Is Your Personnel Action Center Ready for War?

As tlie coriipanv coriiriiariders arid stfl arc gathered amiind rlic cori-ference table atteritivelv listening to a briefing for art iipcoriiirig emrise, a ciirioiis coriipariy coriiriiarider raises his liarid and asks the S-3, "Sir, how long do wc' have to sta?, dead wlieri our MILES light gocs ofi?. ' The S-3 fiiriibles tltmiigli Itis copy of the brigade!r LOI arid says, 'nit controllem will recorislitiite vow tanks four Iioiirs afer they're killed.'* rite S-1 Imatlies a silcrit sigh and decides that the Pcnoririel Ad-ritinistratiort Ceriter (PAC) persaririel, crcept for one clerk, will stay back as the battalion!s rear detachniertt for this ewcise. He has also decided that he'll rieed to stop b!, tlie Stars arid Stripes Bookstore on his wav liorite to pick lip a good novel to read diiring the erercise. l7ie S-I knows that, orice again, tlie rrianeirver plaririem have decided that personriel operations are too tiriie-corisiiriiirig arid airitbeorire to fit into the tight tirite scliediile of the et-- mise. How often has this happened in your battalion? Probably, with the exception of your battalion ARTEP evaluation or a rotation to the National Training Center, nearly every exercise. And therein lies the problem. Are we training our PAC personnel and our company-level logistics personnel the way we would fight a war? Are we going to be able to keep up with the high rate of casualties in tke next war? Will we be able to keep track of the continuous attachments and detachments of our combined-arms task forces and company teams? Is the highly mobile armored atmosphere of the next war going to outrun our ability to evacuate casualties and send replacements to front-line units? With the present state of our personnel systems, I am afraid that in most units, the answer to all these questions is not very pleasant. We have done a good job of creating PACs that can type EERs, fill-out leave forms, process personnel transactions, and perform all the other peacetime garrison functions, but we have neglected the tactical wartime missions of the PAC. The introduction of the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) is a step in the right direction, but we have along way to go before we can feel comfortable about our ability to support the maneuver elements during a high-int ensit y war. The problem is to train our PAC personnel in their many wartime missions without degrading the very important peacetime functions of the day-to-day activities. As any first sergeant will tell you, we can't simply close the doors of the PAC for a week of tactical personnel training. The business of taking care of soldiers' personal and professional needs is an ongoing process with constant demands of time and skilled personnel. This problem is one that we must solve in order to ensure that the next war does not turn our personnel systems into chaos at the first sight of mass casualties. The solution to this problem is in our leadership. Commanders, s-ls, PAC supervisors, and company first sergeants must exercise the personnel systcm whenever possible. rile Adjutant arid S-I Haridbook identifies five critical wartime personnel functions. They are: strength accounting, casualty reporting, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) oper&ns, medical sup ort, and replacement operations.' Each of these tasks, in itself, is critical to the operation of a combat unit. Together, these tasks can make or break a unit in extcnded operations. During the Lorraine Campaign in WW 11, <;enera1 Patton's Third Army suffered a total of SS,182 killed, wounded, and missing soldiers from 1 Septembcr to 18 December 1944. In addition the number of non-battle casualties - those evacuated because OC fatigue, exposure,. and disease - is officially reported as 42.088 officers and men.2 The bitterly contested advance in Novembcr 3944, made under difficult conditions of weather and terrain, resulted in a high casualty rate that could not he offset by the number of replacements available. In that month, the Third Army received only 26,981 replacements, although its casualty list numbered 38,510. By 30 November 1944, there was a shortage of 10,184 officers and men - mostly infantry, tankers, and medical aidmen - in the divisions. Although these figures represent the losses of an entire army, they can give an idea of the massive number of casualties we can expect in 36 ARMOR - January- February the next war. The lbllowing points address the three combat-critical tasks which the PAC performs: wartime strength and personnel accounting, casualty reporting, and replacement operations. They will also suggest some ways you can train your PAC personnel to be ready to handle the heavy burden of personnel operations in combat. Strength Accounting Strength accounting is the combat critical task that provides the commander with personnel information about the capability of his units. During tactical operations; accurate strength data will help the commander and the S-3 decide which units are best suited for a particular combat mission. In the confusion of battle, the TOC often may receive inaccurate or incomplete reports of battle losses. The S-1 must be able to paint the personnel picture for the commander at any given time in the battle. Strength accounting is very difficult and is made even more difficult when the task organization of the unit changes. When a company becomes attached to, or detached from, the task force in preparation for the battle, the S-1 must coordinate with the gaining or losing unit to ensure he transfcrs the proper strength dzta. The problem becomes more difficult when units from outside the brigade, such as ADA or engineer units, are attached to the task force. The brigade S-1’s