Observations from Army Reconnaissance Course

Fall 2018 Observations from Army Reconnaissance Course by CPT Patrick M. Zang Significant transformation came to the Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC) during the last 16 months. Part of this was command-directed to help empha size reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations across the Army. A second part resulted from 3rd Squadron (Black heart), 16th Cavalry Regiment, aligning itself more with the Army’s University Model and the subsequent organiza tional structure change. The Blackheart Squadron created the Department of Reconnaissance and Se curity (DoRS) that now manages the following courses:

• Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course (RSLC);

• ARC;

• Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC); and

• Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Master Trainer Course. The DoRS concept continues R&S train ing throughout the development of leaders. RSLC is designed for team and squad leaders; ARC for platoon-level leaders; and CLC for troop and squad ron leaders. In conjunction with this change, the ARC pendulum swung from training section and platoon lead ers to focusing solely on platoon-level leaders (staff sergeants to first lieuten ants). The change to ARC was codified into the officer corps when ARC became a requirement for all Armor Branch lieu tenants, according to Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 600-3, Paragraph 4a(1), dated June 2017. However, this directly contradicts the ARC prerequisites in the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS), which state that to attend ARC, “one must be serving in or pro jected to serve in a reconnaissance bil let.” Currently there are commanders at the highest echelon emphasizing the requirement in DA PAM 600-3. Howev er, no such champion exists for the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps to emphasize the ARC requirement. Despite the conflict between DA PAM 600-3 and ATRRS pertaining to ARC, a fundamental change will occur within the NCO ranks regarding the course in Fiscal Year 2020. Historically, the pla toon-sergeant position has contained a positional additional skill identifier (ASI) for ARC. In accordance with the Chief of Armor’s initiatives and direc tives, the positional ASI will shift to re flect two staff sergeants per scout pla toon across the Army effective Oct. 1, 2019. In the Active Component alone, there are 307 scout platoons (nine scout pla toons per armored brigade combat team (ABCT) times 10 ABCTs; nine scout platoons per Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) times seven SBCTs; and 11 scout platoons per infan try brigade combat team (IBCT) times 14 IBCTs). These numbers reflect the Army’s organization as of Dec. 31, 2017, and include 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments as SBCTs, and all airborne and air-assault brigades as IBCTs. Ulti mately there are 614 staff sergeants in the Active Component who are to be ARC graduates and who are currently serving in a reconnaissance billet. The assumption is that all platoon ser geants are already ARC graduates. The bottom line is that ARC presents a dichotomous scenario to the Army. All Armor Branch lieutenants must remain at Fort Benning, GA, until they at least attempt ARC. Simultaneously, there is a 2-to-1 ratio of NCOs to officers that according to ASIs are to be ARC gradu ates. This situation presents a misconcep tion that NCOs are unable to attend ARC due to officer needs. The reality lies in the fact that due to operations tempo and forecasting issues, the op erational force has a difficult time se curing a reserved seat for its NCOs. Given this, the schoolhouse at Fort Benning is able to more rapidly and easily forecast and reserve seats in ARC, thereby making the course dy namics skewed toward the officer. (Typical course dynamics are out of 60 students, 50 are officers.) The recom mendation is that the same emphasis placed on officer education be placed on NCO education. The lieutenant is in capable of single-handedly changing a platoon. However, it is the NCO with years of operational experience – cou pled with institutional knowledge and training – who is able to complement the young officer to greatly enhance the platoon’s capability and lethality. Familiar components remain While possessing a revised focus, ARC maintains many components that are recognizable across generations of leaders. The first week of the course is still Operation Bushmaster. This stren uous dismounted field-training exer cise (FTX) is centered on mastery of land-navigation techniques. The culmi nation of Operation Bushmaster is a land-navigation star course the stu dents must pass individually. Upon successful completion of this at rophied (minus-10-point level) task, students enter Teach Week. Topics of instruction include:

• Reconnaissance missions and organizations;

• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB);

• Evaluating routes and obstacles;

• Zone reconnaissance and screen operations;

• Air-ground operations;

• Indirect-fires (IDF) planning; and

• Continuous reconnaissance (managing the transition between R&S/fighter management). Students are then given a troop-level operations order (OPORD) they must subsequently prepare to deliver in a one-on-one setting. ARC premises its OPORD assessments on the CLC mod el; it is a tactical-decision exercise, where the student is presented with a “thinking and adaptive” enemy. The student’s plan must compensate for this enemy’s actions to succeed. Rath er than merely “checking the block”

