Military Deception and Reverse Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: How Staff Integration Creates Advantages for the Brigade Combat Team Commander

Fall 2018 Military Deception and Reverse Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: How Staff Integration Creates Advantages for the Brigade Combat Team Commander by COL Thomas M. Feltey and CPT Lance C. Rae Mission analysis (MA) has colloquially become known as the S-2’s show. Fe verishly producing products for an im portant briefing, intelligence officers brief an enemy plan while the rest of the staff sits idly by (thankful they are not in the S-2 shop). Unfortunately, leaving MA to the S-2 shop alone is not working well in actual practice across the force. Personal observations from time spent as a reconnaissance-troop observer/ coach/trainer (O/C/T) at the Joint Mul tinational Readiness Center (JMRC) and as an instructor at the Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC) have highlighted a trend within training units and stu dents in regard to intelligence prepara tion of the battlefield (IPB). We are fail ing at the squadron/battalion level and below to account for and integrate our enemy’s analysis and adaptations to U.S. forces during MA. As a conse quence, U.S. forces tend to create a “straw man” enemy when conducting MA and are then taken aback when they encounter an enemy who has been thinking about relative combat power and has taken advantage of their perceived strengths and U.S. forc es’ perceived weaknesses. U.S. forces can reverse this trend by conducting integrated IPB, specifically focusing on the conduct of reverse IPB, during Step 2 of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Reverse IPB1 is a commonly overlooked sub-step within Step 4 of IPB, “determine threat course of action” (CoA). IPB review Current doctrine describes IPB in four steps. In Step 1 we define the opera tional environment, determining the area of operations (AO) and area of in terest (AI), and identify significant characteristics of the AO/AI that will require more analysis (enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations). Step 1 of IPB helps U.S. forces identify the ini tial gaps in their understanding of the AO/AI and should generate assump tions, requests for information and Table 1. Sub-steps of Step 1 of the IPB process. (From Army Training Publication (ATP) 2-01.3)

Fall 2018 requests for information collection (IC) necessary to continue IPB.2 In Step 2 of IPB, U.S. forces describe environmental effects on operations, which is broken down into several sub-steps (Table 2). During Step 2, U.S. forces assess how adversaries can af fect friendly operations in the AO/AI. U.S. forces evaluate the effect of the terrain on both friendly and enemy elements by using observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles and cover, also known as OAKOC; the modified com bined obstacles overlay; and the graph ical terrain-analysis overlay. Next, U.S. forces assess the military aspects of weather, and it is the impact on both U.S. forces and the enemy as they op erate in the AO/AI (weather forecasts, illumination data and weather-effects matrix). Finally, U.S. forces assess the impacts of civil considerations that af fect both U.S forces and enemy forces through the lens of area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events, commonly referred to as ASCOPE; and political, military, eco nomic, social, information, infrastruc ture, physical environment and time, or PMESII-PT.3 Table 2. Step 2 of the IPB process. (From ATP 2-01.3)

Fall 2018 U.S. forces evaluate the threat in the third step of IPB (Table 3), using doctri nal templates and our pre-existing knowledge of the enemy based on their order of battle, how they tradi tionally like to fight or how they have been fighting in a specific area. U.S. forces also take into account the ene my’s combat effectiveness, capabili ties, limitations, composition, disposi tion and overall strength. U.S. forces can produce threat characteristics, threat templates, threat capabilities statements and an initial high-value-target list based on the analysis in Step 3.4 In Step 4, U.S. forces determine the threat’s CoA, taking into account the enemy’s objectives, likely endstate and all the previous analysis from Steps 1-3 of IPB. Then, U.S. forces develop ene my CoA sketches and statements for each enemy CoA templated. U.S forces also produce the event template and matrix during Step 4 of IPB.5 Reverse IPB U.S. forces are often satisfied, or are forced to be satisfied, with this initial assessment of the enemy because time is a finite resource. Doctrinally speak ing, U.S. forces should make as many enemy CoAs as time permits. With that said, U.S. forces should develop the following two CoAs at a minimum: the most likely CoA and the most danger ous CoA. If neither of these enemy CoAs takes into account the enemy’s analysis of U.S. forces’ disposition and effects within the AO/AI, those CoAs are flawed and don’t meet the CoA screening criteria of being feasible, ac ceptable, suitable, distinguishable and complete.6 The solution is to conduct reverse IPB during MA; specifically, it should be done within the sub-step of identifying the full set of CoAs (Figure 1). Reverse IPB recognizes and takes into account the enemy’s assessment of U.S. forces operating in the AO/AI. This subtle, critical and often missed sub-step en sures that a much more realistic enemy CoA sketch and statement is produced during MA. This will logically carry for ward to the later steps of MDMP, most importantly the wargame. Conducting reverse IPB during MA ensures that U.S. forces build in the enemy’s initial reactions/counter-reactions, and it produces a much more logical and re alistic enemy in the wargame. It also enables better results for U.S. forces on the battlefield. This analysis can’t be done in a stove pipe, though; the S-2 cannot do this tremendous amount of analysis alone. To successfully conduct reverse IPB, the staff must make an integrated and collaborative effort. This means each staff section must put on its red hat during MA and assist the S-2 by giving their relative combat power analysis7 and most likely enemy adaptation and actions in response to U.S. forces in the AO/AI (unique to their warfighting functions).8 U.S. forces are hesitant to invest the time and manhours required of collaborative IPB, but the benefits far outweigh the costs in regard to the quality of the MA being conducted, and therefore the entirety of MDMP. MA is the most vital step of good MDMP, and it will be made all the Table 3. Evaluate the threat/adversary. (From ATP 2-01.3)

