At the Forward Edge and Beyond: Lethality and the Armored Brigade Combat Team

Fall 2020 At the Forward Edge and Beyond: Lethality and the Armored Brigade Combat Team by MAJ(P) James Burnett and MAJ Jeffrey A. Feser Operational requirements for the past 20 years have degraded the armored brigade combat team’s (ABCT) lethal ity. The state of armored lethality at the small-unit level is serious, and it is continuously decreasing through the loss of institutional knowledge. Decline of lessons-learned Before 2001, when the National Train ing Center (NTC) was the keystone event in every brigade training cycle, battalion and brigade commanders brought with them a sacred institu tional knowledge gained through ex perience. Hard lessons-learned creat ed leaders who bore the knowledge of past battles, engagements and experi ences through fighting a lethal and thinking enemy. As the bridge be tween operational art and tactics, these lessons were the most valuable tool a battalion commander could dis tribute across the force. These documented experiences, aug mented with decades of experience from senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), especially master gunners (MGs), enabled our junior leaders to develop the tactics and leaderships skills that made America’s armored formations the most formidable and lethal in the world. However, the shift to the counterin surgency (COIN) environment ren dered these lessons-learned about how to approach decisive-action en gagements at NTC obsolete. With the return to great-power competition, to day’s Armor force faces the loss of in stitutional knowledge across the force when it comes to decisive-action en gagements. The U.S. Army’s armored and mechanized formations are the arm of decision to the most capable land force in the world. However, while the United States focused on COIN-centric operations for the past 20 years, our adversaries have capitalized on our preoccupation. They adapted, mod ernized and professionalized, testing their weapons, tactics and doctrine in limited conflicts with devastating ef fects. Regaining operational knowledge The return of great-power competition represents a different operational en vironment than previously faced. The incorporation and integration of ene my elements associated with the rise of Grey Zone operations requires small U.S. military elements to disperse over great distances to rapidly converge, engage and destroy the enemy in com bined-arms operations. The U.S.

Fall 2020 military must move rapidly from one point of conflict to another, reposi tioning and attacking the next objec tive to provide continuous overmatch of violence at decisive points. Unfortunately, recent reports from the combat-training centers (CTCs) cite a 30-percent decrease in target hits dur ing the past two decades with first-run crew-qualification rates routinely be low 60 percent. Discrete adjustments to Army manning, training and struc ture have resulted in a multitude of unanticipated second-order effects within the armored force. For exam ple, a myriad of global requirements dampened platform lethality despite technological advances throughout the mechanized force. The question we now need to ask our selves is how can we regain operation al knowledge through institutionalized training, doctrine and manning to in crease ABCT lethality and dominate in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). To address this question and the cur rent state of the armored and mecha nized force, III Armored Corps initiated the Lethality Report on the State of the Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). It collected observations, in sights, data and lessons in collabora tion with Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Human Resources Command (HRC), U.S. Army Materiel Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), First Army and the Maneuver Center of Ex cellence. Report authors III Corps deputy com manding general and III Corps com mand sergeant major presented the findings at the Army Warfighting Con ference in September 2019. The re port articulated a snapshot of the overall state of III Corps’ formations, seeking to address the probability of winning a peer-on-peer LSCO by estab lishing a baseline for discussions on the requirements of the armored and mechanized community. The report also identified and highlighted the de clining lethality in the armored force despite continued weapon-system and fire-control improvements. In response, III Corps identified three lines of effort (LoEs) encompassing 38 recommendations and operationalized by HQDA, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), HRC and TRADOC, to cor rect systemic issues from the crew through Army-command level. These LoEs center on MG use and proficien cy, M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehi cle (IFV) leader competency and im proved operational training. Encompassing these LoEs, III Armored Corps recently submitted the Com mander’s Guide to ABCT Gunnery Handbook to the Center for Army Les sons Learned for its publication. This publication connects commanders with the knowledge that MGs and se nior NCOs have developed during years of executing gunneries. It also provides tips and lessons for how to prepare for successful gunneries as well as enhanced training standards intended to stress crews to their max imize training value. Its focus is how to use gunnery as the means to an end to increase crew lethality in combat. Increasing lethality To increase lethality, it is necessary for all units to fill all authorized MG posi tions to train our mechanized forces. MG use and proficiency addresses the mechanized force’s lack of MGs and the correlating general decline in le thality and safety. MGs are the life blood to developing unit and crew le thality. They are the subject-matter experts, institutionally trained in di rect-fire weapon systems, planning, gunnery, training programs and com bat-vehicle weapons maintenance. They enable