Fall 2018 and putting words on every sentence in their respective OPORD shell, the student is challenged to adhere to R&S fundamentals at all times. The last week-plus of ARC is field time in the form of two FTXs: Operation Ea gle Eye (the tactics and fieldcraft of be ing a scout, coupled with smaller, more manageable missions in accordance with the Army’s crawl, walk, run train ing methodology) and Operation Last Stand, a seven-mission FTX encom passing most Fort Benning training ar eas and built on a 12-hour timeline (five hours for troop-leading proce dures (TLPs), six hours for execution and one hour for an after-action re view and reset). During Operation Last Stand, the stu dents are not provided with dedicated “sleep” time and must execute area-reconnaissance, zone-reconnaissance, route-reconnaissance, screen and ar ea-security missions. The threat is ev er-evolving given emerging tactics, techniques and procedures learned from the Army’s combat-training cen ters (CTCs), open-source intelligence and media sources. Areas of threat em phasis consist of (but are not limited to):

• Red unmanned aerial systems (UAS) serving as observers for massed indirect-fires attacks;

• Contested electronic-warfare environment; and

• In accordance with the U.S. Army’s understanding of Russian new-generation warfare, the use of hybrid maneuver (conventional uniformed forces conjoined with non-state, non-uniformed “proxies”). Some of the noticeable changes imple mented in the course include:

• No requirement for an airborne physical;

• No Army Physical Fitness Test administered;

• Entrance examination conducted on Day 1 focused on operational terms and graphics, land navigation, R&S doctrine and vehicle identification; and

• OPORD assessments. Given the fact that ALC is a course pre requisite for NCOs, units that send their NCOs to the course should make a concerted and dedicated effort to prepare their Soldiers accordingly. All study materials and an OPORD shell is offered on the course Website: http:// w w w . b e n n i n g . a r m y . m i l / Armor/316thCav/ARC/. The following sections will serve as compilation of observations of areas of difficulty for junior leaders, coupled with recommendations and resources to rectify the situation. Also, most identified issues coincide with areas identified during the 2017 Gainey Cup competition. Communications/ reporting There is, and always will be, the re quirement for scouts to communicate effectively using beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications systems. Un fortunately, this is another skill that has atrophied due to the proliferation of new technologies (such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below and Joint Capabilities Release, the Ar my’s next-generation friendly-force tracking system currently fielded to Af ghanistan), and a superiority in com munications and technology compared to our adversaries for the past two de cades. With this challenge in mind, the use of standardized reporting formats (see Army Technical Publication (ATP) Figure 1. ARC course map.

