Reconnaissance and Security Operations Are Essential to Thwarting Russian Interests in Western Hemisphere

Leaders of the Russian Federation maintain a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere by preserving the presidency of Nicholas Maduro in Venezuela. Cooperation between Russia and Venezuela offers the Russian government an ability to bolster its in tertwined military, economic and political interests. To that end, the Russian military continues a campaign of material support to the Venezuelan military to deter foreign and domestic threats. The United States recognizes interim President Juan Guaido and considers the Venezuelan National Assembly, which he currently leads, to be the only legitimate federal institution, ac cording to the Venezuelan Constitution. This pits Russian and U. S. interests in Venezuela at odds because Russia supports Nicolás Maduro, president of Venezuela since 2013, with his presidency under dispute since 2019. In this context, it is crucial to effective ly train the U. S. Army and our allies in reconnaissance and security tactics that incorporate the lessons of post-Soviet acts of Russian aggression to prepare for potential hostilities in the region. Maduro and his United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) present a desper ate need for political, economic and military aid that complements the Russian desire for influence in the region. Venezuelan Socialists justifiably fear the threat of a coup because the PSUV temporarily lost power during a coup d’état in 2002.1 Russia deters threats to the PSUV through arms sales,2 private military contractors,3 military advisers/trainers4 and the United States’ fear of confronting the Kremlin in open conflict if a move is made against the PSUV. Further, Russian veto power in the United Nations Security Council provides political cov er for Maduro. Finally, the Kremlin bol sters Venezuela through direct finan cial aid and lines of credit.5 In return, the Russians gain a foundation to build influence and undermine the interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. With bolstering Venezuela the known objective of the Russian government, the U. S. Army must think critically and train effectively to counter Russian support for the Latin American coun try that could manifest itself into an armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Russian mindset Since the late 1990s the Russian Federation has executed a series of mili tary actions that reveal the character of the military forces the Kremlin has developed to actualize its political ob jectives and the mindset of its con temporary leaders. In June 1999, Russian forces successfully gained lever age in negotiations over the disposition of a newly created United Nations peacekeeping force by seizing the air port in Pristina, Kosovo, prior to the arrival of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.6 This was the first of many actions that demonstrat ed rising boldness among Russian leaders and a belief that Western pow ers will not risk the use of military force against Russians. Russian actors launched a cyberattack in April 2007 against the government of Estonia in retaliation for the removal of a World War II monument honor ing Soviet veterans.7 False news re ports that the Estonian government planned to destroy rather than just move the statue exacerbated the un rest among ethnically Russian popula tions in Estonia.8 This unprecedented wave of cyberattacks led to major dis ruptions of government services, email, online banking, automated-teller-machine access, e-commerce and more. Cumulatively, the cyberat tacks and ethnic tensions led to riots and crippled the country for more than two weeks.9 Notably, the Russian government never acknowledged its role in the cyber attack and the specific perpetrators remain unknown, though they are al most certainly government-supported, Russia-based actors.10 Russia and many other nations learned that cy berattacks now present an effective and low-risk means of disrupting an enemy’s ability to maintain order, which reduces its capacity for armed conflict. One year later, Russia intervened in then-Georgian-controlled South Osse tia and Abkhazia in support of ethni cally Russian populations.11 Prior to the Russian occupation, the Russians recruited, organized and equipped separatists to prepare the battlefield.12 They also conducted large-scale train ing exercises that served as rehearsals for the occupation and a plausible cover for massing forces near the Russia-Georgia border.13 In this conflict, the Russians fought in all domains to achieve limited strategic goals that in cluded greater influence over the South Caucus Energy Corridor and dis couraging a partnership with NATO.14 Post-conflict analysis reveals that the Russian military struggled to operate effectively in joint and combined-arms operations.15 Georgian tactical success sparked anew determination to up grade Russia’s military equipment and move away from Soviet-era tactics.16 Russian President Vladimir Putin took his largest and boldest military actions to date by annexing Crimea and launching an offensive in the Donbass region of Ukraine in 2014. Russia has gained an advantage throughout the conflict through the effective use of deception to delay responses by the Ukrainians and the West.17 Concrete steps taken to conceal Russian involve ment include the use of unmarked soldiers,18 military contractors19 and the dubious use of humanitarian aid.20 Despite these efforts to deny the ex tent of Russian involvement, unsubtle funerals for fallen Russian soldiers confirm the reality of the situation.21 In conjunction with Russian actions in Georgia, these actions confirm a strong preference in the Kremlin for the use of military and paramilitary forces that afford the Kremlin deni ability on the international stage. Lessons-learned Members of the U. S. Army’s Asymmet ric Warfare Group, among others, have published studies based on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine that identified critical lessons for the U. S. military. Their findings indicate that the Russian military favors the use of snip ers and boobytraps as a means of fix ing larger forces and causing signifi cant psychological strain on their en emies.22 Russia has integrated un manned aerial systems (UAS) with electronic-warfare (EW) capabilities to project jamming and spoofing ef fects on its enemies’ locations. These systems also fuel the targeting of indi rect weapons, often toward elements with a large electronic signature.23 Fire-support elements, as opposed to maneuver elements, take finishing actions in Russian offensive operations; this is a continuation of Soviet-style fighting.24 Despite many advances since the end of the Cold War, re source constraints cause several vul nerabilities in the Russian fighting force. Specifically, their lack of re sources causes a deficit of highly trained professionals, especially in the sustainment occupational special ties.25 As a result, their force struggles to match top-tier maneuver and fires with top-tier sustainment, reducing the likelihood of success in expedition ary operations. Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad re quested military assistance from the Kremlin in 2015 as he struggled to fight a growing multitude of militant groups.26 Officially, the Russian Federation Council approved only the use of air assets for combat operations in Syria, though the Russians maintain a ground force in the country.27 Russia has equipped the Syrian army with main battle tanks and small arms while supporting with its own attack aircraft.28 Sustaining this effort re quired the Russians to use reserve units and military contractors, which suggests a weakness in Russian capa bilities with respect to personnel.29 Russian contractors became the subject of much debate when they at tacked a combined U. S.-Kurdish force near Deir Ezzor, Syria, in February

