Winning the Meeting Engagement

". . .Our heavy task forces have difficulty with the high-speed, fluid nature of meeting engagements.. . .I Winning the Meeting Engagement by Major David Ozolek The Soviets believe the first battles of the next war will be meeting engagements between rapidly moving forces. Their doctrine says that about 80 percent of the subsequent battles will also involve encounters between moving forces. They write voluminously on the subject in their military journals, and most of their tactical exercises involve training in meeting engagements. On the other hand, our own doctrinal manuals only briefly address how to fight and win a meeting engagement. Exercises at the National Training Center (NTC) have shown that our heavy task forces have difficulty with the high-speed, fluid nature of meeting enagagements. Part of the explanation for this shortcoming may be that while the NTC's OPFORis well-drilled in the principles of the meeting engagement, it is not an operation that receives heavy emphasis in our own training. If we are to win the first battles, gain the initiative, and continue the fight on our terms, we must understand how our potential opponents plan to fight the meeting engagement, master the principles that will allow us to win these initial battles, and train hard on the subject. For the Soviets, the meeting engagement is not simply a chance encounter, but a n anticipated and probably pre-planned action in which two forces, each engaged in offensive action, collide enroute to their deeper objectives. According to Soviet doctrine, there are three common scenarios in which a meeting engagement may occur: Operational maneuver groups, or first echelon regiments, exploiting strategic surprise and rapidly moving forward just prior to or at the beginning of hostilities, will encounter enemy forces moving forward to their initial defensive positions. Follow-on echelons penetrating gaps in the enemy's defenses caused by nuclear or conventional fire strikes, or by breakthrough attacks conducted by lead elements, will encounter in the enemy's rear, reserve forces moving forward to contain the penetration and restore the defense. Second echelon, or reserve forces, moving forward to stop an enemy penetration may encounter high-speed enemy units attempting to exploit their initial success. Soviet March Organization When Anticipating a Meeting Engagement The combined arms regiment is the building block of Soviet tactical operations, but success in the meeting engagement depends primarily on the regiment's lead battalion's use of speed, surprise, the rapid massing of combat power and decisive maneuver to destroy a n equivalent or even superior enemy. They know that in order to avoid operational and strategic defeat, they must penetrate to our rear quickly to destroy our nuclear-capable systems and our fire support and combat service support before we can decisively use these combat multipliers against them. In order to maintain as high a rate of advance 10 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1987

Soviet Motorized Infantry Battalion in the approach march to contact formation - -- ._-- &-- ---_- ~- -- ---

COMBAT

FORWARD

RECONNAISSANCE

SECURITY

\

PATROL

ELEMENT (FSE)

as possible, the battalion will organize in a column designed to balance speed and the ability to develop the situation. This column consists of three elements: a Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP), a Forward Security Element (FSE), and the battalion main body (Figure 1). The CRP is the battalion’s lead element and is built around a motorized infantry platoon consisting of three IFVs. An engineer squad and a mounted NBC reconnaissance* element are normally attached. The battalion commander may also direct the attachment of an antitank or tank section. Moving three to five kilometers (or nine to 15 minutes, at standard march speed) ahead of the FSE, the CRP’s principal tasks are to identify the best route of march for the remainder of the battalion, to locate the enemy and provide early warning, and if necessary or opportune, to destroy the enemy’s reconnaissance forces. The second element (the Forward Security Element (FSE)) in the advance to contact formation consists of a motorized infantry company, reinforced with a tank platoon, minus the elements detached to form the CRP. This FSE will probably have an attached self-propelled howitzer (SP-122) battery and may be supported by an antitank platoon. The FSE’s mission is to stop the enemy’s advance, fight through his initial resistance, destroy as much of the enemy’s force as possible, and fix what cannot be destroyed. The FSE travels about five to 10 kilometers (15 to 30 minutes) forward of the battalion’s main body. The main body consists of the battalion’s two remaining motorized infantry companies, each reinforced with a tank platoon. If the battalion is the forward element of a regimental march, the remainder of the regiment’s organic SP-122 battalion may be attached. The battalion commander may also designate a small combined-arms force of reinforced platoon size to serve as a reserve to deal with unanticipated events. Soviet Meeting Engagement Battle Doctrine Soviet doctrine says that winning a meeting engagement requires gaining a reconnaissance advantage, achieving surprise, seizing the initiative, securing advantageous lines and areas, and conducting deep attacks against the enemy’s flanks and rear. The battalion may receive initial reconnaissance information from the regiment’s reconnaissance company, which travels up to 50-100 kilometers forward of the lead battalion. The lead battalion’s own reconnaissance effort begins with the CRP moving along the designated route of march to ensure the route is passable and is free of enemy units. Bypasses around obstacles are found and marked or, if’ necessary, the CRP breaches barriers that cannot be circumvented. The NBC element surveys and marks routes around or through contaminated areas. If small enemy forces, particularly reconnaissance elements, are identified, the CRP may destroy them by ambush - providing that the recon mission is not compromised. If the enemy force is too large for the CRP to handle, the CRP reports the enemy’s location, composition, and direction and speed of movement to the FSE commander, who prepares for contact. When the FSE begins to engage the enemy’s lead elements, the CRP’s next task is to locate the enemy’s main body. The high-speed tempo of themeet-ing engagement requires gaining surprise and retaining the initiative. The Soviets attempt to maintain momentum and keep the enemy off balance by continuously piling on forces from unexpected directions. This requires achieving an edge in the decision-making pro-BAlTALlON

