Overcoming Semantics: How to Deconflict the Fundamentals of Reconnaissance to Win at Platoon Level

Overcoming Semantics: How to Deconflict Reconnaissance Fundamentals at Platoon Level by CPT Patrick M. Zang Leaders on both sides during the American Civil War relied on their cavalry scouts to get accurate information so they could get to the battlefield first with the most Soldiers and firepower. Providing crucial information to their parent unit remains the overarching mission of modern-day scout platoons just as it was for their Civil War prede cessors. To ensure mission success and provide a relative advantage to the maneuver commander it supports, today’s scout platoon must understand the nuances and seeming struggle between the re connaissance fundamentals of “retain freedom of maneuver” and “gain and maintain enemy contact.” On the sur face, these two fundamentals appear mutually exclusive. For example, to col lect indicators to answer the com mander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to support timely decisionmaking, scouts must report all information about the disposition and com position of threat forces rapidly and accurately. The challenge is that scouts must do this while ensuring they don’t become decisively engaged because their primary mission to provide recon naissance would likely stop. A decisive engagement is when a unit is considered fully committed and can not maneuver or extricate in the absence of outside assistance. The action must be fought to a conclusion and ei ther won or lost with the forces at hand. Therefore, the scout platoon, no mat ter what its attachments, must ensure “reconnaissance does not stop” be cause it has become “decisively engaged.” According to Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations,1 retaining freedom of maneuver means that “tactical mobil ity and maneuver fundamentally drive the success of reconnaissance tasks. Platoon leaders consider task-organization, their commander’s reconnais sance guidance, movement techniques and scheme of maneuver to retain the unit’s ability to maneuver.” Reconnaissance tasks are important because they confirm or deny assumptions about the terrain and enemy that were made during mission analysis and intelligence preparation of the battle field (IPB) to identify opportunities and maintain agile freedom of maneuver for the brigade. Another way for a scout platoon to retain its freedom of maneuver is through effective counter-reconnaissance operations, which deny enemy collection efforts. This also helps iden tify opportunities for the command to seize, retain and exploit initiative. Therefore, commanders change move ment techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the small est element possible to avoid becom ing decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by avoid ing decisive engagement with a supe rior force and develop the situation further – consistently balancing the requirement to maintain contact while retaining freedom of maneuver. Conversely, to gain and maintain con tact means “cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy on terms and conditions of their choosing. Using at least one of the eight forms of contact, commanders and staffs plan for and integrate:

• Aerial and ground sensors;

• Manned platforms;

• Unmanned systems;

• Dismounted operations;

• Signals intelligence;

• Human intelligence; and

• Visual observation.” These forms of contact allow scouts to gain contact with the enemy using the smallest element possible. Once units make contact, cavalry forces maintain contact until specific orders are given, a change of mission occurs, when dis engagement or displacement criteria dictate or when the unit conducts are connaissance handover with another unit. According to FM 3-98,2 “Maintain ing contact with the enemy provides real-time information of the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make recommendations to the commander based on current intelligence.” While on the surface, the doctrinal definitions of the two fundamentals in question leave little room for interpretation, the difficulty lies in transform ing the science in it to art. The issue lies in the manner cavalry operations are understood at present. Commanders routinely seek to unburden their staffs by mandating a directed course of action (CoA), thereby almost inherently removing the technique of reconnaissance pull from the lexicon. Also, risk-averse commanders tend to prohibit cavalry formations from deploy ing on Warning Order 2, especially when they couple their nature with an inability to execute the military decision-making process to standard and in accordance with the one-third/two-thirds rule (allow yourself up to onethird of available time to complete re quired actions and allow those you lead the remaining two-thirds). This translates to having only one period of darkness, as opposed to two periods, to maneuver into position and answer the assigned questions. This “rush to failure” forces cavalry formations to “lead with their chin” and to unwittingly transform a zone reconnaissance into a movement-to-contact. The answer to the problem is glaringly simplistic: emphasize the basics and add substance to oft-used buzzwords. With that in mind, there are six com ponents a scout leader must inherent ly understand and execute to deconflict the aforementioned fundamentals.