2018. Some suggest leaders in the Kremlin used contractors to prosecute the attack to maintain deniability for the government. Others suggest the contractors acted in a cavalier fashion without explicit consent from the Kremlin.30 Both of these possibilities require that the United States prepare for such actions by Russian contractors in the future. Through Russian assis tance the Assad regime has regained much of its territory, and Russia now has a blueprint for strengthening other regimes in the future.31 Russian military forces currently train and equip Venezuelan military forces to inoculate the Maduro regime against internal and external threats. Economic turmoil poses the greatest threat to the Maduro regime, so the Russians have responded with billions in direct aid and credit.32 Since 2000, Russia has made arms sales of more than $7.5 billion to Venezuela, including fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, armored personnel carriers and small arms.33 Venezuela also relies on em bedded Russian troops to train its force and serve as a deterrent to po tential aggressors.34 Russian strategic bombers have also visited Venezuela, and the two countries have conducted combined military exercises, to the dismay of Western officials.35 These means and methods of support indicate that any potential conflict in Venezuela will have a similar character to those in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Aggressive intelligence collection Lessons of Russian intervention in the recent past indicate that reducing the effectiveness of Russian strengths and exploiting Russian weaknesses re quires aggressive intelligence collection. Training reconnaissance organizations includes at least three audiences – the primary collectors (Soldiers and junior noncommissioned officers), platoon and troop-level lead ership and the staff. Effective training for all audiences requires the use of technology for specific threats and scenarios that force us to think like our adversaries. Ultimately, developing muscle memory in the tasks that cause the right information to flow quickly to the appropriate decision-makers is the goal. This goal includes two important indicators of success: risk deci sions made at the appropriate level and mid-operation changes to the enemy’s course of action. This conceptual framework and our synopsis of selected Russian actions leads to five focus areas for training:

