Armored Brigade Combat Team Cavalry Squadron’s Combat Trains during Large-Scale Combat Operations: Balancing Maintenance, Recovery, Freedom of Maneuver

The squadron was planning to contin ue its reconnaissance east across the Ujen Bowl toward Razish, but its com bat trains were about 20 kilometers back from the current forward-line-of-own-troops (FLOT) in the vicinity of Reyalem. The squadron leadership knew this was less than ideal to sup port even current operations, so the headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) commander had started to move the combat trains to the western end of the Washboard the day before. Un fortunately the HHT commander did not have enough M88 recovery vehi cles in the combat trains to move the squadron’s non-mission capable (NMC) M1 Abrams and M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) in the maintenance collection point (MCP) in one movement. Compounding this challenge, the squadron’s new mission was about to send it another 10 kilometers east. This left the squadron in the precarious position of improving its current position – moving its combat trains from Reyalem (MCP1) to the western end of the Washboard (MCP2) – while simultaneously planning another MCP for the eastern end of the Colorado Wash (MCP3). For at least a brief period of time, the squadron was going to have three MCPs. How did the squadron end up with so many MCPs? How should the squadron arrange its leaders to lead these additional maintenance and recovery nodes? How can the squadron leader ship create a maintenance common operational picture (COP) to enable it to track and regenerate combat pow er in multiple MCPs? Cavalry-squadron doctrine provides a template for how to organize and ar range the squadron’s sustainment and maintenance systems.1 Unfortunately battlefield friction makes it challeng ing for leaders to arrange and operate the combat trains as neatly as doctrine describes it. The three MCPs in the in troductory real-world vignette is one example. Squadron leadership must continually reorganize its sustainment and maintenance assets to improve the system, striving to bridge the inevitable gap between doctrine (an ide al solution) and the current battlefield situation. The authors, both leaders within 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment Blackhawks, became keenly aware of the aforementioned gap in their com bat trains’ disposition during National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 20-01, and they sought to improve their position. Unfortunately the fast tempo of operations prohibited them from closing this gap entirely. However, they learned valuable lessons about their combat trains they share in this article to help leaders navigate the inevitable friction units will encounter while sus taining themselves during large-scale combat operations. An armored brigade combat team (ABCT) cavalry-squadron’s combat trains contain a number of critical re sources and capabilities, but this article will focus on three:

• Command and control;

• Recovery; and

• Maintenance. Ideally, these three activities operate simultaneously without interference, but reality is rarely so clean. Leaders must consider a number of questions related to these three capabilities:

• When should leaders recover NMC equipment to another location, and when should they fix it in place?

• What conditions may cause this Figure 1. Doctrinal squadron/battalion trains. The left side of the illustration, from Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-20.96, does not show the MCP in the squadron’s combat trains, but it does describe it in its text. (Left-side illustra tion adapted from Figure 7-4, ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron; right-side illustration is adapted from Figure 7-3a, ATP 3-90.5, Combined-Arms Battalion) standard to change?

• How do current and future reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations impact these activities?

• Whose responsibility is it to make these decisions, and who must command-and-control these activities once leaders make a decision? These are a few of the questions Cavalry leaders must consider to employ their combat trains effectively, enable the squadron’s R&S operations and achieve their purpose of answering the commanders’ priority intelligence requirements.2 The aforementioned questions allude to the fact that leaders must under stand the current mission and operational variables to develop and implement successful sustainment concepts of support. Furthermore, units must develop and practice standard operating procedures (SOPs) that enable them to succeed in a range of situa tions. This article will explain some of the challenges the Blackhawk Squadron faced during NTC Rotation 20-01 and present some options for how units might address these challenges in the future. Squadron leadership must have a shared understanding of how to lead, organize and arrange the combat trains; how to balance the potentially competing demands of maintenance, recovery and freedom of maneuver; and how to establish a maintenance COP that helps leaders sustain contin ued R&S operations. Cavalry-squadron combat trains The squadron’s combat trains tradi tionally contain the squadron’s com bat-trains command post (CTCP), the HHT command post (CP), the squadron aid station (SAS), an emergency Figure 2. Echeloned squadron trains and maintenance and recovery assets. This figure and Table 1 describe the Black hawk Squadron’s standard distribution of maintenance personnel and recovery vehicles. They also describe what recovery sections or assets are responsible for evacuation among the different maintenance nodes (i.e. troop trains, combat trains, MCP and field trains). (Graphic by the authors) Table 1.