us to defeat the enemy by optimally employing our most lethal weapon systems and increasing train ing focus on effective direct fires; they are a force multiplier. Engaging the enemy effectively at the tactical horizon while dominating the operational foreground takes direct-fire precision that can only be taught by our MGs. However, MGs are manned at below 50 percent across the force, and they often have less live-fire experience than a senior lieu tenant of the 1980s. This lack of expe rience and an inadequate quantity of MGs can be attributed to poor identi fication, development and perfor mance of the candidate at the MG course. III Corps is actively working to change this trend; it is building, managing and fielding MGs within the force. To decrease delinquencies and build effective MGs, III Armored Corps is working with Army divisions to create standardized sabot academies; in crease access to the Abrams Training Assessment Course and the Bradley Training Assessment Course; and cre ate a Department of the Army selec tion process to discover potential can didates. III Corps is also working with FORSCOM and HQDA to designate coded MG skill-identifier positions in Armor platoons while adding require ments for Armor, Bradley and Stryker MGs at division and corps headquar ters levels. Upon completion of these initiatives, each tank company will have three more MGs, with an increase of 18 within each ABCT. Upon identification and graduation from the course, com manders are ensuring MG stabilization through proper personnel coding to maintain unit stability following the completion of key development posi tions – a historical delinquency depriv ing units of trained personnel. Units are able to maintain technical and tactically proficient NCOs up to 18 more months to increase institutional knowledge and stability within the force. Therefore active solicitation of MGs, along with committed manage ment and support from HRC for re maining shortages within each branch, is facilitating increased experience and lethality within ABCTs. Looking at our maneuver brethren in the XVIII Airborne Corps, we can see they have embraced the idea of insti tutional training as the keystone to re alizing operational lethality. Ranger School, Airborne School and Air-As sault School are all key components of their leader development. M2 Bradley IFV leader competency must address the lack of leader proficiency within the M2 Bradley force. The M2 Bradley is the preeminent fighting platform deliberately devel oped by the Army to be part of the le thality coefficient and a key compo nent of combined-arms teams on the battlefield. As such, the vehicle com mander must be able to both effec tively destroy the enemy with direct

Fall 2020 fire and transport infantry into close combat. They are responsible to not only “shoot, move, communicate,” but also to integrate direct and indirect fires; maneuver infantry while sup porting vehicle maneuvers; and com municate a clear and concise view of the engagement area through the in corporation of the Bradley Fighting Ve hicle. A single ABCT holds 233 Bradley crew man positions or about 3,700 infantry-trained M2 crewmen across the Army enterprise. Of the approximately 1,800 officers and NCOs on assignment in structions to mechanized forces in 2020, less than 1,100 have prior ABCT experience. With that in mind, leader competency must be addressed across the force as nearly 700 leaders lack M2 experience upon arriving at an ABCT. Without proficient crews, troop and company commanders, units can not effectively, nor safely, bring to bear the full lethality of the M2 plat form. In response, III Armored Corps is changing the instructional method for leaders unfamiliar with mechanized platforms. It is supporting re-institu tionalization training and an associat ed B9 additional skill identifier for In fantry Branch M2 trained crewmen. It is also enlarging and re-allocating pri oritization of NCOs for the Bradley Leader’s Course through the unit mod ified table of organization and equip ment, while requiring attendance of institutional schooling prior to arrival at ABCTs to create the competency and lethality. Starting in 2021, HRC will annually in crease total Bradley Leader’s Course slots for NCOs, increasing training op portunities because of operational needs. Mechanized-infantry Soldiers must understand how to maneuver their platform at the tactical level; it is the key to robbing the enemy of the initiative. By combining maneuver and surprise, leaders at the lowest levels create opportunities to deny the ene my the initiative. Strenuous training needed Finally, to increase lethality, forces must reintegrate strenuous and com prehensive training scenarios. The lack of sufficient technically competent NCOs who are skilled on the M2 has stagnated current training proficiency within armored and mechanized forc es. Correlations stemming from ineffi cient training and standards are fur ther impacted by current operational tempo, inefficient “Leader’s Time Training,” lack of Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS) / Bradley Ad vanced Training System (BATS), and/or poor preparatory training prior to cer tifications. As such, negligence of technical proficiency and the tactical capability among platform command ers remains limited, which prevents the ability to train and develop lethal Soldiers. These critical issues affect our combat capabilities and Soldier safety. CTC in juries demonstrate that inexperience is the lead contributing factor for in jury and loss of life on both the M2 Bradley and the Stryker. A long-term solution for this problem will have to include exponential increases in the Bradley Commander’s and Gunner’s Course capacity and the creation of a Bradley Crewmen Course to incorpo rate junior leaders. The investment in institutional introduction and recur ring training will reduce injuries, in crease proficiency and ensure units are ready and lethal in case of LSCO. A lack of MGs