Implementation of Quadcopter Unmanned Aerial Systems into Reconnaissance Platoon SGT Christopher Broman

Fall 2019 Implementation of Quadcopter Unmanned Aerial Systems into Reconnaissance Platoons by SGT Christopher Broman During the past 18-plus years of con flict in the global war on terrorism, the U.S. military has witnessed the effec tiveness of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) in a variety of mission sets. In the beginning, these systems were large and expensive, which initially al located them to the role of theater-lev el or battlespace assets. As the years have progressed, miniaturization has allowed these assets to filter down to the squadron and troop levels with sys tems such as the RQ-11 Raven.1 As mass production increases and their uses expand, these systems are be coming both smaller and relatively in expensive to produce.2 As a result, be tween 2004 and 2008, the number of UAS deployed globally increased from around 1,000 to 5,000 systems.3 This widespread availability has been demonstrated best not by near-peer threats but by non-state actors such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). During the battle for Mosul, ISIS flew more than 300 missions in one month, using off-the-shelf drones that cost as little as $650, mainly quadcopters.4 Of those missions, about 1/3 were armed strikes, with the remaining missions being intelligence, surveillance and re connaissance (ISR).5 This demonstrated both the ready availability of these as sets and their effectiveness, especially in urban settings. Despite this, most U.S. troop-sized elements still have only one UAS asset readily available: the RQ-11 Raven system. Instead, each cavalry troop should be operating two quadcopter drone systems per platoon in addition to having the Raven. Why platoon level? The use of UAS at platoon level is not an unknown concept in reconnaissance operations. Both Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Air craft System Operations, and Field Manual (FM) 3-20.98 have chapters on platoon elements using UAS to conduct operations. The manuals describe how UAS can be assigned to reconnaissance platoons to conduct detailed recon of danger areas, assist with route recons or be used for contact-by-fire.6 Con cerning UAS elements being controlled by the scout platoon, the manual states, “[T]his relationship allows the platoon the most flexibility. The pla toon leader can integrate the capabili ties of the UAS into the reconnaissance plan in a seamless manner. He [or she] can then respond quickly to mission/ target changes.”7 Unfortunately in many cavalry troops, the use of UAS, specifically the Raven, isn’t seen as a primary sensor system critical to conducting key reconnais sance tasks. This treatment of UAS el ements as an ancillary system means that integration of their employment into troop operations is not only inef fectual but often non-existent.8 Units often don’t conduct battle drills with their Ravens, meaning that the crews don’t get practice putting their drones into operation quickly during regular operations.9 For most crews, the only time they bring their Ravens out of the box is either for an inventory or for their 150-day flight for recertifica tion.10 More problems such as trying to clear restricted operating zones and com manders worrying about losing sys tems that were designed to be “thrown away” if lost often means that systems simply sit on supply-room shelves.11 This lack of use means platoons don’t get to practice integrating the troop UAS into their reconnaissance plans. There are also challenges for the units that do use their UAS systems. With only one Raven team per troop-sized unit, the asset is often prioritized for use against named areas of interest or even farther forward of the platoons to look for possible threats. While it is extremely important to get this type of intelligence, it often means that unless a platoon is part of the main effort, it cannot use UAS assets in support of its mission. Even with the Raven team un der operational control (OPCON) of a platoon, the platoon’s leader runs into the same problem of prioritization if operating in two- or three-truck sec tions. For example, if all three platoons are running two sections, the troop com mander has to divide the use of one UAS element among (potentially) six maneuver elements. This doesn’t even include the possibility of dismounted teams. To change this lack of UAS inte gration, each platoon needs to have two UAS systems organic to its modi fied table of organization and equip ment (MTOE). By