TACCS does not contain data on units outside the brigade, and the S-I must make face-to-face coordination to receive the strength and personnel data he needs. Wartime personnel accounting, part of strength accounting, is the process whereby the PAC identifies, by name, grade, MOS, and skill level, every soldier in the task force. Personnel accounting is a critical personnel and accounting task in wartime; it must be 100-percent accurate. Task organiiration changes and inaccurate or misunderstood reports can make personnel accounting very difficult to manage. The keys to successful strength and personnel accounting are: good SOPS within the battalion and brigade. proper use of the TAWS systcm, and lots of practice. The clerks who receive the casualty reports in the admin/log center (ALC) must be able to react to changes in the task organization, receive and accurately record reports from subordinate units, and properly process the information through the brigade S-I. The S-2 and his clerks in the ALC must also be able to keep a running total of casualties, evacuations, and soldiers returned to the units, and be able to report the information to the commander at any time. Training p u r PAC in wartime strength and personncl accounting is not an easy task, but you can do it with minimal disruption of the PAC‘s daily activities. Prior to your training, you’ll need to print a copy of your unit’s battle roster from your TACCS computer. Get a copy of the battle roster from one of your sister units which normally cross-attaches with your battalion during tactical exercises, and get a copy of the battle roster or unit manning report (UMR) from anon-brigade unit (FA, ADA, or engineer). You‘ll also need to coordinate the use of the S-4’s command post vehicle (M-577) and two additional vehicles (probably Wton) with radios. On the training schedule, set aside about four hours one afternoon to conduct your exercise. Finally, in preparation, coordinate with the company first sergeants to ensure they don’t schedule any PAC business during your training. On the day of your training split the PAC as it would be in the liicld. Put the S-1 and two clerks in the M577 to act as the PAC forward, and put the remainder of the PAC in a separate location with one of the 1/4-ton vehicles to act as the PAC rear. Ensure the TACCS is located near the PAC rear. You can even locate your PAC rear just outside your battalion headquarters to avoid having to move your TACCS for the training. When you’re ready to begin your exercise, brief the S-2 and the PAC supervisor on the task orgmi7ation you’ve created and on the tactical situation. Give them a little time to consolidate the battle rosters before you begin the exercise. In the second llrlton vehicle, have a reader with a prepared script to act as the company first sergeants. The reader will send reports of KIAs, MIAs, aad WIAs to the S-1 over the radio, using your battalion’s reprt-ing SOP. Make the PAC forward receive the reports, consolidate the information, and send the data via radio or courier to the PAC rear. Make the rear process the information, prepare the propei tranaac-tions, and send the appropriate reports to the brigade S-1. At the end of the exercise, compare the information from the prepared script with the information at the PAC forward and at the ARMOR - January-February 37

PAC rear. Conduct an after-action review and point out the mistakes. Then discuss ways to change the process to make it work better for your unit. Use the crawl-walk-run mcthod in your training. The results or the exercise may not be perfect, hut with enough training, your PAC can become proficient in strength accounting. Casualty Reporting When your PAC hecomes proficient in wartime strength accounting, the next step is to train casuidty reporting. A casualty is a soldier who is lost to the unit by being declared dead, missing, wounded, or detained. Casualty reports are critical to wartime pcrsonnel and administration; they must be transmitted quickly with 100-percent accuracy. Your soldiers are bound hy oath and honor to give their lives, if need he, in the accomplishment of their mission. Our responsibility to the families and next of kin must he approached with the same commit-men1 and professionalism. The proldems that affect wartime strength accounting also afrect casualty reporting. If your personnel accounting is not straight, then you can expect your casualty reporting to be incorrect as well. The lack of good SOPS, inaccurate or untimely reports, and frequent changes in task organization can lead to serious problems in your casualty reporting. The PAC must log each casualty, assign a control number to the casualty, and cross-check the data with the casualty feeder reports (DA Form 1156) and the witness statements (DA Form 1155), as well as with the patient logs at the bat- A PAC trained in peacetime won’t be prepared for the casualties of an actual battle. It’s difficult to train this problem with realism. talion aid station. The PAC must then report the losses to the brigade S-l for proper notification. In the case of a dead or missing soldier, the commander must prepare a letter or sympilthy to the next-of-kin and send it through the casualty reporting channels. The TAWS clerk must also prepare the proper personnel transactions, process them through the TACCS system, and update the unit’s battle roster. To train your PAC in casualty reporting procedures, set up your PAC the same way you did for your strength accounting exercise. The conduct of the casualty exercise will be similar to the strength accounting exercise. Require the PAC to prepare the casualty transactions as well as maintain the strcngth data. For this exercise, you will need a player from the battalion aid station, and you