MAIN BODY

FIG. 1

cess, a difficult proposition for a command, control and communications (C3) system with definite weaknesses. In order to compensate for their C3 shortcomings, the Soviets rely heavily on detailed ad; vance planning on how possible meeting engagements along the route of march will be fought. The commander carefully studies the route of march and determines the locations at which meeting engagements are most likely to occur. A contingency plan for each of these areas on the route of march is prepared. If the enemy is encountered near or in one of the pre-planned engagement areas, he is rapidly attacked according to plan, with a minimum amount of further planning necessary. The pre-emptive seizing of key terrain near the predicted battle sites is seen as a tactical necessity. The battalion’s reserve or reinforced antitank elements occupy dominating sites along the route of march and prepare to deliver immediate and accurate long-range antitank fires if contact occurs. The combat phase of the meeting engagement begins with the FSE deploying on line on advantageous terrain across the enemy lead element’s route of advance. The SP- 122 battery places direct fire in volleys at specific point targets in the enemy formations. In the direct-fire role these weapons are devastatingly accurate to three kilometers against point targets and five or more kilometers against area targets. Once firepower superiority is gained, the maneuver elements of the FSE assault. If firepower superiority cannot be gained, or if excessive casualties are taken in the assault, the FSE establishes a hasty defense on advantageous terrain to fix and suppress the enemy until the main body amves. Using the FSE as a base of fire, the battalion commander uses bold maneuver to move the main body around the FSE to strike the enemy ~ January-February 1987 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 11 forceon its flanks or rear. This may be from a single direction, or if possible, simultaneously on both flanks. This maneuver allows the battalion to concentrate all its fires against the enemy, while the enemy is forced to fight in three different directions at once (Figure 2). Once the main body’s assault is underway, the CRP bypasses the enemy’s main force and establishes OPs on possible routes of withdrawal or reinforcement to isolate the battle area. The reserve may be sent deep to establish antitank ambushes along these routes to prevent or delay reinforcement or escape. The battalion’s other indirect fire support assets, possibly including the two remaining batteries of the regiment’s organic howitzer battalion, will also be used to seal off the engagement area by placing fires across the access routes. If this engagement successfully results in the destruction of the enemy, the battalion regroups in its march formation and continues its advance to the next likely engagement area or to its final objective. If, however, the enemy proves too strong, the entire battalion establishes a hasty defense on advantageous terrain to contain, suppress, and attrite the enemy until the regiment’s main body can be deployed against the enemy force. Soviet Doctrine Strengths The most important strength of Soviet meeting engagement doctrine is the speed at which it allows them to conduct the operation. The direct benefit of this speed is the ability to mass combat power quickly at key locations on the battlefield. Fresh units are constantly introduced into the fight from new directions, giving the enemy multiple problems to solve and reducing his ability to determine the Soviets’ real concept. Doctrinally, it takes only about 30 minutes from the time the FSE makes initial contact until the battaIion main body begins its assault. Because the bulk of his planning was done before the battle began, the Soviet battalion commander can use that 30 minutes to concentrate on the execution of his plan rather than on its development. In the meantime, unless a comparable degree of contingency planning has been done, the opposing commander needs at least that 30 minutes to receive reports from his elements in contact, determine what’s going on, develop a concept and issue a plan to his subordinates. And, about the time that plan is issued, new threats from different directions begin to appear, revisions are required, and the whole planning process must begin again. Thus, the advantage of initiative remams with the Soviet commander throughout the engagement, and he is able to act while his opponent can only react. The continuous reconnaissance effort makes it possible for the commander to ensure the battle takes place where he wants it to. Since the CRP should have Iocated and reported the location, speed, and direction of movement of the enemy’s lead elements and main body before the first contact begins. Simply by adjusting his march speed, the Soviet commander can make sure the battle takes place where and how he envisioned it. he-planning also allows the battle to progress according to plan even ifthe battalion command group is destroyed. In the absence of further orders, the sub-elements continue to fight according to the initial plan until they reach their assigned objectives. Soviet Doctrinal Weaknesses In order to gain these advantages, the Soviets have had to make some sacrifices that lead to exploitable weaknesses. Soviet doctrine says that speed is in itself a form of security. Their stress on the importance of quickly getting deep into the enemy’s defenses discourages them from employing multiple security units not on the unit’s route of march. Since a moving unit must adjust its march speed to that of its slowest element, flank security detachments may slow the main body and may not be used in the highspeed march to contact. Thus, the column’s flanks are often vulnerable to surprise attacks. A weakness that results from trying to fight from a single column is that such a column can be outflanked. Soviet meeting engagement doctrine requires that the enemy’s advance first be stopped (the primary mission of the FSE) and then his flanks attacked (by the battalion’s main body). Although the FSE is a formidable combined arms force, it fights as a single element and cannot black more 12 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 198?

