A Texas National Guard Unit Deploys to Central America

by First Lieutenant Kevin J. Liliy I. g- Texas terminal, bound for the port of San Lorenzo, on the Gulf of Fonseca in western Honduras. Troops flew in and mated with their equipment Incountry. In photo below, an M113 prepared to load at dockside. introduction After the briefing, we speculated on our destination. I was hoping that this was to be our shot at the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, California. But when we received jungle fatigues (before In 1985, our unit was callcd up for deployment and training in Honduras. We could find little doctrinal guidance addressing the use of armor and mechanized infantry in low-intensity conflict or in difficult terrain, like jungle, and there remains a dearth of such material today. Therefore, 1 thought it fitting to share my brief experiences as a tank platoon leader in Central America, from naval deployment to maneuver in-country. In January 1985, the oficers of B Company, 6-112 Armor, 49th Armored Division, gathered with LTC Danny Kohler, commander of 6-1 12 "Rolling Thunder." In what was to become one of the most significant meetings of our military careers, he told us that, effective immediately, we were attached to 3-141 Infantry, 1st Cavalry Division (Roundout), for a special mission. Although details were sketchy, he told that the mission involved the unit's dcployment, that it would last approximately six weeks, and it was classified until further notice. As tank platoon leader of 3rd Platoon, 1 found that we would be attached to A Company, 3-141 - designated Team Alpha. 8 ARMOR - January-February

"We learned that 3-141 was to mobilize and deploy to Honduras in a region known as the Choluteca Gap. Located in the southernmost region of Honduras, adjacent to the Nicaraguan border, the region provided the most probable axis of advance for Nicaraguan armored forces." 198.5, hot weather or jungle uniforms were not standard issue; these were Vietnam-era olive drab ripstop cotton), along with boots and two-quart collapsable canteens - plus the emphasis placed on bilingual soldiers - we had more than a hint that our destination was not Stateside. As we proceeded through the mobilization process, all personal and administrative matters were updated, including wills, vaccines (yellow fever shots as well as malaria pills), physi- I

/ Area of Operations?

cals, etc. We were rushed through an accelerated program of gunnery and tactical tables, and our training was augmented with as much fixed wing and rotor support (for transportation) as possible. In the midst of our preparation, part of the plan was unveiled when we learned that 3-141 was to mobilize and deploy to Honduras in a region known as the Choluteca Gap. Located in the southernmost region of Honduras, adjacent to the Nicaraguan border, the region provided the most probable axis of advance for Nicaraguan armored forces. We learned that we would be no closer than 20 miles from Nicaragua and that, while incountry, would advise and participate with the Honduran Army. This was to be the first deployment of U. S. armored forces to this region Approximately 30 days before departure, we were briefed on the tragic bombing of the U. S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. That event preoccupied planning for most overseas missions and we received extensive anti-terrorist briefings. Army personnel who had experience in the region provided us valuable data on observation, fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (the Army acronym

OCOKA).

