Operation Michael: The Seeds of AirLand Battle

Operation Michael: The Seeds of AirLand Battle by Captain Hilario H. Ochoa Many soldiers do not realize the historical aspects of AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle is based on proven concepts on battlefields around the world. One example occurred during WWI. It was called “Operation Michael,” and it clearly shows us the basic AirLand Battle tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. Time was running out for the Germans in the spring oC 1918. Their defeat of Russia had freed large numbers of troops for use on the Western Front, but the Germans realized that they had to force at least a stalemate in France before the Allied naval blockade and American mobili7ation forced them to accept a peace of exhaustion. On March 21, the Germans launched a massive offensive against the British along the Somme River. The German attack was more successful than any since 1914. The British Fifth Army suffered heavy casualties and was pushed back 40 miles in 10 days. The Germans had found a new formula for victory, a technique known as Hutier tactics. Like AirLand Battle doctrine, these tactics fulfilled the requirements of the time and offered a sensible, flexible, and aggressive plan to win on the battlefield. Both doctrines are similar for their aggressiveness, use of available techniques and technology, adaptability, and reliance on and confidence in the soldiers who wage them. Genesis on the Russian Front Hutier tactics took their name from General Oskar von Hutier, the man who first applied them on the Russian front the autumn of 1917. In operations around Riga, at Ux-kull, the Germans forced the passage of the Dvina River. The heavily entrenched Russians outnumbered the German forces. So, Hutier had to try something new, and what he did went almost unnoticed at the time by other tacticians because the fight itself was so insignificant. Hutier also applied his methods to shred the Italian Army in the battle of Caporetlo. In the March 1918, offensive, Hutier was in command of the crack 18th Army. In actual fact, General Ludendorf, Germany’s first quartermaster general, was responsible for the application of the Hutier concept, in cooperation with his chief of artillery, General Bruckmuller. German doctrine rejected the standard concept of massive artillery preparations and dense waves of assaulting infantry. Instead, a special task organization combined special tactics and training. The Germans organized their troops into three echelons: storm troops, conventional infantry as follow-on forces, and reserves. The storm troops (or assault battalions) were made up of highly trained, specially selected men whose mission was rapid penetration and exploitation to disrupt the enemy’s rear I 1 40 ARMOR - January-February 1988 I area. The battalion had four rifle companies, one machine gun company (six to nine guns), a light mortar platoon (two trench mortars), two artillery pieces, and a flamethrower section. The special assault divisions of the 18th Army had nine assault battalions, two light artillery regiments, three combat engineer companies, and the usual service units. The conventional infantry units were also equipped with light artillery and mortars. The infantry reserves had the mission of consolidating gains, protecting the flanks of the penetration, and resupplying the assault units. The assault units consisted of the best soldiers, all under 35 years of age. Most were from the Russian Front, where they had not become encumbered by the concepts of trench warfare. Hutier conducted six weeks of intense psychological and tactical training designed to encourage small unit leader initiative, exploitation through bypassing pockets of resistance, and the use of combined arms. They were trained to infiltrate enemy positions before and during artillery barrages, in the use of observation balloons, and pyrotechnics for adjusting fire and marking the progress of the attack, and in making tactical decisions at low levels of command to exploit weaknesses. By 8 March 1918, 70 German divisions had received this training. The New Tactics Are Applied At 0.500 on 21 March, Gencral Bruckmuller's artillery barrage began. Instead of the usual barrage that lasted for days, or even weeks, this barrage consisted of 10 minutes of gas shelling, followed by five hours of mixed gas and high explosive. The fire was concentrated on known British artillery positions, command posts, road junctions, and communications installations. At 0930, under cover of a rolling barrage, the storm troops assaulted in small, combined arms groups. They had no specific objectives as had always been the case in prior attacks, only axes of advance, with the intent to penetrate as deeply as possible. The British made the mistake of concentrating their units in the forward trenches, where they were pounded by the artillery, overrun, and bypassed early in the attack. Late on 21 March, the commander of the British 5th Army ordered a withdrawal to the Somme, 10 miles to the rear. The Germans advanced 38 kilometers in four days, and on the 25th, renewed the attack and again pushed forward. When the British were finally able to stop the Germans in the Somme sector, the Germans launched two more attacks against the British, and then the French. All three failed for a variety of reasons: the principal one being troop exhaustion. It is important for us to consider a key point of defensive and offensive doctrine before continuing with the similarities between Hutier tactics and AuLand Battle doctrine. The Germans came to realize during WWI that it was more beneficial to restructure their defensive doctrine to a more flexible defense in depth. This new doctrine included such ideas as five successive defensive lines in critical sectors. The systcm emphasized three principles: flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack. The combination of these principles made the German defenses seemalmost invincible to Allied assault tactics. Attrition and overwhelming AIlicd numerical superiority resulted in this change in German fighting doctrine. The change from the flexible defense to the successful offensive doctrine of Hutier tactics was the result. Hutier Tactics Reborn These changes in 1918 are similar to our own recent doctrinal changes. In 1976, the Active Defense doctrine appeared in Field Manual 100-5, "Operations". Reliance then was on firepower, success in the first battle, the advantages of defense, and the use of fortifications. The doctrine dealt briefly with the offensive operation and immediately created controversy. Field commanders felt that, even though they could win against the leading enemy echelons, they would be unable to withstand the follow-on forces. The next step was the Central Battle concept, which concentrated on operations at the FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops), the extensive use of covering forces, and firepower. The concept of Force Generation was closely allied with this doctrine. Commanders, however, continued to question the validity of this doctrine, and a series of studies, such as Division 86 and Army 86, stimulated active debate. AirLand Battle, our new offensive doctrine, is the result of the concepts of the Integrated Battlefield and the Extended Battlefield. Like Hutier tactics, today's AirLand Battle doctrine is more offensive- and win-oriented. Both doctrines focus on soldiers, as well as systems and tactics. They both depend on basic tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. FM 100-5 tells us, "At the operational level, the force will defeat the enemy by destroying critical units or facilities. At the tactical level, both attrition and masscd fires, substituting for massed troops, wilI occasionally facilitate decisive I ARMOR - January-February 7988 41 I

