Rethinking the Movement to Contact

Rethinking The Movement To Contact By Captain William D. Hewitt When commanders assign or re ceive a movementitocontact mission, they must understand exactly what that mission involves. The standards for conducting a movement to contact with a battalion task force (TF) state that the TF should move on multiple axes within the designated boundaries so as to gain contact with the smallest possible friendly element (a tank section or mechanized infantry squad) without being detected by the opposing force.’: By moving with two or more company teams forward in parallel columns the chances of accidentally bypassing substantial enemy forces is minimized. Furthermore, if this formation were not used, the TF might stretch out along a single axis in a Blcilometer column. When moving to contact with two teams forward, each leading team usually leads with a tank platoon because it has greater survivability. If only one leading team makes contact, the TF commander has at least one company team already on the flank, or ready to move to the flank, of the enemy. Even when the leading platoons of both leading teams make contact, the TF commander can still maneuver the remainder of his force. However, some sharp conflicts be. tween doctrine and application appear when we compare these statements with the following factors that are beyond friendly control. .The size and strength of the enemy force the TF contads (the commander hopes it is only an observation post (OP), reconnaissance ele ment or enemy platoon+&! unit). The enemy element’s disposition and activity (again the commander hopes he is not firmly entrenched in defensive belts). The number of enemy elements that the friendly elements make simil-taneous contact with (hopefully, only one). How Many Teams Forward? In a worst-case scenario, it’s easy to imagine what would happen if a tank force, while moving along multiple axis, with two or three teams forward, had all its lead teams make contact simultaneously with enemy platoon-sized forces in well-prepared positions. With two teams forward and one or two trail teams, the commander then decides to commit his air, artillery, and trail team(s) to support one of the teams in an effort to gain the 61 superiority needed to win3 Here again, the TF commander hopes that the trail team(s) as it (they) maneuver(s) to the flank of the lead team, does (do) not encounter another enemy force. He also hopes that the enemy isn’t bright enough to anticipate his actions, although, logically, the enemy commander has been considering his options while he awaits the contact. If, however, this does occur, the TF commander could then easily h d himself struggling to disengage his units. Each team would have at beat a 31 superiority, and the TF commander would be unable to help any of them. On the other hand, even if the TF commander was able to effectively assist one team, he still would have one team in contact with no ing to extract itself while keeping the support, and this team would be try-january-february 1984 15

"I., -vv-.,-A-I --- -rr-- cation need to be discussed. But, if one or more teams make contact simultaneously, how does a TF commander maneuver with the bulk of his forces? It is highly unlikely that company or team commanders with part of their unit in contact will want to give up platoons when they need those assets to assist the element in contact, particularly if they are to lose their assets to assist teams on the other side of the TF sector. A TF commander needs to understand that his team commanders have as much loyalty to their subordinates as they do to him. Command and control of this ad hoc force presents another problem. The maneuver elements would consist of a company or team and platoons from every other team. Who controls this? How? How effective are these elements going to be as a unit? These questions are not easily answerable and certainly not easily executable on the ground, because the TF commander either violates the principle of unity of command if he forms this ad hoc element, or the principle of mass if he leaves the platoons with the company and maneuvers with only one or two teams. To sum up, the best outcome in this scenario with multiple teams forward is to double or triple the friendly casualties. In the worst case, the TF commander has piecemealed the teams into ineffective combat forces too weak to win, and too weak to continue. And at some point the TF commander must weigh violating at least one principle of war. Some choice! But moving to contact with the smallest possible part of the task force and moving on multiple axes can also be achieved with one team forward. (figure 1). With one team forward, the 'IT commander reduces the chances of simultaneous contacts. If the lead team makes contact, the TF commander has more resources and more options available to react to the situation with the bulk of his unit, than if two lead teams make contact. If one of the trail teams makes contact, then the 'IT commander has at least one company team on the flank, or ready to move to the flank, of the enemy..' Although inadvertently, the lead team has positioned itself to that flank, which in most cases would be a maneuver goal upon contact, and it has done so without suffering casualties. This seems to be a fortunate

ADVANTAGES:

Lead team has isolated enemy Anack can begin as assault un move into position Trail team provides suppressiv fire; acts as reserve on order Two Up, TWO Back

SITUATION:

ADVANTAGES:

Trail team makes contact None, compared to above 111111111111111111-111

SITUATION:

1 Lead team makes contact I I I I Additional maneuver needed Maneuver units need more til isolate enemy force to move into position Figure 1. development, depending on the size of the enemy force. Substantial enemy force is a nebulous phrase that apparently covers anything above company level. If the enemy force is very substantial-a battalion or larger-the scouts, ground surveillance radar (GSR), or air assets, etc., should quite easily detect it. If it is less substantial-a company or battalion, thereby permitting it to slip by the security elements-the single lead team on the flank will create a greater distraction and cause more casualties by attacking that flank than it would as a single trail team. Under no circumstances should commanders allow lead teams and trail teams to be separated by a distance that would divide the TF when contact is made. It is important to note that the depth of forces with one team forward and two or more trailing is the same as with two or more leading and one trailing. This would seldom, if ever, approach the six kilometer estimate in FM 71-2, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, (figure 1). If, for some good reason, the TF commander decides to lead with more than one team forward, he must 16 ins1 mu1 rect tim arithmetically! For the same reason, he cannot allow one of the lead teams to progress much faster or much slower than the other. It should also be apparent that having two teams forward does not necessarily mean that both must move simultaneously. both lead teams moving, the TF commander should have his teams use bounding overwatch with one entire team in overwatch as the other moves. This is obviously more time consuming than having one lead team, but does comply with logic and the specified standards. For every 1,OOO meters added to the direct fire range, it takes from 3 to 5 minutes to effectively respond, and in 5 minutes a team can be decisively engaged and destroyed. Yet it’s not uncommon during training to see lead units separated by more than three kilometers and assigned diverging axes as they approach known or suspected enemy positions; or multiple teams leading with trail teams not positioned well to respond to contact. Although FM 71-2, pp. 4-14, shows Team Composition Once the issue of how many teams will be forward is resolved, their composition must be determined. For mutual protection, the lead teams should never be pure tank or pure mechanized infantry. The infantry protects the tanks from dismounted enemy and antitank (AT) weapons, while the tanks provide the accurate, massive firepower that provides s u p pression for the infantry. Obviously, where good fields of fire exist, the lead team should be tank-heavy. Shorter fields of fire are advantageous to infantry. Remember that dead space (gullies and arroyos), creates shorter fields of fire. Careful map analysis by the S2/3 must be made to ensure proper unit selection. Assigning a tank-heavy team to a sector only after considering the amount of vegetation is denying that team commander the resources that intlict enemy casualties. Just as the infantry dismounts to clear the next treeline, it also dismounts to clear the next gully or arroyo. So relief as well as vegetation must be considered! TF commanders should not lead with an infantry-heavy team unless they anticipate dismounting them early and often. If firepower and survivability are needed, he should lead with tanks-not mounted infantry. mian~ry presenlzj a lesser prooiem. Once the enemy slows down or halts the mounted infantry, he can use his own dismounted infantry and antitank guided missile (ATGM) teams to destroy the tanks. If the contact is made by mounted infantry, the TF commander is personally responsible for the friendly casualties. Dismounting and mounting is dictated by terrain and vegetation and may be done frequently. Dismounting too early is always better than dismounting too late. All this drains soldiers physically ‘. . . For every 1,000 meters addad to the direct fire range, it t5ke8from 3 to bninutes to effectively respond, and in 5 minutes, a team can be &cisively engaged and destroyed Yet it’s not m m - mon during training to see lead unit8 separated by m r e than three kizilometer~ and assigned divergingaxes . . .” and mentally, so plan to rotate the lead mechanized element every few hours to rest, and to rotate the type of teams from mechanized-heavy to tank-heavy and the reverse as the terrain and vegetation change. Logically, if a mechanized-heavy team is leading, a mechanized platoon should usually be leading it, just as tank platoons should lead tank-heavy teams. This keeps more maneuver options available to the team commander. If a tank-heavy team has its only infantry platoon tied down, or eliminated, this equates to losing its security element. If a mechanized-heavy team has its only tank platoon tied down, or eliminated, its firepower and survivability are re duced. The primary combat goal of the defender is to separate tanks from infantry. Why assist him voluntarily? Usually, trail teams should follow no closer than one checkpoint from the lead team(s) and not farther away than two checkpoints. This permits the lead units to back off their present checkpoint and move over a masked route without bumping into a trail unit. It also permits the trail unit to provide additional flank and rear security while the lead element focuses its efforts forward. Additionally, this movement technique facilitates quick wmmana ana Lonmoi Controlling company teams as part of the movement to contact is the function of checkpointa and target reference points (TRP). Checkpoints are predetermined points on the ground used as a means of controlling friendly movements? How many are enough? Is the measles sheet the right approach? If a checkpoint is a means of controlling movement, the question arises: How much land do you control by occupying a checkpoint? Given terrain and vegetation constraints you control only to the maximum effective range of the direct fire weapons system occupying that checkpoint. If only M- 16 rifles are on a checkpoint, it would be useful to have checkpoints every 400 meters or so. If TO Ws are occupying a checkpoint, checkpoints should be planned every 3,000 meters, pre vided that vegetation, hilltops, gullies, etc., don’t obstruct or influence the line of sight. Such intermediate features are also considered as checkpoints. In extensively wide open areas (desert, prairies, etc.) that lack any distinguishable features, the use of multiple phase lines every kilometer, together with the vehicle odometer, control movement (.62 mile = 1 kilometer for due north, east, south, and west movement, and .87 mile = 1.41 kilometer for moving diagonally across grid lines; ie., northeast to southwest). Why these guidelines for checkpoints? If any feature is a possible checkpoint for you, it is logical to assume that it may have been considered as a checkpoint or defensive position by the enemy as well. To control movement quickly, which of the following transmissions is easier, faster, and more accurate? (Consider that all checkpoints are also TRF’s. Planning fires in front of, on or behind friendly positions is also a guideline.)

“THERE’S AN ENEMY OSCAR

PAPAVICINITYALFAZEROZERO

ONE. ATTACK NOW.”

Or after properly encoding the coordinates.

“THERE’S AN ENEMY OSCAR

PAPA AT, 1 SET, ALFA ZULU

TROT. ATTACK NOW.”

This is followed by a period of time while subordinate leaders, forward observers, etc., properly decode the coordinates. Speed and accuracy! But remember that TRP A001 may now

ALFA BRAVO DELTA ECHO FOXjanuary-february 1984 17

I TEAMC

I

TEAM B

Takes Cover RetumsFire Reports Maneuvering Forces e Provides Suppressive Fires I

TEAM 8

e Continue Attack? Bypass? I I

IF ATTACK CONTINUES ...

Team C Becomes the Reserve

IF HASTY DEFENSE BEGINS ...

e Team A and Company B Assist in Withdrawal, Deploy to Cover Gaps \ \ Figure2 be compromised. It should not be used again to control maneuver, however it can still be used to control indirect fires. It has been suggested that because all checkpoints are also TRPs, checkpoints should be eliminated as a control graphic or term and all locations for controlling maneuver and fire should be referred to as TRPs. However, this would severely hamper quick response to the hasty attack. TRPs are recognizable points on the ground and for identdying enemy targets or controlling direct fires . . . Once designated, TRPs also constitute indirect fire targets.6 Given the fact that TRPs control direct and indirect fks, the commander should consider planning TRPs around every checkpoint, if such recognizable points exist. Be cause movement laterally and to the rear is possible if the mission is changed to hasty defense or counterattack, the planner should keep in mind that four TRPs for every checkpoint is not excessive. Planning checkpoints and TRps in adjacent sedors is as important as planning them in your own sedor. A few additional minutes spent during the planning phase saves friendly units from wasting valuable time encoding and decoding coordinates during the execution phase. There’s no excuse for laxity in planning just because the adjacent sector temporarily belongs to someone else. After all, these actions complement lateral move ment on the battlefield-a necessity for mobile warfare. The same holds true in the defenddelay. Phnning entails the prior action required to handle any foreseeable euentuulity. This also includes exchanging operation orders (OPORDS) and overlays with adjacent units. Any TF or team commander can control movement and fire with the order, “MOVE TO CHECKPOINT

TWO AND ORIENT ON TANGO

ROMEO PAPA ALFA ZERO ZERO

ONE.” Similar orders can control movement inside the battle positions for teams and platoons; for example,

“REORIENT ON TANGO ROMEO

PAPA ALFA ZERO ZERO TWO.

security This planning and execution can be very time consuming. The movement to contact can be a very fast-paced operation when moving across open areas with air assets, or a very slow-paced operation composed of tedious drills if the terrain is compartmentalized or heavily vegetated. Hence, the importance of drill discipline and rotating units to ensure freshness. There must be a balance between speed and security. These two aspects are not synonymous. While many famous commanders have advocated speed at the expense of security, a balance was always sought, with speed being more important in the pursuit and security being more important in other operations. Close scrutiny of military history shows that even Patton slowed his pursuit in order to close gaps between units. Wise commanders do not force subordinates to move faster than they think is feasible because this hinders security and causes mistakes. Wise commanders assist subordinates by igniting their imagination and developing their intuition, so that the subordinate becomes confident in his ability to move faster than he pre viously felt he could. Security is not sarrificed for speed. Commanders must realize that an excessive penchant for speed without adequate security drives lead units into enemy forces that may be s u p nor and then compels trail units to follow into the rear of the lead units, hindering both elements’ maneuver and causing unnecessary casualties. A quick trip to the lead vehicle by commanders should reinforce this lesson. The scout platoon can be used to ing this element with a couple of antitank (AT) sections, GSR teams, and even a mechanized infantry platoon can turn a movement to contact into a deliberate attack for the task force. These ad hoc elements, if trained before the conflict, can be a valuable asset. The commander cannot expect his scout platoon leader and his team leaders to execute a demanding mission without this prior training. With it, the scout platoon remains the eyes and ears of the battalion. Scouts, with attachments, should begin their part of the mission as early as higher headquarters permits. Too often the reconnaissance experts are sent out increa~e speed and security. Reinforc- 18 an hour or two before start point (SP) time and the maneuver teams catch up to them after a couple of kilome ters..At this point they are either bypassed, pushed to one side, or forced into the enemy by lead teams, leaving them with no mom for maneuver and unable to provide any security for the task force. The commander must give the scout platoon leader those additional assets, capabilities and time needed to provide intelligence, develop the situation within reason, provide early warning, and make the movement to contact easier. The scout platoon’s mission should be to: Find the enemy’s reconnaissance elements (OPs) and his main force (platoon defensive belt). Monitor enemy movement. Locate obstacles. Attempt to neutralize obstacles with infantry. Conduct dismounted and mounted patrols. If the scout platoon accomplishes this, it has earned its pay. The goal of the scout element is to conduct a movement to contact, to conduct patrols, and to change the TF mission to a deliberate attack at best, or to increase the speed and security of the TF movement at worst. The rest of the TF should remain close to the protedion of the maneuver elements. A long (in space and time) movement to contact may allow an enemy force to move between the “teeth” and the “tail,” easily destroying the “tail,” thereby neutralizing the “teeth.” The trains should be capable of and ready to rearm and refuel on order. Procedures should be estab lished to accomplish this quickly and safely. The TF command and control element must follow close enough so they do not delay the forward move ment of the maneuver teams. Mortars should move by split section to provide continuous support. Air defense artillery (ADA) elements must be positioned to engage enemy aircraft before they can attack friendly ground forces. Attached engineers should be placed behind the lead team with the priority of breaching obstacles and then assisting in breaching enemy positions. Obstacles Two closely related activities associated with the movement to contact are breaching obstacles and condudr ing the hasty attack. Because these activities can turn a wellexecuted movement into a bag of bloody bones, specific, detailed SOPs should be developed for each task. If the security elements or the S2 have done their job, the TF should know, or at least be able to anticipate, where obstacles are likely to be located. These areas are known as choke points. As the TF approaches an obstacle, it should make every attempt to insure a mechanized-heavy team is leading. Tank-heavy units don’t have enough infantry to complete the mission efficiently and expe ditiously. The TF, and all Team OPORDS, or SOPs should identify a breaching force and a support force during all operations. The breaching operation is a complex task, and the enemy will do ‘‘Chse scrutiny of nilitruy history shows that even Patton slowed his pursuit in order to close gaps between units. Wme commanders do not force subordinates to m u e faster than they think is feasible because this hinders senuity and muses mistakes . . .” L everything he can to make it even more so. Therefore, the TF should approach the mission as it would a deliberate attack. The commander must find out as much as he can before the main force arrives. To accomplish this, the scouts occupy a series of OPs to create an umbrella to the front of the lead team(s), and to provide as much intelligence as possible. In the absence of complete intelligence, the commander should assume that the: Flanks of the obstacle are manned. Obstacle itself is mined, wired Ditch may be manned with infan-Obstacle is being overwatched by Enemy will act prudently. Considering that company-sized ele mats engage enemy OPs and battalion-sized elements engage enemy platoons, the TF should not try to accomplish more than is possible. The enemy has already decided, just by placing the obstacle, that he is committed to this particular piece of terrain and that he intends to make the attacker pay for it. and ditched. try and AT weapons. substantial enemy forces.

To secure both flanks and begin breaching operations simultaneously far exceeds a TF’s capabilities. Protecting the breaching element requires securing the flanks, which usually requires dismounted infantry; hence, mechanized-heavy team leading. As the TF tank-heavy overwatch ele ments suppress one flank, the mechanized team clears the other flank. This allows friendly elements to move adjacent to the obstacle to: Provide suppression on enemy overwatch elements. .Kill AT Teams in any ditch obstacle. Provide suppressive fire on the other flank of the obstacle while it is being secured. Once the flanks are secured, and if bypassing is still not possible, the breaching force moves into position to begin activities. Smoke and suppressive fires continue to be placed on suspected enemy overwatch positions. If time permits, more than one lane is breached for the TF. As the lead team moves through the lane, overwatch elements are already in place, so the lead team can move continuously through the lane toward the next checkpoint. If the unit encounters an unanticipated obstacle, these immediate actions should occur: Smoke key terrain to the flanks and behind the obstacle. Crew-mved weapons identify suspected enemy positions and provide suppressive lire. Vehicles in the obstacle back out using the same paths they used to enter. *Begin breaching operations as described above. ’Ikylng to accomplish the breaching tasks simultaneously may result in the lead teams making contact on both obstacle flanks and the engineer element making contact at the obstacle with dismounted infantry. All this ties. F’iecemealing forces at an obstacle can lead to disaster as quickly as piecemealing forces in an attack. would result in u n n e c e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ casual-Hasty Attack Contact with enemy forces usually terminates all movements to contact. Therefore, the actions upon contact should be very responsive. Standard procedures should be developed to include reporting, maneuver response, and fire response. Upon contact the team commander: 0 Ensures that direct fire is returned. Ensures that units move to good firing positions. january-february 1984 19