Fall 2018 better if the staff makes a conscious ef fort to collaborate on reverse IPB. As U.S. forces become more proficient and effective at conducting reverse IPB, they will gain the ability to antici pate and even shape the enemy’s tac tical decisions. This more intimate un derstanding of the enemy will enable U.S. forces to employ the often ne glected military-deception (MILDEC) plan.9 Military deception An advanced step, and a natural evolu tion from reverse IPB, is the develop ment of a MILDEC plan. After the staff conducts reverse IPB and identifies the enemy’s assessment of U.S. forces and likely adaptations, the staff takes ad vantage of the situation by distorting the enemy’s perception of our disposi tion, composition and intentions to the extent that the enemy starts reacting counterproductively. Effective MILDEC is crucial to a commander’s ability to shape, engage and consolidate gains. MILDEC can be broken down into four techniques:

• Feint – an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action.

• Demonstration – a show of force where a decision is not sought, and no contact with the adversary is intended. A demonstration’s intent is to cause the adversary to select a CoA favorable to U.S. goals.

• Ruse – a cunning trick designed to deceive the adversary to obtain friendly advantage. It is characterized by deliberately exposing false or confusing information for collection and interpretation by the adversary.

• Display – the simulation, disguising and/or portrayal of friendly objects, units or capabilities in the projection of the MILDEC story. Such capabilities may not exist but are made to appear so.10 At the lowest level, MILDEC is referred to as tactical deception (TAC-D). As ex plained in Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, “[TAC-D] is decep tion activities planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. TAC-D is planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level command ers to cause adversaries to take actions or inactions that are favorable to U.S. commanders’ objectives. TAC-D is con ducted to influence immediate military operations to gain a temporary tactical advantage over an adversary, to mask vulnerabilities in friendly forces or to enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces.” A further output from greater understanding during IPB is a commander’s/staff’s ability maintain and exploit the relative advantage. How to take advantage Brigade combat team (BCT) command ers can task their IC assets to answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs)11 about the effectiveness of their Figure 1. Determine threat/adversary CoAs. (From ATP 2-01.3)