Also, personnel experienced in low-intensity conflict provided valuable personal insights. The final briefing, however, proved to be the most important. Every soldier received small yellow cards labeled "Rules of Engagement." Again, the loss of U. S. servicemen in Lebanon caused some anxiety as we were instructed not to tire unless tired upon. We were to use deadly force only as a last resort (an effective weapons hold statw). Each man was to have one full magazine for his personal weapon, to be carried in his ammo pouch. The exposed round of each clip was to be covered with tape, thus requiring a more deliberate action prior to engagement. This preventive measure was to preclude any accidents, because contact was unlikely 20 miles from the border. Our people (especially thf: combat veterans) did not receive this rationale well. As the last of the formal briefings ended, we began preparing the tanks and APCs. The MGO-series tanks and M113 armored personel carriers (APCs) were transported by heavy equip ARMOR - January-February 9 ment iransport irucKs from Ft. Hood, Texas, to the Beaumont Army Center, located on the Gulf of Mexico north of Houston, for oceanic movement. On 5 March 1985, the vehicles began the administrative load onto the Trartscolirrrihia (a WWII-era class C3 freighter). Under the supervision of PSG George Kitchen, LOO civilian longshoremen loaded the vehicles. The task took seven days to complete, and the Trartscohirribia departed on 12 March for the week-long journey through the Panama Canal to the Gulf of Fonseca, at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The Gulf of Fonseca. on the Pacific Ocean, is bordered by El Sa!- vador, Honduras, and Nicaragua to the west, north, and south, respectively. According to PSG Kitchen (who had commanded a Navy assault boat unit in Vietnam), the admin status of the load, with weapons under U. S. Customs lock and key, prevented any substantive security for the 1-1/2 day unloading in Honduras. Although conventional threat was unlikely, terrorist action was a possibility, and even local pilferage was difficult to control. Meanwhile, the main body of Task Force 3-142 prepared to deploy from its U. S. hase. As news of our mission reached the press, the move was engulfed in media exposure. The political atmosphere of the day centered around President Reagan's initial Contra aid package. Also, the unwillingness of U. S. state governors (including Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis), to commit National Guard units to the area was noted. A common thought was that while the Reagan Administration sup ported a U. S. show of force in the region, the implications of sending active duty units seemed politically unsound. Thus combat-ready National Guard units were requested. Small farms, rocky hills, and areas of thick underbrush are typical ii the Choluteca Gap area, a key armor approach into Honduras. This theory was denied by official sources who intimated that the deployment was simply a training mission and involvcd no danger to the troops. Such a response was ill-received by various civic leaders, who questioned the emphasis on the use of Hispanic soldiers. Some called the task force "cannon fodder" i d fuel to Gre an escalation of conflict with Nicaragua. The soldiers of TF 3-141 paid little mind to the mcdia coverage and proceeded with business as usual. With two duffle bags pcr man (one for LBE, the other for clothing and personal effects), as well as personal weapons, we loaded onto USAF C-141B transport aircraft at Kelly AFB, Texas. As the "Today Show" covered our departure on national television, the task force set out on its half-day journey to Palmerola Air Base in the mountains of Honduras. (Palmerola was the site of the 82nd Airborne Division's 1988 deployment during that year's infiltration of Nicaraguan forces into Honduras.) The cool mountain air of Palmerola was a pleasant change from the unseasonably near-freezing temperatures at Kelly. But this was only our first stop, as C-130 transports awaited us for a flight further south to San Lorenzo (approximately 40 miles north of the Nicaraguan border and twenty miles east of El Salvador). Once again, we boarded and flew south. 1 had thought that C-1. Ws were typical of "heaky" aircraft, but the twisting and jerking of the plane during our low level, terrain following flight convinced me otherwise. Apparently, a recently-lost Herciilcs gave our pilot good reason to avoid being a target. As we touched down on the dirt runway, the aircraft was awash in a blinding cloud of dust, and we anxiously waited for the ramp to drop. The C-130 finally came to a halt, and we shuffled down the ramp in our neatly pressed fatigues and polished jungle boots. As tankers, our pistols and.4S-caliber "grease guns" presented hardly a formidable force, especially since we 10 ARMOR - January-February

