Integration of Signals Intelligence, Electronic Warfare in Reconnaissance Troop: Seeing Where the Eye Cannot See

Fall 2018 Integration of Signals Intelligence, Electronic Warfare in Reconnaissance Troop: Seeing Where the Eye Cannot See by CPT Doni Wong, 1LT Theodore Lipsky, CPT Brigid Calhoun and CW2 Pablo Cruz In the ongoing debate of how to win against a near-peer adversary in a com plex operating environment, senior Army leaders have posited several so lutions to the question of tactical elec tronic warfare (EW) employment. As the most proximate U.S. light infan try brigade combat team (IBCT) to Rus sia, 173rd IBCT (Airborne) tested an in tegrated EW and signals-intelligence (SIGINT) platoon to bridge the capabil ities gap between the unit and its near-peer Russian adversary, whose armed forces demonstrated renewed EW ca pability in its 2014 conquest of Crimea. The test was conducted in February 2018 when 173rd IBCT (Airborne) con solidated its EW and SIGINT Soldiers into a combat EW intelligence (CEWI) platoon within its military-intelligence company (MiCo). The brigade initially tested the concept with moderate suc cess during Exercise Swift Response 17.2 at Hohenfels Training Area (HTA), Germany, in September 2017. To max imize the CEWI teams’ collection reach, the brigade leadership task-organized them under Troop A (aka “Anvil Troop”), 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Reg iment (Airborne). The concept was tested during 173rd IBCT’s next two ex ercises at HTA in January and April 2018. This article offers lessons-learned and recommendations from these three training exercises, specifically regard ing the utility of habitually integrating the CEWI teams with the brigade’s re connaissance platoons. Although a na scent potential solution to the tactical EW question, the CEWI teams of 173rd IBCT (Airborne) met their brigade com mander’s initial intent by locating en emy emitters, succinctly communicat ing their locations across multiple spectrums to the commander and pro viding the commander with options for enemy signal disruption. CEWI platoon established COL James B. Bartholomees, com mander of 173rd IBCT (Airborne), ap proved the consolidation in February 2018 of the brigade’s EW and SIGINT Soldiers into a CEWI platoon in 54th Bri gade Engineer Battalion’s MiCo. The brigade initially tested the integrated-platoon concept with moderate suc cess during two previous exercises at HTA in September 2017 and January

2018. However, the platoon’s perfor mance fell short of its full capability because of its inability to train as a sin gle platoon ahead of the exercises. After task-organization changes in Feb ruary and March 2018, new-equipment training (NET) and new-equipment fielding (NEF) of the Versatile Radio Observation and Direction (VROD), VROD Modular Adaptive Transmit (VMAX), Saber Fury (a system that manages the electromagnetic environ ment while on the move without net work connection) and Raven Claw (a system used with EW planning tools), the MiCo stood up the CEWI platoon according to the Army’s Multi-Func tional Intelligence and Electronic War fare Concept of Operations, Version 1.1 The brigade commander charged the platoon with three responsibilities that drove the train-up to the April 2018 Joint Warfighter Assessment (JWA) 18.1:

• Locate enemy signal emitters;

• Succinctly communicate their locations across multiple spectrums to the commander; and

• Provide the commander with options for enemy signal disruption. Although the platoon and MiCo lead ership acknowledged the long-term need for advanced fieldcraft and call-for-fire capability, plus training on the Raven unmanned aerial system (UAS) and/or Puma (small, battery-powered, hand-launched UAS), the leadership prioritized system cross-training, re porting and communication-platform proficiency between January and April 2018. The CEWI platoon’s relationship with Anvil Troop began during Exercise Bay onet Guard (see related article, this edition) in January 2018, a month be fore the consolidation directive. The MiCo leadership decided to attach the platoon to a maneuver unit during the force-on-force exercise to optimize the teams’ ability to conduct continuous 24-hour operations. The platoon oper ated below modified table of organiza tion and equipment strength during Bayonet Guard because only four of eight EW Soldiers were released by their parent battalions to participate. The undermanned teams struggled to simultaneously execute collection op erations while providing their own se curity. Therefore, Anvil Troop provided perimeter security, logistics support and a troop headquarters for mission command, enabling the CEWI teams to focus solely on survey and collection activities. This also leveraged the troop’s organic Ravens and 120mm mortars to fix and finish actionable tar gets. Building on this initial success, for JWA in April 2018, the brigade once again attached the CEWI platoon to Anvil Troop and placed the MiCo command er in the brigade tactical-operations center (TOC) to serve as the brigade’s chief of reconnaissance. Because the brigade intelligence-support element (BISE) remained co-located with the brigade TOC, the MiCo commander could exercise mission command over the company while synchronizing the brigade’s reconnaissance and collec tion efforts. Although the CEWI teams would be tactically controlled by Anvil Troop, they would also report to the cyber-EW activities (CEMA) cell in the BISE, which was comprised of the tra ditional SIGINT leadership of crypto logical-support team (CST) and EW