Fall 2018 TAC-D activities. PIR are often tied to decision points. The BCT commander may establish the following PIR: Will the enemy commit forces against our feint force? The cav alry squadron can answer the indica tors associated with the PIR by con ducting reconnaissance-and-security operations. The cavalry squadron col lects indicators in its assigned named areas of interest according to the IC matrix and reports information to the brigade. The brigade conducts analysis, turning the information reported into intelligence.12 In this case, the BCT as signed the PIR as a commander’s criti cal information requirement (CCIR). Therefore, the CCIR will have an asso ciated decision point.13 As a result of ef fective reconnaissance, the BCT com mander can make a decision to com mence a planned attack based on the fact that the enemy has committed forces toward the feint and away from the BCT commander’s true decisive op eration. In summary, reverse IPB is a critical and often missed step of IPB. Staffs must factor in the enemy’s assessment of U.S. forces and the adjustments it will create within the enemy’s CoA. This collaborative effort must be done dur ing MA by the entire staff to create a realistic enemy CoA statement and sketch. As a result, this enhanced MA will lead to a more feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable and complete enemy CoA during the wargame. Knowledge of the enemy’s CoA will in form and shape the U.S. forces’ MILDEC plan and how its inclusion at the tacti cal level can take advantage of the en emy’s assessment of U.S. forces. Finally, we discussed how a cavalry squadron can assess the effectiveness of the MILDEC plan for its BCT com mander by conducting effective recon naissance-and-security operations. Ul timately this will lead to more in formed decision-making by the BCT commander, resulting in success on the battlefield. COL Thomas Feltey is chief of staff, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. Pre vious assignments include commander, 316th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA; senior adviser to the Ministry of Peshmerga and Northern Affairs, Of fice of Security Cooperation-Iraq, U.S. Consulate General, Erbil, Iraq; com mander, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, 4th Stryker BCT, Joint Base Lewis McChord, WA; squadron operations and execu tive officer, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; com mander, cavalry and headquarters troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regi ment, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany; tank-platoon leader and bat talion scout-platoon leader, 1st Battal ion, 66th Armored Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; and scout-platoon leader, Brigade Reconnaissance Troop, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood. His mili tary education includes the armor ba sic and advanced courses, Scout Pla toon Leader’s Course, CLC, Naval Col lege of Command and Staff, the Mari time School of Advanced Military Stud ies and Joint Advanced Warfighting School. COL Feltey holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Rutgers Univer sity, a master’s of arts degree in na tional security and strategic studies from the Naval War College and a mas ter’s of science degree in campaign planning and strategic studies from Joint Forces Staff College. His awards and honors include two awards of the Bronze Star Medal, two awards of the Defense Meritorious Service Medal and five awards of the Meritorious Service Medal. CPT Lance Rae is an instructor with CLC. Previous assignments include cav alry troop O/C/T, JMRC Grizzly Team, Hohenfels, Germany; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3-1 Cavalry, 3rd Armored BCT (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning; commander, Troop C, 3-1 Cavalry, 3rd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Ben ning; mortar-platoon leader, Head quarters and Headquarters Company, 2-12 Cavalry, 4th ABCT, 1st Cavalry Divi sion, Fort Bliss; and tank-platoon lead er, Company D, 2-12 Cavalry, 4th ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division. His military educa tion includes Armor Basic Officer Lead er’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course and CLC. CPT Rae holds a bach elor’s of arts degree in psychology from Eastern Washington University. His awards and honors include the Bronze Star Medal and the Meritorious Service Medal. Notes 1 Reverse IPB is defined in ATP 2-01.3, In telligence Preparation of the Battlefield, November 2014, as “how the presence and actions of U.S. forces will affect threat/adversary operations.”

2 ATP 2-01.3.

3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 For more information on CoA screening criteria, see Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Chap ter 4. 7 For more information on how to assess relative combat power, see FM 6-0, Chap ter 9. PIR (if) Friendly-force information requirement (and) Decision point (then) Enemy commits a battalion (+) against a feint force Brigade’s decisive operation is prepared to at tack Initiate attack with brigade’s decisive operation Table 4. PIR and decision point. Figure 2. CCIR and essential elements of friendly information. (From FM 3-98)

Fall 2018 8 For more information on of staff respon sibilities during integrated IPB, see ATP 2-01.3, Chapter 1. 9 ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, November 2016, defines MILDEC as “ac tions executed to deliberately mislead ad versary military decision-makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations, thereby causing the ad versary to take specific actions (or inac tions) that will contribute to the accom plishment of the friendly mission.” Joint Publication 3-13.4, Military Deception, January 2012, defines MILDEC as “appli cable at all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and can be con ducted during all phases of military oper ations.” 10 From ADRP 1-02. 11 FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operation, July 2015, defines PIR as “an intelligence requirement, stated as a pri ority for reconnaissance, security tasks and [IC], that the commander needs to understand a threat, enemy, adversary or operational environment (for example, terrain or civil considerations).” 12 ADRP 1-02 defines CCIR as “an informa tion requirement identified by the com mander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making.” 13 According to ADRP 1-02, a decision ABCT – armored brigade combat team ADRP – Army doctrinal reference publication ASCOPE – area, structures, capability, organizations, people and events ATP – Army technical publication AI – area of interest AO – area of operations ATP – Army technical publication BCT – brigade combat team CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course CCIR – commander’s critical information requirement CoA – course of action EEFI – essential elements of friendly information FFIR – friendly-force information requirement FM – field manual HN – host nation HVT – high-value target IC – information collection IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield JMRC – Joint Multinational Readiness Center KOCOA – key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach MA – mission analysis MDMP – military decision-making process MILDEC – military deception NAI – named area of interest OAKOC – observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer PIR – priority intelligence requirement PMESII-PT – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time TAC-D – tactical deception USMC – U.S. Marine Corps Acronym Quick-Scan point is “a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision, concerning a spe cific [CoA].”