*- TANK a r, 4 250 M 3 50 M 4 were without ammunition. We moved clear of the aircraft and noticed that the apparent hrst of the C-130 had not dissipated, a, the surrounding air was more than 120 degrees. Our welcome came in the form of an Air Force combal air controller, clad only in khaki shorts, jungle hoots, and an M-16 rifle, who said, "Welcome to Honduras, sir." The airman led us to our 2-1/2-lon trucks, which transported us on the final ride to our base camp, ominously named "The Alamo." (The 14Lst Infantry regiment traces its lineage to the First Texas Infantry Volunteers, who fought under Col. William Barrel Travis at the Alamo.) The Base Camp The planning involved in conducting hase camp operations was extensive, because it was a hybrid between a modern-day assembly arca and a Vietnam-era fire hase. All the support assets normally held in the brigade support area were within the facility. The uncertainty involved in low-intensity environment required maximum security for support personnel. As quoted by Ma.i!jor General Sir Ernest D. Swinton (father of British Armor) in his 1'902 vignette on the Boer War, 77ie Dcfctise of Dimflers Drift, "There is no flanks, no rear, or, stated otherwise, it is front all around." As no doctrinal hase camp design was available, much of the design was from mcniory of oflicers and NCOs who had operated out of fire bases in the Vietnam War. The facility was rectangular. The outer perimeter of three-strand concertina wire was 50 meters from the interior perimeter (a continuous berm, behind which tank, APC, and individual fighting positions were es-lablishcd providing 360-degree security.) The entrance roadway was designed in a circuitous manner to reduce risk of high-speed infiltration by bomb-laden trucks,or cars. All support assets were inside the perimctcr. Logistically, the camp was well supported. Our own water supply came from a well, and all classes of supply were present, including attached MST and medical personnel. ARMOR - January-February 11

Snapshots by the author show details of the base camp, a rectangular, bermed enclosure reminiscent of a Vietnam fire base. Hills nearby limited fields of fire, and resources were slim to provide overhead cover. The tactical situation, however, was less impressive. The size of the internal perimeter was approximately 250 by 150 meters, providing only 25 meters between amored vehicles, and there were no alternate fighting positions. Thus, an entire task force, with support personel, was in an area that allowed no dispersion or natural overhead cover. Additionally, we were at the base of two hills, which severely limited our fields of fire. In spite of these limitations, our first task was to improve our fighting positions and the entire platoon area. Unfortunately, I had no engineer assets readily available and, rather than wait on the support, we borrowed the XO's blade tank to enhance our survivability. This pointed out an important lesson: Having an organic blade available at companyheam level can be a tremendous asset. (Today's M1 units are not equipped with such assets, and tankers must rely on attached support - which may or may not be available when you need it). In addition, all hands began the tedious task of tilling and distributing sand bags. I had the luxury of having tank commanders who had served with the 173rd Airborne and the 1st Cav in Vietnam, and under their watchful eyes the place began to take shape. We placed waist-high sandbag walls around the sleep area, and enhanced infantry positions, but thc total lack of overhead cover was still a problem. In hindsight. the primitive use of trenches (still de rigma in Soviet defensive doctrine), could have provided covered paths from the fortified sleeping areas and the C'P to the tanks, as well as valuable communication channels or MEDEVAC paths in the event of an artillery attack. Also, overhead cover for sleep areas is, without exception, a must. The camp had enough plywood for the latrines, but none for my platoon; until the first shell hits, people have different priorities. Lesson Icarned: Be prepared to support yourself ("midnight requisition" may be your only choice.) Another problem my NCOs pointed out was the absence of Claymore mines, the official justification being the potential dangers these weapons presented to civilians. Notwithstanding civil affairs, security in such an area requires 200-percent security and 100- percent effort. The preparation of the fighting positions and settling in in the oppressive heat reyuired leaders to force hydrate the men and ourselves. The initial acclimatization feeling - constant fever and burning urine associated with temperatures that approachcd 130 degrees - reinforced our need to drink fluids (the two-quart collapsable canteen provides cool water if the fur-lined case is kept thoroughly saturated.) In the midst of all this preparation, 1 found a number of surprises. Initially, while studying the terrain, I found that rather than bcing 20 miles from Nicaragua, we were less than one mile. One hill separated us from the border; it was well within 120-mm mortar range. The need for improved cover took on anew me. ngforme. Another rude awakening occured when, shortly after arrival, my crew and 1 found my B 31 tank. Inside, Cadet (ROTC) Patrick Tibbetts, my loader, asked why the main gun rounds were colored black. (We had rarely seen live rounds which have a black warhead instead of the blue inert training rounds.) My gunner and I hurriedly climbed aboard and confirmed our initial doubts. The tank had been uploaded with 26 105-mm main gun rounds, consisting of (SABOT), (HEAT), and around that I had only read about: the anti-personnel (APERS), or "Beehive" round. The APERS exploded at pre-programmed ranges, dispersing steel, dart-like flechettes. The APERS was an effective weapon, according to Vietnam 72 ARMOR - January-February reports, yet it is not considered part of a standard load. Someone wisely considered the value of such a munition in low-intensity conflict. In addition, each tank had 800 rounds of 7.02-mm anmunition for the gunner's coaxial machine gun and 6(x) rounds of SO-caliber ammunition for the tank commander's M-85 machine gun. Base Camp Security Two men per tank, APC, and M- 60 machine gun position provided night security. The remainder of the crews rested in the sleep area adjacent to the fighting positions. The infantrymen wore "flak' jackets, another item that I had never seen before. Night vision was a problem, because only one set of ANPVSJ night vision goggles was available to the platoon. The remainder had to rely on passive sniper scopes, which were hand held. Needless to say, we relished any moonlight that was available. I had specifically requested two sets of night goggles per tank and was promised the same, but they never came. Military Police provided by SOUTHCOM were equipped with M-60 machine gun-armed jeeps. The MPs controlled the main entrance, as well as the main road outside the base camp, and augmented our security effort. My platoon, as well that of Lieutenant J. D. Martinez (the mcch platoon leader in Team Alpha), oriented on the critical gap which afforded the most likely enemy avenue of approach. In the event of an attack, we were to hold until the support asscts and, if necessary, the remainder of the task force, displaced. Rather than stay with the remainder of the officers in the center of the base camp, LT Martinez and I opted to sleep on the perimeter. Some argued against the omnipresence of the platoon leaders, yet we felt that our best bet was to be visible. A platoon leader's place is with his tank. The first few nights found the platoon leaders in Team Alpha continuously checking our fighting positions, which eventually degraded our performance because of lack of sleep. Intensive heat and stress tends to degrade the performance of even the well-rested, and our sawy platoon sergeants eventually got us to develop a more efficient sleep plan. The task force OPs were placed on the high ground overlooking the probable enemy axis of advance. Although the positions afforded good observation directly into Nicaragua, the steep grade prevented any vehicles from reaching the positions. Consequently, we used horses rented from the villagers to resup-plyhelieve the outpost. Goodwill missions provided by taqk force medics, and cooperation with the indigenous population, were well received by the locals, most of whom were Mesquito Indians. During our patrols through the vi]- lages, the people described incidents of terrorism that had taken place during Sandinista raids. There was frequent stealing of cattle, and occasionally, young women. A local man was dismembered with machetes for fishing in the Rio Negro (the bordering river) against the will of the Sandinistas. Although the U. S. media tends to blame such atrocities on the US.-supported Contras, we were assured that this was not the case. In fact, the villagers welcomed our presence. Hostile action was conspicuously halted when the American tanks appeared. Naturally, we welcomed the local generosity, yet my tank commanders wisely lectured the men to deal cautiously with the civilians. People in war-tom areas are faced with conflicting loyalties. Understandably, for their safety, as well i s your own, soldiers must keep to the mission at hand. Enemy Situation This area of Central America has been the site of many armed clashes. Prior to our arrival, Hon-ARMOR - January-February 13 duran armored cavalry units, equipped with Israeli-built RBY armored cars, defeated an El Salvadoran g --. - hundred n Amatillo which sepht ills5 nuiiuui d> 11 UIII EL Salvador near San Lorenzo, north of our location. (See “Cavalry Action in Central America,” Sept-Oct 1984 ARMOR). It was also reported that, prior to our arrival, two Honduran soldiers manning an outpost near our base camp location were found killed. cane, mangoes, and =$hews. Aside from main roads and cultivated areas, much of the area was slow go ly not within a moment’s notice), and there were rumors of the availability of naval gunfire. We:tiled for some few 4.2-inch mor-:uerrilla lorce of several or no go. would have SI ien who had assaulted the Claymores and a International Bridge, We had arrived during the hot dry tars. Ll-... I..-..- c -.._ E l -^^--- -__ rL- I^-- I..-. I --I. I?...- During our slay, Honduran infantry intercepted a truckload of armed Sandinistas, and in the time since our mission, two major Nicaraguan forays into Honduras have taken place, one of which, in 1986, was countered with support by U. S. Army BIacklzawk transport helicopters; the other, in 1988, resulted in the mobilization of the 82nd Airborne Division. Across the river in Nicaragua, the communists were making a show of force of their own. Each night, Radio Nicaragua warned locals of the coming invasion by the Texas Mercenaries” and “American Butchers,” and two motorized rifle battalions, equipped with BTR-60 armored personnel carriers and augmented with T-55 tanks, were located across the border. Our OPs could always see at least eight or nine BTRs patroling the bordcr. Terrain and Weather Armored forces had never maneuvered in. Task Force 3-141’s area of operations. The terrain ranged from mountains and steep ridges to flat areas covered with thick, thorny brush resembling mesquite. Near the rivers, the topography was tropical, with sandy soil, banana trees, vines, and other jungle vegetation. The few cultivated areas were planted in sugar SGilSOn, 5U InG 1118511 aIlU Salt Ilillb were dry and maneuverable. Fire proved to be a major hazard, and smoke pots caused extensive brush fires, which were constantly burning in our area of operation. Friendly Forces Base Camp Scorpion, located near San Lorenzo, housed combat engineers and some medical personnel. The engineers had received a countermobility mission throughout thc Choluteca Gap region, and antitank ditches spanned over a mile in many locations. Palmerola AB housed the Honduran Air Force, as well as US. Army medical personnel equipped with Blackltuwk helicopters. MEDEVAC would be from Alamo to Scorpion, initially, and to Palmerola if neccesary. Combat support was less well-defined. A Honduran field artillery battery supposedly provided direct support, yct I never learned o l its location, nor received knowlege of any priority of fires, or of priority targets. Nor did 1 ever see a fire support oflicer (EO) or fire support team (FIST). Such information is vital to a platoon leader or team commander and, in hindsight, I should have been more insistent on obtaining such information. I n fact, all my tank commanders should have had thorough knowledge of our support. To make matters worse, we were not even allowed to bring our own task force heavy mortar platoon. A-10s supposedly provided close air support from Panama (approximately 600 miles away, certain-It is clear that our level of fire support was inadequate. Inefficient use, or total lack of fire support, has been a frequent lesson learned throughout military history. Absence ol such assets is an inexcusable oversight. Manuever in Honduras Maneuver of a tank/mech infantry team in restrictive terrain provides the leader with many challenges. The initial problem faced was the proper integration of infantry and armor in such inconsistent topography - from thick brush to mountains, from jungles to farm land. Due to the uncertainty of the enemy situation, as is the norm in a low-intensity area, 3fl-degree manuever security is vital because the team’s flanks and rear are as susceptible (if not more so) than the front. There was no ”school solution” (e.g., always lead with tanks etc.), so we learned on the move. Channelization is often unavoidable, and fields of fire are often limited. In the U. S., we trained to have dismounted infantry lead, if neccesary, through jungle and other restrictive terrain. However, once in country, we found that the vegetation was too thick for dismounts to move effectively. Initially, our hesitancy to lead with tanks by crashing through the jungle caused us to skirt slow go areas, keeping to roads and trails, until we discovered the true meaning of channelization. During our first week incountry, our operation consisted of team- 14 ARMOR - January-February level patrols throughout the task force area of operation. Team Alpha’s mission was to patrol east from the base camp, keeping parallel to the border. Unlike most operations, we task-organized down to platoon level, as I requested to have an APC move with my platoon to serve as my forward screen elcment. With my platoon in the lead, we came upon a very dense area. Rather than bull through the jungle, my APC found a route around to the south. While bypassing this apparent no go terrain, we found ourselves moving with a ridge line running east to west on our right, with the jungle to our left. While moving in an echelon-right formation (the tanks were oriented toward the ridge line), my APC commander reported that he had come upon a tank ditch. After I pulled my tank into position, my gunner moved up to the tank commander’s position while I dismounted to take a closer look at the obstacle. The tank ditch, prepared by Army engineers, was approximately five metcrs wide and three meters deep. It ran all the way to the ridge line on our right and around the jungle to our left. With One of the unit’s M60s passes through a typical Honduran village. t no apparent bypass available, I used the APC‘s radio to call up the armored vehicle-launched bridge (AVLB). While fumbling through my CEO1 to find the AVLB’s call sign. 1 heard over the platoon net: “RP ti... 2 o’clocc and siniultaneous-ly saw my tanks backing into the jungle, all oriented on the ridgeline. I1 was then that 1 realized that I had led my platoon into a classic ambush: effectively immobilized by an obstacle to our front and dense jungle and high ground to our Thick mesquite brush and rocky hills made maneuver difficult. flanks, we must have looked like fish in a barrel. I immediately ordered the squad leader to set up security along the tank ditch, orienting his S O caliber machine gun east over the ditch, with his dismounts covering the north and south. 