Breakout from theveszprem Railhead

Maneuver is one of the most important principles of war influencing a mechanized army. Without maneuverability, both decisive attacks and strong defensive actions are not possible. Not all maneuver however, is dependent on combat vehicles moving under their own power from one point to another. When movement is not possible due to mechanical limitations or fuel shortages, units can use other means, such as rail, to gain the initiative. The German Army made excellent use of railroads to transport troops during both World Wars, thereby gaining strategic advantages. Very few historical works, on the other hand. cover rail movement in the tactical realm. During WWII, the German Army made good use of railroads to move armored vehicles short distances, minimizing fuel consumption and wear on those vehicles. But there is not always a railhead located well within friendly lines. The 2nd SS Panzer Division's ("Das Reiclt") tank regiment faced this problem in March 1945. The breakout from Veszprem depicts exactly how close to the forward line of troops an armored unit can successfully execute a rail-loading operation. In mid-March 1945, a portion of the Eastern Front ran through western Hungary (Map 1). The Hungarian 3rd Army defended the northern sector, from Komarno to Kisper. The 6th SS Panzer Army defended from Kisper south to Lake Balaton. On the evening of 18 March, the majority of the Hungarians deserted or went over to the Russians, leaving a large gap in the front. The 2nd SS Panzer Division's two panzer grenadier regiments immediately rushed north to plug the gap, while the neighboring 3rd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions extended their fronts to absorb the withdrawal (Map 2). The Panther tanks of the 2nd SS Division's tank regiment needed repairs badly. They pulled back several kilometers to a railhead near the town of Veszprem, rather than roadmarch the 60 kilometers north to the break in the front. The lead elements of the Panzer regi- 20 ARMOR - January-February 7988 ment arrived at the railhead just tween two barns. He could see village, apparently unaware of the before dawn on 20 March. The rail-German presence. When they had head itself was in the tiny village of cupy positions among the buildings closed to within 1,OOo meters, a Herend, just northwest of to his left and right. Ahead of him voice came over the radio (Rauch Veszprem. By mid-morning, more were about 2,000 meters of thought it sounded like one of the than forty of the regiment's tanks cornfields, followed by a wooded regiment's company commanders) had arrived at Herend, and the Pan-directing the company on the right tlres began to drive onto the rail flank to engage the T34s. Several cars. Shmnhairnjiieltltrer (major) Several minutes after Rauch took seconds later, the crack of 75-mm Alois Ennsberger, the regimental position, T34s crept from the cannon erupted from the right, and motor officer, supervised the load-wooded area to his direct front. Six all six T.?4s received hits in their ing operations. Shortly after the Russian tanks probed towards the flanks. Some exploded violently, other vehicles from his section oc-area. loading began, a ffiibel-wageir (jeep) arrived with a highly agitated sergeant at the wheel. He exclaimed that Russian tanks were only two kilometers east of Herend and heading towards the railhead. Initial disbelief faded as othcr vehicles arrived with similar reports. A regimental staff officer quickly organized a defensive perimeter around the eastern half of the village (Map 3). The first two tanks on the ramp remained to load onto the train, while the others deployed by company on the outskirts of town. Untenclia@eltrerer (sergeant) Peter Rauch bad been with the division since 1943. Originally from Moenchen-gladbach, in the Rhineland, his first position with "Das Reiclt" was as a loader on a 77ger tank. After several months, he became a gunner and eventually rose to command a Partllter tank in the Battle of the Bulge. His tank was part of the regimental headquarters 1

-\. Mapl.

xx The German Army and its Hungarian allies were holding this line in western section, which consisted of Hungary in March 1945 as the Red Army pressed westward. Panther tanks of seven Pairrites in March the 2d SS Panrer Division were pulling back to the Veszprem railhead for

1945. Rauch positioned his movement toward a repair depot when the Russians broke through the north-tank behind a slight rise be- ern sector. (see Map 2.) ARMOR - 21

