Expanding the Role of Mobile Protected Firepower for Army 2030

Fall 2022 those of M551. “Having [MPF] that can be delivered either by air-drop or air-land enables us to retain the initia tive we gain by dropping in,” MG Nich olson said. “But if all we are doing is jumping in and then moving at the speed of World War II paratroopers, we are going to rapidly lose the initia tive we gained by conducting strategic or operational joint forcible entry.”4 The MPF has since evolved from an idea to a platform capable of “neutral izing enemy prepared positions and bunkers and defeating heavy machine guns and armored vehicle threats dur ing offensive operations or when con ducting a defensive operation against attacking enemies.”5 While the MPF provides substantial firepower to the IBCT, the Russo-Ukrainian war raises significant ques tions about the survivability of armor in modern war. Ukrainian troops have been extremely effective at destroying Russian vehicles with man-portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). Without an active countermeasure system, armored vehicles remain high ly vulnerable to ATGMs and other pro jectiles. Considering the reality that dismounted infantry and indirect fires cannot completely defeat enemy antiarmor threats, the final production de sign of the MPF will be capable of mounting the Trophy Active Protection System.6 MPF in division The planned organization for MPF, ac cording to the Army 2030 divisional realignment, provides each light divi sion with an armor battalion consist ing of three MPF companies, a for ward-support company and a head quarters and headquarters company. Since the primary purpose of the MPF battalion is to support infantry bri gades and battalions by detaching MPF companies and platoons to them, the battalion headquarters will lack the full staffing required to conduct battalion-level tactical operations. In stead, the battalion’s primary function is to provide training, administrative and sustainment support to the com panies as they support the infantry.7 The inherent versatility of the MPF al lows a wider variety-of-use cases and force-structure models that can pro vide division commanders with a greater set of options. In World War II, the Army pooled separate tank battal ions at the corps or field-army levels for piecemeal attachment to an infan try division, regiment or battalion deemed in need of armor support. The separate tank battalion retained the capability to fight, in its organic orga nization, as part of a larger task force or in support of a division or corps.8 The Army of 2030 should retain this capability for flexible employment by making the MPF battalion a warfight ing formation capable of conducting battalion-level operations in support of division objectives. Organizing the MPF battalion as a non-tactical forma tion prevents the division commander from fully exploiting the range of the MPF’s capabilities. For example, a tactical MPF headquarters could mass its battalion in a counterattack during a division defense, bringing its over whelming shock and firepower to bear on an unsuspecting enemy. Without a tactical battalion headquarters to command and control the division’s MPF, commanders may have to settle for local counterattacks by MPF com panies in each brigade’s sector. It is understandable that the Army must make hard choices in an environ ment of fiscal and personnel con straints, but a resource decision should not diminish the capabilities of a weapon system. Division command ers who intend to employ the MPF battalion as a tactical headquarters should man it as such by moving the appropriate staff and personnel to the battalion from across the division. While this induces risk in other tacti cal battalions by removing manpower, the result is a tactical armor battalion capable of massing an extraordinary amount of the division’s combat pow er at a decisive point. Many organizational structures are vi able if the Army designs the divisional MPF battalion as a tactical headquar ters. The Army published doctrine for such an organization in 1994 in prepa ration for the fielding of the M8 AGS, which it eventually canceled. Field Manual (FM) 17-18, Light Armor Op erations, since rescinded, states that the divisional M8 AGS battalion could fight as a maneuver force when the enemy has a considerable mechanized or armored force; terrain favors the use of it as a maneuver force; or a con tingency mission has matured to the level that the entire division has de ployed. A modern interpretation of this concept is a task-organized provi sional combined-arms battalion-light (CAB-L).

One possible organization for the CAB- L (Figure 4) would add a rifle company to the MPF battalion to provide local security and counter anti-tank threats. The rifle company would be equipped with infantry-squad vehicles to main tain pace with the MPF. Depending on the mission variables, the CAB-L would accept other enablers to aid in mission accomplishment. In this configuration, the division commander can employ the CAB-L to provide more firepower Figure 3. The MPF ground-combat vehicle from General Dynamics Land Sys tems. (U.S. Army photo)

