A Force-Management Approach for the Division Cavalry Squadron

As the Army transitions from a coun terinsurgency focus to a multi-do main/large-scale combat operations (MD-LSCO) focus, it’s imperative for commanders at all echelons to gain and maintain an accurate picture of their organization’s operational environment. The problem is that current Army force structure doesn’t provide division commanders with an organic all-weather force able to conduct infor mation collection (IC) that will support division planning; the division is the only tactical-level unit without a spe cialized all-weather organization that’s dedicated to conducting reconnaissance, security and economy-of-force (EoF) operations. A significant change in focus and efforts within the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and ed ucation (DOTMLE) domains are re quired to rapidly correct this egregious deficiency. Functional-area analysis The Army Strategy 2018 outlining the Army’s operating concept of multi-do main operations (MDO) states: “[U] nits from brigade through corps must have the ability to conduct sustained ground and air intelligence, surveil lance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare and cyber operations to shape the battlefield across all domains.” However, U. S. Army divisions are not meeting this requirement with their current force structure. Nor does Army doctrine address reconnaissance and security (R&S) in the division deep area. Army training institutions do not effectively support the complexity or specialization of R&S missions. Divisions must have an organic organi zation able to conduct reconnaissance, security and EoF operations. This or ganization must be able to fight for in formation and survive a multi-domain battlefield. The organization must con tain the organic capabilities and sys tems to conduct IC across all operational domains. Why? Because the Army is the dominant land force for the United States to seize, secure, retain and exploit the initiative to achieve battlefield success. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, states: “Operational initiative is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation. Army forces seize, retain and exploit operational initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting an ene my force multiple dilemmas across multiple domains, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until driven into an untenable position.” To do this, certain tasks are required of Soldiers. Table 1 lists the operations required by the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). Table 2 shows the Army’s mission-essential tasks (METs). Questions to answer Seeing how the Army is focusing on the division deep fight, how can a Table 2. Army METs. Table 1. Required operations from the UJTL.

division commander gain and maintain fundamental operational initiative without an all-weather R&S force dedicated as the division commander’s eyes and ears on the battlefield? How can a division commander maneuver the division to present an enemy commander with multiple dilemmas if the commander cannot visualize the battlefield? ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, states that for effective command and control, commanders must “employ the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning nec essary to understand, visualize and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and di rect, lead and assess military operations.” However, if the division commander and staff do not have a clear operational picture derived from a division-level IC organization, how is the intel ligence driving maneuver? Will the di vision be able to mass its combat power effectively and efficiently at the decisive point in support of the decisive operation? An answer to these questions must be addressed as divisions prepare to conduct MD-LSCO. That answer is the division cavalry (DIV CAV) squadron. Functional-needs analysis To reiterate, division commanders don’t have an organic all-weather or ganization whose primary mission is to conduct reconnaissance, security and EoF operations. As division staffs use the military decision-making process to plan, prepare and execute division-level operations, division staffs and commanders commit forces to opera tions with limited ability to gather essential elements of information about the terrain and threat to support their planning efforts. Division commanders assume tactical risk by preparing and executing con ceptual plans instead of detailed op erations where the intelligence warfighting function (WfF) is driving the movement-and-maneuver WfF. This results in a higher potential for operations becoming desynchronized due to unknown or unforeseen battlefield effects or conditions against a free-thinking enemy who may not fight the way a division staff wants them to fight. This places a higher stress on the brigade combat teams’ (BCTs) organic cavalry organizations to support their respective BCTs’ operations, as well as to provide informa tion needed at the division level. Divisions lack an organic all-weather capability to answer the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. These are information requirements commonly associated with a decision the unit commander must make. If the organization does not have away to accurately answer these information requirements, then division commanders assume the risk of making decisions based on circumstantial, un confirmed and/or incomplete intelligence. This also requires more time for division information requirements to be answered because the BCTs must gain and maintain enemy contact instead of a division-level organization doing so. This further requires the division commander to assume risk by not identifying and bringing combat pow er against the division’s high-value tar gets (HVTs) and high-payoff targets (HPTs) to shape the battlefield in sup port of the division’s operation or plan. It forces the commander to ac cept limited engagements with little payoff in the division’s deep fight. Divisions do not have enough organic ability to support the targeting pro cess: decide, detect, deliver and assess. Outcomes of Steps 3 and 4 of in telligence preparation of the battle field involve identifying enemy HVTs. This in turn enables the organization to develop courses of action and HPTs. This is decide in the targeting process. The organization assesses and allo cates the best asset(s) to locate and identify HVTs and HPTs. This is detect in the targeting process. The organiza tion determines the best asset to action to inflict the desired effects. This is deliver in the targeting process. The organization then assesses the perfor mance or effectiveness of its targeting process. This is assess in the targeting process. The division lacks an organic organiza tion beyond the MQ-1C Grey Eagle unmanned aerial system (UAS) or the RQ-7B Shadow UAS in the maneuver enhancement brigade to support this process. This prevents the division from suppressing, neutralizing or de stroying HVTs and HPTs. These targets are now left for BCT commanders to manage, severely reducing the divi sion’s effectiveness in the reconnaissance fight. Functional-solution analysis A division echelon R&S organization is essential in maintaining security and situational awareness while conduct ing MD-LSCO. A division commander’s ability to see the operating environment facing the division will enable that commander to maintain the initiative and to increase lethality, speed and mobility. The solution is to reintroduce the DIV CAV. Reintroduction of the DIV CAV would affect the DOTMLE domains. Doctrine domain Current Army doctrine does not ad dress R&S operations for a division. The Army’s doctrinal reference for R&S is Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, which states: “This publication provides doctrinal guidance for all formations assigned to the armored brigade combat team, the infantry brigade combat team and the Stryker brigade combat team.” Unfortunately, the R&S cornerstone does not address R&S operations to support LSCO at division level. The su perseded FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, addresses R&S operations at echelon from the platoon through corps. This publication could be re viewed, updated and implemented as a solution to this problem. Organization domain The DIV CAV is a proven organization in peace and combat – cavalry squad rons had exceptional success in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. The DIV CAV is also the premier division-level R&S organization with the proper manning, equipment, train ing and force structure to shape the division fight. FM 17-95 best describes the armored