and their limited expe rience amplifies poor training. As a re sult, training and live-fire standards across heavy formations vary signifi cantly from the requirements estab lished in the Gunnery Training Circu lar. These deviations result in a wide lethality variance across the force as units differed on the types of engage ments and distances they chose. The future battlefield demands a cul ture where units raise proficiency by achieving the standard against in creasingly difficult conditions; howev er, the Lethality Report discovered that only one of the four brigade com bat teams’ (BCT) Abrams gunneries that were analyzed fired 72.7 percent (eight engagements) of their main-gun targetry at a long-range distance. Three other BCTs averaged below 27.3 percent (three engagements). The pre ponderance of BCTs surveyed failed to challenge the capabilities of the vehi cle or the crews; they engaged short- and medium-range targets that do not represent the standard and did not operate under the conditions units expect to operate in during combat. In response, III Armored Corps is initi ating multiple efforts to correct these issues and limit the difference. To im prove operational training and main tain proficiency, it published new pol icies to change the mindset of gunnery from a training event to a means to ward lethality. It now requires unit-level training emphasizing gunnery tasks and AGTS/BATS systems leverag ing to increase lethality. III Armored Corps also forward-positioned digital training systems to support continu ous training during operational de ployments. Recommended changes to Training Circular (TC) 3-20.31, Training and Qualification, Crew, also limits al lowed variances within gunnery; these limits restrict deviation approval lev els and quantities. All planned devia tions from standards prescribed in the TC require approval by the first gener al officer in the chain of command at the G-60 brief. Similarly, division G-3s must now ap prove all primary and alternate gun nery scenarios and shot sheets for crew qualification tables. These ac tions will change the mindset of gun nery, returning its focus to crew lethal ity instead of gunnery completion. Conclusion: increase lethality The U.S. Army must be able to execute simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability operations to prevail in largescale ground combat while distribut ed, but Armor lethality at small-unit level remains in a serious state. The problem is complicated, but the cor rections required are feasible when they are recognized as an intercon nected system. Returning to a great-power training focus requires ABCT emphasis on MG use and proficiency, M2 leader competency and improved operational training to increase lethal ity and ensure the mechanized force is prepared to win the next first battle. MAJ(P) James Burnett is the deputy fire-support coordinator, Joint Fire power Course, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX.

Fall 2020 Acronym Quick-Scan His previous assignments include bri gade S-3 division artillery; battalion S-3, 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment; fire-support officer, 1st Bri gade; fire-support officer, 1st Air Cav alry Brigade – all with 1st Cavalry Divi sion, Fort Hood. Other assignments in cluded action officer, Pakistan Afghan istan Coordination Cell, J-5, Joint Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC. MAJ Bur nett’s military schools include interme diate-level education, Joint Fires Course, Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course and Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader’s Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in English literature from St. Lawrence University; a bach elor’s of arts degree in history from St. Lawrence University; and a master’s of arts degree in diplomacy from Norwich University. MAJ Burnett’s awards in clude the Bronze Star Medal; the De fense Meritorious Service Medal, 1st oak-leaf cluster; and the Meritorious Service Medal, 2nd oak-leaf cluster. MAJ Jeff Feser is the G-35 planner, Le thality Cell Operational Planning Team, III Corps Headquarters, Fort Hood, TX. His previous assignments in clude battalion operations officer for a 450-trooper task force (in Kuwait), co-assigned as commander, Headquar ters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; commander, Company D (tank company), 1-12 Cav, Fort Hood; Multi national Battle Group – East planner, 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo; and recon naissance-platoon leader, 6th Squad ron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX (Operation Iraqi Freedom – Kirkuk). He deployed to Afghanistan as the execu tive officer for Troop A, 1st Squadron, 13th Cav, Fort Bliss. MAJ Feser’s mili tary schools include the School of Ad vanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Engineer Captain’s Career Course and Armor Ba sic Officer Leader Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in interna tional affairs and economics from George Washington University, a mas ter’s of arts degree in military art and science from the School of Advance Military Studies and a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Mary Hardin-Baylor. His awards include the Bronze Star Medal, 1st oak-leaf cluster; Meritorious Service Medal, 1st oak-leaf cluster; Order of Saint George medallion; and Order of Saint Maurice medallion. ABCT – armored brigade combat team AGTS – Advanced Gunnery Training System BATS – Bradley Advanced Training System BCT – brigade combat team COIN – counterinsurgency CTC – combat-training center FORSCOM – (U.S. Army) Forces Command HRC – Human Resources Command HQDA – Headquarters Department of the Army IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle LoE – line of effort LSCO – large-scale combat operations MG – master gunner NCO – noncommissioned officer NTC – National Training Center TC – training circular TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command