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ARMOR · Fall 2023

Maximizing Operational Readiness in the Baltics

1LT Darren Pitts
pp. 52–55Features2023

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Fall 2023 maintenance personnel at a high rate. Items that are ordered against bumper numbers will appear as a PD until a goods movement is conducted to the work order. Understanding how many lines a unit is authorized to stock and of which type is the first step in effective SSL management. The next steps involve accurate inventories, ensuring stocks have initiated replenishment or auto matic re-ordering points, demand analysis of previous high-density train ing cycles, and accurate forecasting of upcoming training and requirements. In addition to the need for constant SSL demand analysis, quarterly de mand analysis is mandated by Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance, and within GCSS-A as a check to ensure that units across the Army are maintaining their SSL. While responsibility for SSL manage ment generally falls on the individual field maintenance team and leader ship within the battalion maintenance program, Commanders have a respon sibility to regularly validate and ensure SSL levels are being maintained at the highest possible level. The easiest way to maintain visibility of a unit’s SSL levels are via the Com mander’s Actionable Readiness Dash board – Shop Stock program on GCSS- A, where a commander can very quick ly view the health of their SSL and view replenishment rates to better in form expectations for their mainte nance program. In the Baltics, units don’t have the lux ury of quick trips to the SSA, so proper demand analysis is crucial to ensure SSL is stocked with the necessary lines, when units don’t have the luxury of accessing their SSA as easily or as of ten. Controlled exchanges Outside of parts management and SSL, controlled exchanges (CE) are an op tion that units can use to maintain OR in the Baltics when presented with long lead times for parts. A Controlled Exchange is the removal of a service able component from an unservice able, non-mission capable (NMC) plat form to a like-item NMC platform that restores a platform to FMC. The process can be used to generate com bat power or increase a unit’s OR but requires deliberate analysis of lead times for parts for both platforms and a conversation between Battalion leadership and maintenance leaders before the Commander can authorize the execution of the CE. In the Baltics, our unit approach to CEs has been used to retore combat power when lead times for two like-platforms are backordered or have a longer lead times because of parts shipping from the CONUS. The analysis associated with understanding lead times to in form CEs tie-in with the importance of parts management and with utilizing GCSS-A and IGC. CEs aren’t a long-term answer but can often enable units that have depleted their SSL to maintain their OR during high density training periods. CEs enable a unit to exercise a level of battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR). BDAR will be critical for main tenance programs maintaining combat power in large-scale combat opera tions (LSCO), particularly for an Army that has been spoiled with substantial parts flow over the last 20-years and has not experienced significant Ar mored-vehicle loss rates in over 70 years. In Finland, our unit utilized CEs to maintain OR across M-113 variant platforms after M-113 variant major assemblies had been consumed. The depleted SSL limited combat regener ation during the following training ex ercises, but an NMC M-113 from the Battalion’s medical platoon generated options for CEs that ultimately main tained 1064 Mortar Tracks and kept additional combat power in the fight. The conversations among leaders at the UMCP are critical to the success of CABs during training in the Baltics and will prove critical in a LSCO environ ment. Competent maintenance lead ers enable combat re-generation via timely CEs, which in turn translate to maintained capabilities for command ers. Conclusion These lessons are important for all units preparing for a EUCOM rotation, or expeditionary training in any aus tere condition. The deliberate prepa ration of maintenance systems is the best way to set the conditions to main tain OR. The fundamentals that have maximized our success in the Baltics can be exploited by any unit that ro tates to eastern Europe, but it requires component maintenance leaders and building a culture of maintenance across a formation. The need to leverage the fundamen tals of parts management, shop stock management, demand analysis, and controlled exchanges to overcome the sustainment challenges of the Baltics are nothing new and will be critical to generating combat power in the next conflict. Leaders beyond the Army’s sustainment enterprise or the forward support company who are not focused on generating combat power under these current conditions will be com bat ineffective when their time comes to cross the line of departure. 1LT Darren R. Pitts is the battalion maintenance officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Bri gade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Divi sion, Fort Cavazos, TX. He previously served as tank platoon leader, Compa ny A, 1-8 Cavalry. 1LT Pitts military schools include the Armor Basic Offi cer Leader Course, Bradley Command er Course, and the Scout Leader Course, all attended at Fort Moore, GA. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from the Virginia Military In stitute. 1LT Pitts participated in an Op eration Atlantic Resolve rotation in Finland and Lithuania from January to September 2023. Notes 1 Department of the Army Pamphlet 750- 3, Guide to Field Maintenance Opera tions (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office: 2023). 2 “External Standard Operating Proce dures,” Maintenance Activity Vilseck, 2022. 3 1LT Samuel C. Skillman, “A Lean, Expedi tionary Shop Stock Listing”, ARMOR, 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/publica tion/issues/43709. 4 COL Michael J. Simmering, “Winning the Maintenance Fight at Pace,” The Compa ny Leader, March 16, 2020, https://com panyleader.themilitaryleader. com/2020/03/16/winning-the-mainte nance-fight-at-pace/.

Fall 2023 BDAR – battle damage assessment and repair CAB – combined arms battalion CE – controlled exchanges CONUS – continental United States CTC – combat training center ESR – equipment status report EUCOM – U.S. European Command FMC – fully-mission capable GCSS-A – Global Combat Support System – Army IGC – Integrated Development Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence LOC – line of communication LSCO – large-scale combat operations MAV – Maintenance Activity Vilseck NMC – non-mission capable OR – operational readiness PD – bench stock SSA – supply support activity SSL – shop stock list TMR – transportation movement requests UMCP – unit maintenance collection point ZM – command directed ZP – provisional (new fielding/ diagnostic spares) ZV – demand supported Acronym Quick-Scan U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division supporting the 4th Infantry Divi sion, maneuver an M1A2 Abrams tank during exercise Arrow 23 in Niinisalo, Finland, May 4, 2023. Exercise Arrow is an annual, multinational exercise in volving armed forces from the United States, United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithua nia and Estonia, who train with the Finnish Defense Forces in high-intensity, force-on-force engagements and live-fire exercises to increase military readi ness and promote interoperability among partner nations. (U.S. Army Nation al Guard photo by Sgt. John Schoebel, 117th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment) U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the “Spartan Brigade,” 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, fire from modernized M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, March 10, 2023. The Spartan Brigade, the Army’s most modernized brigade, completed rotation NTC 23-05, making it not only the best equipped but most lethal unit in America’s arsenal as the Army moves toward building the Army of 2030. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Dre Stout, 50th Public Affairs Detachment)

Fall 2023 Manning Next Generation Main Battle Tank by CPT Larry D. Tran What is the ideal crew-size for the next U.S. main battle tank? The Armor community continues to train for large- scale combat operations (LSCO) with continued efforts in modernizing the armored fleet. Dan Heaton de scribes these modernization programs in his recent ARMOR article.1 Since Heaton’s article was published, the M2A4 Bradley Infantry Fighting vehi cles and the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles (AMPVs) fielding are continu ing to modernize ABCTs. The defense industry is competing within the Next Generation Main Battle Tank (NGMBT) program to determine the future MBT for the U.S. Army. The competitor for the NGMBT program, the Abrams X platform, was showcased at the Asso ciation of the U.S. Army Conference 2022.2 The Abrams X and many other tanks from our allies and adversaries are transitioning to three-person crews with an autoloader. Fifty-five percent of the newly announced MBT platforms are now three-person crews; this includes the Republic of Korea’s K2 Black Panther, the German Leopard 2, the Russian T14 Armata and the Chinese Type 99. The U.S. Army’s MBT has not changed the four-person crew size since the transition from the M4 Sherman (five-person crews) to the M60 Patton plat form in 1959. However, this has not stopped the Armor community’s con tinued analysis of the ideal crew size for the next MBT. The reinvigorated push to modernize the U.S. Army’s MBT and the arguments for the MBT’s ideal crew size have been echoed since the 1990’s. For example, CPT Mike Newell argued for a two-person crew in 1992. His argument was fo cused on reducing the overall silhou ette of the tank allowing for the in crease in armor.3 Robin Fletcher pro posed a three-person crew in 1995 with the crew sitting abreast in the hull compartment, similar to the Abrams X.4 Years of failed moderniza tion programs since 1994, such as the Future Combat System, coupled with the focus on Counterinsurgency Oper ations during the Global War on Ter rorism, resulted in the M1 Abrams platforms continued use within the modern ABCTs supplemented with modernization packages to extend the Abram’s longevity.4 The incorporation of autoloaders and three-person crews in the U.S. Army’s NGMBT is likely to follow suit with the new MBT of our allies and adversaries. Within this article, I assess how a re duction to three-person crews might impact the Armored community at the tactical level. Specifically, I consider how the personnel, organization, doc trine and training factors from the doctrine, organizations, training, ma teriel, leadership and education, per sonnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) framework will be impacted. Within the personnel aspect, the reduction of manning within a tank company re sults in an expansion of time allocated for maintaining vehicles and a reduced capability to sustain continuous com bat operations due to stressed fighter management. Organizationally, there is an opportunity for changes to the tank company’s structure allowing more NGMBTs to be fielded, while also mitigating the strains caused by a re duction of personnel. Lastly, training of armor crewman will shift to accom modate the additional duties taken on without a loader. By understanding these effects, the Armored communi ty can communicate to industry what capabilities a three-person crew re quires for LSCO and better prepare for these changes to ensure a more seam less transition to the NGMBT program. Personnel Utilizing the fiscal year 2023 modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), the implementation of auto loaders and three-person crews reduc es the tank company’s amount of mil itary occupational specialty 19K1O Soldiers from 29 to 15. This 51-percent decrease in 19K1O manpower affects the tank company’s ability to conduct maintenance and continuous opera tions in a LSCO environment. Maintenance is what gets a tank com pany into the fight and the reduction of one crew member extends the amount of time it takes to maintain Figure 1. Tanks from Assault Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment con duct a Combined Arms Breach Full Dress Rehearsal at Vekaranjarvi, Finland prior to Operation Lock 2023. (Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, battalion unit public affairs representative)

Fall 2023 and sustain a tank unit. Maintenance on the M1A2 SEPv3 tank includes the weekly preventive-maintenance checks and services (PMCS), semi-an nual services and annual services. Technical Manual 9-2350-412-10-4 for the M1A2 SEPv3 prescribes the 51 items for the “before” PMCS, two items for the “during” PMCS, a road test, and then the 65 items “after” PMCS. Typically, a full crew of four can complete PMCS in 4-6 working hours, depending on experience levels of the Soldiers. Taking away one Soldier from the crew results in the other crew members assuming additional tasks required for the completion of the to tal work hours needed for weekly

PMCS.

Services will also be impacted with a reduced crew. The M1 Abrams’s TM 9-2350-412-13&P shows that 275-300 working hours are required to com plete semi-annual and annual servic es. Automations are unlikely to have a significant impact on reducing crew-level NGMBT service tasks. Many tasks still require crew members or mechan ics to complete the task, such as replacing filters, replacing seals, clean ing the hull and turret compartment, etc. Battalion-level training manage ment typically uses three weeks as a planning factor for tank companies to complete services with tank platoons rotating through hull services, turret services and ancillary services. If the NGMBT goes to three-person crews, then company and battalion leader ship need to provide additional time for services given fewer hands to turn wrenches with a similar amount of work hours required. The modernization to the M1A2 SEPv3 incorporated additional digital compo nents that links multiple subsystems of the hull and turret together. The complexity of these added digital com ponents become difficult to maintain at the operator and field maintenance level. More often that not, units have sought the assistance of field service representatives (FSRs) from General Dynamics Land System. The effects on maintenance due to personnel reduc tion is exacerbated due to the require ment for advance technical knowledge of the FSRs to diagnosis faults if the NGMBT’s modernization shares the same trends as the M1A2 SEPv3 with the addition of complex digital com ponents. Units must allocate the time for the FSRs, which is an asset that is currently managed at the division lev el, before 10 level and 20 level main tenance can continue. PMCS and other services for the NGMBT become an even more delib erate and longer process compared to the M1A2 SEPv3. Currently, command ers in armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) attempt to protect “services and maintenance Monday’s” as much as possible; however, it is common for competing garrison requirements to spread the formation thin and a four-person crew on the Abrams quickly turns into two. Overall, the reduction to three-person crews on the NGMBT will result in ABCTs allocating more time that is solely dedicated to servic es within their training calendars. ABCTs will have to enforce that main tenance does not stop on Monday’s. Maintenance never stops and contin ues throughout the week. In addition to maintenance impacts, reducing the Table 1. Proposed MTOE change for tank company. (U.S. Army)

End of indexed article

Citation

1LT Darren Pitts. “Maximizing Operational Readiness in the Baltics.” ARMOR, Fall 2023, pp. 52-55.

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