having two systems available, the platoon leader can either have each section use one to aid in its reconnaissance tasks, or use one for close-in ISR support while the second moves in advance of the platoon. In ei ther case, the platoon can use the drones in conjunction with other as sets, such as the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), to create redundancy in its operations.12 For example, picture a scenario where the scout platoon is tasked with route reconnaissance and has two UASs as part of its organic composition. The platoon leader designates Drone A to operate one to two kilometers forward of the maneuvering sections, while Drone B operates directly in front of and to the sides to help clear dead space and laterals. Drone A detects a manmade obstacle and begins over watch. The platoon leader can maneu ver either a truck with an LRAS3 or dis mounts with Lightweight Laser Desig nator Rangefinders onto the site. Now, he or she can detach Drone A to con tinue searching forward of the platoon or have it stay on station for redundan cy of sensors, while Drone B is free to conduct other tasks. If the platoon leader is instructed to

Fall 2019 bypass and hand over overwatch to a follow-on element, he or she can have a drone maintain recon while the mounted and/or dismounted elements collapse from their positions. Once done, the elements can move out with one drone still scanning forward as the platoon moves and the other drone watching the area until the handover is complete. Then it can be retasked. The preceding scenario illustrates why independent operation of two UAS drones at platoon level is beneficial. By having these as readily available as sets, platoons can involve them during planned training exercises or during “sergeant’s time” in the field. This will increase leadership’s understanding of their function, and it will give the op erators increased confidence in the equipment and their abilities. Yet, while the Raven is an important tool in the ISR arsenal, it is not the best UAS asset for the platoon. Instead, a UAS quadcopter design would be most beneficial. Why quadcopters? A quadcopter is a UAS drone that uses four motors to power two pairs of counter-rotating, fixed-pitch blades lo cated at its four corners.13 The motors do not require complex mechanical control linkages to operate because variations in motor speed allow it to maneuver. This simplifies aircraft de sign and operation.14 Research has shown that the “most versatile and mechanically easy to construct auton omous aerial vehicle is a quadrotor he licopter.”15 This ease of construction and use is why they have been become highly popular in commercial markets. A simple search on a retail store’s Web site showed more than 30 different types of quadcopters available with prices ranging from $30 to $3,000.16 The most obvious advantage of the quadcopter design is its increased agil ity over conventional planes. Quadcop ters are so agile that the Drone Racing League flies quadcopters over the seats and through the concourses of the Miami Dolphins stadium at speeds approaching 80 mph.17 This agility means that a quadcopter UAS could fly in environments where a Raven could not, such as within heavily forested ar eas or vertically dense cities. Where a Raven can only fly over the woods to look for enemy locations, hoping to see them through the foliage, a quadcop ter can fly under the canopy to find hostile positions. They can also be flown inside buildings and compounds to help quickly see if there are poten tial booby traps or ambush sites before execution of a breach. The quadcopter’s ability to hover just feet off the ground while providing re al-time imagery day or night would be invaluable to reconnaissance platoons. During route reconnaissance in Af ghanistan, scout-platoon dismounts have to clear culverts for the presence of improvised explosive devices before trucks can move forward. While LRAS3s or Ravens can search the area, they can’t look low enough to actually see inside the culverts. Therefore dis mounts must still try to safely get eyes on. However, a quadcopter that can hover just outside the culvert’s open ing can get the same intelligence with out having to involve a dismount. This keeps Soldiers safe. This same capabil ity can be used to inspect other struc tures such as bridges, too. This kind of use of quadcopters is al ready employed in the civilian sector.18 The hover and low-level flight ability of these drones also means operators can train themselves and others on basic Figure 1. SPC Michael Kobart (left) and SGT David Vidrine, both with Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), inspect the Gen4 InstantEye during training in Baghdad, Iraq. The InstantEye gives Soldiers the ability to see what is around them without endangering personnel. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Cheryl Cox)