Fall 2022 to the main effort or to use the CAB-L’s mobility and shock action for pen etration or exploitation operations.9 MPF in combined joint forcible-entry amphibious operations Defending his service’s decision to eliminate its tank battalions, Marine Corps Commandant GEN David Berger said, “We need an Army with lots of tanks … We don’t need a Marine Corps with tanks.” The Marine Corps’ deci sion to divest its tanks created a natu ral role for the MPF in amphibious joint forcible-entry operations, a mis sion not previously considered when designing the MPF.10 The Abrams’ stra tegic-deployment limitations, size and heavy sustainment requirements com plicate its employment in amphibious operations. The MPF provides advan tages over legacy armor in the Indo-Pacific’s dense jungle environment, numerous islands and unimproved roads, not to mention its potential em ployability on existing amphibious-landing craft. Bearing in mind that the latest itera tion of FM 3-0, Operations, includes a chapter on Army operations in mari time environments, MPF-equipped light divisions that are regionally aligned to the Indo-Pacific region should consider their contribution to amphibious operations. One example is employing a variation of the CAB-L concept to rapidly expand a Marine Corps-established beachhead while the joint force continues to build com bat power. The MPF is a natural fit to fill the armor gap left by the Marine Corps, and it possesses further utility outside of the light division as well. MPF in future armor-centric divisions Beyond its planned employment in light-infantry divisions, the MPF’s mo bility and firepower make it a viable replacement for the M1 tank in caval ry formations of the future armor-cen tric divisions. Its lighter weight gives it greater agility and mobility than the Abrams, allowing it increased maneu verability in restricted and urban ter rain. The MPF’s weight reduces the road and bridge limitations on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern flank that otherwise provide mobility challenges to armor-centric formations, and it offers advantages in the Indo-Pacific as previously stated. Employing the MPF in a heavy cavalry formation does introduce tradeoffs; its reduced firepower and lighter armor may diminish its ability to fight for in formation. However, its greater strate gic and tactical mobility and greater agility are reasonable offsets to the relative reductions in firepower and protection. Commanders must also consider the operational environment’s restrictions on their own heavy armor will also af fect the enemy’s ability to introduce tanks; employing the MPF in these scenarios may provide U.S. forces with a significant advantage over an unde requipped adversary. When teamed with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle or its future replacement, the MPF provides the commander with a well-rounded reconnaissance formation capable of performing high-tempo cavalry opera tions in the Army’s current regions of focus. Corps armored-cavalry regiment-light In addition to its practicality in both light and armor-centric divisions, the MPF can provide the Army’s light corps with the basis for a potent re connaissance and security (R&S) for mation. While the division’s focus is tactical maneuver, the focus of the corps is shaping conditions and cir cumstances through its enablers and organic assets to ensure the success of its assigned divisions.11 Essential to the success of a corps is a formation that can provide the full range of R&S operations. Since the conversion of 2nd and 3rd Ar mored Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) to Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) in 2005 and 2013 respectively, the Army has been without a purpose-built corps-level R&S formation. An MPF-centric ACR that mixes lighter re connaissance vehicles with the heavi er-hitting MPF provides the corps with an R&S formation that possesses the necessary mobility and firepower to fight for information across a broad range of operational environments. The ACR-light (ACR-L) would consist of three cavalry squadrons consisting of two MPF companies and two cavalry troops. The ACR-L would also include a fires squadron, a sustainment squad ron and more enablers from the corps as needed. Employing light armor in an ACR is not Figure 4. CAB-L organization.

Fall 2022 without precedent; before the cancel lation of the M8 AGS, the Army planned to field M8s to 2nd ACR, grant ing the regiment a greater capacity to aggressively fight for information. Giv en the complexity and the scope of corps-level R&S operations, an ad hoc, provisional formation entails unac ceptable risk. To mitigate this risk, it must be a table of organization and equipment formation requiring the procurement of additional platforms. The Army can leverage the MPF to cre ate light ACRs for I Corps, V Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps designed for use in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Info-Pacific Command area of op erations or any operational environ ment that precludes the use of heavi er armor. The Army can manage the personnel costs of activating an ACR-L by converting existing SBCTs. I Corps could gain an ACR-L by converting an SBCT from 7th Infantry Division; like wise, an SBCT from 4th Infantry Divi sion could be relocated to Fort Stew art, GA, and converted to an ACR-L for XVIII Airborne Corps. Finally, V Corps’ European mission set necessitates the conversion of 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment to an ACR-L. Given its increased mobility, protec tion and firepower over existing light and medium vehicles, the MPF will provide I, V and XVIII Corps with a sig nificantly more lethal capability that can be employed in an expeditionary manner to locations that considerably restrict the mobility of heavier forces.