Fall 2018 leadership formerly aligned under the brigade operations section.

JWA

Anvil Troop’s mission during JWA was to conduct an advance guard east of the task force to protect it from direct fires, observed indirect fires and intel ligence collection. The troop’s plan di vided the mission into five phases:

• During Phase I, the troop planned and prepared. Notably, this phase included deliberate coordination with the troop’s attachments to develop a common operating picture and best integrate attachment capabilities into the overall plan.

• Phase II saw the beginning of tactical operations. During this phase, the troop entered the area of operations (AO) and established a screen along Phase Line (PL) Abrams. This screen protected the task force as it built combat power through the air-land sequence.

• Phase III encompassed the troop’s movement eastward from PL Abrams to PL Daily. During this movement, Anvil Troop provided the advance guard for the task force as it moved to contact.

• Following this eastward advance guard, the troop transitioned to Phase IV, in which it screened along the task force’s southern flank. This screen permitted the task force time and maneuver space to seize Objective Florida.

• During Phase V, the troop consolidated and reorganized. At the completion of Phase V, the troop stood ready to receive follow-on missions. Integration of CEWI platoon The two CEWI teams were each attached to an Anvil platoon: one in the northernmost part of the AO and one in the southernmost part of the AO. The plan split the CEWI platoon to take advantage of the elevation to the north and south, affording the SIGINT and EW systems the best possible lines of sight and lines of bearing. While operating with the scout pla toons, the teams received the autono my to decide where to position their survey and collection assets, with the sole condition that they remain to the rear of the platoon’s front-line trace and within supporting distance. This autonomy afforded the CEWI teams the flexibility to best emplace and le verage their systems while remaining nested in the scout platoons’ security perimeter. The CEWI teams maintained communi cations locally with their scout platoon Figure 1. Map of HTA with the task force’s phase lines, objectives, NAIs and Anvil Troop’s platoon boundaries. (Map by CPT Doni Wong)

Fall 2018 using very-high-frequency (VHF) radi os. The troop used Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) and satellite communica tions to communicate with the com mander and the BISE. The CEWI-team leaders could send intelligence that re quired immediate attention over VHF radio while sending less urgent intelli gence over JCR. The CEWI teams’ em ployment of JCR ensured they did not burden tactical nets and could receive updated priority intelligence require ments and named areas of interest (NAIs) from the BISE. It also reduced the troop’s overall electronic signature. Also, the JCR enabled the CEWI teams to send thorough written reports to the troop commander and CEMA cell in the BISE. The CEMA cell contextual ized these reports with collection from other intelligence disciplines and pro vided refined collection guidance to the CEWI teams. CEWI enables recon The mission demanded that the troop constantly transition from security tasks (such as screen) to reconnais sance tasks (such as area and route re connaissance). The CEWI platoon over came this high tempo by identifying and relaying changes to the enemy sit uation and potential targets of oppor tunity. In one such instance, as the troop ap proached PL Bundy during route recon naissance, the CEWI team attached to 3rd Platoon detected enemy positions near NAI 5215 (Hog Hill). This report confirmed the task force S-2’s templat ed enemy observation post at the same position, and it drove the troop’s decision to take an alternate route to bypass Hog Hill. Third Platoon subse quently conducted forward-passage-of-lines of a company team from Task Force Eagle, comprised of one tank pla toon and two infantry platoons, along the secured route reconnoitered by the scouts. The company team then maneuvered to the target’s location and destroyed the enemy while sus taining no casualties. In another instance, while conducting a screen along PL Harold, the CEWI teams determined the location and time for an enemy resupply operation. The detection increased the range in which Anvil Troop could conduct its re connaissance mission, as the identified location was beyond-line-of-sight. The troop used the report to process an in direct-fire mission that effectively dis rupted and desynchronized the ene my’s operations. Scouts enable CEWI Just as the CEWI platoon enabled the troop’s reconnaissance, the troop en abled CEWI operations in three ways: by providing coaching on camouflage and fieldcraft; by providing the Figure 2. Map of HTA with the task forces’ NAIs. (Mapboard by CPT Doni Wong)