”Victory in the meeting engagement goes to the side that gains the initiative and maintains it ...“ than one avenue of approach at a time. Thus, it is possible that enemy elements that are not fixed by the FSE can bypass it and, by spoiling the main body’s effort, prevent the Soviet plan from being executed. Because of C3 system weaknesses, extensive pre-planning for the Soviet battalion is not just desirable; it’s essential. However, even if the C3 system is destroyed, the sub-elements will continue to execute the plan. But if the C3 system is destroyed and the parameters upon which the plan are based are changed, the C3 system’s inflexibility does not allow the unit to react to the changes. This is not to say that sub-elements executing what has become an overall inappropriate plan will simply roll over and play dead, for they will continue to fight hard to gain their objectives. But by keeping them from working together to meet changed circumstances, they can be destroyed piecemeal if action is taken before the C3 system can be restored. Another weakness results from a combination of the heavy reliance on detailed pre-planning and the “echeloning” concept that is a cornerstone of Soviet doctrine. although the spacing between the elements of the march column (a form of echeloning) allows elements not in the initial contact freedom of maneuver, it also opens “windows of opportunity” that can be exploited to disrupt the Soviet plan. Preplanning is done in great detail and relies heavily on rigid schedules for the coordination of fire support and maneuver. Anything that disrupts that schedule, such as forcing an increase in the gaps between march elements and delaying their arrival at assigned locations, seriously degrades their ability to mass combat power. This gives us the chance to fight the sub-elements one at a time, with a force ratio to our advantage. Battle Techniques Victory in the meeting engagement goes to the side that gains the initiative and maintains it by reacting quicker, moving faster, and disrupting the enemy’s scheme. The critical period in a meeting engagement is the 30 minutes between the time the FSE makes contact and the main body launches its assault. Thirty minutes is not enough time for the preparation and distribution of an order. Thus, at least the basics of contingency planning must be done in advance. For any operation in which the enemy’s situation is not thoroughly known in advance, contingency plans must be made for possible contact in the most likely, most advantageous, and most dangerous locations along the avenue of approach. These plans do not need to be impeccably prepared masterplans; simple sketches attached as annexes to the basic order can suffice. All that’s required is a rough overlay with a general statement of the concept and each sub-element’s mission, route, and objective. These plans, if needed, can be initiated by simply broadcasting or sending by messenger the code-word title of the plan and the time of execution. Such plans can be put into action before the Soviet commander’s plan can get fully underway. Instead of having to react to what the Soviets are doing. we can make them have to react to what we are doing. Next, we must exploit the capabilities of our own C3 system. Accurate and timely information must be passed to the task force and January-February 1987 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 13