• First, execute IPB to standard and in accordance with Army Technical Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/ Battlespace.3 The scout-platoon leader and platoon sergeant can’t blindly accept the analysis of the squadron S-2 and troop commander. They, along with their subordinate noncommissioned officers, must analyze the terrain/enemy to seek positions of advantage and threat weaknesses. Also, IPB is a continuous process; it does not stop at the operations order (OPORD). Scout leaders must continue to refine understanding of the environment to generate options and make recommendations to their commanders.

• Second, the scout leader must understand where he/she fits in the higher concept of the operations. In effect, scout platoons all fall under the umbrella of the brigade’s information-collection (IC) plan. Scout platoons need to think of themselves not as belonging to distinct battalions with differing missions but as part of a unified collection front. The scout platoon must understand that its missions are not discrete.

• Third, the scout leader must possess a “master’s level” understanding of the doctrinal components of the commander’s reconnaissance and/or security guidance (CRG/CSG), and when that’s lacking, seek clarity from the commander. Also, the scout leader must ensure the CRG accounts for both mounted and dismounted elements as well as task-organization changes (two- vs. three-section concepts).

• Fourth, the correct implementation of reconnaissance-management techniques (cueing, mixing and redundancy) enable the scout leader to conduct limited economy-of-force missions and gain contact with the enemy while remaining below the detection threshold.

• Fifth, the scout leader must develop a primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plan for all planned contact. To properly develop the PACE plan, the scout leader must understand the capabilities and limitations of all assigned, organic equipment. Unfortunately, the past two decades of conflict have bred a generation of leaders who rely on echelons-above-brigade assets and indirect fires to solve all problems. However, in a near-peer or peer-threat fight, these assets will not be in the direct control of platoon-level leaders. As such, it is up to the platoon and troop leadership to set conditions for success in the absence of said enablers.

• Sixth, the platoon must ensure rehearsals and standard operating procedures (SOP) equate to more than slides in a dusty old tactical SOP (TACSOP). The unit TACSOP must be practiced during every training event and updated accordingly during after-action reviews. Following is an in-depth discussion on these six fundamentals.

It seems that all maneuver leaders recognize the intrinsic necessity of IPB and its connection to mission success. However, at the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course and Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, students are required to regurgitate facts from the higher OPORD with little to no analysis. This trend is more than confounding; it is abjectly criminal and stunts the intel lectual growth of junior officers – those charged with the tactical perfor mance of the Soldiers under their charge. The most glaring example of this is the light and weather-data portion of the OPORD. The officer reads numbers without knowing what they mean. This rapidly increases the speed at which their subordinates stop listening. The IPB manual is perhaps the most important document to the platoon leadership, as well as one of the easiest-to-follow manuals in existence. Each step of the process possesses its own distinct chapter in the manual, with examples, pictures, graphics, charts and “how-to” guides. According to ATP 2-01.3,4 each step contains “desired endstates” (for example, what the preparer is to exit each step with, and what is essential to possess prior to moving forward). The key deliverable for Step 1 of the IPB process is the “identification of general characteristics of the area of operations (AO) that could influence the unit’s mission.” Step 1 is often glossed over, resulting in nothing more than a junior leader outlining on a map the extent of the AO while providing no further analysis or considerations of what is significant. Step 2 of the IPB process, the “so what” portion according to Paragraph 4-3 of ATP 2-01.3,5 states, “[I]dentify how relevant characteristics of the area of interest will affect friendly and threat operations. … Success results in allowing the commander to quickly choose and exploit terrain, weather and civil considerations to best support the mission.” The consequences of fail ure can result in the commander not having the information needed to exploit the opportunities the operational environment provides. This process is outlined in Figure 1. The scout leader must possess an innate sense of the effects of terrain and weather on not only his/her mission, but their effects on the adversary’spending operations, too. As mentioned earlier, the point of IPB is to present relevant and life-saving data to one’s subordinates, not fill up lines on an OPORD shell. By developing a graphic-terrain-analysis overlay (GTAO); taking into consideration the entirety of the military aspects of terrain (obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment, or OAKOC); and the military aspects of weather (wind, visibility, temperature, cloud cover and precipitation), the scout leader pres ents a “fighting product” to the platoon, enabling a disciplined approach to provide an opportunity to maneuver out of contact to a position of relative advantage. (Figure 2.6) Also, the GTAO should inform and de fine the placement of operational graphics. Unfortunately, light and weather anal ysis rarely moves beyond a regurgita tion of numbers that one can easily ac quire individually from open-source means. Troopers generally do not care about this and fall asleep when the platoon leader briefs the respective times associated with the sun and moon cycles. What is essential, and demonstrates the analysis needed to succeed in battle is, among other things, the direction of the wind so the platoon knows the direction sound and smell will travel. It also helps them determine the impact on battery life of both platoon and Soldier-borne un manned aerial systems (UAS); the time the thermal crossover occurs so Soldiers can compensate for this phenomenon in allocating equipment during observation plans; and the times when it will be dark to build a graphic-control measure into the plan that allows the platoon to execute a tactical pause and prepare accordingly for limited-visibility operations. The light and weather-data portion of mission analysis and the OPORD must move beyond a regurgitation of the six-o’clock-news weather report; it must communicate only what is mission-essential to the platoon. This process will enable scouts to better use their sur roundings to maintain freedom of ma neuver and not risk compromise. The third step of IPB is the initial analysis of the opponent, known as the evaluate-the-threat/adversary step. The outputs from this step are:

• Creating the threat order of battle;

• Developing the situation template;

• Creating threat capabilities by warfighting function;

• Determining the high-value-target list;

• Updating intelligence/running estimates; and

• Determining requests for Information. Often leaders at platoon level accept the analysis of the squadron S-2 and their immediate commanders as sacro sanct. However, it is arguable that leaders at all levels must possess a shrewd intuition, capable of challenging their superiors’ assumptions, to de velop the best product possible. Battles can and will continue to be won prior to combatants squaring off against one another. Junior leaders must do their homework by seeking as much knowledge as possible, through open-source means if necessary, to truly understand how their opponent wants to fight. Only through this, a true and professional “red-hat” Figure 1. IPB process. (Adapted from Figure 4-1, ATP 2-01.3) exercise, can the leader apply the mil itary aspects of terrain and weather to determine a threat CoA (Step 4 of IPB). Most of the IPB process occurs at echelons above the scope of the platoon-level leader. However, leaders must not fail to evaluate the threat and prepare accordingly. Moreover, they should never merely “hand-wave” critical components of the OPORD. A thorough analysis of the terrain and enemy dictates the forthcoming scheme of maneuver. A depressing trend is developing among some junior leaders who devel op their “blue” plan without taking into account Paragraph 1 of the OPORD. This backward, cookie-cutter approach can cause devastating consequences in alive environment. This is not to say that Paragraph 1 of the OPORD is the “be all, end all”; however, the situation information provided in the first paragraph sets the stage for developing the rest of the OPORD. Providing adequate time and resources to its development enables the scout to gain contact with the enemy on his/her terms while retaining the sought-after freedom of maneuver required to accomplish the mission ac cording to the fundamentals. Scout’s role Merely reading off the task and purpose of adjacent units and higher echelons of command is an academic disservice. The scout, the “jack of all trades” – who is executing within mission command, supporting at a mini mum the brigade commander – must intrinsically understand how his/her organization fits into the larger picture. Devoid of this knowledge, the scout will miss fleeting opportunities and be unable to maintain freedom of maneu ver. The scout must understand how the brigade commander thinks and his/her endstate, information requirements and decision points. No disrespect to the Army’s squadron commanders, but the cavalry squadrons and battalion scout platoons do not serve subordi nate interests. Scout platoons exist to “answer the mail” for the brigade or division commander as part of the larger IC plan. Therefore, it is paramount for the scout to understand the opera tional environment through the brigade commander’s eyes. Scouts need to understand whether they are executing a reconnaissance push or a reconnaissance pull. This sin gle-factor alone aids in the develop ment of the friendly scheme of maneuver and the CRG. The scout must still understand who the adjacent units are so that, when necessary, support may be requested from local units rather than relying on support from the parent organization. An integrated support architecture (Class I, III, V, maintenance, medical and fires) enables the scout to maintain freedom of maneuver rather than have the scheme of support dictate the scheme of maneuver. To execute mission command as it’s doctrinally in tended to be, and as scouts claim they have done for generations, the condi tions that determine the endstate must first be known. Knowledge of the endstate and knowing where the scout fits into the larger picture enables dis ciplined initiative to be taken by the scout leader, thereby enabling freedom of maneuver and orienting on the reconnaissance objective. Understand CRG/CSG Speaking at the Association of U. S. Army National Meeting in October 2016, Army Chief of Staff GEN Mark A. Milley said the necessity and “willing ness to disobey specific orders” is cru cial when battlefield realities change and there is no time or functioning channel to consult superiors. To follow the Army chief of staff’s “controversial” guidance presented in his quote, the scout is owed detailed CRG and/or CSG. Without it, the scout cannot truly execute and achieve mission command Figure 2. The scout uses terrain to maneuver out of contact with enemy forces to a position of relative advantage, thereby maintaining freedom of maneuver. (Adapted from Figure 4-12, ATP 2-01.3) or, just as importantly, the command er’s intent. CRG and CSG are the bread and butter of cavalry operations. Granted, there is no codified position in