DOTMLPF-P

considerations Although this article focuses primarily on the organization of potential future MPF units, there are other elements of doctrine, organization, training, ma teriel, leadership and education, per sonnel, facilities and policy (DOT MLPF-P) the authors consider rele vant. Doctrine. While the MPF is intended to primarily serve in an infantry-sup port role, expanding its use cases ne cessitates more supporting doctrine. Placing the MPF in a cavalry squadron or regiment means MPF crews and units must be proficient in indepen dent armor operations, fighting for in formation and close-in support to ground troops. The inherent differenc es in maneuver, fire control, commu nication and more among these differ ent missions should be codified in a single manual, providing a sole doctri nal source for both MPF units and the units they support. The blueprint for an all-encompassing MPF manual al ready exists in FM 17-18, Light Armor Operations. In addition to updating the manual for multidomain operations, doctrine writers should add a purpose-built chapter on urban operations. The in creasing likelihood that U.S. forces will conduct future operations in urban terrain means that MPF crews and units must be prepared to fight in cit ies. Maneuver leaders must dispel the notion that tanks do not belong in cities. The role of armor in the urban fight nests with the MPF’s mission to reduce fortified positions for the in fantry; as demonstrated in Fallujah in 2004, a well-trained and well-re sourced armor force can have outsized effects while minimizing casualties for the combined-arms team.12 A chapter on urban operations should address both the MPF and infantry forces. Topics should include forma tions of combined infantry-armor teams; the conduct of local security for the MPF; sectors of fire; surface-danger zones; communications; when and how infantry should ride on the MPF; and more. Although MPF units will undoubtedly cover these topics in their own standing operating proce dures (SOPs), the doctrine should pro vide a baseline to ensure that units think about all aspects of infantry-ar mor operations in urban terrain. Organization. Sustaining the MPF bat talion, regardless of its organization, may prove to be the greatest difficulty for light divisions. The MPF battalion’s forward-support company (FSC) will be robust enough to support each MPF company separately across the division’s operational environment. The FSC’s assets will likely be orga nized into separate teams that would detach from the battalion along with each MPF company during operations. These teams will contain the neces sary transportation, maintenance and recovery assets to keep MPF compa nies fully-mission-capable during op erations, and they will integrate with infantry brigade-support battalions to ensure seamless sustainment. Leaders must also consider the strain that an MPF battalion places on the division-sustainment brigade and whether the current organization of the sustainment brigade can support the quantities of fuel and ammunition that the MPF will consume. Light divi sions must anticipate the massive in crease in demand or risk having the MPF battalion culminate early in an operation. Training. Regardless of how divisions and corps implement MPF, collective training at home stations will take on a new level of importance. Those units who plan to work closely with MPF Figure 5. ACR-L organization.