HUTIER INFILTRATION TACTICS

maneuver at the operational level." This concept is important in both doctrines. Historians have often related AirLand Battle concepts to blitzkrieg tactics. But the significance of the WWI Hutier tactics is that they represented a blirzkrieg without tanks. In Hutier tactics, commanders on the spot exercised subordinate initiative. This enabled the commander to deal with rapidly changing hat-tlefield situations. This concept evolved from an important aspect of the German flexible defense called decentralized control. Squad and platoon leaders had considerable independence and might defcnd or delay anywhere forward of the third, or main, defense line. The Cor-ward, or "Front Battalion Commander," frequently directed the entire defense of a regimental sector. This commander had the authority to commit the remaining two or three battalions of his rcgiment in a counterattack at his own discretion. This exaggerated the difference in decision cycles: while the British and French attackers had to seek orders and reinforcements from their corps or army commanders located miles to the rear, thedefending German battalion commander could direct a regimental counterattack on the spot. Is this not the same type of initiative we want to instill in our subordinate leaders? As FM 100-5 tells us, "To preserve the initiative, subordinates must act independently of each other within the context of an overall plan. They must exploit successes boldly and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. They must deviate from the expected course of battle without hesitation when opportunities arise to expedite the overall mission of the higher force. They will take risks, and the command must support them. Improvisation, initiative, and awessiveness are traits that must be strong in all leaders." Initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. ~~ ~ The officers that led the storm troop battalions were specially chosen for their staunch bravery, moral as well as physical. 'The turmoil of our feelings," one of them wrote, "was called forth by rage and the thirst for blood. As we advanced heavily but irresistibly toward the enemy lines, I was boiling over in the fury which gripped me. The overpowering desire to kill gave me wings. Rage squeezed bitter tears from my eyes. Only the spell of primeval instinct remained." Another important aspect of Hutier tactics was the bypassing of enemy strongpoints in order to move into enemy rear areas. The artillery preparation destroyed British communications and command centers, as well as artillery positions. Such concentration on deep targets caused the British defenders to lose all organization and they collapsed from the rear forward. The British were unable to concentrate their firepower or maneuver their forces to meet the threat. As in AirLand Battle tactics, commanders then also needed to understand depth of time, space, and resources to execute appropriate countermoves, to battle the forces in contact, and to attack enemy rear forces. The Role of Reserves Just as reserves play a key role in achieving depth and flexibility today, so did reserves play an important role in Hutier tactics. Since the assault troops bypassed major enemy centers of resistance, the second echelon, or conventional infantry, was responsible for eliminating these positions. Using Hutier tactics, the Germans avoided enemy strengths and attacked his vulnerable areas. Their organizations had the basic structure, I42 ARMOR - January-Februarv 1988 I equipment, and weapons systems to complete their tasks. be a psychological blow to the entire Allied effort. While the ground troops found gaps in the enemy's lines and were pressing deep into his rear, the ground attack squadrons of the air force were bomhing and machine-gunning surviving enemy points of