Tanks Need the Infantry to Lead the Way

Fall 2023 Tanks Need Infantry to Lead Way by 1LT Brandon Akuszewski and CPT Larry D. Tran A U.S. Army combined arms battalion deployed to Vekaranjärvi, Finland for the first time in history to participate in combined arms maneuver training with the Finnish Army’s Karelian Bri gade earlier this year. The U.S. 1st Battalion “Mustangs,” 8th Cavalry Regiment deployed in support of Operation Lock 2023 to eastern Fin land from May 28 to June 10, 2023. This was also the first time the allied Finnish Karelian Brigade conducted maneuver training east of the Kymi River. Task Force (TF) Mustangs included 400 Karelian soldiers who were attached and fought with their U.S. allies as a multinational battlegroup against a mechanized battlegroup from the Finnish Army’s Armoured Brigade in four force-on-force battle periods. As the Mustangs prepared for Operation Lock, they faced a training problem that armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) have not focused on recently: how do infantry and armor integrate and conduct large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in severely restrict ed terrain? The Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, published in 2016 is the current U.S. Army doctrine for company teams. However, there is no discussion on how a company teams operate in severely restrictive terrain or standing operating proce dures (SOPs) for infantry and tank in tegration.1 Older U.S. Army doctrine Field Manual (FM) 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Company Team, states SOPs for defile operations in restric tive terrain; however, this was pub lished in 1998.2 The lack of infantry and tank doctrine was identified by the School of Ad vanced Military Studies in 2001.3 As a result of this gap in doctrine, U.S. Ma rines 1st Tank Battalion had to relearn how to integrate their infantry and tanks during their combat operations in Fallujah, Iraq in 2004.4 Similarly, TF Mustangs had to reedu cate and retrain their company teams on infantry and tank integration be fore Operation Lock. Operation Lock provided the Mustangs the opportunity to codify SOPs for company teams, and it highlighted dis mounted infantry’s critical role in clearing restrictive terrain before the tanks began maneuvering. Dismount ed infantry pulling in the tanks consis tently resulted in mission success throughout force-on-force operations. TF Mustangs’ SOPs during Operation Lock provide a framework for address ing doctrinal gaps in ATP 3-90.1, Ar mor and Mechanized Infantry Com pany Teams, allowing company teams to be lethal in severely restricted ter rain in future LSCO. Tailored SOPs Intelligence preparation of the battle field in the Vekaranjärvi area enabled the Mustangs to develop SOPs tailored to eastern Finland’s restrictive terrain and the Finnish Armoured Brigade op posing force (OPFOR). The training area was heavily forested with dis persed trails throughout, resulting in mounted platoon mobility corridors. Dismounted avenues of approach were uninhibited and there was little underbrush that impeded movement. Mounted maneuver was restricted to the trails and made the intersections of trails key terrain because control of the junctions provided the owner ac cess to multiple roads. Fields of fire through the vegetation varied from 100m-400m depending on forest den sity. Keyhole shots on mounted ave nues of approach could be identified from 600m-800m away providing the engaging tank with cover and conceal ment. Bridges over the multiple water fea tures throughout the area also cana lized the offensive unit’s maneuver to chokepoints or forced gap crossings to continue maneuvering. Overall, the terrain favored the defending force due to the forest’s cover and conceal ment. Keyhole shot positions could be identified and supported by dismount ed battle positions with anti-tank weapon systems. For Operation Lock, the Mustang’s Figure 1. Task Force Mustang briefs the battalion operations order for the first battle period of Operation Lock 2023. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, bat talion unit public affairs)

Fall 2023 force-on-force enemy was a mecha nized infantry battlegroup from the Finnish Armoured Brigade. The Ar moured Brigade is garrisoned at Hä menlinna, Finland and deployed 107 miles east for this operation. Their units have trained at Vekaranjärvi’s training areas before and are familiar with the dense, forested terrain there. TF Mustangs’ intelligence section ana lyzed the OPFOR’s capabilities and de veloped a detailed enemy situation template, based on the enemy order of battle and historical Finnish tactics from the Winter War and Continuation War. The Armoured Brigade deployed a bat tlegroup for Operation Lock. This is equivalent to a U.S. Army battalion task force. Their warfighting function strengths included maneuverability of their vehicles, decentralized fires net work allowing for shortened fires pro cessing, and they had robust capabili ties to emplace tactical obstacles. Finnish history was analyzed to ab stract how they have conducted de fensive operations in the past. The Finnish conducted delaying tactics during the Winter War and Continuation War, between 1939-1945 resulting to the successful attrition of numerically superior Soviet invaders. The Finns’ delaying operations cou pled with their envelopment tactics, or motti tactics, in the severely re stricted terrain on the Finnish-Russian border resulted in five times more So viet casualties and three times more Soviet vehicles destroyed when com pared to Finnish losses in Winter War.5 The Armoured Brigade was an enemy that the Mustangs had never faced be fore. A formidable enemy that has ex perience conducting defensive opera tions against a superior force in se verely restricted terrain. Therefore, the Mustangs’ company teams consid ered these factors when adapting their SOPs for Operation Lock. Team Assault’s execution and SOP TF Mustangs (Table 1) task organized with their organic battalion minus one-tank company. The TF also includ ed one U.S. Army sapper platoon that was subsequently attached to the mechanized infantry company. The Karelian units that were attached to the TF were a Finnish mechanized in fantry Company (Poni), a Finnish re connaissance platoon (Eagle 10), a Finnish engineering platoon (Snow), a Finnish tank platoon (Delta 10), and a mortar company equipped with the Advanced Mortar System (AMOS), a Finno-Swedish 120mm semi-automat ic twin barreled, breech loaded mor tar turret (Zander). This article focuses on Assault Company’s SOPs that en abled infantry and tank integration and underpinned the TF’s tactical suc cess and how its SOPs and lesson learned can facilitate future revisions of ATP 3-90.1. TF Mustangs conducted three offen sive operations during Operation Lock. During these operations, the TF’s or der of battle deployed the reconnais sance units, followed by the two mechanized infantry companies, and Team Assault remained in its attack position until conditions were set. The deployment of Team Assault was trig gered by the identification of the Kare lian battlegroup’s main body. Table 2 depicts the offensive SOPs that shaped Team Assault’s offensive operations Table 1. Task Force Mustangs Task Organization (U.S. Army Graphic)

Fall 2023 once deployed. Figure 3 illustrates the execution matrix that Team Assault utilized for offensive operations. The first action in the SOP was to con duct the forward passage of lines (FPOL). This was tasked to the mecha nized infantry platoon because it be came the led unit and allowed the pla toon to quickly transition to vehicle dismount operations (VDO) after the FPOL was completed. During the FPOL, the mechanized infantry platoon lead er conducted a battle handover (BHO) with the stationary unit via FM or a face-to-face brief. The intelligence gained from the BHO confirmed or re fined the templated VDO points. Com pletion of the FPOL triggered the next action in the SOP, the VDO. The mechanized infantry maneuvered to VDO and began dismounting. This was a crucial aspect of Team Assault’s SOP because the infantry cleared the severely restrictive terrain of OPFOR anti-tank teams, identified OPFOR tank battle positions and allowed Team Assault to initiate contact with their smallest unit prior to the com mitment of its tanks. For Team Assault, the platoon leader dismounted allow ing the platoon to be with the unit that initiated contact with the enemy. The platoon sergeant maintained com mand and control of the Bradley’s and occupied an attack position, ready to support the dismounts. The takeaway is that there must be platoon leadership in the mounted and dismounted sections to facilitate the relay of reports from the dis mounts all the way to the company commander. Team Assault’s experience in Opera tion Lock demonstrated that the tem po of a company team’s offense in se verely restricted terrain is initially slow. The dismounts conducted squad patrolling techniques and squad at tacks when faced with enemy dis mount teams as stated in ATP 3-21.9, Infantry Platoon and Squad.6 The cru cial trigger within the Team Assault’s SOP was the identification of OPFOR tank battle positions. The resulting action was the deploy ment of tank platoons. The tempo of the tank’s assault was fast because the team’s dismount had cleared the axes of attack of OPFOR anti-tank teams and relayed the position of OPFOR tanks. Team Assault’s initial deploy ment and the sequenced SOPs pro vides a framework for company teams to maintain a slow initial tempo, al lowing the dismounts to set conditions for the tank platoons. The decision to deploy the tank platoons causes the tempo to shift to an aggressive, fast-mounted assault. Company teams must provide the en emy with multiple problem sets once the tank platoons deploy from the attack positions. These problem sets include indirect fires with preplanned fires on the objective, direct fires with Javelin teams engaging the OPFOR tanks they have visual contact with, and the tank platoons engaging with their 120mm main gun. Team Assault continued coordination with dismount infantry through face-to-face battle hand overs in which the dismounted squad/team leader hopped on the turret to provide the location of OPFOR Leopard tanks. A gap in the U.S. Army company team doctrine is standardized hand and arm Figure 2. Battalion S-3, MAJ Ryan Van Wie, and Tank Company Commander, CPT Larry Tran, make final coordination before the first battle period. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, battalion unit public affairs) Figure 3. Tank and infantry integration during the second battle period of Op eration Lock 2023. Crucial to Team Assault’s SOP was the coordination be tween dismounted infantry, mounted infantry and tanks. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, battalion unit public affairs)

Fall 2023 signals that U.S. dismounts utilize to relay information to the tanks on the move. Team Assault’s offensive operations showed the speed at which tank pla toons moved through the objective led to enemy elements being by passed. Company teams must deter mine how the M2 Bradley’s are incor porated into the attack. For Operation Lock, Team Assault maneuvered the M2 Bradley’s behind the tank platoons to clear any enemy elements that the tanks bypassed and positioned the Bradley’s where they could mount the dismounts back into their vehicles as needed. The next action is a decision point for the company team commander de pendent on the remaining combat power and the enemy situation. Team Assault’s decision point was if it had reached its limit of advance and had 60 percent of its combat power. If yes, then Team Assault would exploit the success and continue attacking to a subsequent objective to seek enemy command and control nodes or sus tainment nodes. If the combat power was below 60 percent, then Team As sault would transition to a hasty de fense. This engagement criteria and SOP was utilized for two offensive battle peri ods and resulted in the successful sei zure of Team Assault’s objectives each time with 85 percent or greater of the Team’s combat power remaining for future operations. Conclusion The Mustangs were lethal in Opera tion Lock due to their implementation of company teams and the Table 2. Infantry and tank integration offensive operations. (U.S. Army graph ic) deployment of the infantry before the tanks. Their successes provide an op portunity to address a gap within ATP 3-90.1 on infantry and tank integration SOPs and company teams operating in a severely restrictive terrain. The gaps addressed in this article follow. Team Assault’s doctrinal template and exe cution matrix (Tables 2 and 3) are ex ample products that enabled success and can be potentially added to ATP 3-90.1 as an appendix focused on company teams operating in severely restrictive terrain. The highlight from both products is that company teams must conduct a slow, deliberate maneuver of dis mounted infantry through severely re strictive terrain allowing the condi tions to be set for the tank platoons’ fast assault through the objective. Team Assault’s infantry deployed ahead of the tanks and the Javelin teams always initiated the contact with OPFOR tank crews, who were un able to observe the dismounts within the forest due to their reduced situa tional awareness inside the tank with the engine running. The smallest ele ment of the company team must initi ate contact with the enemy. The position of the mechanized infan try platoon leadership is flexible if the information from the dismounts is re layed to the rest of the company team via FM communications. Standardizing hand and arm signals in the ATP would facilitate the effective face-to-face communication with dismounted squad leaders and tank commanders. Lastly, company teams must plan the M2 Bradley’s role in the attack of the objective, so that the Bradley’s are staged to link up with their dismounts or support the tanks in the attack. Team Assault’s SOP for infantry and tank integration led to increased sur vivability of the tanks operating in se verely restrictive terrain, while also al lowing the infantry to get into the fight with their Javelin systems. The SOPs addressed multiple gaps in ATP 3-90.1 about operating in severely re strictive terrain and infantry-tank inte gration. Revisions to the U.S. Army’s ABCT company teams’ doctrine increases the lethality of armored formations in

Fall 2023 Table 3. Execution Matrix (U.S. Army) severely restricted terrain during fu ture LSCO. Armor is the combat arm of decision, but it still needs the infantry to set conditions and lead the way! 1LT Brandon D. Akuszewski is a pla toon leader, Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Armored Bri gade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, TX. Previously he served as assistant S-3, Company A, 1-8 Cavalry, 2nd ABCT. His military schools include (all at Fort Moore, GA) Scout Leaders Course, Tank Command er Course, Airborne School, and Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course. 1LT Akuszewski has a bachelor’s of science degree in international affairs from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, NY. CPT Larry D. Tran, commander, Com pany A, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regi ment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos. His previous assignments in clude assistant S-3, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT; command er, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), Task Force Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; executive offi cer, HHC, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Reg iment, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division; and tank platoon leader, Company A, 1st 66th Armor Regiment. CPT Tran’s mil itary schools include the Cavalry Lead ers Course; Maneuver Captain’s Career Course; Army Reconnaissance Course; Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course. All schools were at Fort Moore, GA. CPT Train has a bachelor’s of science de gree in human biology from the Uni versity of Texas at Austin. His awards include the Meritorious Service Medal. Notes 1 ATP 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized In fantry Company Team, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016), Chapter 3. 2 FM 71-1, Tank and Mechanized Compa ny Team, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern ment Printing Office, 1998), Chapter 3, Section 6. 3 John W. Washburn, “Integration of Ar mored Forces in the U.S. Army Infantry Division,” School of Advanced Military Studies, January 2001: https://apps.dtic. mil/sti/pdfs/ADA387170.pdf. 4 B.T. Watson, “Maintaining Tank and In fantry Integration Training,” U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, January 2005: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/ pdfs/ADA505349.pdf. 5 Munter Nenye, T. Wirtanen, C. Birks, Finland at War: The Winter War 1939-

40. (Bloomsbury Publishing 2015). 6 ATP 3-21.9, Infantry Platoon and Squad, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern ment Publishing Office, 2016). Acronym Quick-Scan ABCT – armored brigade combat team ATP – Army techniques publication BHO – battle handover FPOL – forward passage of lines LSCO – large-scale combat operations OPFOR – opposing force SOP – standing operating procedures TF – task force VDO – vehicle dismount operations Figure 4. Team Assault conducted an after-action review after the second battle period of Operation Lock

2023. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Raven Parker, battalion unit public affairs)