• Improvised explosive devices (IED)/ boobytraps;

• Sustainment; and

• Information operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States invested significant resources to defeat the threat posed by IEDs and snipers, two strengths we expect to find in Russian supported forces. In contrast to Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian supported forces likely use military grade manufactured explosives – boobytraps – rather than IEDs.36 We must also anticipate that the skill of a Russian trained sniper will surpass the skill of the snipers from Iraq and Afghanistan.37 Passivity significantly in creases the risk to the force in an en vironment with snipers and IEDs/booby traps, while proactive reconnaissance efforts reduce both the psychological and material impacts of the threats.38 Proactive reconnaissance efforts for these threats begin with primary col lectors and troop-level leaders learn ing to think like the enemy while analyzing the terrain. From this analysis, they identify positions of advantage from which to counter the threat and minimize the risk to their force. Currently, our force rarely teaches average scouts to think like a sniper. How ever, we would be wise to encourage this training. Members of the staff must use the analysis to identify the networks that support the battlefield effects of snipers and boobytraps. Analysis from the staff fuels an ongo ing effort to plan future reconnaissance patrols among other operations. Ultimately, the feedback loop signifi cantly increases the difficulty our ad versaries have in achieving battlefield effects from either a sniper or a boo bytrap.39 Leveraging technology U. S. and allied forces must leverage the latest technology in conjunction with battle drills to reduce and defeat the threat of boobytraps and snipers. Currently, U. S. forces infrequently train with gunshot-detection devices and jammers that increase our surviv ability. Technology, like the processes of information flow, requires extensive training that leads to muscle memory to yield a material benefit. For exam ple, the placement of gunshot-detection devices within a convoy or on apiece of tactical infrastructure re quires critical analysis from leaders at the platoon and troop level. Improper placement may yield no benefit to friendly forces.40 Technology infrequently defeats threats on its own; rather, it enables maneuver forces to defeat an enemy threat. Therefore, training battle drills such as react-to-contact must accompany training with gunshot detection and jammers. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threats contrast threats from snipers and boo bytraps in that the means and meth ods available to counter them lack thorough, real-world testing. Most commonly, UAVs serve as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as sets that frequently support the tar geting process for indirect-fire assets. As noted, Russia specifically began us ing drones to project EW impacts to their enemies in Ukraine; however, it is unlikely Russia would support a country like Venezuela with such a scarce resource. This may change as Russia produces and fields more EW-capable drones or if the Syrian civil war stabilizes. Equipping scouts with counter-UAS de vices and weapons enables friendly forces to severely limit a key component of any potential adversary’s fight ing style. To leverage these resources effectively, the staff must analyze the enemy and predict the task and pur pose of their UAVs. As a result, the staff enables commanders to establish engagement criteria. Primary collec tors and troop-level leaders must train in identifying UAVs and employing counter-UAS systems. Again, success requires a feedback loop with each component of a reconnaissance organization working effectively. Effective employment of counter-UAS systems offers an important example of friendly forces exploiting the weak nesses of countries like Russia and Venezuela. If the United States even went to the extreme of using a Stinger missile (about $38,000)41 to destroy the common Russian Orlan-10 drone (about $87,000),42 U. S. forces gain a significant advantage. As the Asym metric Warfare Group stated in its analysis, Russia struggles to compete with the United States in the sustain ment warfighting function.43 This weakness results from the United States maintaining about 30 times Russia’s wealth, which translates into greater resources for defense activi ties.44 Venezuela depends heavily on Russian support due to its own economic turmoil. It is likely, therefore, that U. S. and allied forces can significantly impact the means and ambition an actor such as Venezuela has to fight by attacking its scarce resources. In an armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere, the lack of logistical sup port may constrain adversaries of the United States to the point that it yields a strategic benefit. To exploit weak nesses in sustainment, primary collec tors and troop-level leaders must learn to identify the equipment Russia and its allies use for sustainment. Members of the staff must learn to an alyze the types of forces that specific equipment sustains and assist the commander in valuating it properly. Ultimately, developing and dissemi nating engagement criteria that sup ports U. S. or allied strategic goals be comes paramount in this type of con flict. Reconnaissance organizations as a whole must only introduce a single limiting factor, such as food, water or ammunition, into an adversary’s oper ations to give the following maneuver force a significant advantage.