Fall 2022 must regularly conduct collective field and live-fire training with MPF so that all participants gain knowledge, re spect and familiarity with each other, which will prevent accidents and in crease effectiveness in combat. Al though doctrine will provide a base line, MPF and supported units should create a living SOP to continually im prove interoperability. As a habitual element of Joint-force amphibious op erations, MPF formations must also train with Marine Corps landing forc es. Wider employment of the MPF by con verting SBCTs to ACR-Ls will surely cause a wider training issue. Convert ing an infantry-centric brigade to a de cidedly more armor-centric regiment will put a burden on the Army to prop erly reallocate personnel. The Army can alleviate this problem by creating an additional skill identifier for MPF crewmen in the interim, so that any maneuver Soldier can be cer tified on the platform while the U.S. Army Armor School works to generate the required number of MPF crew men. By adding an MPF leader’s course for officers and noncommis sioned officers, mobile training teams can certify existing Soldiers on the platform without undergoing massive personnel movements. Materiel. The light division’s ability to perform MPF recovery operations is a major concern. Current wheeled re covery systems are incapable of lifting or towing a 38-ton tracked vehicle, leaving the M88A2 Hercules tracked recovery vehicle as the only option. As it stands, the M88A2 is overqualified for the job given its original purpose of recovering the M1 Abrams, which now stands at more than 70 tons. Of course, the M88A2 must also be able to be recovered, necessitating at least two of the vehicles at any light division. An ideal solution would be to manufacture a light armored recovery vehicle on the MPF chassis, allowing better interoperability between recov ery and MPF vehicles. However, since the vehicle would have to be manufac tured in low numbers, this solution is extremely costly. If the Army were to employ the MPF in greater numbers across the force as this article envisions, the cost of manufacturing this solution would correspondingly diminish. A second materiel acquisition that would enhance the MPF platform is a mine plow and mine roller for con ducting the combined-arms breach. This would greatly increase the speed and safety with which light engineers are able to reduce obstacles, and it would allow MPF units to conduct in-stride breaches of simpler obstacles. However, mine plow and roller trans port requirements may prevent them from being brought forward on expe ditionary deployments. Like the recov ery vehicle, these systems would be costly to manufacture in relatively low numbers and would equally become more cost-efficient with greater em ployment of MPF across the force. Ul timately, the need (or lack thereof) for these materiel solutions will be real ized during MPF training and employ ment, at which point these decisions can be re-evaluated. Bridging assets for the MPF-equipped light division or ACRs are also worthy of consideration. The current Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System (REBS) can support tracked vehicles weighing up to 40 tons, and wheeled vehicles up to 50 tons. The current stated weight of the MPF at 38 tons means that a com bat-loaded and equipped MPF could very easily exceed the REBS’ 40-ton tracked vehicle capacity. Any supple ments to the MPF, like more armor or an attached mine plow, would similar ly create risk in bridging operations. Adding more capacity to the REBS may soon be necessary to ensure proper gap-crossing ability for MPF units. In the meantime, MPF operators and ma neuver planners should remain aware of this issue. Leadership and education. The first MPF company is not expected to be fielded until mid-2025.13 However, leaders in every warfighting function must consider how MPF will be em ployed and how they will support or integrate the vehicle into their opera tions. The Army’s professional military education should begin to integrate MPF into training prior to 2025 by up dating decisive-action training envi ronment scenarios to incorporate MPF. At a minimum, these changes should occur in the maneuver basic of ficer leader courses, the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) and the Command and General Staff Col lege (CGSC). Division and corps warfighter simula tions should also include MPF to pro vide staffs with a heightened level of familiarity. The publication of MPF doctrine prior to 2025 will also give leaders the chance to conduct profes sional development with their subor dinates, building capability and readi ness before engaging in training. Facilities. The ability of divisions and corps to build and train cohesive teams around the MPF will rely con siderably on their available training fa cilities. If the best interoperability training occurs during collective field and live-fire training, MPF-equipped units require the necessary maneuver areas, live-fire ranges and mainte nance facilities to do so. Since posts housing light divisions generally lack these facilities, leaders may have to accept compromises. If the cost of building suitable range complexes is too expensive, MPF units at locations like Fort Bragg, NC, Fort Campbell, KY, or Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, may be forced to conduct regular travel to a suitable nearby post for live-fire training – Fort Knox, KY, Fort Pickett, VA, and Fort Stewart, GA, come to readily to mind. In other locations, a lack of access or proximity to the ap propriate facilities at their parent unit’s location may cause MPF units to be permanently stationed away from their parent units entirely to achieve the necessary levels of readiness. Both scenarios make collective training with supported or task-organized units dif ficult. This situation provides an op portunity to regularly practice deploy ment readiness by traveling to anoth er post, increasing units’ preparedness for contingency operations. Conclusion In a significant milestone for maneu ver forces and after nearly 30 years since the retirement of the M551 Sheridan, the Army will successfully field the MPF to light infantry divisions in 2025. The MPF will provide much-needed mobility, shock and firepower to light divisions; the inherent

