Resurrecting 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

Fall 2021 Resurrecting 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment by LTC Cole C. Pinheiro The 3rd Cavalry Regiment, established in 1846 as a regiment of mounted ri flemen, marked its 175th birthday with excitement about rumors that the Army will re-establish an armored-cav alry regiment (ACR) within the next two years. Leaders across the Army are assessing an emerging require ment for an ACR to conduct corps-lev el reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations against a peer threat. How did we get here? Multiple 3rd ACR veterans argued against plans more than a decade ago to convert the unit into a Stryker bri gade combat team (SBCT) in Fiscal Year 2012 and lamented the loss of III Corps’ pre-eminent R&S formation. I argued in 2010 that the conversion to an SBCT was short-sighted, supported by leaders who were misguided by Army Transformation initiatives that were predicated on information-dom inance theories. I thought the decision to convert 3rd ACR ignored the regi ment’s counterinsurgency successes in Iraq and disregarded the fact that 3rd ACR was uniquely capable of serving as III Corps’ eyes and ears during ma jor combat.1 Although partially accurate, my argu ment was unfair to the leaders who advocated for 3rd ACR within the bu reaucracy and who were forced to make tough choices and compromise to prevent the unit’s total decommis sioning. Changes in the international system during the past 10 years have embold ened peer competitors, increased the potential for major conflict and re newed the Army’s focus on large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Conditions may now be ripe to vindicate those leaders who saved 3rd ACR from de struction. It’s time to affirm that their efforts to preserve the regiment for another day were not in vain. Discus sion now centers on the renewed need for an ACR, the proper organization given modern threats and the cost to the total Army force structure. Purpose of an ACR The ACR was uniquely capable of con ducting a screen, guard or cover to protect an armored corps, and it could conduct reconnaissance across the breadth of a corps to facilitate offen sive maneuver. On the offense, the original ACR was built to locate and penetrate the enemy’s security zone and forward defenses while protecting friendly divisions from enemy obser vation, and also while employing di rect and indirect fires to preserve their combat power. Therefore the ACR’s mission was to de stroy enemy reconnaissance and ad vance guard units, and then locate and destroy the enemy’s first echelon reg iments.2 The ACR would then use po sitional advantage or direct and indi rect fires to fix the lead elements of the second echelon while passing for ward divisions to complete the ene my’s destruction. In the defense, the ACR would protect the corps, delay the enemy to provide time for friendly forces, destroy ene my reconnaissance and the advance guard, attrite the first echelon and Figure 1. SFC Ron Corella, a mortar-platoon sergeant assigned to Killer Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, from Fort Hood, TX, slaps high-fives with Iraqi children in Mosul, Iraq, Feb. 1, 2008. (Photo by SGT John Cros by, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Fall 2021 provide early warning to allow the commander to make decisions. The need to conduct reconnaissance was inherent in all the ACR’s missions. Importantly, the ACR’s heavy organiza tion allowed it to gain and maintain contact with the enemy’s main body, survive, fight for information and pro vide timely and accurate reporting to answer the corps commander’s infor mation requirements, enabling the commander to make decisions. The 2nd ACR’s role in Operation Desert Storm – and the regiment’s actions against the Iraqi Tawakalna Division Feb. 26, 1991, during the Battle of 73 Easting – is the prime example of how a highly trained professional ACR can gain situational understanding and seize the initiative for an armored corps.3 Contemporary challenges Russia and China have implemented military-modernization programs to professionalize their forces and field advanced technology to compete in all domains.4 Peer competitors now pos sess advanced reconnaissance assets (space, electronic warfare (EW), cyber, special-operations forces, unmanned aerial systems (UAS)), anti-access ar ea-denial systems and long-range massed fires. The Russians in particu lar have streamlined their sensor-to-shooter processes that allow them to rapidly detect formations and com mand posts (CPs) and to deliver massed long-range fires with devastat ing results.5 The notorious Russian fires attack that destroyed a mechanized Ukrainian battalion near Zelenopillya July 11, 2014, highlights this rapid find-fix-fin ish kill chain. The Russians employed multiple intelligence-collection efforts to identify unit locations and then massed rockets to destroy the concen trated Ukrainian forces. Russia’s investment in sensors and continued modernization of artillery systems is intended to extend battle field geometry even farther. This will allow them to detect and destroy en emy formations at even greater ranges using their integrated-fires com mands.6 To counter these threats, our formations require long-range intelli gence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and