The majority of the Hungarian units in the northern sector deserted or went over to the Russians on 18 March, forcing 2d SS Panzer Division to send its two panzer grenadier regiments north to plug the gap. the unit’s sector at 12 o’clock. The unit designated to engage the target divided the target from left to right, the left-most friendly element engaged the left-most enemy element and then worked inward. The right-most element simultaneously engaged the right-most enemy element and also worked inward. The center friendly elements engaged their center enemy counterparts and worked outward. Cease fire was automatic when they destroyed all encmy elements. This procedure was simple enough for everyone to use, and flexible enough to apply to any given formation. Rauch‘s loader announced that he had loaded and primed the antitank round. Rauch spotted the antenna of a Russian company commander’s tank and ordered his gunner t o fire at it. Two seconds later, the antitank round slammed while the others just burned. None of the crew members emerged. Sporadic artillery fire began impacting within and around the village. Rauch assumed it was mortar shells and high explosive tank rounds, hecause the fire was too light to do much damage. This was, no doubt, a Russian spearhead. His own artillery was still too far behind to fire on the Russians. As the rounds came down around him, Rauch spotted 15-20 T34s charging the German left flank at full speed. Infantrymen clung to the sides of the tanks. The T34s were firing on the move, but were not hitting anything. He was about to report his sighting when the same voice over the radio announced, “T34s, two o’clock, headquarters section engage.” Rauch directed his gunner to the center of the target group in accordance with his section’s operating procedure. All sections, platoons, and companies in the panzer regiment had a standard procedure governing target group engagement. They used the “clock method” to identify the target group’s general location, with the center of into the T34’s fuel cell, causing a violent explosion. Rauch was glad they had destroyed the command tank because it was the only one in the Russian company with a radio. The other Russian tank commanders were now without direction and would blindly follow the last command given. It was common knowledge in the <‘ Jerman Army that killing the Russian commander during an attack usually resulted in a broken or failed attack. After the first T34 burst into flames, the Russian infantrymen leapt from the charging tanks and took positions around and behind them. Rauch directed his radio I22 ARMOR - operator to stay alert for enemy infantry and to keep the bow machine gun ready. Rauch e n g a g e d a n d destroyed two more tanks, hitting one just ahove the roadwheels and blowing the turret off the other. Less than ten minutes after the firing started, 19 T34s were burning on the outskirts of Herend, some within 4oc) meters of the German positions. The smoke was thick in the turret of the Parr-tlrcr, and Rauch felt like throwing up. He sweated profusely, his throat microphone itching on his neck. 'Can we turn on the ventilators?" asked his loader. "No," said Rauch, "they'll interfere with the inter- m a

(Approximate Reprcwentatlon) Panther companies as deployed on eastern edge of Herend. com. Go ahead and crack open the side hatches." At the railhead, panic ensued when the first T34s appeared. When the sporadic shelling began, the Hungarian train engineers attempted to flee. They were persuaded, at gunpoint, to remain at their post. Soldiers armed themselves with machine pistols and parrzer-fausts. Disregarding all safety precautions, the rail loading progressed quickly. The soldiers did not have time to tie down the Parr-tlrcrs once they were in position on the railcars. They merely locked the brakes and traversed the turrets in the direction of the battle. Turret crews remained with their vehicles in hopes of adding some fire support to the battle. This would prove a very wise precaution. Uritemliarjiielirer Rauch used the 20 minutes of calm after the attack to his advantage. He maneuvered his tank to a better covered position and redistributed the available ammunition to make it more accessible. Suddenly, his earphones erupted with, "Infantry, 12 o'clock, 1,200 meters." The hair on the back of Peter Rauch's neck stood on end as he saw the brown-clad figures creeping through the cornfields. German tankers feared dismounted Russian infantry above all else. They were determined, resourceful, and extremely hard to spot until they were on top perienced Russian infantry had absolutely no fear of tanks; they attacked them with satchel charges, mines, and even Molotov cocktails. Rauch's driver swore and started babbling, "We've got no infantry support. They'll be on us like flies. We've got to get out of here." of

YOU.

EX- "Don't lose your head," said Rauch firmly. He told his radio operator," It'sup to you to keep them off us with your machine gun." Machine guns were already chattering on the left and right as Rauch's radio operator fired a burst. Rauch was thankful that he had a five-man crew. He fully agreed with the German Army that a four-man tank crew was not as effective as five. The tank commander was the "brain" of the tank, planning and directing the lire of a tank-killing system. If he operated a machine gun, it made the rest of the tank ineffective as a tank killer. The gunner was the hand and trigger finger for the main gun. Using the gunner to aim the coaxial machine gun was wasteful because it turned the tank into an enormous, mobile machine gun emplacement. ARMOR - 23