doctrine where the CRG is to be placed within the OPORD; however, it’s my opinion that the CRG is an exten sion of the commander’s intent and should be briefed immediately follow ing the endstate in Paragraph 3. A sec ond option is to brief the CRG after the concept of the operations and brief changes to the overarching CRG by phase during the scheme of maneuver. Counterintuitive terms No matter where it’s briefed, the CRG is critically important and often misun derstood. A disproportionate amount of the problem stems from the use of counterintuitive terms (for example, “rapid,” “disengage,” “displacement” and “bypass”). Another problem is that the “go to” manual for a clear under standing of CRG is FM 3-98,7 which is viewed by junior leaders as a brigade-level manual. As I wrote in a previous article entitled “Observations from the Army Reconnaissance Course,” published in AR MOR magazine‘s Fall 2018 edition, one of the CRG’s emphases is the tempo of reconnaissance, which refers to the level of detail and the level of covert ness required by the scout platoon to best accomplish its mission. Tempo is described by four terms: rapid, deliberate, stealthy and forceful. Rapid and deliberate are levels of detail and are mutually exclusive, meaning a scout platoon cannot be rapid and deliberate at the same time. Stealthy and forceful are mutually exclusive levels of co vertness, meaning a scout platoon can not be stealthy and forceful at the same time. (Editor’s note: See https:// www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eAR M O R / c o n t e n t / i s s u e s / 2 0 1 8 / Fall/4Zang18.pdf to read the article in its entirety.) Engagement criteria are protocols that specify the circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force. They can be either restrictive or per missive. Scout-platoon leaders must define the size and type of force they expect their subordinate units to en gage and avoid. This enables planning the use of direct and indirect fires. Engagement criteria must be extreme ly precise to avoid confusion. Disengagement criteria are protocols that specify when to avoid contact or when to disengage from a fight to avoid becoming decisively engaged while retaining freedom of maneuver. If a scout platoon does not understand or violates its disengagement criteria, it will likely become decisively engaged and have to fight the battle to its con clusion. Displacement criteria are triggers for a planned withdrawal, passage of lines or a reconnaissance handover between units. Displacement criteria are also conditions that are either event-driven (for example, associated PIR met), time-driven (for example, the latest-time-information-is-of-value trigger met) or threat-driven (for example, identification of enemy reserve). Recon-management techniques The scout must inculcate reconnaissance-management techniques, using aspects of all three to gain and maintain contact on his/her terms without becoming decisively engaged. FM 3-988 defines cueing as the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide in formation that directs follow-on collec tion of more detailed information by another system. Mixing is the use of two or more different assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement. Redundancy is the use of two or more like assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement. The IC matrix is the “fighting product” that il lustrates an organization’s usage of re connaissance-management tech niques. It is best to consider use of the reconnaissance-management techniques along two lines of effort. First, focus on capabilities rather than assets. By this, the scout should determine what is necessary to observe assigned named areas of interest (NAIs) (thermal capa bility, aerial assets, etc.) as opposed to requesting specific pieces of equip ment. This ties directly into the second line of effort: work with what one organically possesses. Too often the IC plan relies on assets beyond the scout’s control (for example, echelons-above-brigade UAS assets). It is better to think of these assets as contingencies. Based on the weather, changing condi tions on the battlefield and changes to prioritization by commanders at eche lon, the odds of a platoon-level leader receiving some form of control over the assets such as the Shadow, Predator, etc., is minimal. Worse yet, it pro vides a false sense of reality. The National Training Center (NTC), with all lines of support focusing on a single brigade, does not present are alistic appraisal of future conflict. In an environment where all domains of battle are contested by a peer or near-peer threat, these division-and-above assets will be used to conduct the deep fight against strategic high-value and high-payoff targets. Therefore, the scout must return to reliance on their “leather personnel carriers” and imple Figure 3. CRG-tempo.

mentation of the “all-weather scout.” With that in mind, platoon-level lead ers must plan and account for their dis mounted element. The dismounts are not mere “crunchies” in the back of the vehicle. They are combat multipliers, capable of extending the width of the screen, stealthily infiltrating to an NAI in support of an area reconnaissance or clearing an intervisibility line to provide local security for the mounted element. Figure 4 helps understanding of recon naissance-management techniques. In the diagram, 1st Platoon is operating in a two-section concept. Both sections are currently relying on their mounted platforms to conduct reconnaissance of NAI 209 to confirm or deny the pres ence of an enemy observation post (OP) that may serve as early warning to the templated obstacle and enemy mounted element at NAI 210. In this example, since both elements are mounted and using the same capabili ties, this constitutes redundancy. In Figure 5, the southern mounted el ement has elected to position itself in a hide position to deploy its dismount ed squad to establish an OP. This is an example of mixing, in which the pla toon uses both mounted and dis mounted elements, each with separate capabilities to collect against the same

NAI.

In Figure 6, a low-level voice intercepts (LLVI) team, attached to the platoon headquarters, received signals intelligence about enemy voice transmis sions in vicinity of the platoon’s south ern boundary. Given this, the platoon leader changed his task-organization from a two-section to a three-section concept and allocated the platoon’s Raven to the southern section. This is an example of cueing, in which the in formation received by the LLVI team triggered the follow-on collection by other platoon assets (one section and the Raven). PACE plan The scout must be prepared to decisively fight and win a battle without becoming decisively engaged. To meet the commander’s intent, the scout must integrate elements from throughout the organic platoon/troop as well as from across the brigade com bat team. It is insufficient for a scout to solely rely on indirect fires to de stroy enemy elements (particularly mounted elements). The scout must in crease lethality with dismounted antitank capabilities (Javelin, AT-4 and Carl Gustav) and employ such assets to de stroy and harass threat forces. The scout leader must account for all enemy templated on the situational template during the scheme-of-maneuver-development portion of the OPORD process. Also, the scout needs to possess more than one means to ac count for said enemy. This is not to state there must be four proposed means to handle the enemy presented, but more than one CoA and plan must be present. For example, if the platoon is established in a screen with dis mounted OPs to the front and flank against an armored threat, the plan could be:

• 120mm mortars; and Figure 4.

