistakes that caused needless casualties infuriated him. His division had pressed the attack, day after day, for many weeks, from first light until darkness, taking on fuel and ammunition during the night. The vehicles, which received maintenance every day during training, had not been touched for weeks. The continuous fighting under almost impossible conditions for armor had seriously reduced its tank complement and caused heavy losses among experienced personnel, particularly officers. The men were exhausted. Both men and vehicles had been pushed virtually beyond endurance. Certainly, General Wood interceded for his men. He wanted a period of rest for his troops and vehicles and a chance to reorganize. Herein rests a tremendous irony. The "break" 30 ARMOR - which General Wood must have fought so hard for, at great personal sacrifice, was granted just five days after he was relieved of his command. His division, whose forward elements were in the Maginot Line, were relieved by the new and fresh 12th Armored Division. And there is yet another great irony that apparently has eluded historians and gone unrecognized and unappreciated. If it had not been for the "break" that permitted the 4th Armored Division to rest, refit, and reorganize, it would have been impossible for it to make the historic forced march of 151 miles to the environs of Bastogne, and then, in five days of bitter fighting, succeed in breaking through to the 10lst Airborne in that beleaguered city. It was inevitable that Wood and Eddy would lock horns. Unquestionably, Eddy wanted to keep pushing (undoubtedly pressed by Patton) and could not help but be irritated and annoyed at Wood's pleas in behalf of his troops. He probably interpreted this as a sign of Wood's developing softness, because of the pressures of the campaign. To Eddy, Wood's insistence may also have spelled taut nerves. It did not help that Wood was not an easy subordinate. He was a highly intelligent and perceptive man who did not "suffer fools gladly, no matter what their station.'' He had little toleration or rcspect for men of lesser minds, lesser competence. He had difficulty practicing allegiance to those above him whose capabilities he believed were inferior to his own. He was never a "yes" man, and sometimes expressed dissent so vigorously he may have appeared insubordinate. So, the sparks that flew must have caused an explosion, for when the dust settled, Wood was on his way home. Patton must have decided that one or the other had to go, and the decision was - Wood. Wood said of his relief, "I will never know the entire story...." Over the years, those who have known and speculated about this World War I1 episode generally conclude that the full story of Wood's relief has never been told. I, too, have speculated, pondered, and reflected on the reason for his relief. But suddenly for me there is no longer a mystery. 1 have deciphered the reason, and the solution is quite simple and basic. General Wood was rclieved because he was just being General Wood. Now, in an eerie resemblance of his actions during Tennessee maneuvers, he once again "stood up" to his superiors, was critical of their tactics, pleaded for a respite for his exhausted men and vehicles, and finally did in late 1 9 4 what he came within a hair of doing in 1942 - he committed Career suicide. This need not have happened. General Wood could have been unfeeling, less humane about the condition of his men and vehicles; he could have diluted the fierce, almost obsessive loyalty to those he led. He could have ignored what he saw as the misuse of his forces and the improper tactics employed. His demeanor and remarks could have been more tactful, diplomatic, respectful. But if he had done all of that, he just would not have been "P" Wood. Yct, because he was so good and so successful, there has to remain some suspicion about the motives of his superiors and the so-called "systcm." On the date of his relief, there must have been broad knowledge that merely five days later the division was to get its well-deserved "break." If Wood needed rest, as they claimed, why didn't "they" wait live days so that he could get his rest along with his troops? Of an action only nine days before his relief, German General von Mel-Icnthin related, ".... Bnyerlein might well have broken through to the Sar-rebourg-Saverna road, but unfortunately was taken in the flank by the 4th Armored Division, which had forced its way across the Saar at Fenetrange." At the end of November, three days before his relief, the 4th Armored was east of Sarre-Union and "pushing forward with violent lire." Could those have been the actions of a division led by a tired, sick commander? In Europe, there was a paucity of good division commanders. Consequently, division commanders who were timid, mediocre, colorless, and, at best marginally successful, were retained. Realizing this, it certainly flies in the face of logic that Wood, a proven, successful division commander, would sit out the bulk of the war at Fort Knox. Had he done all of this, he undoubtedly would have continued in command of his division and could possibly have linished the war as a corps commander with a third star (if he could have torn himself away from his division). MG Hugh J. Gaffey, Patton's Chief of Staff, succeeded MG Wood, Here was a safe, don't-rock-the-boat choice with whom Eddy, Patton, and others would be comfortable and certainly have no problem. Gaffey commanded for 3- 1/2 months and was followed by ARMOR - January-February 7990 37

I Years later, General Bruce C. Clarke remarked, "The 'Gods of War' did not smile on 'P,, Wood.... Under different circumstances IF'' had the brains, the knowledge, the drive, the magnetic hold on his men to have been listed on the rolls of the 'Great Captains' of history." MG William M. Hoge, who commanded for a brief period until the end of the war. They hardly counted. In the eyes of the men in the 4th, they were still led by Wood; the other two went along for the ride. There was no perceptible change in its method of operating or its indomitable spirit. For the rest of the war, the division bore the distinctive mark of Wood'straining, tactical ingenuity, and military genius. Not long after Gaffey assumed command, the division made its historic link-up with the lOlst Airborne at Bastogne. In the fall of 1945, at a gathering at Fort b o x at the quarters of Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Arthur L. West, 4th Armored veterans were rehashing the war and discussing the division's exploits. General Gaffey was present and himself admitted, "I had little influence on the division and its actions because you carried on under the influence and momentum of General Wood." At another time, General Hoge, said, "Wood was much revered and loved by both officers and men of his division.... I still marvel at the depth of leadership when I took command." The 4th Armored Division, until the end of combat, and for 40 years after as the 4th Armored Division Association, has been General Wood's division. For many years, the New York chapter of the association celebrated Activation Day with a pilgrimage to West Point. The highlight of that weekend each year was the solemn, touching memorial service conducted at the gravesite of General Wood. The division association has met in convention for 40 successive years. General Wood remains the favorite and most frequent topic of conversation. Hs was leadership at its absolute best. Volumes that endeaver to answer the question, "What is leadership?" crowd library book shelves. One could obtain the answer by discarding many of the texts and theories and merely studying Wood. It is too bad that we cannot break down into component parts the Wood charisma and "magic." He knew that the division he trained and led in combat was one of the most outstanding in World War 11. He lived to realize that he was worshipped by his men, and recognized that their deep affection would last to the end of his days and long after he was gone. Years later, General Bruce C. Clarke remarked, "The 'Gods of War' did not smile on "P" Wood.... Under different circumstances "P" had the brains, the knowledge, the drive, the magnetic hold on his men to have been listed on the rolls of the Great Captains of history." This story of General Wood has not been written by an imprcs-sionable, starry-eyed, hero-worship-ping second lieutenant. Hardly. I have commanded a company, tank battalion in combat, an armored cavalry regiment in Germany, and for brief periods a division in Vietnam. I have served on joint and NATO staffs. During a full military career, I have watched from a very close vantage point many senior officers of all our services and of many allied nations. I have studied, taught, and endeavored to apply leadership. In my lifetime, 1 have looked up to few heroes. It is now more than 40 years since WWlI. Yet, in my eyes, MG John S. Wood remains a genuine, authentic hero. I have long admired him, always looked up to him. I consider him the finest soldier, the greatest leader I have ever known. I shall never forget him for what he was and what he stood for. For me, his greatness grows, as my years recede. Brigadier General Albin F. lrzyk trained and fought with the 4th AD from its formation in 1942 through fwe campaigns in the European Theater and service in the postwar occupation. His 44 months of overseas service included assignments as a company commander, battalion commander, division G1, 63, and chief of staff. He commanded the 8th Tank Battalion during the relief of Bastogne. His long and illustrious military career later included service at numerous posts in CONUS, USAREUR, and the Pacific. 32 ARMOR - January-February 7990