Fall 2018 security necessary for sustained CEWI operations; and by conducting the route reconnaissance necessary to confidently position CEWI platforms where they could best operate. Anvil Troop learned the importance of camouflaging the CEWI teams during Exercise Bayonet Guard in January

2018. Though the CEWI teams em ployed their systems competently, they lacked expertise and experience with mounted movement and maneuver. This issue required immediate atten tion, as the mine-resistant ambush-protected all-terrain vehicles (M-ATVs) and their multiple antennae possess a unique physical signature and present a high-value target (HVT) for the ene my. Anvil Troop coordinated with the CEWI platoon before beginning operations to adequately camouflage the M-ATVs and discuss tactically sound routes. The CEWI platoon, without hesitation, l e a r n e d t h e A nv i l Tro o p vehicle-camou flage standard op erating procedure (SOP) and applied it to their M-ATVs. This early coordi nation ensured that the M-ATVs avoided detection at any point during the JWA. As previously not ed, during Bayonet Guard the under manned CEWI pla toon struggled to simultaneously conduct collection and security tasks. Therefore, Anvil Troop responded by adopting the prac tice of keeping its scouts near CEWI positions. The scouts assumed the re sponsibility of local security to best en able CEWI intelligence collection, which in turn helped drive the scouts’ scheme of maneuver, including counter-reconnaissance. This symbiot ic relationship explains much of Anvil Troop’s success. Third, Anvil Troop reconnoitered routes ahead of the CEWI attachments, mitigating the M-ATV’s cumbersome mobility and lack of stealth. It also aid ed the CEWI teams’ ability to position themselves on advantageous terrain. Finally, it allowed the platoon and troop to maintain momentum instead of slowing down for a mired M-ATV or turning around at a dead end. Acting on CEWI intel Throughout JWA, the troop had to de cide how it would act on the intelli gence its CEWI assets provided. The troop’s chosen courses of action (CoA) fell into four categories: continue to monitor, employ indirect fires, conduct electronic attack and conduct a direct ground attack. The first CoA was to continue gather ing intelligence through the vulnerabil ity exploited to acquire a higher payoff target without the risk of the enemy detecting the Blue Force’s (BLUFOR) collection efforts. For example, ahead of the final assault onto Objective Flor ida, Anvil Troop recommended no di rect action be taken on intelligence that indicated a meeting location be tween two leaders. As a result, this de cision enabled the CEWI team to con tinue its collection mission; the CEWI team learned where the opposing force’s daily resupply would occur. The second CoA leveraged indirect fires in an effort to neutralize the Figure 3. A CEWI team’s M-ATV conducts surveillance and collection missions while hidden near the forward-line-of-own-troops (FLoT). (U.S. Army photo by CSM Paul Fedorisin) Figure 4. The CEWI team operates while remaining hidden from visual contact, often within 500 meters or less of en emy positions. (U.S. Army photo by CSM Paul Fedorisin)

Fall 2018 target or disrupt the enemy’s opera tions. This was best accomplished us ing a UAS asset as a primary observer for clearance of fires against static po sitions such as a battle position or a lo gistical or mission-command node. De fensive positions are preferred targets because indirect fires will not have to chase a moving target, and they pro vide a high payoff by disrupting the en emy’s defenses or supporting efforts without unmasking BLUFOR ground forces. In the third CoA, the CEWI teams con ducted an electronic attack to desyn chronize enemy maneuvers and/or deny their ability to report on BLUFOR actions to adjacent or higher units. This was best implemented during en emy offensive operations or right be fore a BLUFOR attack. The ground com mander assumed risk with this CoA be cause the CEWI team conducting the electronic attack radiated a strong, constant signal and became vulnerable to enemy collection and countermea sures. The fourth and final CoA available to the maneuvering unit upon receipt of CEWI intelligence was to conduct a di rect ground attack. This was particular ly prudent when the destruction of an HVT was a priority or when indirect fires were not practical or available. Anvil Troop achieved decisive action when acting upon this fourth option during the JWA. While screening on PL Daily prior to the task force’s seizure of Objective Florida, the CEWI platoon detected the enemy’s assembly area location, scheme of maneuver and ex ecution timeline. After reporting this intelligence to the task force, the troop identified that the target location was located between the FLoT and the main body, posing a serious threat to the task force and eliminating indirect fire as a feasible CoA. The troop instead maneuvered two platoons to attack the assembly area. One platoon conducted the assault, and the second one provided support by fire. Owing to rapid collection of and action on the intelligence, the troop conducted the attack while the enemy maintained minimal security in its assembly area conducting priorities of work, so the enemy could not mus ter a counterattack on the task force. This action was a prime example of dy namic targeting using the “find, fix, track, target, engage and assess” meth odology at the troop level while main taining situational awareness for the task force. Current limitations Currently, the three main limitations are the size of the M-ATV and its mo bility, its large target signature and its dependency on external security. The CEWI platoon’s current vehicle configuration employs M-ATVs. While the M-ATV provides the crew with some protection and mobility, when maneuvering off-road or through the woods, the platform becomes restrict ed. At times during the JWA, the M-AT Vs could not follow the scouts to which they were attached because humvees could traverse terrain inaccessible to M-ATVs. To adapt, the scouts conduct ed route reconnaissance ahead of their attached CEWI teams and then pulled the teams forward on known passable routes. To decrease the CEWI’s vehicle signa ture, the scouts assisted the CEWI teams in camouflaging their vehicles. The scouts also shared their SOPs and lessons-learned on vehicle emplace ment into hide sites. In addition to the M-ATV’s size, SIGINT and EW activities that the CEWI teams conducted broadcast a significant sig nature over the electromagnetic spec trum. This makes the teams suscepti ble to enemy collection efforts. There fore it’s critical for the team and the command it supports to understand the risk they assume when the CEWI team executes different SIGINT and EW tasks. As stated before, the CEWI teams rely on an external security element, espe cially when positioned near the FLoT. At this point in the CEWI platoon’s training glidepath, the MiCo com mander and CEWI platoon leadership prioritized system cross-training and reporting over tactical combat skills. Because of this, the team relied on good visual camouflage, disciplined use of their EW equipment and a ma neuver unit to provide security to max imize their capabilities and survivabil ity. Figure 5. The 1-91 Cavalry camouflage SOP requires all lights and reflectors to be taped, burlap to be placed over the headlights and foliage applied to break up the geometric outline of the vehicle. (Photo by CSM Paul Fedorisin)

Fall 2018 Way ahead The JWA validated the CEWI-platoon concept and the benefit of its early in tegration with ground reconnaissance units. The teams met the brigade com mander’s intent by locating enemy emitters, succinctly communicating their locations across multiple spec trums to the commander and provid ing the commander with options for enemy signal disruption. A sustained habitual relationship with 1-91 Cavalry Squadron, specifically with Anvil Troop, will only increase the brigade recon naissance enterprise’s efficiency and effectiveness over time. When afforded time to train together, SIGINT and EW Soldiers grew as a team and gained trust in one another and their equipment. Future cross-training during the next 12-18 months may en able the brigade to field more teams. The complementary capabilities of the VROD, VMAX and PRD-13 dismounted systems underscore the utility of CEWI consolidation. The NET/NEF of the VROD and VMAX should be sustained, and units should send both military-oc cupation specialty 29-series and 35-se ries Soldiers to training. The mounted EW systems, however, require further development and test ing. The M-ATV platform should be re placed by a more mobile vehicle that has a similar visual signature to scout vehicles. The 173rd IBCT (Airborne) fielded two Razor vehicles in July 2018 equipped with more electronic-search and electronic-attack equipment. Fu ture fielding of new CEWI equipment, however, must incorporate a unit test ing phase before deployment to a ma jor training exercise. The brigade received the prototype Sa ber Fury and Raven Claw systems in late March 2018 and executed its JWA three weeks later. Unfortunately, the field-service representatives (FSR) at tempted a software upgrade to both systems the day before the JWA’s exe cution, resulting in more system com plications. Thus, the systems’ capabili ties did not meet the unit’s expecta tion. Also, the systems were fielded with laptop and Medusa cable short ages that prevented the BISE from pull ing all the data collected by the for ward teams. Abundant FSR support during the JWA mitigated several of the Saber Fury and Raven Claw issues, but a rapidly deployable unit will not always have the luxury of FSR support in a deployed environment. The CEWI platoon is participating in the brigade combat-training-center ro tation, Exercise Saber Junction 18, which started in September at HTA. The brigade once again attached the platoon to 1-91 Cav. The platoon’s training priorities are focused on:

• Refined communications practices and reporting formats;

• Integrating the Puma UAS systems that were fielded in early April 2018; and

• Integrating the Razor vehicles. The UAS systems elevate the CEWI pla toon into a multi-sensor team concept, leveraging UAS to target and integrate fires. The long-term plan for the CEWI platoon will involve sending the pla toon leadership and squad leaders to the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course and all platoon mem bers to the Low-Level Voice Intercept Operators’ Course. The CEWI platoon concept has pro gressed significantly since its first em ployment in October 2017, and with proper training and equipping, it will function as an optimal force multiplier within the brigade’s reconnaissance enterprise. CPT Doni Wong commands Anvil Troop, 1-91 Cav (Airborne), 173rd IBCT (Air borne), in Grafenwoehr, Germany. His previous assignments include Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC) troop commander with 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 199th Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA; and platoon leader and then company executive of ficer, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regi ment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. CPT Wong’s military schools in clude ABOLC, Airborne School, Ranger School, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course and Cavalry Leader’s Course. His awards include the Bronze Star Medal and Meritorious Service Medal (one oak-leaf cluster). He holds a bach elor’s of arts degree in sociology from University of California-Davis. 1LT Theodore Lipsky is the executive of ficer of Anvil Troop, 1-91 Cav (Air borne), 173rd IBCT (Airborne), Grafen woehr. His previous assignment was motorized-reconnaissance-platoon leader, Anvil Troop, 1-91 Cav, 173rd IBCT. 1LT Lipsky’s military schools in clude ABOLC, Airborne School, Ranger School and Army Reconnaissance Course. He holds a bachelor’s of sci ence degree in comparative politics and Russian language from U.S. Mili tary Academy (USMA), West Point, NY. CPT Brigid Calhoun commands the MiCo in 54th Engineer Battalion (Air borne), 173rd IBCT (Airborne), Caserma Del Din, Vicenza, Italy. Her previous as signments include S-2 for 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd IBCT (Airborne); assistant brigade S-2, 173rd IBCT (Airborne), Vicenza; and leader, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Platoon, Company D (military intelligence), Special Troops Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Forward Operating Base Gamberi, Af ghanistan, and Fort Campbell, KY. CPT Calhoun’s military education includes the Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Air-Assault School, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Air borne School and Jumpmaster School. She holds a bachelor’s of science de gree in history from USMA. Her awards include the Bronze Star Medal. CW2 Pablo Cruz is the CST officer in charge (OIC) for 173rd IBCT (Airborne). He previously served as the CST OIC for 319th and 519th Military Intelligence Battalions under 525th Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade. His mili tary education includes the Warrant Officer Basic Course; Warrant Officer Candidate School; Air-Assault and Air borne Schools; and the Survival, Eva sion, Resistance and Escape High-Risk Course. His awards include the Bronze Star Medal. Notes 1 U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excel lence, Integrated Intelligence and [CEMA] Operations at Echelons Corps and Below: Multi-Functional Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Concept of Oper ations, Version 1.0, Dec. 21, 2017.

Fall 2018 ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course AO – area of operations BISE – brigade intelligence-support element BLUFOR – Blue Force CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities CEWI – combat electronic warfare intelligence CoA – course of action CST – cryptologic support team EW – electronic warfare Acronym Quick-Scan FLoT – forward-line-of-own-troops FSR – field-service representative HTA – Hohenfels Training Area HVT – high-value target IBCT – infantry brigade combat team JCR – Joint Capability Release JWA – joint warfighter assessment M-ATV – mine-resistant ambush-protected all-terrain vehicle MiCo – military-intelligence company NAI – named area of interest NEF – new-equipment fielding NET – new-equipment training OIC – officer in charge PL – phase line SIGINT – signals intelligence SOP – standard operating procedure TOC – tactical-operations center UAS – unmanned aerial system USMA – U.S. Military Academy VHF – very high frequency VMAX – VROD Modular Adaptive Transmit VROD – Versatile Radio Observation and Direction