Carrying the Torch for Soviet Reactive Armor

r Those reactive armor "bricks" on the turret and glacis of this Soviet tank threaten to neutralize our *; ing most antitank missiles. Could plain, old fire be the solution? 7 HEAT munitions, includ- ri Carrying the Torch for Soviet Reactive Armor by Richard K. Fickett A 105-mm incendiary prqiectile could be a near-term, low-tech, capability to help fill the HEAT vacuum. A Vietnam-era infantryman might describe Soviet explosive reactive armor (ERA) as "a bunch of flattened-out Claymore mines." From a tanker's standpoint, however, that so-called "bunch of Claymore mines" has all but eliminated his high explosive antitank (HEAT) projectile as an effective round against the ERA-equipped Soviet T- 64B and T-80 tanks. The search for ERA countermeasures has been concentrated in several areas. First, the TOW 2 missile has been redesigned. The tandem-charge, or "blocking-back concept, incorporated in TOW 2A, uses a small explosive charge in the probe to blow a hole through an ERA "brick," paving the way for the shaped charge to penetrate the hull or turret in the conventional manner. TOW 2A went into production in 1987. A second modification, TOW 2B, is designed with a "fly over, shoot down" capability. Similar in concept to the Swedish BILL 2 missile, TOW 2B employs top-attack, using dual warheads canted 30 degrees down, and triggered by proximity fuzes. Instead of hitting the turret or hull broadside, the missile flies just above the target tank and the warheads detonate downward as iL passes over the thinncr top armor. TOW 2B, however, won't cnter production until 1991. Next, development continues on the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) with Terminal Guidance Warhead. MLRS-TGW is a "Gre-and-forget" antiarmor munition that employs a dual-mode, terminal-homing seeker to attack the top armor of tanks in dispersed formations. MLRS-TGW is not scheduled to enter its system demonstration phase until 1989. Finally, the development and deployment of enhanced kinetic energy (KE) rounds has becn accelerated. Current deployment of the MlAl tank, equipped with its 120-mm smoothbore gun and APFSDS-T projectile, provides U.S. armor units with an assured-kill capability against any known Soviet tank, including those equipped with ERA. Unfoortunatcly, only a relative handful of MlAl tanks has been dcployed. A ground-launched hypervelocity missile weapon system (HVMWS) ARM 0 R - January- Fe bruary 33 ~~ ~

The M202, a shoulder-fired, four-rocket flame weapon of the 1960s has entered its concept definition phase. Preliminary test firings have sustained its viahility as a TOW-replacement candidate in the Advanced Antiarmor Weapon System-Heavy (AAWS-H) Program. Production would not occur until the nlid-199Os. Electromagnetic gun technology shows promise in an armor-defeating role, with probable deployment in the next century. Until significant quantities of other ERA-defeating weapon systems come on line, the MW- and Ml-series tanks equipped with the Mf33 105-mm rilled gun and APFSDS-T projectile must bear a disproportionate share of the antitank burden. Background In rushing to high-tech solutions, we may have overlooked other, less complex, but equally effective, countermeasures, which could be fielded in less time. Tank-disabling incendiary munitions are an example. The employment of incendiary munitions in the antitank role dates to the late 1930s, with the innovative Finnish "Molotov Cocktail." This was nothing more than a bottle of gasoline with a rag stuffed in the neck as a fuze. During World War 11, napalm was perfected and employed with devastating results. In the late 1950s and early lWfls, the 101st Airborne Division developed two expedicnt flame devices, the "Eagle Cocktail" and the "Eagle Fireball* (Figure 1). These devices were subsequently adopted as part of U. S. Army antitank doctrine. During the 196Os, the U.S. Army fielded the four-tube, shoulder-fired M202 rocket launcher, a flame weapon capable of engaging targets at a maximum range of 750 meters, using the M74 incendiary rocket. The M74 warhead contained about 1-1/2 pounds of thickened triethylaluminum, which provided a 20-meter bursting radius. Incendiary munitions used in an antitank role have also demonstrated significant operational disadvantages. Napalm is an area weapon, and cannot be used when opposing forces are in close proximity. The engagement range of any hand-thrown expedient device is severely limited, and exposes the thrower to enemy fire. Incendiary mixtures require engineer expertise in handling, and the availability of engineer support is not always assured. Troop safety, munition storage, and weather conditions are ever-present concerns. Proposal Development of a 105-mm incendiary projectile could exploit the tank-disabling potential of splatter- t-ype munitions and provide a new general-purpose partner for the APFSDS-T projectile. The proposal has several advantages: 0 Tank-immaterial. An incendiary projectile designed to defeat a tank without hull or turret penetration would provide an armor-immaterial capability to defeat not only current Soviet tanks equipped with ERA, but also emerging future Soviet tank (FST) variants. 0 Large presented area. All tanks offer large external surface areas. However, an incendiary's splatter effect would be enhanced by the large, squared-off surfaces of the 34 ARM0 R - January- Fe bruary