1 then ran to my tank, which had backed into the jungle, orienting on the suspected RPG position. 1 climbed into the tank commander’s hatch to find that my crew had wasted no time in loading all the weapons. Unable to visually acquire the RPG team on the ridge line, I called my wingman for a situation report while trying to find the suspected enemy on the map. My wingman had initially spotted the team and showed great initiative in maneuvering the platoon. He stated that he had seen three men, one with either a recoilless rifle or an RPG, and the other two with rifles. After initiating a contact-right move in place, the suspected enemy dropped back behind the ridge. I called the spot report into my team commander, who had me stand by. Hearing the call, LT Martinez had his platoon locked and loaded and he obliged my request ARMOR - January-February 15 to cover our rear. Moving his platoon to my back right, he prepared to dismount as our tanks covered his move. It was at that time that our team commander came over the net ordering us to displace immediately. Although we never learned the identities or nationalities of our apparent foes, the experience provided some valuable lessons learned. Initially, soldiers do, indeed, react the way they are trained: battlefield action is almost an instinctive response to scenarios practiced in training. Without much thought, our platoon seized the initiative and, having done so, probably precluded the opposing force from taking action. The platoon required no platoon leader's signal; it simply reacted. The competent and active NCO is an invaluable asset to the American military. A second lesson was the importance of discipline, as the platoon adhered to the rules of engagement. Rather than blasting away at rocks, we developed the situation and responded accordingly. Finally, avoid channelization, even if tanks crash through heavy brush, although at times the jungle was so thick that even the tanks could not penetrate. Of course, if speed is important and there is no bypass, the adherence to visual sectors of responsibility can prevent surprise. While a smoke screen on the ridge line would have successfully covered our breach, smoke was not available, and in a real world situation, a leader can't always rely on it. Throughout our time incountry, we had many valuable expriences. The decision to lead with tanks through dense foliage was succesful, yet the poor visibility required a great deal of dismounted reconnaissance and a compass for proper orientation. One cannot dcpend on terrain association alone. In especially dcnse areas, I would stop my column every kilometer, dismount, and ensure that my compass heading was correct. Overall, our mission proved to be succesful. Our lack of adherence to main roads or likcly avenues of approach allowed us to effectively surprise our opponents during the war game portion of our mission. Conclusion The experience of Honduras proved beneficial to all parties involved, yet our preparation and lessons learned had little to do with doctrinal guidance. We had to learn on the move and absorb what information could he gleaned from our NCOs who had served in low-intensity conflict. It seems that we paid too little attention (or chose to ig-norc) the lessons learned in Vietnam on the value and contribution of armored forces in low-intensity conflict. Unfortunatcly, not much has changed, because our doctrine still almost exclusively deals with desert or European scenarios. One is hard pressed to find any guidance or emphasis on anything else. Operations in an area such as Central America present different tactical challenges. Command and control demands on leadcrs are great. The vagueness of the enemy situation requires one to be flexible and evcr-conscious of vulnerability. In base camp operations, rules ol dispersion and cover and concealment (especially overhead) must be applied, and adequate lire support must be available. Finally, the age-old notion that "the way we train is the way we A rented horse gave access to a hilly observation point near camp. fight" is true. In the end, a soldier will do his job. Hopefully, some of the information provided here will help his leaders help him to do that job a little better. First Lieutenant Kevin J. Lilly received his ROTC commission from the University of Texas at Austin and is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic and Advance Courses. He received a masters degree in business administration from Southern Methodist University in Dallas. He has served as a tank platoon leader with 6-112 Armor, 49th AD, and 3-141 Infantry, 1st Cavalry Division (Roundout), and as a tank company XO and battalion maintenance officer with 6-112 Armor and 1-141 Infantry, 49th AD, TXARNG. He is assigned to the US Army Reserve (IRR). 76 ARMOR - January-February