Fall 2019 operations inside large open spaces such as drill floors. Advantages over Raven A quadcopter has many advantages over the Raven because of its vertical take-off and landing capabilities, espe cially when it comes to launch and re covery. The difficulty of launching the Raven in zero wind conditions is in creased and requires the crew to throw the system from atop a vehicle or building.19 The system also requires a clear area to launch safely. Landing must also be made in a clear area, and the system “lands” by stalling about 10 feet off the ground before falling and breaking apart (designed to come apart with easy reassembly). Instead, a quadcopter can take off eas ily in calm or windy conditions, and it can pierce the densest forest canopy as long as there is a small hole. A quad copter drone can not only take off from the operator’s hand, but it can land by hovering just a few feet away, allowing the operator to grab it safely from the air. This means that a Bradley crew could launch and recover its UAS just by cracking the top hatch enough to set the quadcopter outside the Brad ley. Regarding the ISR mission, quadcop ters have an advantage as well. Both traditional and quadcopter systems have day and night camera operations, but systems like the Raven must con tinuously circle the target. A quadcop ter can instead hover just behind cover and rotate in place to change its view. Many systems come naturally equipped or can have payloads of gimbaled cam eras attached to the drone to increase its surveillance ability. The InstantEye family of quadcopters not only can have gimbaled cameras attached, but they can also mount white or infrared floodlights to illuminate targets. They can also mount a 10x zoom video cam era.20 This ability to attach mission-specific payloads and the increased agility of these platforms are a few of the rea sons why the Navy and Marine Corps Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Sys tems Office (PMA-263) ordered 800 In stantEye systems in February 2018.21 The purpose of the 800 systems is to include them organically into infantry squads to enable ready-to-use UAS ca pabilities at squad level.22 The system ordered is the Mk-2 GEN3-A0, which is considered “expendable” since it does not store digital data onboard.23 It re quires only a single operator; can go from stowed to operational in 30 sec onds; has a two-kilometer range; and weighs only 1.2 pounds.24 This same system was also tested by the troopers of 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, overseas during their deployment for Operation Inherent Resolve.25 While there are significant benefits to the quadcopter design, there are dis advantages. The Raven battery gives it a flight time between 60 to 90 minutes on a single charge.26 Currently systems like the InstantEye Mk-2 GEN3-A0 only have enough battery capacity for about 30 minutes.27 While industry leaders are currently looking at hybrid power or fuel cells to solve this issue, it may be awhile before they match compara ble flight times to traditional UAS like the Raven.28 Probably a more significant issue is that of electronic warfare and/or cyber threats. In 2009, newspapers across the country had headlines describing insurgents grabbing Predator drone feeds, using $26 software to access un secured communications links.29 Later in 2011, the drone fleet was affected by a virus found on classified and un classified computers at Creech Air Force Base, NV.30 An increased aware ness of these threats led to Depart ment of the Army to order Soldiers to cease all use of the Dajiang Innovation family of quadcopter drones in May 2017, citing “increased awareness of cyber vulnerabilities” as the reason.31 Many drones immediately return to a designated point if they lose their con trol signal.32 This means that enemy ac tors could use specialized jammers to create an operational area where our drones cannot operate, not dissimilar to the U.S. military’s use of phone jam mers overseas. This kind of ability is al ready being seen in operational the aters. On April 10, 2018, the New York Post reported that Russia was jamming the Global Positioning System (GPS) components of U.S. drones in Syria.33 Another similar problem is that drone operations rely