"bricked* tiers of an ERA-equipped tank. Prqjectile angle of attack is not critical. 0 Targets the tank driver. The incendiary projectile employs a "counter-driver" strategy. The tank driver is a soft target. His escape hatch is part of the lank's frontal presented area. Egrcss has been complicated by the addition of reactive armor. Disabling the driver temporarily immobilizes the tank, increasing its vulnerability to a second shot. Driver incapacitation would reduce a Soviet three-man crew by 33 perccnt, degrading its overall combat effectiveness and round-the-clock capability. 0 Potential crew exposure. When huttoned-up, the impact ol' an incendiary pro.iectile could produce sufficicnt flame and smoke to force the crew to abandon the tank. The crew would then be exposed to automatic weapon lire. 0 Uses off-the-shelf technology. The M416 105-mm white phosphorus (WP) projectile could be converted into an incendiary projectile by replacing its 6-pound W P filler with an incendiary agent. Thickened triethylaluminum, the filler used with the M74 incendiary rocket, is an option. The use of existing components and materials should minimize development time and accelerate fielding. 0 R&D "Psywar." A highly-visible, media-oriented dcmonstra-tion of the antitank effectiveness of an incendiary projectile might deter Soviet proliferation of reactive armor. If nothing else, a demonstration open to foreign media could begin to erode newly-acquired confidence among T-64B and T-80 tank crews of the GSFG. n Figure 1 -

SMOKE GRENADE

PLASTIC CONTAINER OF THICK-

NED FUEL

OIL AND GASOLINE

MIXTURE

WHITE PHOSPHORUS

LIP OF CAN IS BENT

BACK FOR FUZE EXIT

FUZE LIGHTER

"Eagle Cocktail," top, and "Eagle FireballGre two improvised antitank weapons that use incendiaries to attack enemy tanks. Disadvantages The proposal also has some limitations: 0 Increased competition for limited funds. Development of a 105-mm incendiary projectile would probably qualify as a "new start," with the accompanying paperwork and staffing requirement. Development funding would compete with other approved requirements in the overall tank program. 0 Difference in effective range. A comparison of muzzle velocities for the M416 WP (736 m/sec) and the M774 APFSDS-T (1,508 dsec) projectiles suggests a gap in effective range between an incendiary projectile designed around the M416 and the M774. 0 Stowed load complexity. The availability of a new incendiary pmjectile could complicate a tank comnander's options regarding his stowed projectile mix. ARMOR - January-February The early operational advantage achieved by Soviet ERA could be nullified by an equally simplistic countermeasure - fire. An incendiary capability for the 105-mm tank gun would enable a T-64B or T-80 tank to he knocked out the old-fashioned way - by burning it. Richard K. Fickett is a retired infantryman now employed as an independent consultant in Virginia. While on active duty, he supervised the preparation of all conventional ammunition and missile war reserve studies for the Department of the Army. Recently, he has served as consultant to the Joint U.S. Army - U.S. Marine Corps Hypervelocity Missile Weapon System Concept Definition Analysis. 35