Training While Deployed: Lessons for a Garrison Environment

Fall 2021 by CPT John Conrad and CPT John Formica When junior Army leaders hear the word “training,” it often evokes pain ful images of bureaucratic obstacles such as range-control restrictions, unit-movement-operations require ments and Directorate of Training Management and Security updates. Conversely, the words “combat de ployment” conjure thoughts of opera tional imperatives like mission re quirements, lethality and readiness. Unless there is an imminent deploy ment on the training calendar, junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) tend to fixate on bureaucratic restrictions instead of improving read iness. This results in a perceived di vorce between garrison training and combat operations. We must do bet ter as Army leaders. As an example, our troop’s overseas deployment pro vides some key takeaways on fighting these misconceptions while conduct ing garrison training. We deployed to northern Iraq in 2018 during a time of transition. By the time our unit had arrived, the Iraqi coalition had retaken Mosul, and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) strongholds had been shattered across the country. In response, U.S. forces dropped the “ac company” aspect of the advise-and-assist role, relegating our formations to fixed-site security. This consisted of manning perimeter towers, operating entry-control points and fulfilling quick-reaction-force requirements. While this may sound exciting, for the average Soldier, it equated to eight- to 12-hour daily shifts performing the same important, albeit mundane, tasks. We as the troop leadership struggled to combat complacency within the ranks, so we turned to training. Just as in garrison, three obstacles were immediately apparent: land, ammo and personnel. Land: The troop was stationed at a small airfield in northern Iraq. ISIS had destroyed the airbase, and as a result, Coalition Forc es and the Iraqis only occupied a frac tion of it. On the east side of the air strip, there were a few kilometers of open terrain, overgrown and filled with rubble. This area provided a suitable amount of land to build a functional area for small-unit maneuver live-fires. We co ordinated with the embedded combat engineers to clear the area of remnant unexploded ordnance and ISIS impro vised explosive devices. After a few weeks of effort, a sizable piece of ter rain was ready. We dubbed it Nomad Multi-Purpose Range Complex (NMPRC).

Ammo: Unlike in garrison, ammo was no issue. The airstrip had been a stag ing area for U.S. forces and Iraqi Secu rity Forces before the attack on Mosul. It had a large ammunition holding area, filled with an abundance of training-dedicated munitions. Figure 1. Soldiers of Nomad Troop, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, begin movement on a section of the live-fire Nomad Multi-Purpose Range Complex (NMPRC) in northern Iraq in September 2018. (U.S. Army photo by CPT John For mica)

Fall 2021 Personnel: Now that we had land and ammo, how could we maintain our se curity responsibilities while training squads? This required engaged leader ship and motivated Soldiers. Platoons rotated security responsibilities monthly, so when they were serving as quick-reaction forces, they also exe cuted training. This provided a 30-day dedicated training progression, gradu ating from completing individual-qual ification ranges to day and night dis mounted section live-fire lanes. Accomplishing this required adapta tion and innovation, but our Soldiers were up for the challenge. After re turning to the States, we reflected on the three lessons-learned from our time spent training in Iraq. Training shouldn’t be paint-by-number In a garrison environment, range con trol is a necessary evil. It reduces risk, deconflicts organizational efforts and maintains infrastructure. However, it also caters to the lowest common de nominator. Planning training has turned into a paint-by-numbers affair for leaders. Surface danger zones are already drawn, firing boxes are man dated, and Soldiers are at the mercy of range inspectors and target opera tors. However, when we arrived in Iraq, there was no range control, let alone a range, so leaders were able to build our training exercises from the ground up. This provided some challenges, but it presented even more opportu nities. By cutting out the bureaucracy, we were able to focus purely on hon ing lethality. Gone were the bureau cratic training distractors: the manda tory cold times, range sign-on and clearing processes, and coordination with the ammunition supply point. These were replaced with tough, realistic training scenarios, efficient use of time and leader development. While this level of autonomy is not possible in a garrison environment, the lesson is still applicable. When de veloping training, leaders must not fix ate on bureaucratic restrictions. We must be competent enough as profes sional officers and NCOs to safely plan and execute training within our forma tions. If range control did not exist, how would we safely plan and execute training events? This is our responsi bility as Army leaders and profession als. Reinventing the wheel is OK To realize our goal of maneuver live-fires, leaders had to innovate. Re sources were ample, space was abun dant and Soldiers were made avail able, but outside of berms and rubble, NMPRC was indistinguishable from a desert. Our greatest challenge was de veloping functional targetry and for mulating a scheme of maneuver. Based on a shared understanding of the training objectives, the platoons worked together to develop solutions. With a bit of ingenuity, static and dy namic targets were constructed. Single silhouettes took up positions in the rubble, two-silhouette machinegun teams were laid in bunkers, and three-silhouette teams were manually pulled Figure 2. Soldiers of Nomad Troop’s Section B, 2nd Platoon, establish a sup port-by-fire position at NMPRC in northern Iraq in September 2018. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Jamie Douglas) Figure 3. Soldiers of Nomad Troop’s Section A, 1st Platoon, call for indirect fires from 60mm mortars at NMPRC in northern Iraq in September 2018. The training was intended to develop live-fire section proficiency. (U.S. Army pho to by 1LT Jamie Douglas)

Fall 2021 up using detonation cord (desert mice had eaten away at 550 cord in previ ous trials). For the night iterations, chemical lights served as indicators of enemy positions. Out of a desert and rubble, we made a two-square-kilome ter live-fire range that included a zone-sreconnaissance lane, a screen line and indirect fires. What made this possible? Leadership got creative. Live-fire training events are one of the few times when Sol diers truly feel like warriors. That in stinctual fire burns low amid weeks of motorpool Mondays, inventory lay outs and readiness tasks. However, the fire never burns brighter than during live-fire training with a rifle in hand. Repetitive and unoriginal training events can quickly disinterest Soldiers. “Don’t reinvent the wheel” is the ad vice given to every young leader upon being told to plan and execute train ing. Most offices and computers are littered with binders and gigabytes of concepts of operations and operations orders, laying out how each training event has been conducted since the current battalion commander was a platoon leader. In choosing the safety of the familiar, junior officers and NCOs condemn their Soldiers to either outdated or mundane training. As leaders we are told what to train, but we are not told how to train. A section live-fire can be conducted in innumerable ways using the same range and the same targets, so why do we typically do it the same way every time? It’s OK to reinvent the wheel if that results in safely trained Soldiers and better-developed leaders. Grounded in doctrine Leadership turnover seems to occur before any deployment. In our case, three of the four platoon leaders had been in position for less than a month before we arrived in Iraq. Nearly half the troop’s junior officers and NCOs had not participated in any of the gar rison train-up. Although we were all deployed together, the leadership had never trained together. To begin moving in the right direction, we turned to Army doctrine. Leaders relied on Army Doctrine Publication 7-0, Training, to provide the concepts for how to train; Army Doctrine Refer ence Publication 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders; and the Army Training Network (ATN) to flesh out the details on these concepts. We also hosted leadership-develop ment sessions discussing unit-training management, navigating ATN and con structing small-arms ranges. Platoon leaders developed personalized indi vidual and collective training sched ules from scratch. Weekly training meetings were implemented with an emphasis on the Eight-Step Training Model. With a small and achievable training plan, and no outside-resource depen dencies, we were able to train sections and develop leaders to our standard and at our pace. Instead of drowning in a condensed and hectic training ro tation, we had the opportunity to slow down the process. This allowed junior leaders to see the fruits of their labor and witness training management in action. This effect had been lost in the trainup for our deployment. Often, we jumped from one training event to the next, checking the block and flying by the seat of our pants. We must do bet ter in garrison. Leaders must provide and protect the time necessary to fo cus on executing training well instead of just going through the motions. This will provide better development and training for junior leaders and Sol diers, as well as making the process of training that much more satisfying. Final thoughts We are entrusted as leaders to pre pare our formations for combat to fight and win our nation’s wars. Whether operating in a garrison or a deployed environment, planning and executing tough and realistic training poses unique challenges. Our overseas deployment provided clarity on mis Figure 4. Soldiers of 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, encounter “enemy contact” during a zone-reconnaissance training lane at NMPRC in northern Iraq in October 2018. The training was intended to develop live-fire section profi ciency. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Jamie Douglas)

Fall 2021 takes we made during our train-up. Oftentimes, “checking the block” or going through the motions provides the easiest route to managing the lim ited time and resources available in a garrison environment. However, this is a disservice to our Soldiers and our profession. It is all too easy to become fixated on bureaucratic constraints or training distractors. We must remain committed as leaders to improving our Soldiers’ lethality and readiness. CPT Jake Conrad is a Joint Chiefs of Staff intern in Washington, DC. Previ ous assignments include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regi ment, Fort Hood, TX; commander, Troop N, 4-3 Cavalry, Fort Hood; squadron S-4, 4-3 Cavalry; and com pany executive officer, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade Com bat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. CPT Conrad’s military schools include Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC), Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Army Recon naissance Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Airborne School, Stryker Lead er’s Course and Maintenance Maneu ver Leader’s Course. He has a bache lor’s of science degree in chemistry from Penn State University and a mas ter’s degree in policy management from Georgetown University. CPT Con rad’s awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal and the Order of Saint George (Bronze Medallion). CPT John Formica is the Patton lieuten ant/assistant professor of military sci ence, Spartan Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Battalion, 4th Brigade, U.S. Army Cadet Command, Norfolk State University, VA. His other assign ments include squadron S-4, 4th Squad ron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; executive officer, Quicksilver Heavy Weapons Troop, 4-3 Cavalry, Fort Hood; and reconnaissance-platoon leader, Troop N, 4-3 Cavalry, Operation Inherent Resolve, Iraq. CPT Formica’s military schools include Air Assault, ABOLC, Army Reconnaissance Course, Stryker Leader’s Course and Master Educator’s Course. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in international rela tions (with honors), with a double ma jor in international law from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. CPT Formica also has a master’s of arts de gree in higher-education administra tion from the University of Louisville. His awards include the Order of Saint George (Black Medallion) and the Army and Cavalry ABOLC Leadership Award. Acronym Quick-Scan ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course ATN – Army Training Network ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria NCO – noncommissioned officer NMPRC – Nomad Multi-Purpose Range Complex