resupply of Class III and V, and the MCP (Figure 1, left side).3 Although it is not specifically referenced in Cavalry doctrine, the combat trains – specifically the MCP – usually contain a portion of the forward-support com pany (FSC)’s maintenance platoon to return battle-damaged and NMC equipment to the fight as soon as possible.4 The Blackhawk Squadron’s com bat trains include most of the FSC’s maintenance control section (MCS) and service and recovery (S&R) section, the squadron’s shop stock, elements of the cavalry and tank troops’ field-maintenance teams (FMTs), and a team from the field-maintenance section (FMS) to support wheeled and light track maintenance (Figure 2 and Table 1).5 With this SOP, the Blackhawk Squadron combat trains include four key leaders: the squadron S-4, the HHT commander and platoon-level leader ship from the SAS and maintenance platoon.6 Doctrinally the squadron S-4 controls the squadron’strains, and the HHT commander has supervisory responsibility over the combat trains. However, the Blackhawk Squadron gave the HHT commander operational control over all elements in the com bat trains to leverage his leadership experience and authority – a decision that enabled the squadron’s sustain ment operations at NTC.7 In addition to the added weight of a troop commander, Blackhawk’s deci sion to place the HHT commander in command of the combat trains creates redundant leadership there. This en ables the S-4, HHT commander or HHT executive officer to leave the CTCP and trains for the squadron main CP or the field trains to conduct planning and support activities. Finally, if the combat trains have to split – like in the case of creating multiple MCPs, which will be covered in the next section of this article – these leaders can separate to lead the addi tional node(s). Another notable aspect of the Blackhawk Squadron’strains is the baseline disposition of the squadron’s maintenance and recovery assets (Figure 2). In line with doctrine, the Black hawk Squadron SOP prioritizes for ward maintenance and recovery sup port by placing the four FMT M88s and contact trucks in the troop trains, along with a portion of each team’s tank and BFV mechanics (91A and 91Ms).8 The rest of each FMT’s 91A and 91Ms are located in the combat trains, along with the FMTs’ forward repair system (FRS) and bench-stock containers.9 The FRS and bench-stock containers are located in the combat trains to not hinder the mobility of the troops’ trains. This arrangement places all the squadron’s 91A and 91Ms in either the troop or combat trains. Cavalry-squadron doctrine is not unique in organizing its FMTs forward in the troop and combat trains. Combined-arms=battalion doctrine orga nizes its FMTs into the company and combat trains as well (Figure 1, right side).10 The forward placement of all Table 2. Options for MCPs unable to displace in one movement.

the brigade’s 91A and 91Ms means the only tank and BFV mechanics further back than the squadron or battalion combat trains are the M88 recovery-vehicle operators in the brigade-sup port battalion (BSB) FMC. In effect, the brigade does not have any field-maintenance capability for its combat plat forms (M1 Abrams and M2/M3 BFVs) in its field trains or brigade-support area (BSA) unless leaders deliberately adjust their task-organization or place ment of 91As and 91Ms.11 Balancing maintenance, recovery, freedom of maneuver Leaders must balance their desire to conduct maintenance forward with the realization that the squadron’s combat and troop trains can lose their freedom of maneuver – a fundamen tal of reconnaissance – if they are overwhelmed with NMC vehicles.12 At the troop-level, doctrine states that “[i]f the field-maintenance team can not repair the equipment quickly onsite, evacuate the component to the squadron’s [MCP].”13 Unfortunately the authors learned firsthand that the need to evacuate NMC equipment to the combat trains to retain troop free dom of maneuver can have the second-order effect of limiting the squad ron combat trains’ freedom of maneuver. Cavalry troops have little choice but to evacuate NMC vehicles that require lengthy amounts of time to fix, so the squadron must develop options to re tain its combat trains’ freedom of maneuver. Ideally, the troops’ FMTs in the combat trains are able to repair NMC combat platforms recovered there rel atively quickly. Alternatively, the com bat trains can hold NMC vehicles until additional part(s) arrive from the bri gade’s supply-support activity, still al lowing the FMTs to repair the vehicles in the combat trains. In either case, the HHT commander must prepare to displace the combat trains, including any NMC vehicles. Given the fact that there are two M88s in the combat trains, this starts to be come problematic if there are more than two NMC combat platforms there. Given the combat trains’ disposition, two NMC combat platforms is the threshold at which the combat trains can still “displace in one move ment.”14 Once the combat trains exceeds two NMC combat platforms, the squadron is forced to look for other options to retain its freedom of maneuver. Once the combat trains are no longer able to displace in one movement us ing its organic S&R M88s, the squad ron has three options to retain its free dom of maneuver (Table 2). First, leaders can provide reinforcing support by consolidating the troops’ FMT M88s in the squadron combat trains or by re questing reinforcing M88s from the BSB’s FMC S&R section. Second, the commander can evacuate NMC plat forms with its S&R M88s to the squadron field trains, typically located in the BSA, or request assistance from the BSB’s FMC S&R section to accomplish the same task. Finally, the commander can create additional MCPs and bound NMC equip ment from one MCP to subsequent MCPs on the battlefield. Each of these courses of action has advantages and disadvantages (Table 2), and some re quire assets that may or may not be available depending on the current mission variables. The first option to displace the MCP and combat trains with more than two NMC combat platforms is to gain rein forcing support by consolidating the squadron’s M88s or by requesting M88 support from the BSB.15 If the squadron orders its FMTs to provide reinforcing support to the FSC’s S&R section, this solves the immediate problem of the combat trains’ mobility, but it hinders the troops’ ability to conduct its own recovery operations and may limit the troop trains’ of free dom of maneuver. This may be a good solution if M88 support is only needed for a short period of time or if the troops can go without their M88s for a specified period of time (for example, during more stationary security operations) be cause the commander can solve the problem without requesting assistance from another headquarters. However, it runs counter to the doctri nal concept of keeping maintenance assets “as far forward as the tactical situation permits to return inoperable and damaged equipment to the battle as quickly as possible.”16 To retain the squadron’s ability to con duct maintenance and recovery operations forward, the squadron can re quest reinforcing support from the bri gade’s BSB. Unfortunately, the FMC has limited reinforcing capacity for recovery support, and there may not be enough M88s available in the BSB’s FMC – depending on the brigade’s op erational readiness (OR).17 Some com manders may commit the FMC’s M88s early to reinforce battalions or the squadron if they have one or more NMC M88s. Also, the BSB may need to retain these M88s to move NMC vehicles in the BSA. Reinforcing recovery support is the preferred option to retain the combat trains’ freedom of maneuver in most cases, but this option may be come difficult depending on the brigade’s OR rate. Another option is to recover NMC combat platforms back to the squadron’s field trains in the BSA. R&S doc trine implores planners to specify when this is necessary – without citing specific examples – but maintenance doctrine reminds us that this option requires moving more maintenance assets and personnel to the field trains to enable maintenance operations there.18 According to current modified tables of organization and equipment, the brigade only has four tank and BFV mechanics in the BSA, but these main tainers are dedicated to the FMC’s M88s for recovery operations, not maintenance operations. This disposi tion differs from historical maintenance concepts of support that included maintenance pass-back support.19 This does not mean that the squadron cannot conduct maintenance activities on its combat platforms in the field trains, but commanders must either send maintainers back to the field trains with their NMC vehicles or task-organize 91A or 91Ms to the FSC’s

In some cases, a combat platform may be damaged to such an extent that it requires evacuation for sustainment maintenance. If this is true, the lack of tank and BFV mechanics in the BSA is not an issue. Doctrinally, the BSB’s FMC “serves as the central entry and exit point for all equipment requiring evacuation for sustainment maintenance.”21 The decision to evacuate NMC combat platforms back to the squadron field trains retains the troops’ and combat trains’ freedom of maneuver, and it enables the brigade to maintain its standard recovery stance. However, it may come at the cost of forward-maintenance activities. In the best-case scenario, if commanders can af ford to reallocate maintainers to the field trains, this option may slow the return of combat platforms to the troops. In the worst-case scenario, the field trains collect excess NMC vehi cles, which jeopardizes the field trains and BSA’s freedom of maneuver. Either way, the decision to recover vehicles back to the squadron’s field trains in the BSA must be a deliberate one that includes ensuring M1 Abrams and M2/M3 BFV mechanics and tools are available to fix these platforms. The third option is for the squadron to temporarily create more than one MCP. As briefly touched upon in the opening vignette, the authors found themselves in this situation during NTC 20-01, and although it was less than ideal, they were able to negotiate the challenges by leveraging the HHT commander’s leadership. If the combat trains were unable to move all the NMC vehicles in the MCP, the S-4 could move the CTCP and the bulk of the combat trains, and establish anew MCP closer to the FLOT, while the HHT commander, with recovery support, assumed the task of recovering the NMC vehicles from the existing MCP to the new MCP in multiple move ments (Figure 3). Rather than being constrained by its rear-most, immobile pieces of equip ment, multiple MCPs enabled the squadron to continue sustainment operations and maintain its “mobility so that it may support the [R&S] mission at extended ranges” by creating an other MCP closer to the FLOT.22 This places the S-4 and the CTCP closer to the troop trains so that he or she can maintain communication and sustain ment reporting with the troops. Also, this allows the portion of the troops’ FMTs in the combat trains and their maintenance capabilities (lift, shop and bench stock, etc.) to remain closer to the troop trains, supporting their maintenance requirements. By creating another MCP, the squadron can continue its logistics planning and position its alternate CP (i.e. the CTCP) closer to the main CP, and enable the squadron’s freedom of maneuver through close access to emergency ammunition and fuel while simultane ously recovering vehicles from the previous MCP(s). Multiple MCPs Having multiple MCPs has its advan tages, but it creates more challenges and support requirements as well. Having multiple MCPs enables the combat trains’ freedom of maneuver by restoring its mobility, but it often necessitates more than one move ment to displace. If attacked, leaders may have to temporarily abandon some immobile equipment during sur vivability moves. Also, multiple MCPs will decisively engage the squadron’s recovery assets until all NMC vehicles are consolidated in the new MCP. Finally, each additional MCP is another location that must be secured and sus tained, requiring additional maintenance personnel to conduct security operation and additional time for lo gistics-resupply operations. While more MCPs enable the squad ron to continue operations, they hin der the squadron’s ability to rapidly displace and regenerate combat pow er. As the squadron’s lines of commu nication (LoCs) get longer, M88s and like vehicles for recovery move further from the older MCP(s) and make it more difficult to recover vehicles from there. Also, leaders prioritize recovering vehicles that have parts on hand, leaving those with long-lead-time parts at MCPs further back. At that point, the squadron inherits another logistical problem: resupplying multiple MCP(s). The HHT commander and first sergeant must assume the responsibility for resupplying the MCP(s), and this creates more demands on their al ready busy timelines. Until the squadron transitions to more stationary operations, regenerating its lost combat power becomes more and more difficult as its LoCs get longer. Despite these disadvantages, the squadron may be required to create Figure 3. Proposed composition of combat trains with two MCPs.

multiple MCPs if reinforcing support is not available and the brigade or squadron does not wish to execute pass-back maintenance to the field trains or BSA. Regardless of the option selected to retain the trains’ freedom of maneuver, leaders must establish mainte nance time limits and evacuation timelines, and specify conditions for recovery operations to determine when evacuation to the different trains is advantageous.23 At a mini mum, leaders should establish these conditions within their operations orders, but ideally, they establish and train these conditions as part of their tactical SOPs. Comparing current doctrine, ATP 3-20.97, Cavalry Troop, mentions the idea of time guidelines to enable re pair or recovery decisions. ATP 4-33, Maintenance Operations, discusses some of the things that commanders should consider when developing maintenance time limits. ATP 3-20.5, Combined-Arms Battalion, references specific examples of evacuation time lines, and ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron, mentions that leaders must determine triggers in coordination with supporting elements across the bri gade for when evacuating equipment to the trains is advantageous.24 ATP 3-20.5 suggests a standard where by “repairs requiring up to two hours are conducted at company trains; two-to six-hour repairs at the combined-arms battalion MCP; and any repairs requiring greater than six hours go to the field trains.”25 Leaders must re member that the option to recover ve hicles to the field trains must consider whether the brigade, BSB and squadron commanders’ plans – specifically, the disposition of the brigade’s tank and BFV mechanics – support execut ing maintenance in the field trains and

BSA.