resistance. Another key to the success of Hutier Tactics was the combined arms battle groups at company and battalion level. They had elaborate systcms of communication and control which enabled them to achieve not only maximum combat power, but a coordinated action. In these tactics, we see the importance of having a leader who can react to any situation and think on his feet. FM 100-5 says that forceful and rapid operations achieve at least local surpise and shock effect. The following is a good example of what this means to us. Yn two days of fighting, the Germans had captured the whole of the British defended zone on either side of the Somme. By 24 March they won through and had advanced 14 miles in 4 days, the greatest gain of territory since 1914." The Importance of Intelligence Certainly one must ask why certain units or places are chosen to be attacked. In the case of Operation Michael, why did the Germans attack the British 5th Army and why did they attack in the area of the Somme River? There are several important reasons. 0 First of all, the British wcre still the German's toughest, if not the most numerous enemy. Defeat of the British forces would not only be important militarily, but would also 0 Secondly, the Somme was a sector the British had recently taken over from the French. Consequently, the line was in a poor state of repair and, most important, it was a boundary seam of the Anglo-French front. A blow here would split the Allied front in two. 0 A third reason was that the British 5th Army was the weakest of the four British armies in France. It had only 12 divisions stretched over a 42-mile front. When the attack came, infantry was crowded in the forward trenches in the exact zone which the artillery bombardment neutralized. The final reason was that the army was commanded by Hubert Gough, whose tactics had been so disastrous at Ypres the previous autumn. In arriving at these reasons, the Germans depended heavily on intelligence about the enemy. The ability to be agile on the battlefield requires such good, accurate intelligence, and lots of it. Conclusion The employment of Hutier tactics and their success in bringing mobility back to the battlefield in the spring of 1918 clearly indicate the beginnings of AirLand Battle fundamentals. This can be more clearly understood in a paragraph from FM 100-5: "AirLand Battle doctrine takes a nonlinear view of battle. It enlarges the battlefield area, stressing unified air and ground operations throughout the theater. It distinguishes the operational level of war - the conduct of campaigns and large-unit actions - from the tactical level. It recognizes the nonquan-tifiable elements of combat power, especially maneuver, which is as important as firepower. It acknowledges the importance of nuclear and chemical weapons and of electronic warfare, and it details their effects on operations. Most important, it emphasizes the human element: courageous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, effective leaders." ARMOR - January-February 7988 References World War I., S.L.A. Marshall. American Heritage Press. New Yorli. 1971. "Soldiers." July 1983 article on Airhnd Battle. LTC P. Cavanaugh Jr.. p.6. Towards Combined Arms Warfare. CSI. CPT Jonathan

M. House. USACGSC. Fort Ixavenworth. Kansas. B e Two World Wars. Susanne Everett and Brigadier Peter Young. Bison Boob. 1983. FM 100-5. Operations. August 1982. Captain Hilario H. Ochoa was commissioned in Armor from Texas A&l University in 1975 and is a graduate of the

AOBC,

AOAC,

and CAS3. He has served as a tank platoon leader, CSC XO, support platoon leader of 3/67th Armor, 2d AD; and S1 and tank company commander of 2/33 Armor, 3d AD, He served as military history and leadership instructor at the C&S Dept, USAARMS, from 1983-1985, and also served at the C&S training branch. 43