heavily on GPS data to know where the ground-control station, the enemy and the UAS are lo cated. Enemy actors could “spoof” the GPS information being received, result ing in the system going to either false-target locations or areas where the en emy could capture the asset.34 A pos sible answer would be the use of the already available simple-key loader de vices to encrypt drone GPS systems.35 Regardless, as technology advances, both the Department of Defense and manufacturers will need to ensure that their drones can face these threats to operate on future battlefields. How to implement The Army should designate a mix of Ac tive Component and National Guard squadrons as testing units. These should be a mix of light (such as air borne), medium (Stryker and infantry brigade combat teams) and heavy (ar mored-cavalry regiments and armored brigade combat teams) squadrons to encompass all aspects of cavalry oper ations. These units should have two or three trained Soldiers per platoon who receive necessary training in flight and systems management, overseen by a squadron master trainer. The master trainer would be responsi ble for both the quadcopters and as sets like the Raven. Each platoon would receive two quadcopter UAS systems and start receiving training from the troop trainers. For the MTOE, the drones should be assigned to the sec tion leaders’ crews. This would ensure that in either the two- or three-truck section, the UAS would be in the ma neuver elements to maximize recon naissance assets forward.36 The troop could then plan force-on-force reconnaissance missions, using both platoons to maintain its UAS pro ficiency and to start learning how to avoid UAS. With the rise of enemies such as ISIS now using UAS against us, it is imperative that reconnaissance platoons understand how best to coun ter these operational threats. The troop should also integrate drone reconnaissance into these missions, using the Raven system to support one of the platoons with its task, or to act as a third party and try to find any op posing-force (OPFOR) maneuvering el ements within its designated recon naissance area. This would give troop

Fall 2019 and platoon commanders the experi ence of using the troop’s Raven asset to aid in reconnaissance plans. Profi ciency should reach a level where the troop can plan a reconnaissance mis sion with the UAS available, which is habitually integrated in the plan to en sure redundancy and continuous re connaissance. While this process is occurring, squad rons would be taking lessons-learned from across the various line units to create a unit standard operating pro cedure (SOP) for employment of the Raven and quadcopters UAS. The squadron should also start practicing integration of the brigade’s organic UAS asset: the RQ-7 Shadow aerial-re connaissance platoon.37 The increase of UAS assets in the area of operations will require deconflicting airspace with conventional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. This will be a key task for the squadron tactical-opera tions center. The Marines experienced this issue during the Sea Dragon 2025 Integrated Training Exercise. Solutions they found were the use of brevity codes to auto matically bring UAS down to either a restricted altitude and/or grounding flights if low-level close-air-support was needed, and developing a five-line radio call (to provide pertinent infor mation for air assets) to submit to higher to get company-level UAS to fly higher than 1,000 feet above ground level.38 The culminating event for the squad ron would be to go to a training center to conduct a force-on-force operation with UAS integration from squadron to platoon level. This could either be done as part of a brigade rotation or as a stand-alone event. During this event, a Shadow aerial-reconnaissance pla toon should be OPCON to the squad ron. Once all the squadrons finish their rotations, an evaluation of lessons-learned from both the squadrons and the OPFOR should be conducted. The Army could then take this information and create a cavalry-squadron UAS SOP and best practices for all cavalry units to use going forward. The final key to the implementation process is getting leadership the re sources to best access the incoming UAS feeds. Currently, most troop and platoon leaders do not have the capa bility to watch drone feeds from any UAS asset inside their vehicles while moving. A possible solution could be the installation of viewing systems such as the One-System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) into vehicles. This laptop-like system