Teams A. B. and D attack and destroy the FSE while Team C interdicts and delays the main body.

US TASK FORCE

team commanders and to the special element leaders from anyone who has knowledge of the enemy. Although the task force command net should be reserved principally for commanders, it must be open for anyone else with important information. Team commanders ’ must learn to talk not only to the task force commander, but also with each other to coordinate their actions. One of the arguments some commanders use against this idea is that the command net becomes too cluttered and when the commander needs to transmit, he can’t break into the net. This, however, is a problem that often stems from poor training in communications procedures. Simplified reporting and conscientious use of short, accurate reports can eliminate most of the abuse of such a system. Whenever possible, the task force should use multiple, mutually supporting axes for its lead elements. Although this will reduce the task force’s overall speed to the speed of the slower of the lead elements, unless the higher speed capable on a single axis is absolutely essential, the extra degree of flexibility provided by multiple axes will be a significant advantage in the first minutes of a meeting engagement. Since the FSE can only interdict one avenue of approach at a time, the leading team not in contact is free for other maneuver. Another useful technique is that of using specially designated antitank elements for the pre-emptive seizure of key terrain along the route. Composed of ITVs with infantry attached for security, or M2s with their infantry squads, these small elements leapfrog succeeding terrain features and provide immediate long-range overwatching fire in the event of enemy contact. Such terrain can also be designated as battle positions for attack helicopters, if available. Tanks are not the best system to use for this task because the mobility and sunriva-bility of the tank makes it more crucial for the high-speed assault phase of the operations. And with overwatching fires provided from these positions, the company teams can maneuver with greater speed and increased security. Exploiting the “Windows” The most difficult and perhaps the most important task in the meeting engagement is determining and exploiting those “windows of opportunity” presented by the Soviet approach march formations. Left uninterdicted, the Soviet battalion will, on contact, quickly move from the column to its combat formations and rapidly overwhelm our elements with locally superior forces. In order to create favorable local force ratios for our elements, we must keep the Soviets from being able to re-mass by rejoining the separated elements of the column. That five-to-ten kilometer gap between the FSE and the main body is the window of opportunity that allows us to do just that, but two things must occur simultaneously if this is to happen. First, we must mass enough combat power for the quick destruction of the FSE before the main body can enter the fight. Second, we must extend the amount of time it takes the main body to enter the fight, by delaying it on its route. We must also decrease the main body’s combat power by attriting it as it moves and exhausting it before it gets to the main engagement area by forcing it to fight a series of minor engagements along its route. An attacker must have at least a 3:l advantage in combat power to have a chance of success. Since the FSE is a reinforced company, roughly three teams will be necessary to destroy it. When combined with adequate advance planning, our advantages in mobility, fire control and C3 can allow us to quickly mass sufficient combat power to provide for a successful attack on the FSE. With rapid, decisive, action, the FSE can be quickly eliminated. At the point that this successfully happens, the enemy loses about one-third of his overall physical ability to fight. The disruptive effect of this loss on the 14 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare January-February 1987 enemy’s overall effort will be even more devastating than the physical losses in themselves, since all of his pre-planning will now be for naught and his relatively inferior C3 system will make it difficult to compensate for his significantly reduced combat capabilities. The fourth maneuver company available under the J-series TOE is the key asset for delaying the main body while the other three companies destroy the FSE (Figure 3). Once again, the force ratio necessary for accomplishing a mission is the key factor in determining what type and how large a force to use. Holding up and attriting the enemy’s main body should be a moderate-risk delay mission, one that can be successfully accomplished with a force ratio of about 1:3. Thus, a single company-team can provide a sufficient deep-attack force to interdict the enemy’s follow-on element. It’s important to use the right type of element for each task in the meeting engagement. Having