DIV CAV’s mission: “The armored [DIV CAV] squadron is a highly mobile, armor-protected force organized as part of the armored and mechanized-infantry divisions. The squadron operates primarily in the environmental states of war and conflict. It may deploy into a theater as part of a division, brigade or joint task force. The light/airborne [DIV CAV] squadron is a highly mobile, lightly armed force organized as part of light-infantry divisions. As part of the light-infantry division, it may operate in any environmental state from peace to war. The squadron is deploy able by air or sealift to a theater of op erations as part of the division, or in support of a brigade or joint task force. This squadron possesses a sig nificant tactical mobility advantage over the infantry battalions in the di vision.”1 When comparing U. S. Army R&S force structure by parent echelon to doc trinally templated enemy forces, the enemy has a capability overmatch. The enemy retains an organic organi zation at battalion through corps lev els, where the United States does not. Figure 1 compares U. S. and enemy R&S force structure by parent echelon. Enemy forces retain an R&S advantage over U. S. forces at battalion level be cause the enemy uses a company-sized force to conduct its R&S opera tions. This is not a specialized R&S or ganization, but it has triple the combat power of a U. S. battalion’s scout platoon. U. S. forces retain an R&S advan tage over enemy forces at brigade level by employing a cavalry squadron – compared to the enemy’s brigade reconnaissance company. At division level, the enemy retains the advantage by employing a reconnais sance battalion – compared to a U. S. division, which has no organic organization. U. S. forces gain the advantage at corps level by employing a cavalry regiment especially designed to con duct R&S operations – compared to the enemy’s use of an organic infantry or armor brigade tactical group to con duct its R&S operations. The enemy’s overmatch also enables it to win the counter-reconnaissance fight. Counter-reconnaissance is active and passive and includes action to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance elements and to deny the enemy in formation about friendly units. Counter-reconnaissance keeps enemy reconnaissance forces from observing the main body by defeating or block ing them.2 The force that wins the counter-reconnaissance fight has a significantly greater advantage over its opponent. The enemy’s ability to control R&S gives the enemy commander a marked advantage in controlling the tempo of the battlefield; maximizing combat power and battlefield effects; and re taining the initiative, specifically at di vision level. Requiring division commanders to ac cept tactical risk by not having combat power to shape the division deep fight reduces the reaction time and maneu ver space for the division. This is a vi olation of the Army’s fundamentals of security and prevents the division commander from setting the required conditions for BCTs to be successful. Structure needs change The DIV CAV force structure must al low for semi-autonomous and self-sustaining R&Sand EoF operations. A so lution to prevent an increase in manning requirements would be to reduce BCT cavalry squadrons to a brigade reconnaissance troop. The squadrons’ guidon, remaining personnel and equipment could then be used to build each DIV CAV squadron. The DIV CAV will eliminate the enemy’s current R&S overmatch. Figure 1. American and enemy R&S force structure by echelon.