fires. Enemy indi rect fires increase the importance of dispersion, survivability and redun dant communications among friendly echelons in LSCO.7 The U.S. III Corps experimented by employing a traditional ACR against a modern, technologically advanced en emy during Warfighter Exercise (WfX) 21-4 in April 2021. The ACR was com prised of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) augmented with fires, aviation and engineers. III Corps or dered the regiment to conduct an advance guard in front of a portion of the corps, destroy enemy forces in the disruption zone and protect the trail ing division from direct and indirect fires until the enemy’s battle zone was reached. Although WfX 21-4 was an imperfect replication of LSCO, the simulated en emy’s robust reconnaissance capabili ties, obstacle efforts, attack aviation and joint fires created significant chal lenges for the ACR. The exercise has doctrine, organization, training, mate riel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy implications that suggest the next ACR must be designed differ ently than its Cold War ancestor to achieve its purpose on the modern battlefield. Previous 3rd ACR The next ACR should not fully adopt its predecessor’s blueprints. It requires redesign to survive all forms of contact against a peer threat. The old 3rd ACR was organized this way:

• Three ground-cavalry squadrons. Each squadron contained three cavalry troops (cavalry troop: nine M1A2 Abrams tanks, 13 M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and two M1064 mortar carriers, plus headquarters, medical and maintenance sections), one tank company, an organic field-artillery battery (M109A6) and an HHT, which contained the staff, medical platoon and support platoon.

• An attack-aviation squadron with an assault company and aviation-maintenance company (4th Squadron, 3rd ACR: 24 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and 10 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters).

• A regimental-support squadron (RSS).

The regiment’s separate companies in cluded 66th Military Intelligence Com pany, 43rd Combat Engineer Company (three sapper platoons and an assault/ obstacle platoon) and a Bradley Line backer battery (for air defense). The ACR was well-resourced with de centralized firepower but was short on the dismounts required to clear key terrain to enable maneuver. The regi ment knew that enemy with anti-ar mor systems in complex terrain was a significant threat, and the ACR’s only Figure 2. SPC Stephen Whitney, a cavalry scout with Headquarters and Head quarters Troop (HHT), 3rd “Thunder” Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regi ment, sits behind an M240B rifle May 28, 2010, while serving on a personal-security detachment at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. (Photo by SGT Roger RyDell Daniels, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Fall 2021 solution was suppressive fire. Scenar ios similar to what the Israeli Defense Forces faced in 2006 during the inva sion of Lebanon were a real possibili ty. Intelligence collection If the future ACR is going to success fully conduct R&S for a corps on a deeper battlefield, the intelligence warfighting function requires rein forcement. The ACR will likely contin ue to operate forward enough of the divisions to provide decision space, but it will not physically be located in the corps’ deep area past the coordi nated fire line (CFL). If the ACR is go ing to contribute to the corps’ shaping efforts or inform the corps command er’s decision-making, it must be able to see and detect enemy formations deeper on the modern battlefield. This requires more cyber and EW capabili ties at the regimental level, and more low-level voice-intercept teams to al low squadrons to gain signal intelli gence across a vast front. UAS. The ACR requires a UAS capabil ity that can range the corps’ deep area to assist in detection and delivery of joint fires. This UAS capability, unlike the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, should be eas ily launched and recovered without the use of an airfield so that the ACR can employ it effectively while main taining tempo in the offense. The ACR may incorporate future semi-autono mous and autonomous ground and air sensors when they become available to extend its reach. The regiment should field small UAS at company lev el to enable tactical maneuver. Sen sors should be networked so that ground-combat systems can view them, and they should support the joint force interoperability initiative of any sensor, any shooter. Human intelligence (HUMINT). The regiment should retain HUMINT capa bility to collect from the population. These intelligence capabilities will support both the ACR’s close fight and the corps’ deep fight. Force structure, organizational restructure Fires. The fires complex should differ significantly from the traditional ACR. An organic field-artillery battalion is superior to the old independent bat tery model because it provides a bat talion commander with staff to train the fires enterprise and to assist in fires planning and execution during LSCO. The ACR can anticipate that the corps and division commanders will place the M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the M270 Multiple-Launch Rocket System as far forward as possible to shape their respective deep fights, normally behind