Fall 2022 versatility of the platform will un doubtedly cause MPF units to take on new missions. In anticipation of this growth, leaders must envision a vari ety of MPF organizations and missions. The possibility of employing the MPF as a tactical battalion provides the di vision commander with a separate battalion that can aggressively maneu ver and fight across the battlefield, generating an overwhelming shock at the decisive point. Similarly, the Army’s corps can employ MPF as the centerpiece of a light ar mored cavalry regiment suitable for maneuver across the Indo-Pacific and the European continent, or in contin gencies worldwide. The MPF may even prove useful in heavy cavalry forma tions, favoring mobility and agility vs. the heaver M1. As the ever-increasing weight of other armored platforms limits their mobility and expeditionary deployment, the MPF, limited only by fiscal and manpower constraints, is best suited to provide the Army’s light forces with a versatile system capable of a variety of missions. Retired LTC Lee Kichen served in com mand and staff positions in armor, ar mored-cavalry and mechanized-infan try units in the United States and over seas. He also served on the Army Staff and Training and Doctrine Command staff. LTC Kichen’s military schooling includes Air War College (non-resi dent), CGSC, Armor Advanced Officer Course and Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, a mas ter’s of social-sciences degree in soci ology and political science from Pacif ic Lutheran University and a master’s of arts degree in counseling psycholo gy from Chapman College. His awards and honors include the Legion of Mer it (one oak-leaf cluster) and Meritori ous Service Medal (two oak-leaf clus ters) and the Order of St. George- Sil ver Medallion. MAJ Aram Hatfield is an Armor officer who currently is a student in the Ad vanced Military Studies Program, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His previous as signments include chief of reconnais sance, Mission Command Training Pro gram’s world-class opposing force, Fort Leavenworth; commander: Com pany A, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor Regi ment (Airborne) (Provisional), 1st Bri gade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Air borne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; com mander: Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 1st BCT, 82nd Air borne Division; scout platoon leader: Headquarters and Headquarters Com pany, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regi ment, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division; Fort Hood, TX; and platoon leader: Troop B, 1/9 Cavalry, 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry Divi sion; Fort Hood. MAJ Hatfield’s mili tary schools include CGSC, Advanced Airborne School (Jumpmaster), Ranger School, Airborne School, Cavalry Lead er’s Course, MCCC, Pathfinder School, Air-Assault School, Army Reconnais sance Course and the Armor Basic Of ficer Leader’s Course. He has a bach elor’s of science degree in computer science from the U.S. Military Acade my, and a master’s of science degree in administration from Central Michi gan University. MAJ Hatfield commanded the Army’s MPF Company Excursion at Fort Bragg from 2018 to 2020. Company A, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor (Provisional), used 18 light armored vehicles bor rowed from the U.S. Marine Corps to develop tactics, techniques and proce dures for the future MPF vehicle. The company took part in many infantry battalion and brigade field-training ex ercises and successfully supported 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, at JRTC. Notes 1 Army Public Affairs release, June 28, 2022. 2 LTC Ben Ferguson and CPT Lennard Sal cedo, “Mobile Protected Firepower: An Opportunity,” ARMOR, Summer 2022 edition. The M8, canceled just before the start of protection, was officially the Ar mored Gun System. However, FM 17-18, Light Armor Operations (written specifi cally for employment by light-armor bat talions, companies and platoons), re ferred to it as a light tank. 3 Ferguson and Salcedo. 4 U.S. Army Armor School, Thunderbolt Blast (Armor School newsletter), Decem ber 2013-January 2014, Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Armor School, https://media-cdn.dvidshub.net/pubs/pdf_14894.pdf; retrieved July 30, 2022. 5 Congressional Research Service, “In Fo cus: The Army’s Mobile Protect Firepow er (MPF) System,” updated May 18, 2022. 6 Eric Tegler, “Two Light Tank Prototypes Battle for the Future of Army Firepower,” Popular Mechanics, March 7, 2021, https://www.popularmechanics.com/mil itary/weapons/a35634134/army-mpf-tank/. 7 Christopher Stone, Army Capability Manager-IBCT briefing at the Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Feb. 16, 2022, Fort Benning, GA. 8 Anthony Daskevich II, Insights Into Modularity: 753rd Tank Battalion In World War II, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 15, 2018. 9 Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 17-18, Light Armor Operations (re scinded) May 8, 1994. 0 Michael R. Gordon, “Marines Plan to Retool to Meet China Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2020; quoted in Matthew W. Graham, “Tanks in the Surf: Maintaining the Joint Combined Arms Landing Team,” land-warfare paper, Washington, DC: Association of the U.S. Army, July 2022. 11 Headquarters DA, FM 3-94, Theatre Army, Corps and Division, July 21, 2021. 12 Kendall D. Gott, Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. 13 Stone briefing, Maneuver Warfighter Conference Feb. 16, 2020, Fort Benning. ACR – armored-cavalry regiment ACR-L – armored-cavalry regiment-light AGS – Armored Gun System ATGM – anti-tank guided missile BCT – brigade combat team CAB-L – combined-arms battalion-light CGSC – Command and General Staff College DOTMLPF-P – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy FM – field manual FSC – forward-support company IBCT – infantry brigade combat team JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center MBT – main battle tank MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MPF – mobile protected firepower R&S – reconnaissance and security REBS – Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team SOP – standing operating procedure Acronym Quick-Scan