Figure 2 shows this reorganization compared to templated enemy forces. The DIV CAV structure would depend on its parent division. Figure 3 shows the task-organization for DIV CAV squadrons of armor and mechanized-infantry divisions. This pertains to 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division and 4th Infantry Division. Figure 4 shows the task-organization for light-infantry divisions. This per tains to 10th Infantry Division (Mountain), 25th Infantry Division, 82nd Infantry Division (Airborne) and 101st Infantry Division (Air Assault). DIV CAV squadrons would contain organic small-caliber fires (mortars); anti-armor capability; extended-range com munication; chemical, biological, ra diological and nuclear (CBRN) detection; UAS; and sustainment. Fires would be provided by the division-artillery brigade with the soon-to-be-fielded “extended-range cannon artillery.” These organic capabilities ensure the squadrons would sustain MDO. To maximize the three-dimensional battlefield, the division’s combat-aviation brigade would provide one air-cavalry troop (ACT) and one aviation-assault platoon under the DIV CAV commander’s operational control. The ACT would extend the DIV CAV’s operational reach beyond its ground systems. ACTs would extend the DIV CAV’s range to detect, identify, locate and report HVTs, HPTs and enemy movement; and to destroy targets of opportunity. Aviation-assault platoons would add an enhanced level of rapid mobility for movement and maneuver, personnel recovery, casualty evacuation and sus tainment operations. Aviation-assault platoons can stealthily emplace dis mounted scouts over extended rang es; conduct aerial resupply; extend line-of-sight communications; and rap idly move casualties to the squadron’s main aid station or to the division-sup port area. Training Cavalry organizations must be re moved from under the Armor Branch and made their own independent branch. Cavalry operations are a spe cialized field. The nature of the missions cavalry troopers conduct require unique individual training and specialized schools with their own training pipeline. However, BCT cavalry squadrons and troops are commanded by infantry and armor officers. Cavalry scouts in light-infantry divisions are filled pre dominately with infantry Soldiers. This results in light-infantry BCTs using their cavalry squadrons as another in fantry battalion rather than as a spe cialized R&S organization. As mentioned, cavalry troopers re quire specialized training in R&S. The 19D (cavalry scout) military-occupation specialty (MOS) pipeline will need to produce more cavalry scouts be cause there will be a shortage due to removing previous 11B (infantry MOS) Soldiers from the light-infantry BCTs. Current non-19D cavalry scouts in all enlisted ranks require an MOS reclas sification course. R&S operations re quire a range of additional training to support the complexity and unique operational environment of a DIV CAV squadron. Table 3 is the recommended addition al skill identifiers (ASIs) with respec tive training courses for DIV CAV squadrons. Over-the-horizon communications are an emerging training deficiency within the cavalry community. This must be Figure 2. The proposal for each echelon to have DIV CAV.

Figure 3. Pro posed DIV CAV task organization for armor and mecha nized infantry. Figure 4. Pro posed DIV CAV task organization for light infantry. an area of concentration for cavalry troopers – up to and including troop level – to ensure consistent communication with the squadron main command post in MDO. Materiel Generating the DIV CAV ground-com bat power is possible by reallocating equipment from existing BCT cavalry squadrons as they change to brigade reconnaissance troops. The M3A3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting Vehicle has proven to be a viable platform for the armored reconnaissance troop (ART). This would be an interim solution un til a more viable and tactically sound platform is available.

A possible solution is the M1127 Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicle. The M1A2 System Enhancement Package V3 Abrams tank and the soon-to-be-field ed M1A3 Abrams tank are the best platforms for the armor platoons in the ART. The future armed reconnaissance air craft (FARA) would be the airframe of choice for the ACT. This new aircraft design will take significant time to mature to support the air-ground integra tion that doctrine requires. There are more viable, adaptable and cost-effective solutions (off-the-shelf aircraft) for FARA than a first-built airframe. The M93 Fox CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicle is sufficient for the DIV CAV’s CBRN reconnaissance platoon. The RQ-7BV2 Shadow will provide the requisite organic UAS for the DIV CAV. Sustaining the DIV CAV will require a forward-support troop (FST). Current FSTs within each brigade-support bat talion configured to support the BCT cavalry squadrons can be reallocated to the division’s sustainment brigade to sustain the DIV CAV. Detailed analy sis of Class III bulk and Class V require ments are required to ensure each FST has the necessary transportation as sets. Leadership and education Professional military education (PME) remains the cornerstone of institu tional knowledge. Cavalry troopers re quire specialized PME and a larger pipeline to sustain manning requirements. Table 4 shows the PME required for cavalry leaders. The focus on cavalry operations and doctrine would require a separate cavalry career path and PME. Components 1, 2 and 3. The DIV CAV should be assigned to the 10 Component 1 and eight Component 2 divisions. Component 3 does not have di vision-level combat-arms organiza tions. MD-LSCO will require equal R&S capabilities at all echelons regardless of Army component. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the need to employ all combat formations at echelon, regardless of Army compo nent. How solution fits operations Having an organization with a special ized focus, craft and branch would en sure division commanders have a crit ical capability the U. S. Army hasn’t had for more than 20 years. The rein troduction of DIV CAV will give division commanders a robust, dynamic and flexible IC asset. Table 3. Recommended ASIs.

The DIV CAV would also enable divisions to develop and shape operations in the division deep area, supporting the division commanders’ objectives. It would also enable subordinate BCT commanders’ success in assigned mis sions. Furthermore, the DIV CAV’s ability to conduct EoF missions would enable preservation of the division’s decisive operation’s combat power. The com bat power within a DIV CAV would en able the squadron commander to solve the division commander’s prob lems before they become bigger prob lems. MAJ Greg Marsh is a course developer assigned to Company A, 1st Battalion, 145th Aviation Regiment, Fort Rucker, AL. Previous assignments include small-group leader, Aviation Captain’s Career Course, A/1-145 Aviation, Fort Rucker; observer/coach/trainer (O/C/T), Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA; commander, Troop B, 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Drum, NY; J-3 aviation officer, U. S. Forces-Afghanistan Detachment South/Southwest, Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan; and platoon leader, Troop C, 4th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Lewis, WA. MAJ Marsh’s Table 4. Specialized cavalry PME. military schools include the Command and General Staff Course, ACLC, O/C/T academy, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Joint Firepower Controller Course, Warrant Officer Basic Course, OH-58D Aircraft Qualification Course, Scout-Platoon Leader’s Course, Tank Commander Certification Course and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has an associate’s of arts degree in liberal arts and military history from New Mexico Military Institute, a bachelor’s of science degree in liberal arts from Excelsior College ACLC – Air Cavalry Leader’s Course ACT – air-cavalry troop ADP – Army doctrine publication ART – armored reconnaissance troop ASI – additional skill identifier ASLT – assault BCT – brigade combat team CBOLC – Cavalry Basic Officer Leader’s Course CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear DivCav – division cavalry DOTMLE – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education EoF – economy-of-force EW – electronic warfare FARA – future armed reconnaissance aircraft FM – field manual Acronym Quick-Scan and a master’s of arts degree in man agement and leadership from Webster University. Among MAJ March’s awards are the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with oak-leaf cluster, the Air Medal (third award) and the Combat Action Badge. Notes 1 FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 1996. 2 FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security, 2015. 3 Maneuver Center of Excellence, Army Reconnaissance Council, Oct. 2, 2020. FSO – fire-support officer FST – forward-support troop FWD – forward HPT – high-payoff target HVT – high-value target IC – information collection LNO – liaison officer MD-LSCO – multi-domain/large-scale combat operations MDO – multi-domain operations MET – mission-essential task MOS – military-occupation specialty NCOIC – noncommissioned officer in charge O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer OIC – officer in charge PME – professional military education R&S – reconnaissance and security RTNS – retransmission

SLC – Scout Leader’s Course SPT – support Acronym Quick-Scan continued STEP – Select, Train, Educate, Promote (methodology) UAS – unmanned aerial system UJTL – Universal Joint Task List UMT – unit ministry team WfF – warfighting function