• Mobile Gun System/Anti-Tank Guided Missile + Abrams/Bradleys. The scout will not always possess the capability to harness the entirety of these weapons systems; however, it’s critically important the scout move beyond the pedantic viewpoint of a PACE plan only relating to communications. A leader, particularly a reconnaissance and security leader, must be prepared to accomplish the commander’s intent and establish conditions for the future success of the higher headquarters through many means. Also, the goal is to place the enemy into more forms of contact simultaneously than he/she can adequately handle. Rehearsals Rehearsals need to move beyond cli ché as one of the first things to be cut due to time constraints in the troopleading procedures (TLP). Also, units must move beyond using the cop-out “per unit SOP” during the TLP and OPORD process. An SOP is only useful and possesses a chance to survive first contact if it is practiced. Merely putting an SOP together immediately before an NTC rotation to appease the observ er/coach/trainer is academically lazy. At a minimum, all organizations should rehearse actions on contact (mounted and dismounted, against direct, indirect, UAS and improvised explosive de vices) and actions on the objective. Furthermore, how a rehearsal is con ducted is just as important as merely conducting one. Rehearsals need not be cumbersome at platoon level. The platoon must maximize its time and effectiveness to develop a shared understanding. A rec ommendation is for the platoon to conduct, at a minimum, two rehears als. The first rehearsal should be con ducted as if the “gods have favored you” and no friction arises. This allows platoon members to build confidence in the plan briefed. Once the platoon knows the plan, a “dirty run” occurs through use of the platoon sergeant (or, if possible, the troop executive officer or first sergeant). During this iteration, a leader assumes the “red hat” and injects friction into the already established plan to work through contingencies and identify areas that require intellectual energy to defeat the enemy. I recom mend that during this iteration the platoon come in contact from enemy forces, be assessed a casualty (so as to re hearse the casualty-evacuation plan), be presented a significant maintenance issue and be placed in varying degrees of chemical, biological, radio logical, nuclear and high-yield explo sives threat. While there will more than likely not be enough time to fully develop each scenario, the charge of the “red hat” is to focus on what is most probable (ac cording to the IPB analysis) to prepare the platoon for that eventuality, there by establishing an environment where the platoon can retain its freedom of maneuver. Conclusion The reconnaissance fundamentals of “gain and maintain enemy contact” and “retain freedom of maneuver” appear at first glance to be mutually exclusive and at odds with one another. However, through a disciplined Figure 5.

approach and reliance on the funda mentals, platoon-level scout leaders can place their organizations in a posi tion of relative advantage to achieve success and the commander’s intent while not violating the fundamentals. By conducting a to-standard IPB, understanding where their element fits into the higher concept of the operation, inculcating CRG/CSG, using recon naissance-management techniques, developing a PACE plan for contact with the enemy and holding rehears als, platoon-level leaders will find themselves well situated to win the first contact of the next war. CPT Patrick Zang is the course director for the Army Reconnaissance Course, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Benning, GA. His previous assignments include commander, Troop C, 2nd Squadron, 13th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, TX, and (when de ployed) Camp Buehring, Kuwait; assistant S-3. 2-13 Cav, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; executive of ficer, Troop G, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored-Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; mortar-platoon leader, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3-3 Cav, Fort Hood; and tank-platoon leader, Troop I, 3-3 Cav, Fort Hood. CPT Zang’s military schools include the Cavalry Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Infantry Mortar Lead er’s Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Airborne School. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science/history from Indiana University of Pennsylvania Notes 1 FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, July 1, 2015. 2 Ibid. 3 ATP 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, November 2014. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 FM 3-98. 8 Ibid. AO – area of operations ASCOPE – areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events ATP – Army technical publication CoA – course of action CRG – commander’s reconnaissance guidance CSG – commander’s security guidance FM – field manual GTAO – graphic-terrain-analysis overlay IC – information collection IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield KOCOA – key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach LLVI – low-level voice intercept NAI – named area of interest NTC – National Training Center OAKOC – observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment OP – observation post OPORD – operations order Figure 6. Acronym Quick-Scan

PACE – primary, alternate, contingency and emergency PIR – priority intelligence requirement PL – phase line PMESII – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure PMESII-PT – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time SOP – standard operating procedures TACSOP – tactical standard operating procedures TLP – troop-leading procedures UAS – unmanned aerial system Acronym Quick-Scan Continued