The main gun was then useless. The gunner would aim the coax, while the loader shot it, ONLY if there were no tank targets in sight. The main machine gunner on a German tank was the radio operatorbow machine gunner. He was the only crew member who could afford to operate independently without degrading the effectiveness of the tank-killing system. His primary duty was to keep enemy infantry away from the tank. A fifth crew member also came in handy when replacing broken tracks. The Russians made three infantry assaults within an hour. Mortar and tank rounds were still sporadically impacting in Herend. Rauch used his periscopes to maintain %()-degree visibility, ensuring that the encmy was nowhere near his vehicle. This was very important because with no infantry support, the tank commander was the only one who could ensure that enemy infantrymen did not approach his tank from behind. He also observed the tanks to his left and right to spot any infantry approaching them. He knew that his other tanks were also watching him. In past engagements, his section's tanks had cleared each other of enemy infantry by firing on each other with machine guns. Convinced that no Russian armored vehicles were participating in the assault, he had his gunner aim the main gun at the infantrymen while the loader tired the coaxial machine gun. The Germans halted all three assaults. Hundreds of dead Russian infantrymen littered the cornfields, some within 100 meters of the dcfensive positions. The final infantry assault had not yet died down when Rauch spotted a formation of tanks moving in a wide circle long the left flank. He counted 14 T34s and reported this immediately over the radio. The German Army trained all personnel to take the initiative to call in spot reports. This facilitated action because it was not necessary for key leaders to keep an eye on everything in their sector of responsibility. Sixty alert, knowledgeahle observers in each company were exponentially better than only two or three. The only reply to Rauch's report was, "Headquarters section, engage." After his gunner squeezed off the h t round, the radio crackled with reports of 17 T34s moving along the right flank. The company occupying the center-right sector received the order to engage that formation. Rauch realized that the Russians were attempting to envelope the railhead. He had not had time to engage another T34 before the formation on the left flank pulled back, leaving four burning hulks behind. Staring in disbelief, the young tank commander saw that the same was taking place on the right flank, though no more than five T34s were burning. The Russian commander was not accepting any more losses. There were now very few tanks left around the perimeter. Several teams of soldiers, armed with MWMs and pntzefausls, assumed positions on the edge of town to ward off attacks. A flight of IL-2 ("Iron Guslav") ground-attack born-bers appeared without warning over the railhead. The crews manning the flak cars (reinforced concrete rail cars carrying anti-aircraft guns) needed no orders to engage the aircraft. "Don't worry," shouted En-nsberger, "the safest place is at the target." This was indeed true, because the Russian aircraft attacked as they always did, perpendicular to the train rather than along the length of it. The bombs fell many meters short of and past the target, inflicting no damage on the train. As more machine guns joined in, the wall of tracers terrified the pilots, causing them to drop the rest of their bombs and fly east. The Russian Air Force was by no means as tenacious as the Red Army. A crusty old Rauiptscliaiie1trer (master sergeant) remarked, "If those had been American planes, we would all be dead." Pcter Rauch's tank was the second-to-the-last tank loaded onto the rail car. Before moving to the railhead, he destroyed another T34 that attempted to infiltrate Herend. As he approached the ramp, he saw the Partrlters on the rail cars firing towards the Russians, each shot rocking the cars violcntly. Soldiers on the ground were shouting warnings, frightened that the rail cars would tip over. "Would you rather be captured?" shouted back one of the tank crew members. Rauch had his gun tube over the tank's back deck. but told his gunner not to fire until they were set on the train. He then noticed he was on the last remaining rail car. As soon as his tank stopped, the train began slowly to pull out. He stared incredulously at the tank remaining on the ramp, alone Paiizer W, realizing that it had lost its spot to save an additional Parttlter. Anger flashed in Rauch's mind. Soldiers of the Waffen SS did not leave their comrades behind, even if there were not enough rail cars present. Only then did he see 10 Panthers approaching from the south, firing on the Russian positions. This must be the regiment's 4th Company, commanded by Urtterstlrmt)ielrrer (second lieutenant) Knocke. The Parrzer IV was not alone after all. Sporadic 24 ARMOR -

"... The Veszprem action also illustrates the importance of teamwork and swift target identification. Units must practice standard operating procedures so that all actions are automatic. All units, down to individual tank crews, must have the discipline to hold their fire until ordered to fire....'I high explosive shells were still impacting in Hercnd as the train pulled clear of the village. All of the tanks on the train escaped, reinforcing anew defensive line forming farther west. The 2nd SS Panzer Division's ability to withdraw the ma.jjority of its armored force intact prevented that portion of the Eastern Front from collapsing. Actions such as this could no longer win the war, but extended it several weeks. This enabled thousands of refugees to make their way west, escaping life behind the Iron Curtain. Uitersfiinnfiielrrcrtwr Knocke's company joined a regular army unit and fought its way through the Russian lines. Although Knocke's company was behind enemy lines, the unit's discipline preserved its fighting spirit. The men had confidence in their commander and in themselves. All 10 Pantltcrs were destroyed in numerous fire fights, but most of the crew members rejoined their regiment at Esterhazy eight days later. This small military operation stresses that there is no such thing as a secure railhead during wartime. The forward line of troops can change quickly, with enemy armored spearheads penetrating tar into the friendly rear area. Even if enemy units are far away, there is still a great possibility of enemy agents operating in the railhead area. Units should train for these possibilities so that soldiers do not panic if such situations arise. All weapons systems not directly involved in the loading operation must deploy quickly to repel the attacker. If a prolonged defense is necessary, individual vehicles must break off, one by one, to load onto the train. As the outer defensive perimeter becomes thinner, vehicles already on the train must use their firepower to supplement the defense. Makeshift antitank and machine gun crews are the final defensive measures if no infantry support is available. Such an operation is very difficult, but by no means impossible. The Veszprem action also illustrates the importance of teamwork and swift target identification. Units must practice standard operating procedures so that all actions are automatic. All units, down to individual tank crews, must have the discipline to hold their lire until ordered to fire. This conserves ammunition and ensures engagements at decisive ranges, both of which are very important when fighting a numerically superior enemy. The Gcrmans did this very well at Veszprem. Individual companies engaged the entire target group, rather than the whole regiment firing at will. They hcld out for six hours using this system, but used only a fraction of their ammunition. The key link in this system is one overa commander. If no organic commander is present, a senior individual must take charge, or the units will begin to fight separately. Finally, Peter Rauch'screw portrays how vital it is that a tank'screw members work together as closely as the fingers on one hand. Each crew member must be thoroughly familiar with the others, and know how they will react in all situations. This saves valuable seconds of reaction time, and gives the crew a decisive edge over the enemy. To keep tank crews together as long as possible is the only way to develop such teamwork. The German Army stressed crew integrity. Wounded soldicrs always rcturned to their crews after convalescence, and crews were never split up unless promotion or death made it impossible to do otherwise. The Veszprem operation typifies the results of this system. High quality crew-teams are the key to destroying enemy tanks. Captain B. H. Frlesen was commissioned in Armor from the USMA in 1983. He has served as an M1 tank platoon leader and company XO with 1st Bn., 64th Armor; and assistant s4 at 2d Bde. in the FRG. A graduate of the

Airborne School, and Cavalry Leaders Course, he is currently assigned to 3d Sqn., 3d ACR at Fort Bliss. I ARMOR - 25 I

Tactical TankGunnery The preparation of soldiers for combat is the first and foremost mission of every maneuver commander. Armor commanders, in particular, know that both tactics and gunnery are integral to fight the tank successfully. Why, then, should soldiers train to accomplish them as separate tasks? Lieutenant Colonel Bill Hansen made these points in a recent Antior article, in which he described a program to align tank gunnery training with actual battlefield requirements. (See "Integrating Tactics and Gunnery Training," March-April 1985.) At almost the same time that article appeared, 2-69 Armor, IWth Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia, built a similar program tailored to a tank battalion. The battalion developed the tactical gunnery programs because units must train precisely as they expect to fight. There are several good reasons to combine tactics and gunnery. The most important is the limited training space and time available to the Army today. By developing a program in which tactical skills are always included as apart of gunnery training and vice versa, the commander can accomplish several training tasks simultaneously and save both time and space. Secondly, by combining tactics and gunnery, the distinction between the two is soon blurred, and soldiers quickly begin to think about tank fighting as an integrated operation in which both skills are essential for success. This thought process will climinate field training exercises and external evaluations in which gunnery skills seem to be -. superfluous to the training - = objective. Finally. such in- 2 5 tegrated training rapidly 3 makes unit SOPS important documents. and stand- 8 ardization becomes rampant in the unit. Soldiers will begin to "think" that "... The evaluators are they are fighting, not just Often the best training. bccause the dif- teachers available to ference has been Our soldiers..." eliminated. While any unit can develop a tactical tank gunnery plan, unless it is part of a total program in which component tasks are related to one another logically and in support of the unit's purpose, it will not necessarily be successful. A good training program of any kind must describe the commander's dcsircd outcomes before the unit expends any resources. Pre-training Evaluation To that end, the leadership of 2-69 Armor developed a comprehensive program of planning, executing, evaluating, and providing feedback for specific tasks with the National Training Center (NTC) as the focus for unit training. In order to improve the tactical skills essential for success at the NTC, we evaluated unit performance on those skills to determine what needcd additional emphasis. The abilities to accurately engage and destroy enemy targets, to maneuver the tank tactically, and to find and occupy positions that offer cover and concealment were high on the list. This evaluation revealed that the existing battalion gunnery program did not train tank crews to accomplish these tasks very well. The solution to this complex problem was to build a gunnery program in which tank crews stayed in a constant tactical state throughout the training period. This and fanatical adherence to the standards set forth in FM 17-12-3 produced substantially higher kill ratios during subsequent force-on-force and live fire phases at the NTC than the unit's previous rotation. From a training management viewpoint, the commander can tailor such a program to meet available range and ammunition constraints ARMOR - I and the normal training distractors that any unit experiences. Because an OPORD governs its execution, FRAGOs can make any adjustments easily and effectively, To prepare for the gunnery period, each company commander prepares a plan that provides specific guidance to his platoons based on battalion goals and objectives. This plan must include specific company requirements and concurrent training. A typical battalion gunnery program begins with preliminary gunnery training that the company commander and his master gunner design to meet the special requirements. The company program considers past crew performance, previous training and unit commitments during the train-up period. In addition, emphasis is on vehicle maintenance during this phase. 'I... The precombat inspection is an excellent oppoflunify for the company commander and his officers and NCOs to train subordinates... before training starts in earnest. It is also the first step toward the team-building process necessary for survival in combat - and at the NTC....'I Beginning with the last service before the gunnery period, the turret receives a thorough check, which includes borescope and pullover, sight purge, synchronization, and ballistic solution checks. Setting Up Assistance Teams To reach the desired high gunnery standards, we organized a battalion tank gunnery assistance team (TGAT) well before we started training. The company master gunners and the best tank commanders and gunners form the nucleus of the team. The gunnery team conducted the tank crew gunnery skills test (TCGST) and selected the tank crew evaluators (TCEs) who evaluated company and battalion training during the remainder of the gunnery period. While many units have de-emphasized the role of the evaluators, we found them to he a significant aid in evaluating crew performance during training and yualilication. More important, the evaluators are often the best teachers available to our soldiers. While it is possible lo evaluate crew functions from the tower, it is unlikely that the crew can learn how to shoot more effectively without an on-board expert (coach) to provide meaningful comments at the conclusion of each run. The evaluator also kept everyone honest by ensuring that the crew followed the rules. The battalion master gunner certifies each member of the assistance team and each evaluator before training begins. The battalion's first centralized gunnery training was the crew gunnery skills lest. The master gunner and the S3 validated the test to ensure that instructions, evaluation, and goals were in accordance with battalion guidance. The success of the gunnery program first became evident during the gunnery test as soldiers quickly learned that we would enforce high standards of gunnery performance. No one, including the battalion commander, was allowed to proceed to the next tank table until he had mastered the test. The company commander can conduct additional concurrent training if he desires. MILES gunnery techniques, terrain driving, wingman training, and platoon obstacles are examples. Upon completion of the company gunnery skills test, the battalion commander conducted a precombat inspection of personnel and equipment. Precombat Inspections The precombat inspection is an excellent opportunity for the company I ARMOR - 27 I commander and his oficers and NCOs to train subordinates and attachments on the unit SOP and the standards expected before training starts in earnest. It is also the first step toward the team-building process necessary for survival in combat - and at the NTC. The battalion commander can get a feel for NCO proficiency, leadership, and SOPS in each company. Following the inspection, each company conducted an evaluated tactical road march of at least two hours duration in accordance with a battalion march table. This road march can be especially beneficial to the company commander because it allows him to shake out the bugs in his command and control system and to train with his SOP. A quartering party preceded the main body into a tactical assembly area near the next range. The quartering party adhered to specified ARTEP standards, including NBC monitoring, security measures, selection of positions, establishment of land line communications, and road guides. As part of the company program, commanders conducted the road march under simulated NBC conditions, in MOPP status, at night, with an attack enroute, under NCO leadership, under the control of the executive officer, or in any other way that has significant training value. Building Cohesion at the Platoon Level The company is responsible for the initial tank tables and the tank crew proficiency course, which comprise the next phase of training. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant conduct this training to fostcr platoon-level cohesion. This step is essential to develop the platoon leader and those skills necessary to make the wingman concept work. The execution of OPORDS, map reading, graphics, and reporting procedures receive emphasis in this phase of training. It will not be uncommon to note an improvement in platoon leader skills from just listening to the dramatic increase in their levels of confidence on the radio. This improvement can occur in as little as three days of intensive training and is generally accompanied by a noticeable decrease in the number and duration of radio transmissions on the platoon nct. The important point here is that all training after the gunnery skills test was linked to the unit’s tactical mission. This provided a mechanism to evaluate individual and unit performance on the component tasks of the battalion’s overall mission. The company commanders included whatever tactical Lraining events thcy wanted during the preliminary gunnery phase. For example, each company could have an obstacle-breaching drill that included engineers during the TCPC or by the tank platoon alone. These skills have direct application at the NTC, in both the force-on-force and live tire phases. The battalion incorporatcd into the

TCPC.

This provided a direct link between gunnery training and success against the OPFOR at the NTC. Finally, during the preliminary phase, the company commander further developed his SOP, communication between him and his platoon leaders, and continued the team-building process. The company commandcr is free to concentrate on tactics because the company master gunner focuses on the technical aspects of gunnery. The battalion standard for the TCPC was that each crew must demonstrate proficiency before it could continue to TT 111 and IV. We programmed sufficient time for the company commander to conduct as many repetitions as necessary to ensure that the crews mastered basic skills. MILE!! feedback gave a real-time evaluation of crew progress and reduced the repetitions necessary before crews achieved proficiency. Bccause the crews had some respite from the rigors of garrison duties, they could devote a few uninterrupted hours to honing their field maintenance skills. In our case, the long road distance from garrison required commanders to plan training in such detail that they eliminated numerous shopping trips to pick up equipment, personnel and supplies. Because detailed planning is the key to success at the NTC, commanders got in the habit of doing so early in the training period. At the conclusion of this phase, the company commanders were required to make a tactical reconnaissance of the next range. An Unfamiliar Range Poses Added Challenges Due to construction of anew multi-purpose range at Fort Benning, the battalion had to use a nonstandard range for tank gunnery during the development of its tactical gunnery program. This proved to be particularly advantageous because the nonstandard range was a natural area with trees, high grass, rolling terrain, and few range markers or observable target pits. To develop a qualification program on this range placed a premium on map reading skills, selection of firing positions, terrain driving, and target acquisition. We conducted the movement to and occupation of the tactical assembly area most often at night under the watchful eye of an evaluator. The company performed all normal assembly area procedures including a tactical ammunition upload and a refueling operation, usually by platoon. 1 1 28 ARMOR - January-February 7 988

Before range firing began, the lowed by an OPORD and overlay to Some company commanders used NTC standards, which set the stage the link-up time to evaluate respon-for TT VIII. Using the "one-third, siveness to orders. two-thirds" rule, the company com-The use of on-board smoke as mander prepared a company order part of the movement criteria, and for his platoon leaders. The intent the use of some or all of the pas-company commanders planned for a calibration exercise and TT VI as a tactical operation. Because of the nature of these two events, one platoon could fire, while the others remained concealed in the assembly area and worked on prepare-to-fire checks and concurrent training. Units should be encouraged to be imaginative during this phase because they can learn many tactical lessons with little or no expenditure of resources. To illustrate the point, one platoon firing on the calibration line can use camouflage nets, establish a hot loop, and practice reporting procedures according to the unit SOP. The platoon leader is now able to practice platoon fire commands while he runs the exercise. The company commander should use this time to check load plans and crew drills. Meanwhile, battalion sets up a sand table exercise to train leaders on the control and distribution of fires and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The point is that no matter what the primary training objective, units can practice many tactical skills from crew to company lwei in almost any environment. All that is required is attention to detail, concentrated planning, and some imagination. More important, the effort to reduce the distinction between gunnery and tactics continues in a subtle but effective manner. I!. We conducted the night phase similarly, except that we incorporated night tactical operations techniques. We used light sticks to mark routes and firing positions. Wingmen used night vision devices both for training and safe ty..." Tactical Movement to the Range Late in the day, when TT VI is to be completed, the company commander issued a warning order, fol-was to practice the steps necessary to give each tank commander an order and overlay in a timely fashion. This is important because failure to receive and to understand the commander's intent at platoon and crew level has proved time and again to be the weakest link at the

NTC.

The S3 controlled execution of lT VI11 with assistance from the battalion master gunner and the gunnery assistance team. This group planned target location, engagements, tower and wingman scripts, and certified all evaluators working the range. The company is responsible for providing firing tanks and wingmen at the specified time and place. In executing the OPORD, the tank crew, under the control of his wingman (who was always the company commander, platoon leader or platoon sergeant) departed the tactical assembly area at the designated time along a prescribed route to the first checkpoint on his overlay. sage point procedures specified in the ARTEP are options available to the company commander as part of the training package. Some company commanders chose to use the initial checkpoint as an attack position to evaluate crew performance in accordance with his unit SOP. In any case, the crew should test-fire machine guns at the first checkpoint, thcn proceed down the qualification course. The tank commander's overlay had all necessary graphics to portray correctly the tactical situation, including a series of points that roughly corresponded to the firing positions. The tank commander navigated between each checkpoint, using terrain driving. The wingman issued specific target instructions to make the exercise tactically meaningful, but conducted all engagements in strict accordance with FM 17-12-3. At the last engagement, the tank commander receivcd a spot report on some type of enemy activity that required him to make a call for fire. He had to execute the request correctly within thirty seconds. If he did so, the battalion heavy mortar platoon executed the call for fire. In addition to the obvious benefits for the tank crew, the mortar platoon received excellent training in integrating their fires into the tactical scheme. Because the mortar platoon historically has difficulty with tactical integration at the NTC, this element was a positive effort to solve that problem. 29 I ARMOR -

"... The benefits were substantial in leadership development, mastery of gunnery skills, performance at the NTC, and most importantly, the elimination of the distinction between tactics and gunne ry...." cluded crew cuts and the score. We used the debriefing as the primary teaching tool throughout the gunnery program because it represented a thorough evaluation of all t-r--L p tactical and gunnery skills. the debriefing was that the crew'sown platoon leader or sergeant was a participant. In addition to the An important feature of - '.sr. b z I -

- -.- - %- Practicing Night Operations In Conjunction with Gunnery We conducted the night phase similarly, except that we incorporated night tactical operations techniques. We used light sticks to mark routes and firing positions. Wingmen used night vision devices both for training and safety. Wingmen called for illumination to add realism and to further train the younger leaders. We used unit recognition signals at the attack position and throughout the exercise. The outbrief includcd night tactical operations to assist tank crews in becoming more expert under those conditions. Summary The most important benefits of this gunnery program are total crew involvement in the integration of tactics and gunnery, and the tactical development of the platoon leader and sergeant in bringing effective tank fires on the enemv. We accomplished these important lessons through the tactical nature of the program and by using the chain of command as wingmen. The company commander, platoon leader, and platoon sergeant were responsible for directing the movement of their wing tanks, providing engagement instructions, and for observing fires. In the process, they gained the mental and oral communication skills necessary for survival and success on the battlefield. The interaction between tanks on the range stressed the development of a mental picture of desired battlefield outcomes in the minds of the junior leaders and exercised the communication skills necessary to convey that picture to subordinates in the wing tank, all in a short radio transmission. At the conclusion of each run, both the tank crew evaluator and the wingman debriefed the crew using the after-action review format. Tower personnel provided input for the briefing to bring out strengths or weaknesses that they noted. The debriefing was a formal presentation of each engagement, which in-team-building benefits, the crews hclpcd their wingmen to become better leaders and communicators by pointing out deficiencies in technique or instructions during the engagements. At the conclusion of TT V111, the company either continued on to TT IX or returned to the motor pool. The conduct of such an extensive gunnery program required a reasonably large expenditure of manpower from the battalion. However, the benefits were substantial in leadership development, mastery of gunnery skills, performance at the NTC, and, most important, the elimination of the distinction between tactics and gunnery. Graduates of this program are tank fighters who have the skills and desire to meet the enemy and to destroy him. Lieutenant Colonel Lon E. Maggart commanded 2-69 Armor, Fort Benning, Georgia, from April 1984 to April

1986. He is presently assigned to the Inspector General's Office, HQ, V Corps, in the FRG. I30 ARMOR - I