will also need some prepared casualty fcedcr rcports (DA Form 11%) and witness slate-ments (DA Form 1155). Make the exercise reader send casualty reports, by battle roster number, to the S-1. Give casualty feeder rcports to the aid station corresponding to the reported casualties. Make thc PAC cross-check the information as it comes in. You can include mistakes in the reports to help exercise your PAC‘s cross-checking system. Ensure the PAC initiates the sympathy letters and makes the proper transactions with the TACCS computer. Mass casualties and inaccurate or incomplete reports are realities the PAC mity have to dcal with in the next war. You’ll do no one any favors if you make the exercise too easy. Upon completion or the exercise, conduct an AAR. Compare the information sent initially to the s-1 and the aid station’s records with the reports the PAC prepared to send to the brigade S-1. Point out the errors and make suggestions that will help the S-1 section improve next time. Repetition is the key to proficiency in casualty reporting. As your clerks hecome more comfortable with their duties, their performance will improve. Ensure that every member of the PAC can perform all the functions in the PAC forward and the PAC rear. Each mcmbcr of the PAC should be able to assume any of the PAC’s functions at any time in combat. Replacement Operations The lcthality of the modern battlefield demands that we he able to keep a continuous flow of replacement personnel and equipment moving to our front-line units. Accurate and effective strength ac- 38 ARMOR - January-February counting and casualty reporting will result in the generation of replacements for your unit. When replacements arrive, your PAC must he readv to receive and in-process the soldiers and determine where the battalion can best use them. Finally, the PAC must get them to their new unit. The PAC must estaldish a replacement receiving point (RRP) in the battalion ficld trains. The RRP must have sufficient space and equipment to hold the replacements until you can transport them to their units on resupply vehicles. As replacements arrive at the RRP, the PAC must perform several administrative functions. The PAC must welcome the soldiers to the unit, orient them to the current tactical situation, inspcct the clothing and equipment of the replacements, and make corrections as necessary. The PAC must inspect the replacement’s personnel records and make the proper TACCS transactions to add the soldier to the unit’s battle roster. The S-1 must confer with the S-3 and commander to determine which unit should have priority of replacements based on the tactical situation. Finally, the PAC supcr-visor must coordinate with the support platoon leader for movement of the replacements to the front-line units. In garrison, you can train your PAC lo set-up the RRP (maybe in your unit motor pool) and you can train your TAWS operator lo make the proper strength transactions, but you can do the best replacement training when your unit is deployed in the licld. The best replacement training I have seen was conducted during a battalion ARTEP evaluation in Hohenfels Training Area in Germany. In this exercise, the brigade staff tasked a unit not involved in the exercise to provide 30 soldiers to act as rcplace-men1 personnel. The brigade S-1 gave them dl lictitious names and assignment orders to the battalion. The PAC had to in-process the soldiers through the battalion RRP and transport them to their gaining units, which were involved in the actual ARTEP maneuvers. When the replacements reached their companies, they each im-nicdiatcly hecamc casualties, some KIA and some WIA. The companies then had to report and evacuate the casualties through the battalion aid station or the battalion graves registration point. and eventually back to the brigade BSA. During the exercise, both the replacement system and the casualty reporting and evacuation system were exercised. The units actually participatins in the maneuver did not have to take soldiers away from their valuable training, and the soldiers used as rcplacements were returned to their units in less than 24 hours. The training was intcrest-ing and very hencficial to the units involved. The training was also lowcost in terms of affecting the maneuvcr companies’ ability to conduct their ARTEP maneuvers. Conclusion With a little initiative and innovation, you can train your unit to do wcll in personnel opcrations. The key to proficiency is simply practice. Sct aside time on your training schedule on a weekly basis lo exercise your PAC‘s ability to conduct tactical operations. Involve everyone ARMOR - January-February in the PAC, as wcll as the company-level logistics operators. The long-standing perception, that the PAC is a garrison-oriented organization, is wrong. The next war is likely to prove that wartime personnel functions are imperative for the continued opcrations of the combat units. With the proper training and emphasis lrom commanders, our units will not have to relcarn the lessons of the past. Notes U. S. Department of the Army, The Adjutant and S1 Handbook, Coordinating Draft. 1986, p. 7-1. Cole, Hugh M. The Lorraine Campaign. US. Government Printing Office. 1950. Cole, p. 594 Handbook, p. 7-5 Handbook, p. 7-6 Handbook, p. 7-9 Handbook, p. 7-9. Captain Thomas D. Mayfield, a 1983 graduate of Texas A & M University with a degree in economics, has served as a COHORT tank platoon leader with 3-68 Armor, Fort Carson, CO; and as tank platoon leader, company XO, and battalion S- 1 in the 2-68 Armor, 8th ID, in Germany. A graduate of AOBC and the Cavalry Leader’s Course, he wrote this article as a paper for his AOAC writing requirement. He is on orders to the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. 39