has an adaptor kit, so it can operate from almost every Army vehicle.39 In 2015, a Stryker brigade used the OS RVT system, installing it from brigade to company level during a rotation at the National Training Center, Fort Ir win, CA.40 If these systems are able to view feeds from quadcopter UAS, then installing them into the vehicles of the section leader, platoon sergeant and platoon leader would enable the lead ers to view footage from UAS systems organic at all levels of a brigade. These systems should also be installed in the vehicles of the troop commander, first sergeant, executive officer and the TOC to enable the same capability. Even if the platoons do not get their own UAS, the troop and platoon leadership should still be equipped with drone-viewing systems to better integrate the UAS assets they already have. Other alternatives could include using radio systems such as the Harris Corp’s RF-335, which is designed to support full-motion video from nearby drones, a capability that could even be used by dismount-team leaders away from ve hicle-based systems.41 Conclusion While the “standard-issue cavalry scout” will always be the Army’s pri mary reconnaissance sensor, that scout will need other systems to help in crease effectiveness, namely drones. The use of drones on the battlefield will grow exponentially during the next 10 years as technology advances. As an indicator of this, U.S. Special Opera tions Command requested more than $74 million for the 2019 fiscal year (FY) to procure a variety of UAS, including $10 million for 527 nano-sized vertical take-off and landing UASs.42 The Army’s “cargo-pocket” ISR pro gram is already looking at deploying pocket-sized aerial-surveillance devic es to the squad level.43 In the future, these will be essential to small-team operations such as a dismounted lis tening posts/observation posts, but at the platoon level, it will still be essen tial to have an organic UAS asset that can provide real-time intelligence on the move. As stated in the Reconnais sance and Scout Platoon manual, “UASs provide additional information needed by the platoon leader to deter mine which routes and cross-country terrain best accommodate reconnais sance operations.”44 While there are currently multiple UAS already available, none of these can match the agility and employability of the quadcopter UAS. They are more ag ile, simple to deploy and can operate even in dense vegetation and compli cated urban terrain. Quadcopters also have the capability to land on terrain or buildings, and they can be used as a remote video sensor, something no Ra ven could even attempt. Simply put, the addition of quadcopter UAS into the platoons would only increase their ISR capabilities and overall lethality. SGT Christopher Broman is an opera tions assistant, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 113th Cavalry Regiment, Iowa National Guard, Camp Dodge, IA. His previous assignments include operations non commissioned officer for Troop B, 1-113th Cav; team leader within Head quarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-113th Cav; and tube-launched, opti cally tracked, wire-guided missile gun ner in Troop A, 1-113th Cav. SGT Bro man graduated military-occupation specialty 19D one-station unit training at Fort Knox, KY. His awards and deco rations include the Army Achievement Medal, 2nd oak-leaf cluster; and the Iraq, Afghanistan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign medals. SGT Broman has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Iowa State Uni versity. Notes 1 FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009. 2 CPT Christopher M. Brandt, “The Future of Unmanned Systems in Cavalry Squad rons,” ARMOR, April-June 2015 edition. 3 Alan Kim, Brandon Wampler, James Gop pert and Inseok Hwang, “Cyber Attack Vulnerabilities Analysis for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2012.