the ACR’s lead elements within the ACR’s sup port area. The ACR will clear position areas for artillery of the field-artillery brigade and should advocate for a general-support reinforcing relationship with those rocket battalions. Corps and Figure 3. SPC Melvin Stewart, R Troop, 4th “Longknife” Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry, talks with the pilots after con necting a fuel line to an AH-64 Apache helicopter May 27, 2010, during four weeks of training at NTC. (Photo by SGT Roger RyDell Daniels, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Fall 2021 division commanders will use their long-range munitions to disintegrate the enemy’s integrated air-defense systems and destroy the integrated-fires command (IFC), but the ACR can effectively use the shorter range, less-desired M26 rockets to enable its ma neuver. The Army’s nascent extended-range cannon artillery (ERCA) should be fielded to the ACR. Pairing ERCA with long-range sensors, including radars, would allow the ACR to range the en emy’s artillery with organic fires, which would help shape the corps’ high-payoff target list and protect the divisions from the enemy’s IFC. The regimental commander could attach batteries to ground-cavalry squadrons to enable operations or keep the bat teries consolidated under regimental control to mass fires. Finally, when the ACR is operating as the lead element of the corps’ for ward-line-of-own-troops (FLOT), it should be the proponent that controls the CFL’s movement to maximize the use of fires between the CFL and fires-support coordination line. Airspace. The ACR is challenged be cause it cannot control airspace, and this impedes responsive fires, attack aviation and joint fires. Lacking a joint air-ground integration center, the ACR can only manage airspace if a division allocates it to them, and the current size and composition of the regimen tal fires-and-effects coordination cen ter does not favor positive control of airspace. During the restructure, the Army should consider providing the ACR with the capability to control air space to enable responsive, deep joint and surface fires in support of the corps. Movement and maneuver. The Army should rectify the original ACR’s short comings when reconstituting the movement-and-maneuver warfighting function. Ground-cavalry squadrons consisting of three troops (each with two scout platoons and two tank pla toons), a tank company and a Stryker or mechanized-infantry company would have enough combat power to achieve the ACR’s original purpose. Each squadron would contain the in fantry required to clear complex ter rain or to employ anti-armor weapons to enable rapid maneuver. Army research-and-development ini tiatives, including unmanned ground-combat vehicles and networked UAS platforms, should be considered when modernizing the ACR. Organic mobile 120mm mortars would provide cavalry troops with responsive fires to enable maneuver. The regiment’s engineer capability should include sapper pla toons for each cavalry squadron as well as redundant breaching, bridging and blade assets to enable mobility and countermobility against an enemy with significant engineer capabilities. But the regiment may lose some dig assets that standard brigade combat teams (BCTs) use for survivability in the defense. The right engineer struc ture may have more capabilities than 43rd Engineers but less than a brigade engineer battalion. Air cavalry. Lastly, the ACR requires a unique air-cavalry squadron that con tains three air-cavalry troops of recon naissance aircraft, an assault-aviation company to move infantry and sup plies, a medical-evacuation section and an aviation-maintenance compa ny. The regimental commander would decide how to employ the aircraft, ei ther decentralized in support of the cavalry squadrons or as a battalion-sized maneuver element to destroy large enemy formations. Air defense. The ACR needs more as sets to protect itself from contempo rary peer threats. Arrayed across the corps’ FLOT, the ACR is extremely vul nerable to enemy air attack. This threat necessitates short-range air-de fense (SHORAD) systems that are light ly armored and capable of surviving direct-fire attacks from enemy ground-reconnaissance elements. The original ACR architects understood this and provided a battery of Bradley Line backers. Future solutions may include mobile vehicle-mounted SHORAD sys tems and dismounted Stinger teams in the cavalry troops and infantry com panies. Other assets. The ACR also requires counter-UAS systems to prevent the enemy from detecting the regiment’s formations. The increased chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives threat suggests that the ACR requires a chemical company with a chemical reconnaissance platoon and decontamination capabilities to maintain tempo for the corps. Impact on support The RSS would struggle to support this organization without restructuring. While each cavalry squadron will maintain its vehicle fleet with its for ward-support company, the RSS re quires a passback maintenance capa bility to reconstitute combat power quickly and return it to the fight. The ACR’s position in front of the corps makes evacuating broken vehicles to a cannibalization point or trailing divi sion-support area problematic. The RSS maintenance company should have organic military-occupation spe cialty 91A, 91M and 91P mechanics to help repair tanks, Bradleys and Pala dins. This tracked mechanic capability was removed from the brigade-support battalion’s Bravo companies, but this should be reconsidered given the ACR’s unique mission. For the same reason, the RSS needs some heavy-equipment tractor-trailer capability for recovery to the regimental-support area (RSA), even if it is only given these assets during combat opera tions. Within the ACR’s supply-support-activ ity platoon, the common authorized stockage listing should be more robust than a BCT’s, and the regimental com mander should be authorized to direct more lines to enable greater opera tional reach. Enemy activity, displaced persons and the large volume of follow-on friendly forces will produce congested lines of communication (LoCs), traffic-control problems and a priority for movement forward toward the front. The RSS should anticipate that the expedition ary sustainment command throughput will be interrupted as resupply con voys pass through divisions to reach the RSA. Resupply will be delayed in LSCO as sustainment units fight to push commodities forward. Accordingly, the RSS should have wa ter production and storage capability, greater mobile bulk-fuel capacity and more transportation capability to car ry additional Class V and commodities to prevent the ACR from culminating

Fall 2021 in front of the corps. Operating across the breadth of a corps will require the regiment to establish multiple forward logistics elements to support the dis persed squadrons. The extended LoCs between these sustainment nodes produce command-and-control (C2) challenges at echelon and distribution problems as drivers are pushed to the limits of human endurance. CPs The ACR requires CPs that are equipped and manned to control in creasingly complicated and dispersed operations across a vast front. CPs must be smaller, mobile, camouflaged and lightly armored to protect against artillery shrapnel. While the Army has experimented with modular Expando Van-based CPs, the force requires ar mored platforms that are rapidly es tablished and displaced, enable staff collaboration and are networked for modern systems. The depth and breadth of the battle field require that ACRs be manned and equipped to maintain both a main CP and a tactical CP over a long time and to be outfitted with redundancy in all command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems to ensure C2 survivability. Directional an tennas, high-frequency and high-ca pacity line-of-sight radios can help maintain communications in a contest ed environment. The contemporary reality is that peer threats will be able to intermittently degrade communica tions across the spectrum. Mission command, facilitated by a firm understanding of the commander’s in tent and initiative, are fundamental in the LSCO fight. The ACR has a role in answering the corps commander’s critical information requirements and in shaping the corps’ deep and close fights. The regimental staff should be larger and more senior than a BCT to meet those requirements. A post-bat talion-command lieutenant colonel serving as the deputy commander would assist the regimental command er in synchronizing all warfighting functions across the regiment’s area of operations. Winners and losers The most contentious portion of the debate is who will win and lose in any force-structure change. Branch equi ties are at stake if 3rd Cavalry Regiment converts from an SBCT to an ACR. There is pervasive concern on where Army leadership will make cuts across the total Army force to field a modern ACR. Armor Branch, for example, has been discussing the importance of re constituting division cavalry and an ACR because of the greater likelihood of major conflict. Corps and divisions are the units of ac tion in LSCO, and these commanders currently are overly reliant on ISR and national assets for reconnaissance. We will likely have to shutter the ABCTs’ armored reconnaissance squadrons to make force-structure changes, per haps leaving the ABCT with a brigade reconnaissance troop. However, change is hard for leaders who spent the last two decades with ABCTs as the units of action. These leaders became accustomed to strong, responsive BCT R&S formations. Our dirt combat-training centers have struggled to replicate corps and divi sion effects. Multiple decisive-action rotations have conditioned BCT lead ers to distrust division intelligence feeds and to value brigade-level recon naissance squadrons. For these reasons, a decision to move reconnais sance assets from BCTs to divisions/ corps would require cultural and nor mative changes across multiple branches. The greatest challenge decision-mak ers face is determining where to make force-structure cuts and what emerg ing technologies to fund. The ACR’s maintenance cost is high and a deter rent to conversion in a budget-con strained environment. In fact, mainte nance cost was a determining factor in the decision to transform 3rd ACR to an SBCT. Therefore, budget is likely the largest political and bureaucratic im pediment to rebuilding the ACR. Conversations across the force are converging in one aspect: a modern ACR structure should not simply mir ror the storied regiment that was dis assembled in 2012. However, there is one vital element that must remain the same in the next 3rd ACR. The troopers’ esprit de corps and aggres sive mentality has been the regiment’s lifeblood for 175 years and the driving force behind its many notable contri butions to our nation’s defense. The regiment still practices its unique cav alry traditions, and its members are proud of its reconnaissance heritage. Figure 4. “Donovian” forces, depicted by Soldiers from 11th ACR, advance through the “city” of Razish at NTC, Fort Irwin, CA, March 17, 2012. The Do novian forces are used in the training environment to provide a greater sense of realism during training – 11th ACR serves as the opposing force (OPFOR) at NTC. However, the U.S. Army’s dirt combat-training centers have struggled to replicate corps and division effects. (Photo by SGT Zachary A. Gardner, 11th Ar mored Cavalry Regiment Public Affairs Office)

Fall 2021 Senior leaders should be proud that they were able to protect this from de struction a decade ago. Today 3rd Cav alry Regiment is blessed with out standing leaders and disciplined troop ers who are awaiting a final decision on transformation, and they are ready to resume their role as III Corps’ ACR. LTC Cole Pinheiro is the C2 chief, Oper ations Group C, Mission Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Previous assignments include ex ecutive officer, 2nd Brigade, 1st Ar mored Division, Fort Bliss, TX/U.S. Eu ropean Command; executive officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; operations officer (S-3), 1st Bat talion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Bri gade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss/ Camp Buehring, Kuwait; commander, Company C, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Di vision, Fort Carson, CO/Arghandab Riv er Valley, Kandahar, Afghanistan; as sistant operations officer/battalion planner, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR, Fort Hood, TX/Mosul, Iraq; executive offi cer Troop K, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR, Fort Carson/Fort Hood; and tank-platoon leader, Troop K, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR, Fort Carson/Baghdad, Iraq. LTC Pinhei ro’s military schools include the Com mand and General Staff College, Cav alry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Cap tain’s Career Course and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in international rela tions from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, and a master’s of arts degree in security studies from Georgetown University. Notes 1 CPT Cole C. Pinheiro, “The Armored Cavalry Regiment: Battle Proven and Fu ture Primed,” ARMOR, June-August 2010. 2 Field Manual 17-95, Cavalry Opera tions, 1996. 3 Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunder stood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,’” International Se curity, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996). 4 H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2020. 5 Andrew Radin et al, The Future of the Russian Military: Russia’s Ground Com bat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia Competition, RAND Corpora tion, 2019. 6 Ibid. 7 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations. ABCT – armored brigade combat team ACR – armored cavalry regiment BCT – brigade combat team C2 – command and control CFL – coordinated fire line CP – command post ERCA – extended-range cannon artillery EW – electronic warfare FLOT – forward-line-of-own-troops HHT – headquarters and headquarters troop HUMINT – human intelligence IFC – integrated-fires command ISR – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance LoC – line of communication LSCO – large-scale combat operations NTC – National Training Center OPFOR – opposing force R&S – reconnaissance and security RSA – regimental-support area RSS – regimental-support squadron SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team SHORAD – short-range air defense UAS – unmanned aerial system WfX – warfighter exercise Figure 5. 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Tennessee Army National Guard) Soldiers test-fire their weapons before entering Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom III. The 278th is the only ACR in the National Guard as of 2017 and the only other current ACR besides 11th ACR. (U.S. Army photo) Acronym Quick-Scan

Fall 2021 Table 1. The Army’s two ACRs are actually only ACRs in name – 11th ACR is NTC’s OPFOR, and 278th ACR is an ABCT. Many Army ACRs were inactivated or redesignated. Per the Armor Branch historian, Dr. Robert S. Cameron, the original ACRs, which were created to constitute corps and Army R&S assets, collectively served as a tactical reserve in Europe as the Cold War began. In fact, the first three ACRs orga nized in Europe were converted from constabulary units, so their focus shifted from stability to combat operations. Between the late 1940s and the 1990s, the ACRs gained in combat power, particularly with the inclusion of an aviation squadron; in the 1990s, 3rd ACR in cluded an HHT, three ground-cavalry squadrons, an aviation squadron and a support squadron. Each 3rd ACR ground-cavalry squadron in cluded a headquarters troop, a tank company, an artillery battery and three cavalry troops (each with two tank platoons, two scout pla toons, a mortar section, a maintenance section and a headquarters). The regiment also included organic nuclear-biological-chemical, air-defense artillery, military intelligence and engineer assets.