Fall 2018 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, Ap pendix A), communications windows and radio systems beyond mere fre quency modulation (FM) are simple fixes that platoon-level leaders can im plement during Sergeant’s Time train ing to increase platoon capacity and le thality. The reconnaissance community en courages scouts to use someone else’s bullets to bring an effect against the enemy. Therefore, a scout who cannot communicate with the fires direction center, the fires battalion main or the squadron main is useless to the com mander. To improve communication abilities, ARC introduces students to high frequency (HF) radios. By no means is an ARC graduate a master of the HF radio. However, the concepts and capabilities introduced during the course resound across monthly obser vations from the CTCs and the Center for Army Lessons-Learned (CALL). It is a matter of tribal lore that the scout’s best weapon is the radio. Therefore, a scout must possess the capability to communicate BLOS to bring effects against the enemy and provide options – and thereby an ad vantage to the commander. It is opined that many shy away from the HF radio due to its complexity. CALL Handbook 17-20 is readily accessible and pres ents a step-by-step how-to guide for all the Army’s common radio systems. Many commanders keep a copy of this handbook in their vehicle at all times, and all ARC students are provided a hard copy of this invaluable resource. Land navigation Platoon-level leaders struggle to un derstand the ever-changing dynamics of the modern battlefield, more spe cifically the threat’s capability to insti tute a contested electromagnetic spec trum. It is open-source knowledge that during the conflict in Ukraine, Russia and/or its proxies spoofed Ukrainian Global Positioning Systems, causing a violation of international territory and a massive retaliatory Multiple Launch Rocket System attack on an entire bat talion. A simple remedy for this type of threat is to move beyond the 21st-Century re liance on technology and return to the basics of a map, compass and protractor. That’s why the preceding course overview makes it clear that ARC emphasizes land navigation, ter rain association and route planning. For example, students are challenged physically and mentally to plan and ex ecute a route focused on their under standing of terrain association, time-distance analysis, backstops, attack points, catching features and the abil ity to self-locate during Operation Bushmaster. The Army recognizes that land naviga tion is a perishable and vital skill, yet training geared toward keeping this skillset fresh in the minds of Soldiers is lacking. A perceived problem is overreliance on technology during the Iraq/ Afghanistan fights. Leaders have be come complacent due to informational and technological overmatch. This complacency allowed an erosion of the basics. One of those basics, unaided land nav igation across uneven terrain, is the hallmark of military operations. Scouts who are unable to successfully navi gate put themselves at risk and detract from their unit’s combat power. Fur thermore, the mission of the scout is to be in the right place at the right time, able to collect information to an swer a priority intelligence require ment (PIR), allowing the commander to make a timely and accurate deci sion. To facilitate proficiency among scouts, basic skills like determining road distance, elevation based on con tour lines, intersection, resection and understanding the G-M angle are con cepts that must be strongly revisited – if not taught from scratch – among stu dents. Actions on contact Given the dichotomous nature of the Armor Branch (tank and scout), many students struggle to grasp the concept of making contact on “your” terms and with the smallest element. There is a prevailing infantry-centric mindset in which a “knife fight” is the preferred method of contact. However, it is im portant to understand that as scouts, one of the fundamentals of reconnais sance is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. There are eight forms of contact. Given this, it is acceptable and within the bounds of doctrine to make contact with the enemy from a purely observational perspective. This enables the scout element to retain freedom of maneuver and maintain contact with the enemy while continu ing to orient on the reconnaissance ob jective and answer PIR for the com mander. When it comes to contact with the en emy, we stress to our students that the primary-alternate-contingency-emer gency (PACE) plan is not solely limited to Paragraph 5 of the OPORD. It is crit ical to develop, brief and understand a PACE plan in everything we do. More specifically, during the scheme-of-ma neuver (SoM)-development portion of the OPORD process, the scout leader must account for all enemy templated on the situational template. Also, scouts need to possess more than one way to account for said enemy. This doesn’t mean there must be four proposed means to handle the enemy presented, but there needs to be more than one course of action (CoA) with a plan. For example, if the enemy is tem plated to possess an observation post, the scout’s primary means may be through an indirect-fires target from the artillery battery. The alternate CoA could be an indirect-fires target from the troop mortar section; the contin gency CoA could be direct-fire weap ons systems from the mounted ele ment; and the emergency CoA could be from a dismounted M240L light ma chinegun from a scout squad. Another challenge among scouts today is a distinct lack of emphasis on dis mounted operations. Platoon-level leaders must plan and account for their dismounted element. They must un derstand that dismounts are not mere “crunchies” in the back of the vehicle. They are combat multipliers capable of extending the width of the screen, ca pable of stealthily infiltrating to a named area of interest in support of an area reconnaissance or capable of clearing an intervisibilty line (a rela tive, localized, pattern of limitations on observation, caused by (often subtle) variations in terrain elevation) to pro vide better local security for the mounted element. TLPs Armor and cavalry doctrine is distinct ly lacking when it comes to a how-to

Fall 2018 guide and an adequate explanation of TLPs. Field Manual (FM) 3-21.10, Infan try Rifle Company, Chapter 2, is a 56- page breakdown of the TLPs. Armor and cavalry manuals currently consist of little more than a listing of the TLPs’ eight steps. This void in armor and cav alry doctrine stunts the growth of our junior leaders. Upon graduation from Armor Basic Of ficer Leader’s Course (ABOLC) and ARC, operational-force commanders should expect these young officers to be, at a minimum, a “P” at platoon-level TLPs. The truth is far from this, however. Young leaders struggle with time man agement and focus, providing a clear task and purpose to subordinates and conducting events simultaneously (as opposed to sequentially). As a result, leaders struggle to issue clear and con cise guidance to their subordinates; in stead, the entire leadership isolates it self from the entire organization in an attempt to plan by committee. To cor rect this, junior leaders must become proficient at decentralized planning and the issuance of FM fragmentary orders. Mission command There is a fundamental misunderstand ing of mission command among junior leaders. It is as if they are conditioned and trained to believe that conducting leader checks or backbriefs, asking questions, etc., are tantamount to mi cromanagement. However, Army Doc trinal Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the com mander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the com mander’s intent to empower leaders in the conduct of unified land opera tions.” I opine that mission command is the new “mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time and civilian con siderations” (otherwise known as METT-TC) of the Army, a cop-out that leaders use to shirk their responsibili ties. Yes, as leaders it is understood that the goal is to provide subordinates the “what,” not the “how.” However, there are times when a commander is forced to exercise detailed command, or command and control. Mission command is best achieved through trust. Trust is achieved through training. Junior leaders need not be afraid to question their subor dinates. At the end of the day, the pla toon leader is responsible for every thing the platoon does or fails to do. Leaders in the military are charged with one of the most awesome respon sibilities that exists in the world: the care of America’s sons and daughters. Given this, providing oversight, asking questions, requiring backbriefs and “micromanaging” with subordinates who have not earned “trust” should not be perceived as negative but rath er as the standard. Commander’s recon guidance Commander’s R&S guidance is the bread and butter of cavalry operations. Granted, there is no codified position in doctrine where the commander’s re connaissance guidance (CRG) is to be placed within the OPORD; however, it is the opinion of the ARC team that the CRG is an extension of the command er’s Intent. It should be briefed imme diately following the endstate in Para graph 3. A second option is to brief CRG after the concept of the opera tions and then brief changes to the overarching CRG by phase during the scheme of maneuver. No matter where it is briefed, it is crit ically important and often misunder stood. A disproportionate amount of t h e p ro b l e m ste m s f ro m counterintuitive terms (rapid, disen gage and displacement). Another prob lem is that the “go to” manual for a clear understanding of CRG is FM 3-98, which is viewed by junior leaders as a brigade-level manual. Cavalry doctrine provides a disservice to leaders at the squadron and below level. Figure 2 has led scouts over the years to believe that there are solely two combinations (rapid and forceful, or stealthy and deliberate). However, this is one of the great misnomers of cav alry operations. The following (italicized text) is from a section from Chapter 3 of the ATP 3-20.98 rewrite now pending: Focus defines the scout platoon’s area of emphasis and can consist of one of four categories (threat, infrastructure, terrain and weather effects, and soci ety). Providing focus enables the scout platoon to develop their scheme of ma neuver and operate within the higher commander’s information needs. An example of focus would be in an ABCT cavalry squadron conducting a zone re connaissance, the lead platoon is threat-focused to provide freedom of maneuver for the trail platoon that is terrain-focused. The reconnaissance focus must be fur ther refined by the commander into re connaissance objectives. A reconnais sance objective is a terrain feature, Figure 2. This graphic has been used for years in armor and cavalry doctrine to illustrate the tempo portion of the CRG. (Adapted from Figure 4-2, FM 3-98)

Fall 2018 geographic area or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. The re connaissance objective must directly support the endstate defined in the commander’s Intent. Tempo of reconnaissance refers to the level of detail and the level of covert ness required by the scout platoon to best accomplish its mission. Tempo is described by four terms: rapid, deliber ate, stealthy and forceful. Rapid and deliberate are levels of detail and are mutually exclusive, meaning a scout platoon cannot be rapid and deliberate at the same time. Stealthy and forceful are mutually exclusive levels of covert ness, meaning a scout platoon cannot be stealthy and forceful at the same time. Note: The tempo of a reconnais sance operation can change by phase. Therefore, the tempo issued in the OPORD covers the breadth of the mis sion and not necessarily every part of the operation. When the scout-platoon leader issues his or her reconnaissance guidance, the tempo is always issued as two words. There the four distinct terms associated with reconnaissance tempo comprise four possible combina tions. Rapid tempo indicates that the level of detail for the reconnaissance operation is limited to a certain number of pre scribed tasks or PIR. Rapid tempo has nothing to do with the speed with which the operation is conducted. An example of this would be a rapid route reconnaissance in which the command er is only concerned with the ability of a bridge to support follow-on forces. Deliberate tempo implies that all tasks of the mission must be accomplished to ensure overall mission success. An ex ample of this would be when an orga nization is new to its area of operations and possesses limited information about a main route that it wishes to use as a main supply route for future operations. Given this scenario, the scout platoon would be ordered to con duct a deliberate route reconnaissance of the main supply route, following all the critical tasks associated with a route reconnaissance and creating a route reconnaissance overlay for the commander. Stealthy tempo emphasizes avoiding detection and generally consists of re strictive engagement criteria. Stealthy reconnaissance takes more time and uses dismounted reconnaissance meth ods to maximize the use of cover and concealment to reduce friendly signa tures. Stealthy reconnaissance is used when time is available, detailed recon naissance is required, enemy threat contact is likely, or when terrain re stricts the use of mounted reconnais sance elements. Forceful tempo develops the situation rapidly by employing ground and air assets to develop the situation rapidly and “fight for information.” Forceful re connaissance relies on the use of standoff weapons and optics to rapidly seize the initiative and answer the commander’s information needs. Forceful reconnaissance is used when time is limited, detailed information is not required, terrain is open or when dismounted reconnaissance elements cannot answer the information re quirements in the time allotted. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiat ing engagement with an enemy force. They can be either restrictive or per missive. The scout-platoon leader must define the size and type of force he or she expects subordinate units to en gage and avoid. This enables the plan ning of the use of direct and indirect fires. Engagement criteria must be ex tremely precise so as to avoid confu sion. Example, if the engagement cri teria for 1st Platoon issued by the com mander (a scout platoon in an SBCT cavalry squadron) is nine or fewer dis mounts, two or fewer boyevaya raz vedyvatelnaya dozornaya mashinas (BRDMs) (Russian scout vehicle) or one boyeva mashina pekhoty (BMP) (Rus sian fighting vehicle), the scout-pla toon leader, operating in a two-section concept, can break down the engage ment criteria to the section level as fol lows: five or fewer dismounts, one BRDM, only engage the BMP with dis mounted anti-tank weapons systems at less than 1,000 meters. Note: The scout platoon must develop a PACE plan for initiating contact with the enemy. For example, if the scout platoon is to destroy an enemy BMP as part of its scheme of maneuver, the pri mary means to destroy the BMP may be a priority fires target from the artil lery battalion. An alternate means to destroy the BMP may be using troop mortars. A contingency may be direct fire from an anti-tank weapons system, and an emergency means may be a dis mounted anti-tank weapons system. Engagement criteria needs to be thought of as the size of the enemy el ement that can be rapidly destroyed by the organic firepower on hand in the scout platoon. This enables the scout platoon to avoid becoming decisively engaged and retain freedom of maneu ver. Disengagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstance of avoiding contact or when to disengage from a fight so as to avoid becoming decisively engaged and retain the Figure 3. CRG tempo. Note that there are four tempos that can be given to a scout platoon: rapid and stealthy, rapid and forceful, deliberate and stealthy, and deliberate and forceful.

Fall 2018 freedom of maneuver. If a scout pla toon does not understand or violates its disengagement criteria, it will likely become decisively engaged and have to fight the battle to its conclusion. Us ing the example from engagement cri teria listed above, if an individual sec tion encounters three BMPs, they are to disengage. While the section may possess enough anti-tank weapon sys tems to gain a small tactical victory, the chances of becoming decisively en gaged and failing to orient on the re connaissance objective are too great. In this scenario, the scout section would seek to avoid a direct-fire en gagement and move, if necessary, to an alternate location to maintain threat contact while avoiding engage ment. Displacement criteria are triggers for a planned withdrawal, passage of lines or a reconnaissance handover between units. Displacement criteria are condi tions that are either event-driven (ex ample: associated PIR being met), time-driven (example: latest-time-in formation-of-value trigger is met) or threat-driven (example: identification of enemy reserve). Allow Figure 4 to enhance the way we understand CRG. The figure is to be viewed as the strike zone in baseball. Bypass criteria is the pitch below the batter’s knees. While the hitter is ca pable of turning this pitch into some thing positive, it is, generally speaking, something not worth the hitter’s time and therefore should be bypassed and reported. Engagement criteria, or the middle of the strike zone, are threat el ements that the commander is 100-percent comfortable with the sub ordinate element engaging and de stroying without outside assistance. Disengagement criteria can be thought of as the pitch coming straight for the batter’s head. While one could stand in there and allow oneself to get “hit” in the interest of getting on base and advancing the team’s ability, one could also end up in the hospital or worse. Therefore, disengagement criteria is a threat element the commander is un comfortable with the subordinate ele ment engaging for fear of becoming decisively engaged and requiring assis tance for extrication. Lastly, displace ment criteria can be easily construed as Ball 4. In essence, this is a change of mission for the hitter; he is no longer a batter in the box attempting to win his one-on-one engagement with the pitcher but instead is now a baserun ner. This nuanced ath letic example is how the concept was explained to me by my CLC in structor and has demonstrated no ticeable dividends when instructing ARC students. Platoon operating distances Fort Benning, due to its distinctive lack of mounted-maneuver training area, presents young leaders with a false understand ing of the capabili ties of weapons systems and op tics, and how to ar ray their formation across the depth and breadth of the battlefield. It is virtually unfathomable to be presented a situation on Fort Benning in which a Long-Range Ad vanced Scout Surveillance System mounted on a humvee can observe a target beyond one to two kilometers. Further, the restrictive and vegetated terrain severely limits the student’s ability to approach anything resem bling the doctrinal operating distances outlined in ATP 3-20.97, Appendix B. The notion of a cavalry troop executing a screen across an 18-kilometer front is completely foreign and unimaginable to the students. With this in mind, operational-force leaders must account for and adjust for this deficiency. Table 1, with Figure 5, describe how. Understand that a screen is not synon ymous with a “line.” The term “screen line” is yet another misnomer in caval ry doctrine and needs to be stricken from our lexicon. It is critically impor tant to understand the necessity of depth in conducting a screen. Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02 defines a screen as “a security task that primarily provides early warn ing to the protected force.” As such, the platoon’s ability to create depth is created by using and combining dis mounted observation posts and UAS, and applying supporting range and dis tance to the platoon’s organic-vehicle platforms. This process enables the platoon to adhere to the reconnais sance-management techniques (cue ing, mixing and redundancy) while ex ecuting target and reconnaissance handovers and maximizing the funda mentals of security. This provides early and accurate warning, and it also pro vides reaction time and maneuver space. Recommendations Operational-force commanders must rely on their ARC graduates to aug ment the respective formation with doctrinal knowledge to bridge the gap, concurrent with a reliance on “outdat ed doctrine.” The ARC cadre provided a significant portion of the manpower to rewrite ATP 3-20.98. That manual is now in draft form and its publication date has not yet been determined. In the interim, some useful references are the following: Figure 4. Disengagement criteria, engagement criteria, displacement criteria and bypass criteria.

• FM 17-98, September 1994;

• Soldier’s Manual (SM) 3-20.96, February 2017;

• FM 5-20a and 5-20b, 1944; and

• FM 21-75, 1944. Furthermore, it is imperative for NCOs to attend ARC. Their presence enhanc es the course through their operation al experience. Also, the NCO Education System (NCOES) has deteriorated to such a point that graduates of the Ad vanced Leader’s Course (ALC) and Senior Leader’s Course (SLC) routinely report that they learned absolutely nothing related to their military-occu pation specialty (MOS). This is a trav esty of the highest degree. Given the fact that NCOs’ only permanent-change-of-station move to the “school house” is for the Sergeants Major Academy, it is incumbent on leaders to ensure the most-quality training is be ing delivered at each step. If NCOs are not provided the opportunity to en hance subject-matter expertise in their MOS at Fort Benning during mandated professional-development courses, where is this to occur? ARC cannot sin gle-handedly pick up the slack for the lack of reconnaissance training in ABOLC and the abject failure of ALC and SLC to teach anything beyond the route-reconnaissance overlay. The institutional domain is to supple ment the operational domain. The Army cannot continue in its belief that the officer corps, through an over-reli ance on institutional knowledge, can single-handedly change the culture of Screen width = (1/2 the maximum effective range of the weapons sys tem) x (.75 the number of vehicles) x terrain + flank security. Regarding the terrain portion of the formula:

• Use 1 for unrestricted;

• Use .5 for restricted; or

• Use .25 for severely restricted.

• Flank security is calculated using the maximum effective range of the weapons system. Given the following conditions:

• An ABCT cavalry troop platoon with six Bradleys in unrestrictive terrain could screen a width of 9,750 meters and a depth of 4,875 meters.

• Width = (.5 x 3,000) x (.75 x 6) x 1 + 3,000 = 9,750 meters. Note: 3,000 is used for the maxi mum effective range of the M242 Bushmaster. Screen depth = width/2. Table 1. Figure 5. (Adapted from Figure B-2, ATP 3-20.97)

Fall 2018 the Army as a whole and provide the requisite emphasis and skills to bring R&S operations back to a pre-9/11 state. The NCO, the backbone of the Army, is still expected to serve as the subject-matter expert and primary de veloper of the young lieutenant. There fore, a refocused and restructured ap proach must be undertaken. At the end of the day, this article is merely a blend of information. Do not view this article as a shameless ploy to emphasize the importance of the course; that is not the intent. From a holistic perspective, this article is meant to inform the force and dispel rumors about what the course is and what it is not. ARC has changed significantly, and it will continue to undertake a wholesale approach to its methodology to retain relevancy for the operational force. I ask the operational force to emphasize NCO education beyond basic NCOES when it comes to efforts to continue the proliferation of cavalry knowledge and fieldcraft. Due to the fact that cav alry is a mindset and not a branch, it is imperative to move our doctrinal un derstanding forward through educa tion, not merely the use of a “bard” style of passing tribal lore across gen erations. CPT Patrick Zang is ARC’s course direc tor. His previous assignments include commander, Crazy Horse Troop, 2-13 Cavalry, Fort Bliss, TX, and Camp Bueh ring, Kuwait; assistant S-3, 2-13 Cav, Fort Bliss; and troop executive officer, mortar-platoon leader and tank-pla toon leader, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX, and Iraq. His military education includes CLC, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leader’s Course, ARC, ABOLC and Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science/history from Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Acronym Quick-Scan ABCT – armored brigade combat team ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course ADP – Army doctrinal publication ADRP – Army doctrinal reference publication ALC – Advanced Leader’s Course ARC – Army Reconnaissance Course ASI – additional skill identifier ATP – Army technical publication ATRRS – Army Training Requirements and Resource System BLOS – beyond-line-of-sight BMP – boyeva mashina pekhoty (Russian fighting vehicle) BRDM – boyevaya razvedyvatelnaya dozornaya mashina (Russian scout vehicle) CALL – Center for Army Lessons Learned CoA – course of action CRG – commander’s reconnaissance guidance CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course CTC – combat training center DA – Department of the Army DONSA – day of no scheduled activities DoRS – Department of Reconnaissance and Security EW – electronic warfare FM – field manual FM – frequency modulation FTX – field-training exercise HF – high frequency IBCT – infantry brigade combat team IDF – indirect fires IPB – intelligence preparation of the battlefield METT-TC – mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time and civilian considerations MOS – military-occupation specialty NCO – noncommissioned officer NCOES – Noncommissioned Officer Education System OPORD – operations order PACE – primary, alternate, contingency and emergency PAM -- pamphlet PIR – priority intelligence requirement R&S – reconnaissance and security RSLC – Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team SLC – Senior Leader’s Course SM – Soldier’s manual SoM – scheme of maneuver TLP – troop-leading procedure UAS – unmanned aerial system

• ADP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012.

• ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, December 2015.

• ATP 3-20.97, Cavalry Troop, September 2016.

• ATP 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, April 2013.

• “Russian New-Generation Warfare,” CALL Handbook 17-09, Version 2.1, April 2017.

• “Scouts in Contact: Tactical Vignettes for Cavalry Leaders,” CALL Handbook 17-01, December 2016.

• “Reconnaissance and Security Commander’s Handbook,” CALL Handbook 17-12, April 2017.

• “Radio and System Operators,” CALL Handbook 17-20, Version 2, August 2017.

• DA PA M 6 0 0 - 3 , O f f i ce r Professional Development and Career Management, June 2017.

• FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, July 1, 2015.

• FM 3-20.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, July 2006.

• SM 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron Universal Operational and Organizational Concept Volume III, Standard Scout Platoon (6x36), Feb. 10, 2017.

• Training Circular 3-25.26, Map Reading and Land Navigation, Nov. 15, 2013. Other References