Fall 2019 4 Mark Pomerieau, “How $650 drones are creating problems in Iraq and Syria,” C4IS RNET, Jan. 5, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet. com/unmanned/uas/2018/01/05/how- 650-drones-are-creating-problems-in-iraq-and-syria/. 5 Ibid. 6 FM 3-20.98. 7 Ibid. 8 CPT John Albert, “A Practical Guide for Excellence in Company Unmanned Air craft System Operations,” ARMOR, July-September 2016. 9 Ibid. 10 SGT Joshua Laidacker, “Vanguards re certify with Raven UAS,” Army News Ser vice, accessed May 29, 2018, https:// www.army.mil/article/122541/van guards_recertify_with_raven_uas. 11 David Hickman, “UAS Implementation at the Platoon Level,” sUAS News, Nov. 7, 2011, https://www.suasnews. com/2011/11/uas-implementation-at-the-platoon-level/. 12 FM 3-20.98. 13 D.C. Patel, G.S. Gabhawala, A.K. Kapa dia, N.H. Desai and S.M. Sheth, “Design of Quadcopter in Reconnaissance,” paper presented for International Conference on Innovations in Automation and Me chatronics Engineering 2013, Feb. 21-23, 2013, https://www.researchgate.net/pub lication/271835155_Design_of_Quadcop ter_in_Reconnaissance. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Walmart, drones with cameras and vid eo cameras search, accessed June 2, 2018, https://www.walmart.com/ search/?cat_id=3944_133277_1231385& grid=true&query=drones+with+camera+a nds+video+camera&typeahead=drones#s earchProductResult. 17 “Drone Racing at the Miami Dolphins Stadium,” Wired (UK), May 20, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ixFayeB1NIY. 18 Patel et al. 19 FM 3-20.98. 20 InstantEye Robotics, “InstantEye Mk-2 Payloads,” accessed June 2, 2018, https:// instanteyerobotics.com/products/pay loads/. 21 Kimberly Kohlheep, “United States Ma rine Corps Orders 800 InstantEye Sys tems,” InstantEye Robotics, Feb. 6, 2018, https://instanteyerobotics.com/uncatego rized/united-states-marine-corps-orders- 800-instanteye-systems/. 22 Connie Lee, “Marine Corps Begins De livering Quadcopters to Squads,” National Defense Magazine, Feb. 6, 2018, http:// www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/arti cles/2018/2/6/marines-corps-begins-de livering-quadcopters-to-squads. 23 InstantEye Robotics, “InstantEye Mk-2 GEN3-A0 sUAS Spec Sheet,” accessed June 2, 2018, https://instanteyerobotics. com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/In stantEye-Mk-2-GEN3-A0-v2.3-11-20-17. pdf. 24 Ibid. 25 SGT Cheryl Cox, “InstantEye brings se curity, situational awareness to 10th Mountain Soldiers,” Army News Service, March 3, 2016, https://www.army.mil/ar ticle/163463/instanteye_brings_security_ situational_awareness_to_10th_moun tain_soldiers. 26 FM 3-20.98. 27 InstantEye Mk-2 GEN3-A0 sUAS spec sheet. 28 Brandt. 29 Siobhan Gorman, Yochi Dreazan and August Cole, “Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB126102247889095011. 30 Noah Shachtman, “Exclusive: Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet,” Wired, Oct. 7, 2011, https://www.wired. com/2011/10/virus-hits-drone-fleet/. 31 LTG Joseph Anderson, “Discontinue Use of Daijang Innovation (DJI) Corporation Unmanned Aircraft Systems [Memoran dum for Record],” retrieved from https:// d3ciwvs59ifrt8.cloudfront.net/17ccfa30- 82ea-4870-b441-3e19d1395c29/ c075d4f1-ffde-4a76-b415-c5d611debe47. pdf. 32 Brandt. 33 Yaron Steinbuch, “Russia reportedly jamming US drones in Syria,” New York Post, April 10, 2018, https://nypost. com/2018/04/10/russia-reportedly-jam ming-us-drones-in-syria/. 34 Kim, et al. 35 Natick Contracting Division, Army Con tracting Command, “Short Range Micro (SRM) Unmanned Air Vehicle Salient Char acteristics: Short-Range SUAS System Re quirements,” accessed June 4, 2018, http://www3.natick.army.mil/docs/SUAS/ Attachment6_Short_Salient.pdf. 36 Headquarters Department of the Army, FMI 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations, 2006. 37 Ibid. Acronym Quick-Scan 38 Noncommissioned officers and officers, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, “Sea Dragon 2025: Small Unit Leaders’ Thoughts,” Ma rine Corps Gazette, Vol. 101, Issue 4, https://www.mca-marines.org/ga zette/2017/03/sea-dragon-2025-small-unit-leaders-thoughts. 39 Kris Osborn, “Soldiers See Real-Time Drone Feeds From Handheld Devices,” Warrior Maven, March 4, 2018, https:// defensemaven.io/warriormaven/land/sol diers-see-real-time-drone-feeds-from-new-handheld-devices-o- JrqY1MikmR_5v5D_AcvA/. 40 Defense Department, FY15 Army pro grams, OSRVT Increment II, 2015. 41 Osborn. 42 Vivienne Machi, “SOCOM Setting Re cords for Unmanned Systems Procure ment,” National Defense Magazine, May 14, 2018, http://www.nationaldefen semagazine.org/articles/2018/5/14/so com-setting-records-for-unmanned-sys tems-procurement. 43 Jeffrey Sisto, “Army researchers develop Cargo Pocket ISR,” Army News Service, July 21, 2014, https://www.army.mil/arti cle/130189/army_researchers_develop_ cargo_pocket_isr. 44 FM 3-20.98. FM – field manual FMI – field manual interim FY – fiscal year GPS – Global Positioning System ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance LRAS3 – Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment OPCON – operational control OPFOR – opposing force OSRVT – One-System Remote Video Terminal SOP – standard operating procedure UAS – unmanned aerial system