0 Calls for indirect fire. 0 Directs suppressive fire on sue Receives reports from sub- 0 Evaluates reports. Evaluates the person making the 0 Considers maneuver options. 0 Reports to battalion. Backup reporting systems in the teams should be encouraged to accomplish the notification of contact. Units in contact must immediately report the contact to prevent trail teams from maneuvering into the stopped lead team. Until experience is gained, many of pected enemy locations. elements. reports. 1 . . Although speed looks good units dw-ing fierol exercises, security leasens friendly casualties ana? suppressive fire inflicts enemy casualties. Overemphasis of any oneprinciple is dangerom. Corn-rnanih-8 need options, not wute-cesscuy casualties . . .99 t0 Commandera a8 they fly O V W ~~ ~~ the commander‘s duties are sheer guesswork. The most critical decision is whether or not to conduct the hasty attack. Force ratios, enemy dispositions and possible enemy intentions must be determined in order to pre vent the loss of the team because of incomplete reporting, overdeveloped ego, unit pride, or plain incompetence. The decision to conduct a hasty attack must be made quickly but judiciously. Teams usually have the forces to overcome an enemy obsewa-tion post, while a larger part of the battalion TF is needed to overcome a platoon-size force or larger. The addition of two tank-killing weapons systems can easily impact on the success at team level. While the decision to conduct a hasty attack is made judiciously, the attack must be quick, decisive, vie lent, and totally destructive. The do’s and don’ts of the hasty attack are: Don’t let the enemy fire at you without overpayment in return! Don’t let him escape to fire again. Don’t let him maneuver. 0 Do give him the choice to surrender or die in place. In conducting the hasty attack, commanders must realize that the “laws of time and space” cannot change. For example: if one team is in contact and other teams are moving to support that element, those ele ments will arrive at different times and under different conditions. Commanders must coordinate and focus their attack, just as they coordinate their defense. If the enemy is defensively deployed, the TF commander must expect minefields, bunkers, and trenches and he must approach the hasty attack much as he would the deliberate attack. The commander must avoid piecemealing his unit into the enemy. Whether a team or a TF conduds the attack, establishment of a far base of fire by the overwatching element (at a least company (-)) is the imme diate response. Orientation of the maneuver elements toward the enemy can be achieved by having a flare fired above the objective. Using the axis of advance for the maneuver unit and the flare create an imaginary line that divides the objective for maneuver units in the assault (figure 2). As the maneuver units begin to swing around the overwatching lead ele ments, continuous direct and indirect fire is directed at known enemy positions and suspected enemy positions. Smoke is used to isolate the enemy to protect the maneuver force. As the maneuver force approaches the enemy, the need for accurate s u p pressive fire increases and, because of the enemy’s fire, the ability to freely maneuver decreases. Providing increasing levels of accurate suppressive fire requires an increasingly higher percentage of the maneuver force to be committed to fire rather than maneuver. If the enemy is in well-prepared positions, or is substantial, a near base of fire might be established if the entire maneuver force has difficulty moving due to enemy fire. Every maneuver element has the obligation to move as close to the enemy as possible until it can no longer maneuver and is still too far away to assault. Then, it becomes part of the support force, as other maneuver elements continue to move to the point of maximum friction. If a leader finds all of his forces unable to maneuver because of enemy fire, additional forces are obviously needed. Thus a TF commander may find that he has only one platoon out of his entire force to conduct the assault or breach, with the rest in support. If the enemy is not substantial in size, nor in defense positions, a faster moving, mounted assault will still result because the entire maneuver force will be able to make the assault, as there is no need for additional support fire. Just as the machinegun stopped headlong infantry assaults in trench warfare because it inflicted mass casualties, antiarmor weapons and intricate defenses require the TF commander to reevaluate headlong armor charges without due consideration and deliberation. If history does indeed repeat itself, are we in the 192CL1932 time frame? It is time to rethink our doctrine regarding the “tweup--oneback” or “tweup-tweback” mentality in move ment to contact. In any event, it is time to clarify doctrine. Although speed looks good to commanders as they fly over units during field exercises, security lessens friendly casualties and suppressive fire inflicts enemy casualties. Overemphasis of any one principle is dangerous. Commanders need options, not unnecessary casualties. We simply don’t have the forces to throw away in a high intensity conflict. Perhaps the loss of a single company or battalion may fall into the acceptable range to some commanders, but losing too many companies and task forces may well mean losing the war. Let’s rethink the movement to contact. Footnotes

I ARTEP 71-2.3-862-863.

2 FM 71-2, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Fore, pp. 4-10. Ibid.

I E‘M 71-2

i FM 101.51, Operational Terms and Graphics, DD. 1-23. i; ‘Ibid.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM D.

HEWllT was a Distinguished Military Graduate from Penn State University in 1976. He served as platoon leader, battalion XO and company commander. He is a graduate of the armor officer advanced course and recently commanded B Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor at Fort Hood, Texas. He attended Army Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and is currently a project officer at the Army Training Board, Fort Eustis. Virginia. 20