Fall 2022 Combat Vehicle Developments to Propel Army of 2030 – and Beyond by Dan Heaton Protection from above, an adaptabili ty for future technology and a reduced logistical footprint are among the transformational capabilities of the new armored vehicles in development for the Army’s divisions and armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs). As the Army moves toward 2030, its 16 ABCTs (11 in the active-duty force and five in the National Guard) are un dergoing a once-in-a generation trans formation to bring new capabilities to leaders and Soldiers. The ABCTs of 2030 require new and different capa bilities to defeat potential adversaries on future battlefields that will use ad vanced equipment and cutting-edge technologies in the 21st Century. To counter these future threats from peer adversaries, the Army Future Command’s Next-Generation Combat Vehicles Cross-Functional Team (NGCV CFT) works with both internal and ex ternal partners to develop faster, more survivable and more capable armored vehicles, able to deliver increased fire power to the battlefield. Transforming the capabilities of ABCT is a team sport. The next generation of combat vehicles is being developed with a partnership that stretches across the Army and beyond:

• The Maneuver Center of Excellence is the Army’s centralized planner, manager and integrator for capability development and user activities for Army combat formations.

• NGCV CFT is responsible for developing sound requirements for the highest-priority capabilities, supported by Soldier feedback, to close capability gaps.

• The Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate is responsible for determining and developing future-force capabilities for the infantry and armored force of tomorrow and for conducting capability-based doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development, p e r s o n n e l , f a c i l i t i e s a n d policies assessments, experiments and integration.

• The Ground-Combat Systems Center conducts the foundational research and prototyping required for potential new systems.

• Program Executive Office-Ground Combat Systems acquires the vehicles. Together, this team – with support from industry and academia – are moving deliberately to deliver cutting-edge capabilities to Soldiers. To achieve maximum effect, armored and combat vehicles must be able to operate in a formation capable of working with our sister services, allies and partners. Individual platforms must have robust, interoperable com munications data links both to other platforms in the formation and to higher-echelon commanders. Realtime communications will allow divi sion-level-and-above leaders to see and understand the big picture and rapidly allocate and employ assets to attack an enemy across all domains, while commanders at the brigade lev el and below focus on the close fight. Developments underway now in the Army’s next generation of combat ve hicles will ensure our formations re tain overmatch into 2030 and beyond. The U.S. Army is now delivering its first new tracked armored vehicles in 40 years. In January 2023, the first Ar mored Multi-Purpose Vehicles (AMPVs) will arrive at 1st ABCT, 3rd In fantry Division, at Fort Stewart, GA, in what will be the first of a steady stream of AMPV deliveries to ABCTs. Development of Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicles (OMFVs) continues to proceed, with manufacture of pro totype vehicles starting in 2023. Ex perimentation on concepts that will inform future decisions on upgrades to the Abrams tank will continue in 2023, supporting development efforts that could eventually lead to the Next-Generation Main Battle Tank (NGMBT). While AMPV, OMFV and tank research are all at different stages of develop ment, they share key commonalities: digital design and open systems archi tectures. OMFV and future tank devel opments will feature the Ground-Com bat Systems’ Common Infrastructure Architecture (GCIA), which is also known as Modular Open-System Ar chitecture (MOSA). The GCIA approach is central to cur rent OMFV design efforts. Simply put, GCIA allows the Army to incorporate today’s technology into a vehicle, while its operating system is intention ally designed in such a way that future technology can still be easily incorpo rated. GCIA also allows future technol ogy from Company X to be incorporat ed into a vehicle designed by Company Y because of the “open” nature of the underlying system. AMPV is being fielded with a MOSA-compliant sys tem. “On OMFV, our industry partners are looking at different armor-package considerations, different track config urations, what systems will we be us ing for targeting and active protection systems [APSs],” said BG Geoffrey A. Norman, director of NGCV CFT. “The science is continuing on all these fronts, and we don’t know for certain which technologies will be ready next. But we will have the architecture in place where we can add those tech nologies when they have reached the appropriate level of maturity.” While science and technology devel opments are happening in industry and in government labs and test cen ters, the Army is also closely watching how armored vehicles are being em ployed in the most recent Russian in vasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as how they were used in the Nagorno-Karabah conflict of 2020. In both of those conflicts, losses of tanks and other armored vehicles largely appear to stem from lack of combined-arms tactics, compromised logistics, de layed and neglected maintenance,