The Battalion XO in Combat: Where Will He Be Most Effec

Among the more sipificant points discussed in After-Action Reviews (AARs) at the National Training Centcr (NTC) is that of the physical location of the battalion executive officer (XO) prior to and during an engagement. The XO’s primary consideration is to place himself where he can I m t fulfill his responsibilities to the commander and to the battalion. This is such an obvious fact that it hardly seenis worthy of discussion, but like too many crystal-clear factors, it is often overlooked simply because it is out in plain sight. In order to determine the XO’s best (most functional) placement in battle, we must first review his most important duties from the battalion comrnandcr’s point of view--and Iiy doctrine. Opinions vary on just where the XO should be during battle. They range from that which says the XO is primarily responsible for the Combat Service Support (CSS) function and should work from the Brigade Support Area (BSA), to that which says the XO’s main function is to coordinate the entire battalion staff and to monitor the information flow between battalion and brigade. This latter premise holds that the XO should be at the Tactical Operation Center (TCIC). A third theory holds that the XO should be forward in lhc battalion’s secondary effort area where he can keep ahreasl of the ongoing battle. Yet another proposal would place the XO at the TOC during the actual fight and then have him free to ive? circulate from front to rear areas, as needed, during lulls. All of these opinions take into consideration that the XO may have to assume battalion command at a moment’s notice. For the purpose of this article, I chose four criteria to evaluate the courses of action in placing the XU: 0 Ability of the XO to coordinate the staff. 0 Ability of the XO to assume command. 0 Ability of the XO to control the CSS effort. 0 Ability of the bat1 iI I’ ion lo react to changing battle situations and flex missions. The first three items specifically delineate the XO’s three most important doctrinal responsibilities, and thc fourth provides a cause-and-effect relationship between the XO’s actions and the battalion’s success. Therefore, how the XO’s position affects each of these four criteria becomes the major determining factor in deciding his location. General Information In 1984, Major Generals Frederick

J. Brown and John W. Foss, commandants of the Armor and Infantry Schools respectively, sent a message to LTG Carl E. Vuono, the commanding gcneral, that gave their interpretations of the duties of the XO: Keep abreast of his own, liigliec lower, arid adjacerii irriit operations... anticipate fiiiiire rcqtrirenieiiis aiid ot*emce ilie plaririirig process... cavesdrop O J his OIVJI aiid higher coriiriiarid net.... rcporf io arid relay orders aiid riiessages fmm higher tiori and plaririirig of the CS arid CSS operations... take o w a combat vcliiclc arid become direct!v irivohvd iii the battle as directed bv the coiri-iiiander, arid he prepared io take conmiarid.... Additionally, FM 71-21 outlines the requirement for the XO to transmit the commander’s guidance to the staff and to coordinate the staff in its efforts to ful-full that guidance. headqiianers... coordinate the c ’\CClI- ’ The responsihilities are many and complicated, but its primary job is to keep the commander informed on all aspects of friendly and enemy situations during battle. In addition to this all-encompassing requirement, BG Leland, a former NTC commander, says the TOC must provide the commander with all of the information in a consolidated and analyzed form; it must remain stationary at critical times and must provide reflcx responses, such as dropping to internal nets of unanswering companies, relaying for distant stations, and checking compliance with the commander’s instructions. TOC manning is composed of the hnttalion S2 and S3 sections, and 1 i ARMOR - 31

When stationed at the TOC, the the fire support clement (FSE), for a total of 20 officers and soldiers. FM 17-17 states that if the XO does not supervise the TOC; the S3, or one of his assistants, will fulfill that role. It also states that if the XO is not forward on the secondary effort, the S3 will be there. If, in that case, the XO is supervising the CSS effort, the S3 will be at the secondary effort, leaving the TOC under the supervision of the assistant S3. This can lead to trouble if this officer is young and inexperienced. Also, his rank may tend to cause problems when he deals with staff officers or company commanders. The young captain who can run the TOC and make decisions in the absence of the commander, as the XO or S3 would do, is a rare pcrson, indeed. Hcre again, it is a lack of experience, not a lack of motivation, that hampers this young officer who has received a job far above his trained capabilities. The negative results of situations such as these are documented in the 1981 and 1982 NTC observation rcports. They indicatc that this technique, which was often used at that time, often resulted in a TOC that operated ineffectively as a command and control facility during battle. Another point to rememher in placing the XO is that FMs 17-17 and 71-21 state that the locations of the TOC, conibat trains, and field trains behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT) are 4-10 km, 4- 10 km, and 20-25 km, respectively. In the TOC Those who hold that tlie XO should operate from the TOC present these arguments: XO is on the spot to coordinate the stafPs planning efforts during battle. He has information from all levels of command at his immediate disposal. He can talk to any member of his staff through the battalion command or admin/log nets during the battle. Immediately following the battle, he has access to the commander to hclp develop or ascertain the commander’s concept for the next operation. Once the S1, S4, and BMO have moved forward to the TOC, the XO has his entire staff on hand and can distribute the requirements for fulfilling the com- “... We gain very few advantages in placing the XO on the battalion’s secondary ef- f 0 rt....” mandcr’s intent. Bcfore the new order is published, the entire staff is at the TOC, and the XO can ensure that all aspects of the operations order (OPORD) are in synch. Lastly, the XO can oversee any coordination between company commanders and staff officers that might take place at that time. Although the XO’s ahility to assume command from the TOC is limited because of his distance from the FLOT (4-10 kms) and his lack of a pcrsonal combat vehicle at the TOC, the XO has the latest information on the battle and is, therefore, better able to assume command than if he were in the trains area or in the secondary effort area. Although the XO has only a limited capability to control the CSS effort from the TOC, he is in contact with his S1, S4 and BMO via radio and will have personal contact with them during the initial planning phase and during the OPORD sequence. Finally, his access to large amounts of information, his staff and the cornmandcr’s, as described above, combined with his experience and the force of his presence as second in command of the battalion, enables the XO to take immediate action upon receiving a flex mission from brigade, or upon noting a significant change in the overall situation. This, in turn, enables the hattalion to better react to flex missions and the changing situation. In The Secondary Effort Area We gain very few advantages in placing the XO on the battalion’s secondary effort. While there, his ability to coordinate the staff during the battle is severely limited, and if he has to assume command, his available battle information will be much less than that which he would have had at the TOC. However, there are those who feel that the XO would be in a superb position to assume command from the secondary effort because he would be physically involved in the ongoing battle. On the other hand, his view of the battle would be strictly limited to what he would see through his pcriscopes, and he would not have the overall view he would have had at the TOC. Also, to place the XO at the secondary effort would restrict his ability to move freely as far back as the field trains tu coordinate and supervise their efforts between battles. If the battle unexpectedly resumes, or he has to suddenly assume command, tlie XO will be many kilometers behind the battle line. If, on the other hand, he chooses to go I 1 32 ARMOR - I

NTC needcd their XOs to supervise no farther back than the TOC, he will not be able to personally supervise any of the CSS effort. Finally, with the XO in the secondary effort area, the S3 will supervise the TOC. Although the S3 will supervise the TOC bctter than one of his assistants, he usually does not have the experience, nor the authority that the XO has. Therefore, the diminished ability of the S3 to start the staff planning process will reduce the ability of the battalion to react to flex missions and changing situations. The Trains/TOC Areas Those who hold that the XO should work in the trains/rOC areas during the planning phase of the battle, and in the TOC during the battle, argue that to work between the TOC and the trains during the planning phase, the XO can supervise the planning preparation and coordination of his entire staff. He has them physically at the TC)C for initial guidance, he can spot-check them in the trains area and forward, and he has thcm together again at the TOC for the OPORD sequence. Furthermore, he has the same capabilities during the battle as he did whcn he worked exclusively out of the TOC area. In The Trains Arguments against pliicing the XO in the trains area include the limitation of his ability to coordinate the efforts of the staff from there. Because the CSS effort depends upon the tactical plan, the XO must move to the TOC accompanied by at least the S4 to ensure the proper coordination of the CSS effort in support of the upcoming operation. Staff coordination during the battle is even more difficult because of the XO's separation from the tactical planning staff (SuS3) and the rcduccd amount of information available there. The XO's ability to assume command from the trains area is only fair. He is 4-25 kms behind the FLOT and without his own combat vehicle. Although the administration/logistics center (ALC) should maintain a situation board, its emphasis is in monitoring the CSS effort and it can give the XO only limited overall battle information. If he has to assume command, the XO would do so under constrained circumstances. Although the XO would be available immcdiately in the trains area to resolve conflicts that might arise between the S1, S4 and BMO, this is not his primary responsibility. Finally, with the XO in the trains area, the TOC is under the command of a junior and, very likely, an inexperienced officer. As discussed above, this usually results in a TOC that operates poorly as a command and control facility. As a result, thcre will be a reduction in the battalion's ability to react to flex missions and changing situations. Conclusions The final analysis supports the opinion that the XO should be free to move between the trains areas and the TOC during the planning stages and then rcmain at the TOC during the execution stage. By following this course of action, the XO will be able to best perform his staff supervision and coordination functions before and during the battle, and be on the spot with the best information to assume command during the battle if required. The 1985 NTC Observation Notes state quite clearly that units at the CSS efrorts, primarily during the planning phase, in order to be consistently successful. They also noted that the success of the OPFOR was directly related to their XOs being at the TOC during the battle. Furthermore, a random selection of 25 battalions at the NTC showed that four of them did not use their XOs at their TOCs during the battle. Of these, three had poor TOC operations in command and control. The 11 battalions that used their XOs at the TOC all received favorable results in TOC operations. These are suggestions--suggestions backed by NTC Observation Notes and other reliable factors, but suggestions nevertheless. They are not infallible--nothing is in battle, but they offer an excellent choice from which to start, and one that will be successful. We cannot overlook the importance of the XO in a consistently well-run operation. It will serve battalion commanders well to place him where he can do the most good for the longest period of time. Captain Ronald M. Bones-tee1 was commissioned as an Infantry officer from West Point in 1979. He sewed as a rMe platoon and weapons platoon leader in Korea and as a scout platoon leader, CS company XO, battalion S1 and S4, and company commander at Ft. Riley, KS. A graduate of the AOAC and Combined Arms and Services Staff School, he is currently attending Harvard University for graduate studies in training for his secondary as a Russian and East European foreign area officer. I I ARMOR - 33