Ambush!

It is asserted by those who have made the profession their study that an army is exposed to more danger on marches than in battles. In an engagement the men are properly armed, they see their enemies before them and come prepared to fight. But on a march the soldier is less on his guard, has not his arms always ready, and is thrown into disorder by a sudden attack or ambuscade. Ageneral, therefore, cannot be too careful and diligent in taking necessary precautions toprevent a surprise on the march and in making proper dispositions to repulse the enemy, in case of such accident, without loss. - Vegetius The Military Institutions of the Romans’ Imagine, if you will, a US Army mechanized march column cautiously moving on a narrow road through a defile in mountainous terrain. Suddenly, the lead tank erupts in flames and stops, blocking the passage and halting the rest of the column. Immediately, the surrounding cliffs light up with the flashes of machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, antitank missiles, and mortar fire. There is no room for maneuver, and vehicle after vehicle is torched in the deluge of fire. The infantry swarm out of their carriers and assault the heights, only to run into mine fields and a wall of automatic fire that drives them back into the kill zone - and certain death. The tanks are helpless; they can’t elevate their guns high enough to reach the ambush force. Every tank commander dies before he can drop down inside the tank and button-up the hatch. Later, the few survivors claim that they never saw a single enemy soldier. The scene I’ve described can be only too real. History is full of examples of military units that suffered immense loss of men, materiel, and morale from sudden assaults into their march columns. One such attack occurred during the American Revolution. In August 1777, a strong force of British and Indians ambushed General Nicholas Herkimer and his column of militia as they crossed a creek in a heavily wooded area near Oris-kany, New York. The ensuing battle cost General Herkimer his life and the lives of over a third of his men. In Indochina in 1954, Regiment 803 of the Viet-Minh Communist army attacked French Mobile Force 100, a regimental-size unit consisting of motorized infantry, tanks, mobile artillery, and along column of cargo trucks, near the town of Ankhe in southern Vietnam. The ambush cost French forces over 900 casualties and 200 assorted armored and wheeled vehicles damaged or destroyed. In 1964, Viet Cong guerrillas attacked and overran a South Vietnamese Army ammunition convoy at the foot of the monument commemorating the loss of Mobile Group 100 ten years earlier. All of the South Vietnamese were killed and the ammunition captured. Our soldiers lack the training to survive that kind of attack. Training manuals and instruction in our service schools must address that problem in detail. One solution is to add REACT TO AMBUSH to the MOVE mission in the Army Training and Evaluation Program and emphasize it during tactical road marches. The current TAKE ACTION ON CONTACT task is inadequate in that it doesn’t readily apply to a unit in an immobilized column, nor does it address the need for infantry to dismount immediately and assault in such a situation. We must also rewrite current doctrine on the column or traveling formation to state that it is when a march unit is in column that it is most vulnerable. The notion that a column formation is used when the enemy threat is 16 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare small could lead to fatal relaxation of security. In every campaign in US military history, our columns have been subject to surprise attack by the enemy. A scan of current Army training manuals for guidance on how to overcome that threat shows that we forget our Vietnam experiences, and other lessons in history, and give counterambush doctrine hardly a page in our texts. For instance, the only reference that pertains to ambush of a mechanized task force march column appears in Field Manual 71-25. It states: Ambushes will be fought through without delay. In the event the battalion is ambushed, the march unit in the kill zone will increase speed, fight through, and report the ambush. The battalion commander may order that march unit to return tothe ambush site and conduct a hasty attack to clear it of the enemy or to establish a blocking position on the far side of the kill zone while a following march unit conducts the hasty attack.. The Tank andMechanizedlnfantry Battalion Task Force2 Equally scant guidance is available to a company team commander in Field Manual 71-15. It states: If the company is engaged by the enemy during the conduct of a road march, the commander should make sure the platoons are trained to: return fire on the move; submit spot reports; evade antitank missiles; move rapidly to a covered and concealed position and continue to engage; use smoke to screen movement if cover or concealment cannot be reached; update spot report with additional information. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team3 By themselves, those references will not prepare a mechanized march column commander to face and overcome an ambush prepared by experienced, disciplined soldiers. In addition, the guidance those references provide will be useful only if the element caught in the kill zone has the freedom to maneuver - a situation hardly ever found in a well-laid ambush. Counterambush training must begin with an understanding of the prnciples of ambush, which are surprise, concentrated fire, prevention or restriction of maneuver of the target, and security.

"... If maneuver in the kill zone is impossible, soldiers must understand that the only recourse for survival is to gain fire superiority.... I Understand those principles, and you will have an appreciation of the countermeasures needed and the leadership challenge you will face. Soviet soldiers understand those principles all too well. The Soviets are gaining first-hand experience right now at the hands of truly expert ambushers: Afghan guerrillas. You can bet that Soviet military instruction is full of wisdom gained from those experiences. The US Army experience in Vietnam and other wars showed that once an ambush occurred, the most important countermeasure to take was counterfire with all available weapons. Since a mechanzied column is pregnant with weapons of every description, the challenge is to convince our soldiers to use them, for the first reaction of green soldiers is to run and seek cover, very seldom to fire back. Also, if maneuver in the kill zone is impossible, soldiers must understand that the only recourse for survival is to gain fire superiority. Without it, even if they can move, they won't escape the kill zone. Gain fire superiority over the enemy, and he suddenly loses the initiative and becomes vulnerable to counterattack. That is the time to assault the ambush site. While an assault might force the enemy to withdraw, to stay in the kill zone means certain death. As in all combat operations, counterambush requires well-drilled, confident, aggressive, and - above all - disciplined soldier teamwork. The job of leaders is to build that disciplined team and make it work. Marshal de Saxe, an experienced combat soldier of the 18th century, noted in his book about the art of war: The Romans conquered all peoples by their discipline. In the measure that it became corrupted, their success decreased. When the Emperor Gratian permitted the legions to quit their cuirasses and helmets, because the soldiers complained that they were too heavy, all was lost. The barbarians whom they had defeated during so many centuries vanquished them in turn. de Saxe My Reveries Upon the Art of War" The standard of training needed to defeat an ambush is high and demands constant practice. we must give our soldiers the needed edge to survive. Let us give them the skill they need to overcome an ambush NOW. Footnotes 'Phillips, T. R. Brig. Gen., Roots of Strategy. Hamsburg, Stackpole Books, 1985, p. 132. 2FM 71-25, The Tank and Mechanized Znfantry Battalion Task Force, 1984, appendix C, para C-14-f. 3FM 71-15, The Tank and Mechanized Znfantry Company Team, 1985, appendix B, section 4. 'Phillips, T. R. Brig. Gen., Roots of Strategy, Hamsburg, Stackpole Books, 1985, p. 229.

MARIO was commissioned in infantry from OCS after serving as an enlisted combat engineer and armor crewman. Agraduateof thelnfan-try Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and the Armor Officer Advanced Course, Airborne School, and the Armor Officer Advanced Course, he has served as a platoon leader in both infantry and armor units, as XO of an infantry company, and as an assistant S3 of an armor battalion. He is scheduled to become S1 of 3-63 Armor, 3d ID, in Germany. ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 17