Russia’s Developing Tank-Support Combat Vehicle Concept Dr. Charles K. Bartles and Dr. Lester W. Grau

Fall 2022 time to respond to these threats and suppress them, including the fire of dual 30mm cannons that penetrate the walls of houses.”8 Regarding defensive capabilities, a ma jor Russian concern before the start of the “special military operation” was the Ukrainian acquisition of North At lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) antitank weapons such as the United States’ Javelin ATGM and the United Kingdom’s Next-Generation Light AntiTank Weapon (NLAW) ATGM. Accord ing to RIA Novosti, another “informed source” stated that the BMPT could withstand Javelin and other Western ATGMs: “The experience of military operations shows that the BMPT ‘Ter minator,’ due to its increased protec tion, can withstand the hit of the Jav elin anti-tank system as well as other NATO-made anti-tank systems and grenade launchers. After these at tacks, the BMPTs needed minor re pairs in the field, so combat capability could fully be restored.”9 Despite Russian pronouncements about the effectiveness of the Russian military and equipment during the “special military operation” – which are notoriously unreliable and in many cases are demonstrably false – the Russians’ continued discussion of the BMPT concept suggests that the Rus sians perceive the BMPT’s perfor mance favorably.10 BMPT and Russian force design In the past, dis cussion of the BMPT’s organiza tional structure in t h e R u s s i a n ground forces re volved around three options: a single BMPT in a tank platoon, a BMPT platoon in a tank company or a BMPT com pany in a tank battalion. It appeared that Russia was planning to adopt the last option, although in regular prac tice the BMPT platoons in the BMPT company would be attached to tank companies, or individual BMPTs would be attached to tank platoons. But in the September edition of Armeisky Sbornik, a Russian armor expert pos its that BMPT battalions should be fielded in each tank regiment, and pre sumably each tank brigade.11 If Russian military theorists are dis cussing “upsizing” BMPT units from company to battalion level, it lends credence to the idea that the BMPT concept and performance are per ceived to be sound. Although there may now be discussion of BMPT bat talions instead of just BMPT compa nies, it is important to note that Russian force planning still envisions an approximately 1:3 ratio (one BMPT per three tanks) as ideal. Instead of one BMPT company supporting a tank battalion, the current schema envi sions one BMPT battalion supporting three tank battalions, with BMPT com panies, BMPT platoons and individual BMPTs being attached to tank battal ions, tank companies and tank pla toons, respectively. Since all tank units will almost certain ly not have BMPT support, the “upsiz ing” of BMPT formations suggests the BMPT will be fielded in greater num bers than initially anticipated. It is also important to keep in mind that the use of BMPTs does not mean the Russians intend to abandon the use of com bined-arms units in favor of tanks and BMPTs. Rather, tank and motorized ri fle units will still provide mutual sup port, but the way this support will be organized will differ due to the capa bilities that the BMPT provides to the combined-arms formation. The imple mentation of this new system is still in its infancy, but Russian tacticians are planning for it, as will be described. Possibilities for BMPT employment Traditionally during an offensive, a tank battalion is usually reinforced with one or sometimes two motorized rifle companies. Generally, the tanks form the first echelon, with the sec ond echelon consisting of BMPs/BTRs, followed by their dismounts standing off at 200 meters or moving from cov ered position to covered position. But Figure 2. U.S. Soldiers fire an FGM-148 Javelin. (U.S. Army photo) Figure 3. A United Kingdom Soldier launches an NLAW. (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence photo licensed under the Open Government Licence version 1.0)

Fall 2022 BMPTs, when present, can be in the first or second echelons of a com bined-arms reserve, remain directly subordinate to the battalion com mander, and in urban operations can be part of the assault group. BMPTs will permit the more lightly armed and armored BMPs and BTRs to still pro vide support but stay farther behind the line of contact. When acting as part of first-, second-or third-echelon battalions, the BMPT conducts fire support and destroys the enemy, focusing on enemy antitank systems. In a combined-arms reserve, the BMPT will repel enemy counterat tacks, defend flanks and deal with un foreseen contingencies. When directly subordinated to a battalion command er, BMPTs destroy enemy personnel, means of fire, armored vehicles and tanks; support the actions of the first and second echelons (when they are engaged in battle); and cover the flanks. The current opinion of Russian tacti cians is that BMPTs are generally most effective when employed in the same echelon as tanks. In this scheme of maneuver, BMPTs can provide close-fire support for tanks by effectively de stroying enemy antitank weapons both at the forefront and throughout the depth of the enemy’s defense. The decision about the exact nature of BMPT employment depends on vari ables relating to the combat mission; intent of the senior commander; and composition, state and position of the enemy. Variant 1. In this variant, a BMPT is placed at equal intervals (1:3) be tween the tanks of the formation, with the BMPT platoon commander situat ed next to the tank-platoon leader. This scheme of maneuver will be most beneficial in situations when the ene my is in a hasty and/or unprepared de fense. Variant 2. During an offensive in spe cial conditions (urban terrain, moun tains, forest, desert, etc.), it is impor tant to prevent the enemy from sud denly flanking attacking battalion and the seams between companies. There fore the combat formation of the com panies (platoons) will be oblique from right/left, and a robust reconnaissance will be conducted in the directions from which the enemy could possibly approach. The second echelon (re serve) will maintain constant readi ness to thwart any potential enemy at tack. In this scheme of maneuver, BMPTs are placed on the flanks of the attacking tank companies, with the position of the platoons oblique from left to right (or right to left). Variant 3. In situations where the en emy has a prepared defense with dense antitank fires and engineer ob stacles, a breakthrough zone must be established. The battalion commander (if not the higher commander) will de termine the direction for this concen tration of effort. In this scheme of ma neuver, the BMPTs are placed on the direction of concentrated effort. Variant 4. For the successful develop ment of an offensive, the timely intro duction of the second echelon Figure 4. BMPT battalion. (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) Figure 5. Tank regiment (with BMPT battalion). (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles)

Fall 2022 (combined-arms reserve) into battle is important. When the second echelon of the battalion is introduced into bat tle, it is advisable to place the BMPT on its flanks to provide covering fires for the tank company conducting the assault and to protect it from possible enemy counterattacks. If the second echelon is committed to combat, one of the tank companies of the first echelon is withdrawn from combat. Then the BMPTs supporting it can be retasked to support the new tank company being introduced to battle. In any case, the placement of the BMPTs in the combat formation of the battalion is determined by the battal ion commander. In some cases, the battalion commander may not attach the BMPTs to the first-echelon compa nies but instead leave them in his re serve to deal with unforeseen Figure 6. Tank brigade (with BMPT battalion). (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) Figure 7. Combat formation of tank companies each reinforced with motorized rifle platoon and BMPT platoon. The platoons are positioned in line (BMPTs are placed evenly between the tanks). (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bar tles)

Fall 2022 Figure 8. Combat formation of tank companies, each reinforced with motorized rifle platoon and BMPT platoon. The BMPT platoons are positioned oblique from right/left. (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) Figure 9. Combat formation of tank companies, each reinforced with motorized rifle platoon and BMPT platoon. The position of the platoons is in line (BMPTs are placed on the direction of concentration of the main effort). (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles) contingencies. This is done primarily to repel possible enemy counterat tacks. These BMPTs will move with the second echelon of the battalion to ei ther reinforce the second echelon as it enters battle or else perform some other combat mission. Based on Russian’s initially heavy tank losses in Ukraine, many in the West

Fall 2022 have concluded that the tank is obso lete. Later combat in Ukraine showed that tanks are still a vital and decisive weapons system that play a critical role in modern combat.12 However, it is also clear that tanks need immedi ate support against air and ATGM at tack. It is apparent that Russian military theorists have concluded that the BMPT concept is viable and merits further development based on the sys tem’s combat experience in Syria and Ukraine. But Russian military theorists seem convinced that BMPTs will sig nificantly increase the combat capa bilities of a tank battalion, especially in urban areas where tanks have tra ditionally had difficulties. BMPTs can reportedly ensure the completion of combat missions in a shorter time and to a greater depth/width than tank formations acting without BMPT sup port. The BMPT has been under consider ation and development since the days when the Soviet Army and Warsaw Pact confronted NATO. The BMPT was designed not only for urban areas but also for the large, open areas of Rus sia where a noncontiguous (fragment ed) battlefield with open flanks would be the norm, and maneuver and fire power would dominate the fight. The “special military operation” in Ukraine is not that battlefield. The Ukrainian forces outnumber the Rus sians, the lines are contiguous, and firepower has a decided edge over maneuver. Two artillery armies with a common history, geography and way of war are battling for a decision that is anything but quick. The BMPT has arrived late to the fight and in small numbers. Some lessons appear to be developing from that conflict. Reliable reconnais sance, communications and precision fires are crucial. Towed artillery ap pears to be a thing of the past. System support and maintenance need a lot of work. Firepower enables maneuver, but firepower is not strictly the Figure 10. BMPT platoon in the second echelon (BMPTs on company flanks). (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bar tles) Figure 11. Legend of Russian symbols for Figures 7-10. (U.S. Army graphic by Dr. Charles K. Bartles)

Fall 2022 provenance of the artillery. The BMPT provides a tank unit with significant firepower in conjunction with the ar tillery and enhanced mounted infan try. The BMPT will probably be a larger component of Russian tank units fol lowing the current conflict. Dr. Chuck Bartles is an analyst and Russian linguist at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leaven worth, KS. His specific research areas include Russian and Central Asian mil itary force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted profession al development, and security-assis tance programs. Dr. Bartles is also a space-operations officer and lieuten ant colonel in the Army Reserve who has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and has served as a security-assis tance officer at embassies in Kyrgyz stan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in Rus sian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, a master’s of arts degree in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Kansas and a doctorate degree from the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is co-au thor of (with Dr. Les Grau) The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and the Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (Mentor, 2017). Dr. Les Grau, a retired U.S. Army infan try lieutenant colonel, is FMSO’s re search director. Previous positions in clude senior analyst and research co ordinator, FMSO, Fort Leavenworth, KS; deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and Gen eral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; political and economic adviser, Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The Netherlands; U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Soviet Union; battalion executive offi cer, 2-9th Infantry, Republic of Korea and Fort Riley, KS; commander, Head quarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Support Brigade, Mannheim, Ger many; district senior adviser, Advisory Team 80, Republic of Vietnam and pla toon leader and battalion S-3, Berlin Brigade. His military schooling in cludes U.S. Air Force War College, U.S. Army Russian Institute, Defense Lan guage Institute (Russian), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Infantry Officer Advanced Course and Infantry Officer Basic Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science from the University of Texas-El Paso; a master’s of arts degree in in ternational relations from Kent State University; and a doctorate in Russian and Central Asian military history from the University of Kansas. His awards and honors include U.S. Central Com mand Visiting Fellow; professor, Acad emy for the Problems of Security, De fense and Law Enforcement, Moscow; academician, International Informati zation Academy, Moscow; Knowlton Award; Legion of Merit; Bronze Star; Purple Heart; and Combat Infantry Badge. He is the author of 13 English-language books on Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and more than 250 articles for professional journals. Dr. Grau’s best-known books are The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Com bat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahi deen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Notes 1 M. Yurshin, A. Hazarenko and A. Chogovadze,“Тесное Сопровождение [Close Support],” Armeisky Sbornik, Sep tember 2022. 2 Lester W. Grau, “Preserving Shock Ac tion: A New Approach to Armored Ma neuver Warfare?”, ARMOR, September-October 2006, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/ pdfs/ADA456423.pdf; Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “A New System Pre serves Armor Dominance of the Future Battlefield: The BMPT Terminator,” AR MOR, June 2015, https://community. apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/; Lester W. Grau and Charles

K. Bartles, “Enhancing Russian Tank Sur vivability: Tank-Support Combat Vehicle Entering Tank Battalions,” ARMOR, Sum mer 2022, pdf_65050.pdf (dvidshub.net). 3 M. Yurshin, A. Hazarenko and A. Chogo vadze, “Живучесть Танков: Применение боевых машин поддержкн танков в современных условиях [Tank Survivabil ity: Employment of Tank Support Combat Vehicles under current conditions],” Ar meisky Sbornik, September 2021. 4 Anton Lavrov and Aleksey Ramm, “Они еще вернутся: «Терминаторам» дали год испытаний: Решение о серийной закупке боевых машин поддержки танков будет принято после всесторонней обкатки [They’ll Be Back: Terminators Get a Year for Testing. A De cision on Serial Procurement of Tank-Sup port Combat Vehicles Will Be Taken After Comprehensive Trials],” Izvestiya, Feb. 15, 2021, https://iz.ru/1124767/anton-lavrov-aleksei-ramm/oni-eshche-vernut sia-terminatoram-dali-god-ispytanii. 5 “Первую в ВС РФ штатную роту БМПТ ‘Терминатор’ ввели в состав дивизии на Урале” [The first full-time company of BMPT ‘Terminators’ in the armed forces of the Russian Federation was introduced into a division in the Urals],” TASS, Nov. 30, 2021, https://tass.ru/armiya-i- opk/13074661. 6 Sergey Ptichkin, “ВС РФ впервые применили в ходе спецоперации БМПТ ‘Терминатор’ [The armed forces of the Russian Federation used the BMPT ‘Ter minator’ for the first time during the spe cial operation],” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the official newspaper of the Russian Federa tion published by the Russian govern ment, May 18, 2022, https:// rg.ru/2022/05/18/vs-rf-vpervye-primeni li-v-hode-specoperacii-bmpt-terminator. html. 7 “В спецоперации на Украине задействовали ‘Терминаторов’ [‘Termi nators’ were involved in a special opera tion in Ukraine], Radio Sputnik, May 18, 2022, https://radiosputnik.ria. ru/20220518/terminator-1789151283. html. 8 “Источник: ‘Терминаторы’ показали высокую боевую устойчивость на Украине [Source: ‘Terminators’ showed high combat effectiveness in Ukraine],” RIA Novosti, July 22, 2022, https://ria. ru/20220722/terminatory-1804166241. html. 9 “Российские ‘Терминаторы’ выдерживают попадание ‘Джавелина’, заявил источник [Russian Terminators can withstand Javelin hit, sources say],” RIA Novosti, Aug. 31, 2022, https://ria. ru/20220831/bmpt-1813306805.html. 10 Since the BMPT has about the same amount of firepower as two motorized rifle platoons and there is interest in hav ing the system support dismounted in fantry, there has been some discussion of rebranding the system as a “fire-support combat vehicle,” but as of now the name of record for the system is still “tank-sup port combat vehicle.” 11 M. Yurshin, A. Hazarenko and A. Chogovadze,“Тесное Сопровождение [Close Support].” 12 Jeff Shogol, “Tank warfare is still rele vant, even if the Russians suck at it – Rus sia’s horrific tank losses in Ukraine are not the death knell of tank warfare,” Task and Purpose, Sept. 23, 2022, https://tas kandpurpose.com/news/tank-warfare-Russia-Ukraine-future/?utm_ source=sailthru&utm_ medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb.

Fall 2022 Acronym Quick-Scan ATGM – anti-tank guided missile BMP – boyeva mashina pekhoty (Russian infantry fighting vehicle) BMPT – boyevaya mashina podderzhki tankov (Russian tank-support combat vehicle, nicknamed “Terminator”) BTR – bronetransportyor (Russian armored personnel carrier) FMSO – Foreign Military Studies Office NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NLAW – Next-Generation Light AntiTank Weapon

Fall 2022 Expanding Role of Mobile Protected Firepower for Army 2030 by LTC (Retired) Lee F. Kitchen and MAJ Aram M. Hatfield The U.S. Army awarded General Dy namics Land Systems a low-rate initial-production contract June 28, 2022, to produce 96 mobile protected firepow er (MPF) vehicles capable of providing infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT) with “greater survivability, the ability to identify threats early and at greater distance … allowing Soldiers to move at a faster pace.”1 The MPF’s shock, mobility and firepower will provide the light-infantry division the ability to fight and win in multidomain largescale combat operations. However, this use case is decidedly narrow in scope. The MPF’s expeditionary characteris tics make it viable in operations where heavier vehicles cannot be employed. The MPF can serve in a wider variety of roles across the land domain be yond its planned purpose as an infan try-support weapon in the light-infan try division. Expanding the role of the MPF in both light and armor-centric divisions and corps can greatly in crease the mobility and firepower of the Army’s largest tactical formations. The MPF is the Army’s first new tank since fielding the M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT) in 1980. The M551 Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne As sault Vehicle, “General Sheridan,” which entered service in 1966, was the Army’s last light tank. Although the Sheridan possessed the attributes of a light tank – such as thinner armor and less weight than the MBT, and greater strategic and tactical mobility than a heavier tank – the Army re fused to call the M551 a light tank. Similarly, calling the MPF something other than a tank “is intended to dis suade service members from viewing it as a tank-like vehicle and then em ploying in the same way as the M1.”2 Certainly, the lighter weight and pro tection of the MPF vehicle necessi tates that it be employed differently than the better-protected M1. This does not mean that the system must be relegated to the duties of an as sault gun. Commanders should consid er the possibility of collectively em ploying the MPF to exploit opportuni ties and achieve objectives through overwhelming shock and firepower. Restating requirement for light tank Since the M551’s retirement, light for mations resorted to using uparmored humvees with a variety of weapons as a replacement for the M551. Near-peer adversaries during the same pe riod continued to field strategically and tactically deployable light ar mored fighting vehicles far more lethal and survivable than uparmored hum vees. Recognizing the need for more substantial armor support to infantry, the XVIII Airborne Corps has frequent ly requested mechanized company-teams to support IBCTs during Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rota tions and for future contingency oper ations.3 MG John W. Nicholson Jr., command ing 82nd Airborne Division, voiced the need for a platform that would pro vide the division with capabilities like Figure 2. M8 Armored Gun System (AGS) Level 2 armor, circa 1994. (U.S. Army photo) Figure 1. M551 Sheridans of Troop E, 17th Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division, at Fort Campbell, KY, in April 1972. (U.S. Army photo)