Greatest risk Among likely threats from a Russian ally like Venezuela in the Western Hemisphere is the ability of the Russian government to manipulate information. It presents the greatest risk to the mission. Russia claimed that hu manitarian needs necessitated their intervention in Georgia 45 and Ukraine,46 while claims of fighting ter rorism drove its intervention in Chech nya47 and Syria.48 Russia currently employs hundreds of military contractors in Venezuela, whose activities remain largely unknown.49 Cuba – another Russian ally – maintains an estimated force of 20,000 personnel in Venezuela.50 Also, the PSUV has driven Venezuela into a humanitarian crisis.51 Certainly, Russia could use humanitarian concerns or threats posed by pro-Western, anti-Maduro militias as a jus tification for more direct military intervention. Reconnaissance organizations make first contact with both the enemy and the civilian population. Scouts, there fore, must train to identify which Russian-supported actors are on the bat tlefield and where civilians require hu manitarian assistance. In an information campaign, U. S. forces and our al lies must consider ourselves guilty un til proven innocent. By distinguishing between actors on the battlefield and identifying areas requiring humanitarian assistance, the United States takes important first steps toward denying Russia the ability to use information to its advantage. Distinction between ac tors on the battlefield in conjunction with thorough training on escalation-of-force procedures and the rules of engagement leads to justifiable actions. Non-lethal capability, means of restraint (e.g. flexcuffs) and other forms of technology increase the op tions available to commanders to sup port U. S. goals in an information campaign. When encountering a Russian-backed actor, tactical success becomes meaningless without the ability to control information. Summary In summary, Russia has strong incen tives to train and equip the Venezuelan military and defend Maduro’s re gime. Recent history suggests that a Russian-supported Venezuelan force will use IEDs/boobytraps, snipers, UAVs (possibly with EW capabilities) and Russian contractors on the battle field. Outside of the battlefield, the Russian government will most likely use its political capabilities to create confusion while conducting an infor mation campaign and cyberattacks on behalf of the Venezuelans. To counter these threats and exploit the weaknesses of a Russian-support ed Venezuela, the United States must properly equip reconnaissance forces and train them to aggressively collect information. Scouts, staff and commanders must rehearse specific collec tion and analysis tasks that enable us to destroy IED/boobytraps and sniper networks. Similarly, we must rehearse collection and analysis to engage enemy UAVs and sustainment assets ac cording to our strategic goals. Finally, we must train with the mindset of proving our innocence to an onlooking world to deny the Russians any advantage in an information campaign. 1LT Anthony Analla is the squadron S-4, 3rd Squadron, 61stCavalry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Car son, CO. His previous assignments include executive officer, Headquarters Troop, 3-61 Cav, Fort Carson; and ex ecutive officer of the scout troop and scout-platoon leader, 3-61 Cav, Fort Carson. His military schools include the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course, Army Reconnaissance Course and Air-Assault School, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. 1LT Analla has a bach elor’s of science degree in law and le gal studies from the U. S. Military Academy. Notes 1 “The Current Situation in Venezuela,” Organization of American States, May 28, 2002, http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/cpdoc3616_02. htm. 2 Joshua Chang, “Arms Sales, Mercenaries and Strategic Bombers: Moscow’s Military Footprint in Venezuela,” George town Security Studies Review, Nov. 24, 2019, https://georgetownsecuritystudies review.org/2019/11/26/arms-sales-mercenaries-and-strategic-bombers-mos cows-military-footprint-in-venezuela/. 3 Ibid. 4 Ryan C. Berg, “Russia Is Gearing Up for a Conflict with the United States in the Caribbean,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 9, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/09/ russias-putin-venezuela-evade-oil-sanc tions-preparing-conflict-united-states/. 5 Darya Korsunskaya, “UPDATE 3 - Putin, Maduro Discussed Venezuela’s Debt to Russia Last Week,” Reuters, Oct. 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-venezuela-debt-kremlin/update-3-putin-maduro-discussed-venezuelas-debt-to-russia-last-week-idUSL5N26M4LA. 6 Patrick Wintour and Ian Traynor, “Russian and British Troops in Tense Pristina Stand-Off,” The Guardian, June 12, 1999, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/1999/jun/13/balkans5. 7 Damien McGuinness, “How a Cyber At tack Transformed Estonia,” BBC News, April 27, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/ news/39655415. 8 Ibid. 9 Kertu Ruus, “Cyber War I: Estonia At tacked from Russia,” European Affairs 9, No. 1-2 (2008), https://www.europeanin stitute.org/index.php/component/con tent/article?id=67:cyber-war-i-estonia-at tacked-from-russia. 10 Ibid. 11 Official Website of the Russian presi dent, Aug. 26, 2008, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/transcripts/1222. 12 Ariel Cohen and Robert E Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgian War: Lessons and Implications, Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/full text/u2/a545578.pdf. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Peter Apps, “Russia Raises Military Clout with Reforms after Georgian War,” Reuters, Feb. 27, 2014, https://www.re uters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-re forms-after-georgian-war-idUS

