Part I: The Ten Lean Years

The Ten Lean Years From the Mechanized Force (I 930) To the Armored Force (I 940) by Major General Robert W. Grow, USA, Retired (Ed. Note: This remarkable and enlightening manuscript has only recently come to ARMOR Magazine. It is full of facts, the personal observations of a very astute officer, and generally heretofore unknown or limited information, and it deserves the widest possible dissemination to the Armor Force. General Grow passed away in November, 1985. ARMOR Magazine will present “The Ten Lean Years” in serial format over the next four issues. We strongly suggest that our readers keep all pertinent issues readily at hand for future reference on the verv turbulent decade from 1930 to 1940, when the major doctrinal changes regarding mechanization came first into being and then into effect, eliminated the horse as a cavalry mount, and introduced the armored, tracked vehicle into the Army’s arsenal. This is history, first person in the vernacular of the participant; it is armor history from the beginning, when world events and the vision of a few dedicated officers laid the foundations of the US. Army Armor Force as we know it today. The staff of ARMOR Magazine is proud to present THE TEN LEAN

YEARS.)

Throughout the decade from 1930 to 1940, it was my good fortune to serve in positions that called upon me to play a considerable role in the development of mechanization; its application to cavalry; its acceptance, as well as lack of acceptance, by the Cavalry Branch; and the eventual development of a separate Armored Force. My personal diary, recording both events and my reactions and hopes; many official directives and reports; as well as press clippings in my possession, are my sources for the following account of the creation of the Armored Force. This account is an attempt to piece together the history of the ~~ 22 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1987 period as I saw it at the time. I quote liberally from both documents and diary. From my relatively junior position, I doubtlessly failed to understand or correctly interpret many actions or expressions of my superiors. However, my close personal contact and friendship with Generals Van Voorhis, Chaffee, Henry, Kromer, and Herr, as well as countless junior officers with whom I worked, gave me an unusual opportunity to observe, as well as to take part in, the evolution that took place during the decade of the Thirties. The reader should remember that the Army was very small at this time and that the great majority of officers - certainly those in field grade - were personally acquainted with each other and, especially within each branch, were on a first-name basis. Contradictions appear in the following pages. These reflect changes in thinking as development progressed. The reader should bear in mind that quotations represent my understanding or thought at the time and not in retrospect. If I have misquoted or misinterpreted any action or statement of others, I can only offer my humble apologies. This is the way it appeared to me at the time. The decade of the Thirties comprised “ten lean years” for the military establishment, as well as a period of economic depression for the country. It was also the critical decade for Cavalry more than for any other branch. The long history of the soldier on horseback was coming to an end. Among cavalry officers there emerged two schools. One hung tenaciously to the dying hope that somehow, some way, the horse would prove indispensable to the Army. The other school - for the most part younger officers, believing firmly in the value of the mounted soldier - sought eagerly for a replacement for the horse. In spite of the success of Sir Edmund Alienby’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine in 1917 and 1918, World War I had proven conclusively that “there are no foxholes for horses,” and that horse units could operate, at best, only on the fringe of battle and in an ever-diminishing role. The divergence of opinion within 1 the Cavalry Branch brought clearly into focus the true meaning of the term “cavalry”. Whereas the older, more reactionary group held firmly to the definition (supported by Webster’s Dictionary) that cavalry was that branch of service whose soldiers fought on horseback, the younger and more far-sighted faction held that cavalry was that branch of service whose soldiers fought mounted. The latter were concerned only that the mount enable the soldier to employ his weapons effectively in battle. To these officers, the distinction between infantry and cavalry was that the former fights on foot and the latter fights mounted. This distinction is basic and fundamental. The distinction does not, nor did it ever, imply that Cavalry could not (or should not) often fight dismounted. Simply put, the far-sighted officers felt that a significant portion of the Army should consist of troops organized, trained, and equipped to fight mounted whenever the situation permitted. Following World War I, the Army settled back, having been reduced first to 280,000 and then to 125,000 men. The Cavalry School and the 14 cavalry regiments, far from any battlefield, resumed the posture of the days of Pancho Villa and General Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916. A few trucks and some scout cars were added to their organization, although they still maintained mule-drawn trains. Allenby’s brilliant campaigns in the Middle East had “proved”, to the believers, that horse cavalry was still in effective force. The infantry had a few tanks but these were recognized as an asset to the dismounted soldier confronted by machine guns. George Patton, who commanded our tanks that took part in the fighting of World War I, remained with the Tank Corps at Fort Meade, Maryland, until it was disbanded in 1920 and the tanks were assigned to the Infantry Branch. He maintained his strong interest in tanks and kept himself well-informed of progress overseas, but largely through personality clashes he was shifted about and did not take a significant part in cavalry mechanization. I met him on numerous occasions and was impressed by his wide knowledge, but I never became aware of any influence that he exerted on the development of mechanization in the Army until the Armored Force was formed. Then, as a protege of General Marshall, he quickly came to the front. Later, under his command, I learned to admire and respect him as a great tactician and, in my opinion, the greatest fighting leader of World War 11. During the Twenties, a few farsighted officers in the War Department were venturing opinions that the Army must take advantage of the progress being made in the automotive industry. They felt that foreign armies were devoting more than just thought to mechanization. Lack of funds precluded extensive procurement, however, and the absence of a real research program handicapped development. In Rahway, New Jersey, J. Walter ”. . . Foreign armies were devoting more than just thought to mechanization.. . # I Christie was working on a convertible tank, but the Ordnance Department gave him no encouragement while they puttered around making some improvements on the French Renault and designing something of their own. The Mechanized Force is Born Enough interest had developed by 1930, principally at Fort Meade where some limited tank and motorized training was conducted, to induce General Summerall, in his last year as Chief of Staff, to take positive steps taward the development of a mechanized force. In the belief that a mechanized unit, designed for mounted combat, would naturally assume a cavalry role, he visited Fort Brown, Texas, the home of the 12th Cavalry, and selected its commander, Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis, to head a provisional force made up from detachments from all arms and services. As the operations officer of the 12th Cavalry at the time, I eagerly accepted the opportunity to accompany Colonel Van Voorhis in the same capacity in this new but promising field. I thus became closely involved with mechanization for the next twenty years. The troops were assembled at Camp Eustis, Virginia, in the fall of 1930. January-February 1987 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 23

It would have been difficult for General Summerall to have selected a man with lesb knowledge of mechanics than Colonel Van Voorhis. On the other hand, he could have selected no one with a clearer insight into the need to develop a better cavalry “horse” and yet retain the principles of mounted combat. My mechanical knowledge was equally limited, but I had acquired at Fort Riley, where I served for five years, a profound conviction that a soldier who fights mounted can defeat one who fights dismounted, provided his mount affords a good base of fire and can maneuver effectively on the battlefield. We agreed from the beginning that our mission was to give the mounted soldier a decisive role in battle. As Adna Chafee was to remark later, “The mission of cavalry is to fight.” The Mechanized Force at Eustis was not cavalry. Although the commander and the S3 were cavalrymen, and the armored car troop was a cavalry unit, the Force was a composite group of all arms and services. The executive officer, Jimmy Brett, was an infantry tanker whose battle experience had been with the World War I Tank Corps under George Patton. The tiny Renault tanks maneuvered at a foot pace. In the first demonstration given to orient Van Voorhis and me, Brett led the attack on foot with colored signal flags. From this demonstration, we made our first basic decisions: all equipment must be capable of high battlefield - as well as road - mobility and, most importantly, leaders must learn to think and to command while mounted. Neither of these aims were satisfactorily accomplished during the twelve months that the Mechanized Force existed, although much progress was made under difficult conditions. Ordnance made some improvements in the old tanks, but the real impetus to modernization was given by Mr. Christie. Delayed by lack of funds and professional jealousy, seven tanks were finally procured during 1931. Mechanization Approved - In Theory By late spring, 1931, enough progress had been made for the War Department to accept the con-ceDt of mechanization for the entire Four of J. Walter Christie’s tanks arrived at Camp Knox with the Detachment for Mechanized Cavalry Regiment in early 1931. Army. The Chief of Staff, General MacArthur, announced the policy that all arms and services would adapt motorization and mechanization to their traditional roles. The Mechanized Force was to disband in the fall and its elements to return to their basic assignments. Since it was apparent that the Cavalry Branch would be the chief beneficiary of the more mobile mechanized equipment and since the Chief of Cavalry was willing and anxious to develop it, Colonel Van Voorhis with the nucleus of his headquarters and the armored car troop, plus the engineer, ordnance, and quartermaster units, were transferred to a new cavalry post - Camp Knox, Kentucky. There they were redesignated as the “Detachment for Mechanized Cavalry Regiment.” The Detachment included four of Christie’s new tanks. In the meantime, the press reported on 11 January 1931: Announcement of the training program of the experimental Mechanized Force at Fort Eustis, Va., for the purposeof studying the mission in war of the mechanized units of the Army, has been made by the War Department. During the period Jan. 1 to June 30 the new force ... will participate in 1 Ofield exercises and marches ... The primary mission of the Mechanized Force, as laid down by the War Department, is to provide a powerful weapon of high tactical and strategic mobility, high hitting power, high mobile defensive power, limited holding power, capable of independent action ... Several European nations, especially Great Britain, have created independent organizations composed of these mechanized weapons and designed to take the place formerly allotted to Cavalry of dealing quick hard-hitting blows awayfrom base. For the first time, the United States Army has collected the manymech-anized features now serving as auxiliaries and has formed an experimental mechanized force which will operate as a unit. It seems ironical that such a sound doctrine, developed in the War Department in late 1930 and announced in January 1931, should require almost ten years to be implemented in the Armored Force of 24 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1987

1940. The “ten lean years” were beset with acrimonious debate between horse and machine advocates, including General Staff officers; extreme budgetary limitations; failure of the supply services to encourage and use fully the United States’ vast industrial potential; and the failure of the War Department to follow up the farsighted policy announced in January 1931. The Role of the Chief of Cavalry War Department organization in the Thirties included an element under the General Staff called “Chiefs of Arms and Services.” The chiefs of combat arms, among whom was the Chief of Cavalry, were limited in command authority to their respective service schools and boards but had the responsibility for the development of organization, training, and equipment recommendations. Thus, to the Chief of Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas, fell the highly important responsibility of recommending the manner and means to develop mechanization in his arm. Throughout the decade of the Thirties, the progress of mechanization within the Cavalry Branch was largely dependent upon the desires of the Chief of Cavalry. In 1931, Major General Guy V. Henry was the Chief of Cavalry. He welcomed the opportunity to mechanize and supported the mechanization of one horse regiment and later of a second regiment and a brigade headquarters. However, beset by serious opposition to the conversion of horse units by horsemen of his own branch and even by Congressmen, and by extremely limited funds for either development or procurement, and by the reluctance of the Ordnance Department to accept ideas from the automotive industry, General Henry made relatively slow progress in mechaniz-ing the Cavalry Branch. The slow pace of mechanization within the Cavalry Branch tended to confirm the belief of both Van Voorhis and Adna Chaffee that mechanization could not succeed under cavalry sponsorship and that it develop as a separate agency or arm under the War Department. Although their feelings were not openly expressed, there existed a certain coolness between them and General Henry. At Fort Knox, a lack of full confidence in the Chief of Cavalry at Fort Riley persisted throughout the ten-year period. In my opinion, General Henry was mechanized-minded and did as well as could be hoped under the conditions that existed during his tour as Chief of Cavalry and later during his tenures as the Commanding General of Fort Knox and as Commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Riley. In 1934, Major General Leon B. Kromer was appointed Chief of Cavalry and encountered the same difficulties as his predecessor. Some progress came in the development of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and in the attitude of a large number of cavalry officers. In 1936, during General Kromer’s tour, the project for a mechanized cavalry division, which originated in the Chief‘s office, was first brought forth. If nothing else was accomplished during his tenure, this project was a major step in getting both cavalry and the War Department to think big. Changes in officer assignments, however, as well as continuing outright opposition, prevented any major development during General Kromer’s tour. In March 1938, Major General John K. Herr succeeded Kromer as Chief of Cavalry. He came from command of the 7th Cavalry at Fort Bliss, Texas. He remained fully committed to the retention of all horse units, although he accepted mechanized cavalry as a significant element of the arm and urged its development and expansion, as long as no horse units were sacrificed. Since expansion without conversion was impossible within budgetary limitations, he effectively blocked the development of mechanized cavalry on the scale demanded by conditions in Europe. My firm belief is that had General Herr, from the beginning, taken a strong stand for the mechanization of the Cavalry Branch, the Armored Force would never have been created. The General Staff, certain that a mechanized force was necessary, was ready to support the Chief of Cavalry. The General Staff had nowhere else to ‘turn. General Lynch, Chief of Infantry, did not want any “panzer” divisions, although some other infantry officers did. As late as 25 May 1940, when I left the Chiefs office, I still believed that the new mechanized force might be brought into being under the Cavalry banner, since Herr was weakening and promised me that he would recommend some conversions. I was wrong. Generals Van Voorhis, Chaffee, and others, discouraged by the attitude of Herr, prepared for the break which had to come, and in June 1940, the Armored Force was born. It was still cavalry, except in name, although to the public and “officially” it was a new arm (or rather “force” since only Congress could create an arm). It was, however, controlled by its own chief. Thelast Chief of Cavalry had lost it all. The Mechanized Force, 1930-1931 Given this brief historical outline of the evolution of the Armored Force, we will once again turn back the clock to the year 1930 and the birth of the Mechanized Force. The intentions of the War Department with respect to a role for the Mechanized Force were expressed in a letter from the Adjutant General, dated 3 November 1930, which stated in part: It has been organized on the theory that modern tanks, through their armament, speed, marching radius and mechanical reliability, are now capable of extended maneuver beyond the immediate support of divisional infantry, and may be so employed. It is believed that its principal role will be the execution of those tactical missions presenting an opportunity for a force capable of tactical and strategical mobility and quick, hard-hitting striking power. In connection with troops of other arms, it should be assigned missions which call for the display of the above qualities, The series of portraits on the following center-spread are from left. COL Adna R. Chaffee, M A J Robert W. Grow, M G Guy V. Henry, M G John K. Herr, M G Leon B. Kromer. and COL Daniel Van Voorhis. Story continues on page 28 January-February 1987 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 25

“...For the time being, the future of mechanization in the Army was tied to the Cavalry branch.. . I # such as the seizing and temporary holding of distant key positions; attacks involving turning and enveloping movements; counterattack, wherein the elements of success are speed, surprise and decisive direction; missions such as advance, flank or rear guard; missions in the breakthrough, and exploitations. The ability to crush its way forward over highly-organized ground in the face of stabilized resistance is secondary [emphasis added]. Its employment in no wise diminishes the role of infantry tanks. This was a clear-cut cavalry role, as cavalry was taught at Fort Riley following World’ War I. Unfortunately, it was not accepted by the horsemen,” either in Washington or in the field. The Mechanized Force consisted of the following elements, some of which did not reach Camp Eustis until early in 1931: Headquarters and Headquarters Company Antiaircraft Detachment (1st Plt, Btry E, 69th CAC) Armored Car Troop (Trp A, 2d AC Sqdn) FA Battery (Btry A, 6th FA, portee) Chemical Section (Det, 1st Chem Regt) Engineer Company (Co C, 13th Engr) Machine Gun Company (Co H, 34th Inf) Ordnance Company (19th Ord CO) Motor Repair Section (28th Motor Repair Sect, QMC) Tank Company (Co A, 1st Tk Regt) During the winter and spring of 1930-1931, we held a continuing series of marches, command post exercises (CPXs), field exercises, ceremonies, and demonstrations. The individual units were well-trained so that our problem, according to my notes, was basically twofold: “...to develop a combined tactical team, and to determine appropriate organization and equipment.” The lessons learned from each exercise were assembled during the spring of 1931 and tables “ of organization and equipment (TO&E) prepared for a mechanized brigade of 190 officers and 2,900 men with 845 vehicles of which 420 were in the combat echelon. The combat echelon included 230 tanks, 50 self-propelled guns and mortars, 90 halftracks, 19 armored cars, plus engineer and antiaircraft vehicles on tank chassis. The Christie tank was accepted in March (cost: $54,000) and set up for field tests. It reached Camp Eustis in April and was shown to the Ordnance Advisory Committee, where it performed very well. At this time Major General Van Horn Moseley, Deputy Chief of Staff, told the Committee that the future of mechanization lay along the lines of an auxiliary to the established functions of the line, rather than as a separate entity for battle maneuver. Notes from my diary indicate some of our thinking in January 1931: We must stop talking miles and use minutes. Engineers must have cross-country vehicles. Small obstacles delay this Force. Light power machinery will help. The biggest antiaircraft job is to cover defiles. Each vehicle needs an antiaircraft weapon. The antiaircraft battery should be dispersed in the march column. We must have uniform signals throughout the Force. thinks’followthe lead-er’ principle will not work. Don‘t think he understands Cavalry. S-3 must have accurate maps with time-distance of each element. Talked over medical detachment with S-4. Casualty collecting end is the most difficult. thinks cal .50 a fine weapon. Will try it shooting at tanks. Wonder if 25-lb bombwill do them much damage. These quotations indicate the scope and variety of problems that were under consideration at that time. Following the first long march - Camp Eustis to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where we held two demonstrations (Fort Bragg was then a field artillery post) - I noted that the new TlEl tank did well. The field artillery officers were convinced that we needed close, fast gun support. Meanwhile, decisions were being made in Washington which would affect the future of mechanization within the Army. Cavalry Branch Given Proponency Over Mechanization In May, Van Voorhis took the TO&E for a mechanized brigade to Washington. We had little hope of its acceptance, since we were aware of the tentative plan to put the Force under the Chief of Cavalry as a mechanized cavalry regiment with artillery and maintenance attached. Although rumors filled the air and kept us confused, we continued to carry out our training schedule, including small arms range practice. By the end of May, the decision came and our hopes for a strong independent mechanized brigade of all arms and services were dashed. In a letter to a friend, I described my feelings, which were torn between branch loyalty and what we considered the best interests of the Army: In regard to mechanization, we did our best to keep it out of the Cavalry, both for the good of cavalry and mechanization, but there are good arguments for the proposition as finally adopted ... l think the idea will be welcomed by a large proportion of cavalry officers who have seen the handwriting for some time. Of course it was a choice of a cut in Cavalry in either case and, in this way, the cut really occurs only in the horse element. We do not know yet which cavalry regiment will be mechanized or where our station will be ... There is no doubt but that the employment of a mechanized force and cavalry are so similar that only a physical inspection to see whether a command had wheels or horses could tell the difference ... The development in the next few years will be revolutionary to our Arm, but I have no doubt that the Cavalry will handle the situation well, for we have the most important characteristic, built up through 28 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1987

The T1 E l tank performed well in the experiments of the early 1930s. the centuries and which no other Arm possesses, i.e.. mental mobility ... We have found that the most important element to date. For the time being anyway, the future of mechanization in the Army was tied to the Cavalry Branch. The Chief of Cavalry, Guy V. Henry, now became deeply interested in the developments at Eustis. With his executive officer, Colonel Oliver, he accompanied the Force on a march to Camp Lee and a field exercise therein mid-June 1931. My comments after our return, taken from my diary: Tea for Henry at Van Voorhis quarters at 1600. Nothing new came up. Henry rather lukewarm on Knox. Oliver favors it. Henry seems rather imbuedwith the magnitude of the thing, since he has seen it and I think wants toget away by himself where he can digest it. He saw everything: good weather and bad, good road and mud, a real snappy attack with delay caused by carriers (tank transporters), and he saw some good driving and maintenance. The radio was poor the first day and excellent the second. We couldn’t have asked for more. Oliver is much impressed and I think we wilt get sympathetic treatment. General Henry’s attitude was shown by his memo to Moseley on 3 July 1931 by which he transmitted a proposed TO&E for a mechanized cavalry regiment: All tables are only tentative ... 1 can assure you that as soon as the matter is definitely approved and turned over to the Cavalry, no stone will be left unturned to make it a success. Despite his good intentions, General Henry was to have mixed results in getting the Cavalry Branch to accept mechanization during his tenure as Chief of Cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel Adna Chaffee joined the Force in July and Our training program continued through the summer and fall, although we knew that the Force was to be broken up soon. The Army-Navy Journal carried this comment on 1 August: What is hoped for in organizing the cavalry regiment (mechanized) is that the unit will be able to demonstrate that it can perform the functions and normal duties of a Jimmy Brett left on 1 September. A Christie tank is recovered during a field problem at Camp Knox, KY. in the early 1930s. January-February 1987 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 29 cavalry regiment in warfare, nothing more, nor for the time being, nothing less, if it is to be considered a success. I commented that “this sounds like Moseley” and added that the decision was a “blow for Van Voorhis who has worked so hard for a real independent Mechanized Force.” Mechanized Force Disbanded By September, the decision to base the mechanized cavalry regiment at Knox had been made, but we were finding difficulties in salvaging motor equipment from the Force to take there. On 18 September, my diary relates: Van Voorhis and Chaffee were told by Moseleythat cavalrymecha-nization would be one regiment only, to be selected and sent to Knoxthiswinter(lS31-32).[Actually the 1 st Cavalry did not get to Knox until a year later.] We take no tracklaying equipment from Eustis. The Christies were shipped by rail. We were to leave Eustis about 1 November with Headquarters, Armored Car Troop, and the Ordnance Company. The Quartermaster Detachment and the Signal Corps Detachment would come along for post duties and the Engineer Company would go to Knox for awhile to work on buildings and post facilities. The Tank Company and the Machinegun Company would return to their parent infantry units and the Field Artillery Battery, Antiaircraft Detachment, and Chemical Detachment would return to their former stations. From a practical standpoint, this was the end of the Mechanized Force. The breakup started in October,

1931. Men who wished to stay with the unit were transferred into the Detachment. Troops and equipment to go to Knox were inspected and passed in review on 24 October. On the 26th of October, the Field Artillery Battery left for Fort Hoyle and the Tank Company for Fort Meade. Van Voorhis was much affected, especially by the loss of the tanks. As viewed from Force Headquarters and expressed in our “Consolidated Report of Operations,” our conclusions were: a. That a mechanized force is a powerful instrument in the execution of the mobile missions of war.

b. That a mechanized force, if properly organized and equipped, can accomplish the missions set forth in the War Department directive of 3 November 1930.

c. That experience has shown that the present Mechanized Force is not suitably organized, equipped, or of sufficient strength.

d. That experience has shown that all elements of the present Force are essential to a mechanized force, and should form integral partsthereof, toassure thedevelop-ment of that peculiar technique of training and of the control which is essential to the full development of the powers of the Force. Our final recommendation was: e. That a mechanized brigade, tables, be organized on the present Mechanized Force as a nucleus with a definite project of completion in personnel and equipment in a fixed period of time, and that the force be stationed at a location pro-vidingsuitableterrain and housing. The final recommendation was not adopted, however, and the Mechanized Force ceased to exist at midnight on 31 October 1931. In retrospect, we can now say that in spite of equipment that vaned from obsolete tanks to passenger cars framed in boiler plate, to commercial trucks, we had been able to develop tactical doctrine which, in large measure, withstood organized as shown in the attached the test of World War 11.

# M O R GENERAL ROBERT W. GROW,

NhOSe career began as a horse CaValW-nan, became one of the pioneers in the nechanization of the U.S. Army. He was :he first S3 of the Mechanized Force under ZhaffeeandVanVoorhisin theearly1930s m d later commanded the 6th Armored 3ivision in the European Theater during NWII. He retired as a major general in 1953 after serving as military attache in Vloscow during the postwar years. General Srow died in November, 1985. Two editors who are not members of the ARMOR staff made major contributions in preparing the “Ten Lean Years“ manuscript for publication: CAPTAIN PETER R. MANSOOR was commissioned in Armor from West Point in 1982, the top cadet in his class. He was also an honor graduate of the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course and the Armor Officer Basic Course, and is also a graduate of the Airborne course at Fort Benning, GA. He served as a tank platoon leader with D Company, 3d ACR, as cavalry platoon leader in ATroop, XO of D Company, and as S3 of that unit. He recently attended the Armor Officer Advanced Course and is now assigned to the 1 1 th ACR. KATHY CAST GARTH earned a BA in English at Old Dominion University in 1981, later working for a newspaper and an advertising agency in the Fort Hood area. She is currently residing in Radcliff, KY, while her husband attends the Armor Officer Advanced Course. 30 ARMOR. The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1987