Maintenance running estimates To enable the squadron and troop commanders to make maintenance and recovery decisions, the squadron must include maintenance running es timates as part of its COP. Maintenance running estimates enable com manders to determine where to con duct maintenance, when to recover vehicles to a different maintenance node (i.e. troop trains, combat trains, MCP and field trains), when to adjust the standard maintenance time limits, and how to retain the trains’ freedom of maneuver. To enable these decisions, the staff must develop maintenance-related friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and continuously update the squadron’s running estimates us ing these FFIR, or risk unnecessary maintenance delays or the squander ing of future combat power. Three keys to enable the establishment of the squadron’s maintenance COP are FFIR and reporting and tracking sys tems. Leaders across the squadron must report timely and accurate main tenance information to update the squadron’s COP. The first step to establish maintenance running estimates is determining what information must be reported to en able the commander to make maintenance and recovery decisions. The 1-1 Cav’s experience during NTC 20-01 highlighted the need-to-know of four critical FFIR:

• Location and fault(s) of all NMC equipment;

• Part availability for NMC equipment;

• The location and capabilities of each maintenance node; and

• Current recovery capabilities at each node. The list of NMC equipment at the MCP(s) was particularly important for commanders to continue to account for equipment and plan for the Table 3. Maintenance running estimates tracker with example data.

Figure 4. 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, combat-power tracker. (Graphic by CPT Max Banerjee) displacement of the squadron’s com bat trains. Collectively these mainte nance running estimates (Table 3), combined with the squadron combat power tracker (Figure 4), enabled commanders to decide where to con duct maintenance, when to recover NMC vehicles to a different maintenance node and how to prepare for future operations. Maintenance running estimate track ers must be updated from a combina tion of routine situation reports, battle-update briefs (BUBs) and periodic maintenance updates from the squad ron’strains. Troops’ routine situation reports should include information on NMC vehicles – whether they were combat losses or maintenance faults – and the locations of troop and com bat trains. BUBs provide another ven ue for confirming and refining running estimates, including planned movements of the squadron trains during the next 24-48 hours and maintenance updates from the troops. Finally, periodic maintenance updates from the squadron’s combat and field trains provide critical updates on NMC vehicle locations and maintenance status. Updates from the combat trains are especially important, as mainte nance activities there are taking place under the supervision of the HHT com mander and away from the line-troop commanders. While the squadron ex ecutive officer, maintenance officer and field-maintenance technician are responsible for leading the field-maintenance effort itself, the HHT com mander must plan, recommend and supervise the combat trains in the context of its sustainment, mobility and tactical emplacement within the squadron’s larger operations. This includes potentially splitting the combat trains if conditions require that. This is a significant increase in the HHT commander’s maintenance responsibilities as compared to garri son – where HHT does not even have afield-maintenance team of its own – and the squadron executive officer and HHT commander must synchro nize plans and priorities daily to en sure unity of effort. Conclusion Maintenance operations are demanding enough in garrison, but they face increased challenges during tactical operations. Inevitable drops in the squadron’s OR rate often create competing maintenance and recovery demands that can challenge the MCP(s) and trains’ freedom of maneuver. The squadron has three options to overcome these challenges: request reinforcing M88 support; initiate passback maintenance; or create more MCPs. These three options for retain ing the combat trains’ freedom of maneuver have advantages and disadvan tages, and leaders must understand the entire maintenance system from the troop to the brigade level to en able optimal maintenance and recov ery decisions. To sustain continued combat operations, squadron leaders must have a shared understanding of how to bal ance the potentially competing de mands of maintenance and recovery, and the trains’ freedom of maneuver. All commanders must contribute to these efforts by reporting accurate FFIR that update maintenance running estimates and establish a COP to en able decision-making. Finally, the HHT commander must have an intimate knowledge of the bri gade’s maintenance and recovery system to lead the combat trains and en able combat power regeneration. Re generating and maintaining combat power are not easy tasks during con tinuous operations, but leaders must learn and apply lessons like those mentioned here to ensure successful R&S during large-scale combat. MAJ Gary Klein is the squadron executive officer, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX. His previous assignments include squadron operations officer, 1-1 Cav, Fort Bliss; plans officer, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; small-group leader, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Command and Tactics Directorate, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA; troop senior observer/coach/ trainer, Task Force 4, Operations Group, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA; commander, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, “War Rakkasans,” Fort Campbell, KY; and commander, HHT, 1-33 Cav. MAJ Klein’s military schools include Advanced Military Studies Program, Command and General Staff Officer Course, MCCC, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Ranger School, Air borne School and Air-Assault School. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in biochemistry from the University of Michigan, a master’s of science degree in medicinal chemistry from the University of Illinois-Chicago and a mas ter’s of arts degree in military operations from the School of Advanced Military Studies. CPT Ragan Rutherford is an instructor, Cavalry Leader’s Course, 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Benning. His previous as signments include commander, Troop A and HHT, 1-1 Cavalry, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; plans of ficer, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; executive officer, Troop N, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cav, Rose Barracks, Germany; and platoon leader, Troop O, 4-2 Cav, Rose Barracks. CPT Rutherford’s military schools include the Cavalry Leader’s Course, MCCC, Ranger School, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Airborne School and Pathfinder School. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Texas A&M University. Notes 1 ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016. 2 Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, Washing ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015.

ATP 3-20.96.

ATP 4-33, Maintenance Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019. 5 The MCS attaches one 92A to support logistics automations in the field trains. The S&R section attaches one M984 to support recovery operations from the field trains. The FMS is primarily located in the field trains, but it attaches 91Bs and 91Hs to the combat trains to enable wheeled vehicle and light track mainte nance there as necessary. 6 It is advantageous to echelon the squadron’s S-1 and S-4 leadership across the battlefield as well. We recommend splitting the S-1 section between the combat and field trains, and the S-4 section between the squadron main CP and the combat trains.

Placing the HHT commander in charge of the combat trains is not unusual. See Paul M. Guzman, Anthony R. Davila and Marc A. DeLuca, “The Combat-Trains Command Post in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s Cavalry Squadron,” AR MOR, January-March 2016; and Kyle S. Marcum and Andrew J. Prunty, “Fighting the Combat-Trains Command Post in a Decisive-Action Training Environment,” ARMOR, January-March 2016.

ATP 4-33.

NTC Ops Group, “Combined-Arms Battalion Maintenance,” The Company Lead er; accessed May 9, 2020, http://compa nyleader.themilitaryleader. com/2020/05/09/combined-arms-battalion-maintenance/. 10 ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.

ATP 4-33.

FM 3-98. 13 ATP 3-20.97, Cavalry Troop, Washing ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016.

ATP 3-20.96.

Reinforcing support is mentioned in modern maintenance doctrine, and it is specifically referenced in modern sup port relationship doctrine, but it is no longer deliberately described as a maintenance support method like it was prior to Army modularization. See ATP 4-33 for modern mentions of reinforcing maintenance support; FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014, for modern support relationships doctrine; and FM 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations and Procedures, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004, for a description of the historical “backup / reinforcing sup port method.”

ATP 4-33.

Ibid.

ATP 3-20.96; ATP 4-33.

FM 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations and Procedures. 20 Garrick L. Cramer and Jeffrey P. Kelley, “Passback Maintenance in a Decisive-Action Operation,” www.army.mil, May 29, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/204474/pass_back_maintenance_ in_a_decisive_action_operation; accessed May 3, 2020.

ATP 4-33.

FM 3-98.

ATP 3-20.96.

ATP 3-20.97 and ATP 4-33.

ATP 3-90.5.

ABCT – armored brigade combat team ATP – Army technical publication BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle BSA – brigade-support area BSB – brigade-support battalion BUB – battle-update brief COP – common operational picture CP – command post CTCP – combat-trains command post FFIR – friendly force information requirements FLOT – forward-line-of-own-troops FM – field manual FMC – forward-maintenance company FMS – field-maintenance section FMT – field-maintenance team FRS – forward repair system FMS – field maintenance section FSC – forward-support company HHT – headquarters and headquarters troop LoC – lines of communication MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MCP – maintenance collection point MCS – maintenance-control section NMC – non-mission capable NTC – National Training Center OR – operational readiness R&S – reconnaissance and security SAS – squadron aid station SOP – standard operating procedure S&R – service and recovery Acronym Quick-Scan Noncommissioned Officer Academy Instructor Opportunity The Henry Caro Noncommissioned Officer Academy at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA, is interested in leaders who are called to a greater sense of purpose to serve and provide quality education to the Army’s future. The academy is seeking people who aim to inspire others through their optimism and commitment to the team, and who are critical thinkers with innovative ideas to enhance the institution and broaden the learning experience. Standards and discipline are two important aspects of this institution, and its goal is to develop leaders and strengthen the Army community. Fit and disciplined noncommissioned officers who strive to grow personally and professionally should apply at the Fort Benning Website, https://www.benning.army.mil/MCoE/NCOA/Instructor-Application.html.