BREA1Q1YR20140227.

Uri Friedman, “Russia’s Slow-Motion Invasion of Ukraine,” The Atlantic, Aug. 29, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2014/08/russias-stealthy-slow-motion-invasion-of-ukraine/379312/. 18 Ibid. 19 Ellen Ioanes, “These Are the Countries Where Russia’s Shadowy Wagner Group Mercenaries Operate,” Business Insider, Nov. 19, 2019, https://www.businessin sider.com/russia-wagner-group-mercenaries-where-operate-2018-4. 20 Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine Says May Block

Russian Aid Convoy,” Reuters, Aug. 12, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-ukraine-crisis-russia-aid/ukraine-says-may-block-russian-aid-convoy-idUSK

BN0GC08Q20140812.

Karoun Demirjian, “Putin Denies Russian Troops Are in Ukraine, Decrees Certain Deaths Secret,” Washington Post, May 28, 2015, https://www.washington post.com/world/putin-denies-russian-troops-are-in-ukraine-decrees-certain-deaths-secret/2015/05/28/9bb15092- 0543-11e5-93f4-f24d4af7f97d_story. html. 22 Christopher Scott et al., Russian New-Generation Warfare Handbook, Asym metric Warfare Group, December 2016, https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf. 23 Yuri Lapaiev, “Russian Electronic War fare in Donbas: Training or Preparation for a Wider Attack?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, No. 34, March 17, 2020, https:// jamestown.org/program/russian-electronic-warfare-in-donbas-training-or-preparation-for-a-wider-attack/. 24 Keith Crane, Olga Oliker and Brian Nichiporuk, “How Capable Are Russia’s Armed Forces?” RAND Corporation, Oct. 29, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_reports/RR2573.html. 25 Scott et al. 26 Kinda Makieh, “Syria’s Assad Wrote to Putin over Military Support: Statement,” Reuters, Sept. 30, 2015, https://www.re uters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-putin/syrias-assad-wrote-to-putin-over-military-support-statement-idUSKC

N0RU17Y20150930.