too much combat power where it’s not absolutely necessary is almost as bad as not having enough since it means potentially decisive actions at other locations in the battle will be deprived of critically needed assets. The combat characteristics of an infantry-heavy combined arms team make it the unit of choice for delaying the main body in most terrain. This frees the tank-heavy teams for the job they’re best suited for - assaulting the FSE. The infantry-heavy team’s delaying mission can be assisted by reinforcing it with the long-range weapons available to the task force that are not necessary for the destruction of the FSE. For example, the task force heavy mortars, because of their limited range, high-volume of fire and trajectory characteristics should support the assault on the FSE. Since the main suppression threat coming from the FSE is the SP-122 battery in the direct-fire mode, the mortars, firing high-angle from behind covering terrain features, can suppress the SP-122s without the 122s being able to return fire. Simultaneously, the task force’s supporting long-range artillery can be used to support the interdiction of the follow-on force at greater range, attriting and slowing the enemy’s main body. Attack helicopters are also good weapons for the deep fight. Their firepower and ability to strike quickly from any direction are the ideal complement for the infantry’s ability to trap the enemy’s motorized and armor elements in antiarmor ambushes established along the enemy’s route and to use close combat to fix the enemy for the helicopters to destroy. Working with the task force’s ground-mounted ATGM systems, which provide long-range fire against the main body from key terrain features at optimum stand-off distance, the combination of close infantry antiarmor ambushes, the helicopter’s firepower and mobility, and the ground-mounted ATGM’s long-range accuracy, the Soviet follow-on force faces a threat of insurmountable depth that it can neither bypass nor fight through at a high rate of speed. The time these deep elements buy by slowing and attriting the main body gives those elements that have been in contact with the FSE time to complete its destruction and reorganize, and then to move and assault the main body under the suppressive fires of the deep elements. As the final phase of the meeting engagement begins, the task force commander must also look past the immediate battle to anticipate what will happen next. Reconnaissance elements must move forward to determine if the way is now clear for immediate exploitation of the success in the meeting engagement or if the regiment’s main body is on its way to continue the attack. If the regiment is not an immediate threat, the task force must reorganize into its movement formation and penetrate as deeply as it can, throwing the enemy’s major force off balance. But if the main body’s attack is imminent, the task force commander may have to elect to form a hasty defense to reduce the combat power advantage of the enemy regiment’s main body. Quick reorganization, continued reconnaissance, and rapid decision making are essential in preparing for the enemy’s next move. The task force must keep in mind that a meeting engagement with a regimental lead battalion is only the enemy’s opening move and not an end in itself. It will invariably be followed either by another enemy offensive operation that will also have to be defeated or by an enemy defensive reaction that can be attacked and exploited. In either case, the successful conclusion of the meeting engagement is not an opportunity for the task force to sit on its laurels, but a stepping stone for continued and probably more decisive action. Conclusion This discussion has only touched the surface of what may possibly be the most difficult operation we would face in a fight with a Soviet or Soviet-trained force. The principles and techniques that have been offered here may be of some immediate help to units training at the NTC. However, to be fully prepared for the day that we might have to fight a Soviet-instigated meeting engagement in real combat, we must more fully develop our doctrine on the subject and elevate the meeting engagement mission to a much higher place in our training plans than it now seems to occupy. As General DePuy said a decade ago, “If we don’t win the first battle of the next war, we won’t be around to fight the second.”

served at the NTC as the S3 of the OPFOR Motorized Rifle Regiment, as a mechanized infantry battalion S3, and as an S3 observer-controller. His previous assignments include mechanized infantry platoon leader and company commander, adviser in RVN, and assistant professor of English at USMA. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and the Armed Forces Staff College. He received his BA and MAfrom JohnCarroll Universityand is presently assigned to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. ~~ January-February 1987 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 15