Tom Balmforth and Maria Kiselyova, “Russian Forces Just Occupied a Former US Air Base in Syria,” Business Insider, Nov. 15, 2019, https://www.businessin sider.com/russia-lands-forces-at-former-us-air-base-in-northern-syria-2019-11. 28 Anton Lavrov, “The Efficiency of the Syrian Armed Forces: An Analysis of Russian Assistance,” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 26, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/03/26/efficiency-of-syrian-armed-forces-analysis-of-russian-assistance-pub-81150. 29 Keir Giles, “Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2017, https://carnegieendowment. org/2017/05/03/assessing-russia-s-reorganized-and-rearmed-military-pub-69853. 30 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U. S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” The New York Times, May 24, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/ middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html. 31 Lavrov. 32 “Russia to Boost Venezuela Ties Amid US Pressure,” BBC News, Feb. 8, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51423110. 33 Chang. 34 Berg. 35 Christopher Woody, “The US and Russia, and Their Fighter Jets, Are Looming over Venezuela’s Latest Dispute,” Business Insider, Oct. 23, 2019, https://www. businessinsider.com/russia-us-geopoliti cal-tensions-loom-over-venezuela-colombia-conflict-2019-10. 36 Scott et al. 37 Ibid. 38 “IED and Sniper Defeat: The Battle Staff Operations Process in a [Counterinsur gency] Environment,” 2007, https://info. publicintelligence.net/USArmy-Battle Staff.pdf. 39 Ibid. Author’s note: This is my personal synthesis of the information that the Combined Arms Center presents. They describe the feedback loop with a focus on staff operations. My focus is on the process as a feedback loop, with each segment of the reconnaissance organization playing an equally vital role. 40 U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Sniper Defeat Handbook, 2008. This re source is restricted to Defense Department Common Access Card holders. See Chapter 5 for details on the placement of detection devices. 41 Franz-Stefan Gady, “India to Buy 245 US Stinger Air-to-Air Missiles,” The Diplo mat, April 1, 2016, https://thediplomat. com/2016/04/india-to-buy-245-us-sting er-air-to-air-missiles/. 42 U. S. Army TRADOC, “OE Data Integration Network,” accessed June 18, 2020, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/ Orlan-10_Russian_Unmanned_Aerial_Ve hicle. 43 Scott et al. 44 Jeff Desjardins, “All of the World’s Wealth in One Visualization,” Visual Capitalist, Jan. 17, 2020, https://www.visual capitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-wealth-in-one-visualization/. 45 “Meeting with Creators of the Film Au gust 2008 and Veterans of the Military Operation in South Ossetia,” Feb. 23, 2012, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/14582. 46 “Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists’ Questions on the Situation in Ukraine,” March 4, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/20366. 47 Official site of the Russian president, interview for National Public Radio, Nov. 16, 2001, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/transcripts/21402. This is a NPR interview of Russian President Vladimir Putin. 48 “Meeting with President of Syria Bashar Assad,” president of Russia, Oct. 20, 2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/50533. 49 Richard Sisk, “Hundreds of Russian Mercenaries Now in Venezuela, U. S. Admiral Says,” Military.com, Oct. 4, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/10/04/hundreds-russian-mercenaries-now-venezuela-us-admiral-says.html. 50 Adam Taylor, “How Many Cuban Troops Are There in Venezuela? The U. S. Says over 20,000. Cuba Says Zero,” Washing ton Post, May 2, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/2019/05/02/ how-many-cuban-troops-are-there-venezuela-us-says-over-cuba-says-zero/. 51 Lucia Kassai, “End of Venezuela’s Oil Fortune Looms over Maduro’s Regime,” Bloomberg Quint, June 20, 2020, https:// www.bloombergquint.com/business/ end-of-venezuela-s-oil-fortune-looms-over-maduro-s-regime. Acronym Quick-Scan EW – electronic warfare IED – improvised explosive device NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization PSUV – United Socialist Party of Venezuela UAS – unmanned aerial system UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle