Brigade Combat Team 2020 retired LTC Robert W. Lamont

The force structure the Army carries into 2020 will define its vision well into this century. That structure will be shaped by the company-grade officers who walked the streets of Baghdad, who will mature into the field-grade staffs leading the equipment-acquisition and doctrinal-development processes of the BCT 2020 structure that takes the field. Like all previous generations, their experiences, good and bad, will greatly influence their decisions and actions as they shape the personnel, material and doctrine ahead. Other shaping influences on the Army’s force structure will be generated from the first five decades of this century (Table 1), with potential to influence our national character. Thus the force structure of 2020 will result from the training and operational experiences of the post-Global War on Terrorism generation, who will also face the new peer-competitor strategic landscape in the last half of this century with its associated economic and political challenges. Since the importance of BCT 2020 force structure as we look ahead should not be Brigade Combat Team 2020 by retired LTC Robert W. Lamont 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 Combat engagement Disengagement

Modernization Flashpoint Events Company-grade personnel gain operational experience Current doctrine expands New technologies are combat-tested Declining deployment tempo Field-grade personnel shepherd equipment modernization and organization Economic activity and lack of clear peer threat reduces budget support and industrial base Structure fielded Training defines operational experience and mindset Future operational concepts defined and equipment requirements detailed Concepts and requirements developed post-2012 begin to reach force Operational techniques experimented with under 2020 structure reach doctrinal maturity China surpasses both USA and European Union in gross domestic product* World reaches oil-production tipping point Climate change disrupts food supplies Overpopulation increases all resource demand Technologies Unmanned aerial vehicles Command-and-control networks Satellite communications to lower echelons Execution of 2012 Army Modernization Strategy: Joint distributed communications, Ground Combat Vehicle, artillery enhancements, air scout upgrades Robotics Artificial intelligence Autonomous engagement Defense acquisition and private industry developments Table 1. Developmental influences 2000-2040. These shaping influences on the Army’s force structure have potential to influence our national character. *From www.photius.com, Photius Coutsoukis, 2010. understated, it’s therefore timely to explore possible organizational designs for the brigade combat team in the 2020 timeframe. In this article, I’ll center not only on the mission, doctrine and capabilities demanded of the BCT to conduct full-spectrum operations, but I’ll also discuss the BCT organizational design’s ability to implement maneuver-based defeat mechanisms as a follow-on to initial-entry operations in many environments. Finally, I’ll discuss the limitations that cost places on organizational changes and the constant dialogue that must occur while the Army prepares to disengage from current operating theaters in a resource-constrained environment. Full-spectrum operations command and control In discussing fleet tactics, Navy CAPT Wayne Hughes notes, “Doctrine isn’t what is written in the books; it is what warriors believe in and act on.”1 One need only look at Field Manual 3-0, Operations, to realize that a decade of conflict has caused the Army to pause and reflect on what it believes. That reflection includes full-spectrum operations, a subject that now occupies its own chapter in the manual. The chapter details the interaction between offense, defense and stability operations. It also sets that interaction against the demands to take initiative and operate at a faster tempo than the enemy to negate his effectiveness relative to the current battlefield situation. Also, it treats non-lethal operations in stability and civil-support environments with the same intensity found in the discussion of more traditional offensive and defensive operations. The Army realized that operating within the local population did not receive full focus when forces trained away from the local community. So, within the context of these full-spectrum operations, what does it mean to control tempo? To better understand the competitive dynamic of seizing the initiative, a model of the process and interactions between friendly and opposing command-and-control systems is required. The Lawson 22

Command-Control Cycle is introduced in Figure 1 to visualize these processes.2 Table 2 details the actions available to each side to influence these key points within the C2 cycle and gain an advantage in terms of operational or tactical tempo in the process.3 Since we want to be able to gain an advantage over our opponent and seize the initiative, any future force structure must be able to muster these capabilities. By executing the command cycle faster than our enemy, we impose our will on his ability to influence the action; if we can stay ahead in this process, the action they do take will be of limited effectiveness since the operating environment will have changed by the time he is able to conduct his plan. Joint context The discussion within the Army’s capstone document, Operations, clarifies that a single large-fix formation cannot support the diverse requirements of full-spectrum operations. Future BCT structures must work in the context of their roles in accomplishing the joint task force’s intent. The Army’s approach, using modular force structure, ensures the flexibility of accomplishing a range of missions. It has made the combined-arms brigade the main instrument for conducting maneuver-based campaign in a noncontiguous environment.4 Figure 2 provides a visualization of the phases and capabilities needed to implement high-end maneuver against a wide range of threats. As depicted, the first phase of our joint campaign is the seizure of a lodgment area by the early-entry force. This may demand a forcible entry by airborne, airmobile or amphibious forces. Alternatively, invitation and support from the host nation may characterize early entry. These initial operations secure the area, facilities and conditions necessary to conduct subsequent decision maneuver ashore. During the second phase, the BCT 2020 rapidly translates intelligence into actionable maneuver to ensure it retains initiative throughout the operation. With initiative, BCT 2020 causes the enemy to face an expanding array of tactical Sense Process Compare Decide Act Sense Process Compare Decide Enemy force Own force Desired state Desired state Controlling function Physical execution Environment Counter-reconnaissance battle Act Figure 1. Lawson Command-Control Cycle. The Lawson model outlines how C2 information is used from initial input into the planning process through the implementation of force actions in the operating environment. Within the context of full-spectrum operations, the influence of civilian populations is included as part of the environment. BCT sensors collect information on the enemy and environment and process this against their own force data. This provides the commander and his staff situational awareness against which to compare their desired endstate. Any difference between the two becomes the basis for action orders to the blue force. Layered on top of the Lawson Cycle are key focal points for the force designer, such as the counter-reconnaissance battle, shown as the dashed box around the competing sensor functions. The ability to gain positional advantage is captured during the physical execution of the command cycle as the BCT’s capabilities are translated from planning into battlefield action and effects. Connecting these two processes are the controlling functions of command, shown as an arrow. Visual, radio and digital communications serve to translate the commander’s intent into action. Actions Sensing Controlling Physical execution Destroy Attack it Attack it Mobility kill Disrupt Jam it - gains range Jam it - gains time Barrier employment Deceive False targets, chaff False message traffic False route, directions Deny Avoid sensors Communications security, information assurance Barrier and fires Exploit Detect enemy Monitor enemy Channel movement Table 2. C2 focal points and influence. 23 threats he is unable to counter due to their rapidity, combined-arms nature and recurring positional advantage. As depicted in Figure 2, for brigades to become the principal tactical unit for conducting maneuver-based operations, they must:

• Be organized to see the battlefield better than their opponent;

• Have the systems to challenge a full range of enemy action; and

• Link these two attributes together with a robust C2 architecture, able to more effectively transition to the command cycle. BCT modernization One of the key constraints in advancing a BCT structure for 2020 is that no additional funding will be available for material solutions. With that in mind, the 2012 Army Modernization Strategy becomes the baseline for proposed capability sets that are available for consideration as we focus on potential brigade organizations. Without getting into the detailed analysis of each warfighting function’s material profile planned for the outyears, the following is highlighted as influencing future brigade designs. Collectively, the fielding of the Joint Tactical Radio System, Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, Distributed Common Ground System-Army and Joint Battle Command-Platform will continue to improve the ability of the brigade to function within a JTF and control its own operations across a wide range of battlefield activities. The Kiowa Warrior upgrades will advance the brigade’s ability to sense the environment and provide a better armed response when needed. Unmanned vehicles, ground and air, will provide more sensing capabilities to the brigade and allow for lower-risk target acquisition and engagement. Finally, the planned Ground Combat Vehicle modernization will support better mobility and protection for our mounted infantry as they face an array of tasks across the full spectrum of conflict, which demands “boots on the ground” to successfully engage and bring the mission to closure.5 Figure 3 proposes the BCT organization for the 2020 timeframe. Most of this structure is familiar to those with a heavy-brigade background. What jumps out as new is the addition of a composite helicopter squadron directly under the control of the brigade. While the interim and final command relationships of this organization are up for discussion, the intent is to provide the brigade direct and responsive aviation support demanded by full-spectrum operations. Figure 2. Joint campaign phasing and maneuver. The capabilities of such a squadron would allow additional aerial reconnaissance, vertical mobility for both assault and sustainment, and attack options characterized by speed, accuracy and lethality. These are hallmark capabilities required to develop that expanding array of tactical threats needed to seize and retain the initiative and exploit maneuver as a defeat mechanism. The influence of such a brigade structure clears during movement beyond the perimeter of the lodgment area. Maneuver options on this perimeter increase at a rate of 3-to-1 for each step the brigade extends the perimeter.6 However, if we can expand our thinking away from the limitations associated with a linear representation of the battlefield, the addition of air mobility allows the brigade to strike at any point with range. This opens the maneuver potential exponentially, greatly complicating the threat’s ability to focus on a single line of advance. In this way, the combination of airmobile reach and speed compound the hitting power of heavy ground-maneuver units. Enemy actions taken to counter one threat, such as dispersing to cover possible landing sites to his rear, make him vulnerable to the capability set of the other arm of our brigade ground-maneuver triad. This places the enemy on the horns of a dilemma, from which he loses the initiative. The composite helicopter squadron has the potential to be tailored for each mission and operating area. As a starting point, this organization would include six attack aircraft, six light-lift aircraft, 12 medium-lift aircraft and six reconnaissance aircraft. Also, the organization provides the operating headquarters for unmanned aerial vehicles. Finally, the headquarters provides the logistic and maintenance support appropriate for this number of aircraft to the squadron. The other twist to the brigade structure is the addition of a dismounted-infantry battalion. This returns the triangular nature to the brigade structure and extends its ability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict. It is somewhat ironic that operations at the “lower” end of the spectrum of conflict are manpower-intensive to execute, but this is necessary. In short, positive interaction with local populations demand dismounted infantry for success. Whether walking security patrols, engaging in humanitarian relief or completing civil-affairs projects, it is Soldier-to-civilian contact that defines national presence. At the middle and upper end of the spectrum of conflict, this dismounted element adds stay- 24 JTF Phase 2 decisive maneuver and transition Lodgment area X X X Air & surface ports of debarkation Urban areas

X Early entry force-JTF Phase 1 X ing power and security when facing the ever-expanding urban landscape associated with many potential Third World operating environments. Fielding the proposed communication suite will allow the brigade to combine combat functionality in new ways. Figure 4 provides insight into a few of the possible combinations available under the 2020 charter. The brigade has three functional groupings that provide a framework for cross-coordination and support rather that formal command structures, including:

• A ground maneuver element;

• An aviation combat element; and

• A combat-support and combat-service-support element. BCT elements Cavalry. The cavalry squadron within the ground-maneuver element provides the brigade the ability to conduct economy-of-forces missions during high-intensity operations beyond the lodgment area. It screens open flanks, provides route security and sets the stage for the three maneuver battalions to engage the enemy on favorable terms. Also, it adds eyes on the battlefield to collect and pass on the raw information needed to devel-

MI X op the situational awareness required to outmaneuver their opponent. The combat power inherent in the cavalry squadron allows it to fight for intelligence and develop the situation in a manner not achievable by similar organizations that must depend on stealth as their sole mechanism for accomplishing the collection of battlefield information. Mobility. Since maneuver is a recurring theme around which our BCT 2020 structure is built, it should come as no surprise that mobility would form a key point of discussion as we explore how the various parts of the brigade work together. The dismounted-infantry battalion will use the speed inherent in light and medium helicopter lift to secure chokepoints, block enemy action and control routes, and in so doing ensure the forward movement of the heavy ground battalions. In other scenarios, trucks will provide their mobility as they follow in close support of the rest of the ground-maneuver element. Engineers. The doctrinal mobility role of the engineer company remains consistent with current practice and is a key capability in the brigade, exploiting maneuver as a defeat mechanism. Augmenting the gap-crossing capability of this organization will have to be explored. This is driven by the fact that drainage patters historically move from higher elevation inland to the coastal plain, creating potential gaps along any route of lateral expansion from the lodgment area. Fortunately, since the brigade is operating within the context of a JTF, naval units can support some of these gap-crossing requirements when such a capability is demanded in and around the littoral. In some scenarios, more engineer assets may well be demanded given the difficult nature of the operating area or the counter-mobility capability of the enemy. Communications and command. To see the battlefield, the brigade’s enhanced communications and command suite will link all the organization’s sensors to provide a unified common operating picture of friendly, enemy and noncombatant players within the battlespace. Ground-maneuver reports, UAV downlinks and reconnaissance helicopters will feed the target-acquisition process as fire-support centers rack and Figure 3. Proposed BCT 2020 organization. 25 stack targets consistent with the commander’s priorities and joint-force rules of engagement. The brigade will be able to shape the battlefield to facilitate ground maneuver by directly linking these sensors to the shooter executing the attack. This direct linkage has the potential to reduce response time and, in so doing, increase the relevance of these attacks while reducing potential fratricide and collateral civilian damage. Prepositioned-equipment support While these examples of combined combat show the capabilities of the brigade, the same technique can apply to the lower end of the conflict spectrum. During humanitarian operations, medical, transportation and engineer units can combine to move supplies, restore basic services and provide medical assistance when host-nation services have broken down either due to enemy action or natural disaster. The helicopter lift greatly extends the range of such operations and provides quick response and support before any rebel or enemy forces can secure popular favor during times of stress. Since helicopter lift can operate independently of the host nation’s road network, it provides the brigade’s leadership options to counter route-based threats or continue operations in the face of a heavily damaged transportation system. In this scenario, it may well be the combat-service-support element that is the focus of effort for the brigade. Combat units in this case would operate in a supporting role by providing the security force needed to allow humanitarian operations to proceed unencumbered. However, stationing these maneuver brigades will require a combination of forward-basing, Army prepositioned afloat and in-continental U. S. positioning to exploit the shortening strategic timelines of an uncertain world. While forward-basing options may be limited, they represent dramatically shortened air-transportation requirements that have potential to reduce the amount of lift demanded for a deployment and the time needed to execute. When this potential combines with the APA equipment sets, the BCT 2020 is able to deploy in a minimum amount of time. The combined operational reach of APA and air deployment offers the best odds of exploiting the strategic surprise resulting from initial-entry operations and, in so doing, sets the stage for further maneuver beyond the lodgment area. Finally, adding this same approach with the extended deployment leg associated with stateside basing provides the same deployment options but at a higher cost in airlift assets. Balancing these modernization options will demand across service look at the joint-capabilities needs down the line. Training BCT 2020 While organizational charts provide some insight into future force design, the

MI A U L U M X Battlefield shaping Ground maneuver Sensor-to-shooter linkage Target acquisition and assignment Combat support and combat service support Mobility Aviation support Figure 4. Battlefield functional alignments. 26

AAR – after-action review APA – Army prepositioned afloat BCT – brigade combat team C2 – command and control JTF – joint task force NSWC – Naval Surface Warfare Center UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle Acronym Quick-Scan reality remains for any operational unit: if you can’t train it, you can’t fight it. Meeting the Army’s standards for brigade-level-and-below training is achievable within the current National Training Center infrastructure. A larger, and in some way more important issue, is whether BCT 2020 can be trained within the context of full-scale JTF employment. This implies a JTF training location as rigorous in its operating environment and evaluation methodologies as those found at the service level for the Army at Fort Irwin, CA; the Air Force at Nellis Air Force Base, NV; or the Navy at Corona Naval Surface Warfare Center, CA. As we build new force structures in the 2020 timeframe, they will demand a modernization of the JTF training environment as well. This training environment will require the full instrumentation of the operating forces to establish ground truth as a basis for detailed and rigorous after-action reviews. Most of the pieces for such a training arena are currently in place. Groundtruth data in terms of time, space and position are currently captured at the service level for three of the services as indicated above. NSWC Corona has the facilities to pull all this data together and provide near-real-time exercise reconstruction to support the JTF AAR process. By linking the Southern California naval-operating areas with ground and air maneuver space from Irwin, Twentynine Palms, Nellis, Chocolate Mountain and Yuma, the services can build a JTF operating area of enough size, environmental complexity and diversity to fully challenge any future brigade or JTF force design. This will continue to increase in importance as the range of sensor and weapon systems expands; the ability to fully exploit their inherent capability will become increasing difficult as these capabilities outstrip the confines of many current operating areas. The maneuver space afforded the JTF commander on the West Coast is unique and should receive special attention in the resource-constrained moderation that awaits all the services. Interactive organizations The BCT 2020 structure promotes Soldier development by bringing together diverse branch experience while focusing the entire organization on accomplishing a single mission. This structure brings straight-leg infantry, mechanized infantry and Armor Soldiers into routine contact with each other to share professional insight and lessons-learned. Aviation capabilities interweave into an operational array as they support maneuver and sustainment operations across the battlefield. The combat multipliers inherent with combat-support and combat-service-support, especially as it applies to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, are visible across the brigade structure as each organization contributes its role in mission accomplishment. This inherently interactive organization provides a testbed for future operational designs and serves as a proving ground for the development of maneuver soldiers across the brigade. In fact, these very interactions in the middle- to late-2020 timeframe will drive future operational-concept development and material-requirements definition. This should add importance to the need to field a dynamic brigade structure that explores ground- and air-mobility options within a maneuver-based paradigm as the Army prepares for a range of potential operational scenarios. The ability of anew generation of Soldiers to solve these increasing complex operational problems will be instrumental in our national survival. Retired U. S. Marine Corps LTC Robert

W. Lamont served as an exercise action officer for III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan, planning Tandem Thrust in Australia and Cobra Gold in Thailand. Other assignments included operations analyst in the Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, completing analyses for anti-armor force structure, combat identification and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. He also served as a tank company commander and assistant operations officer with 3rd Tank Battalion, Twentynine Palms, CA. His service afloat includes executive officer, Marine Detachment, USS Constellation, and combat cargo officer, USS Cleveland. His military schooling includes the Basic School, Quantico, VA; Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY; and Armor Officer Advanced Course, Fort Knox. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in management and technology from the U. S. Naval Academy and a master’s of science in operations research from Naval Postgraduate School. He is a silver-level member of the Order of St. George. Notes 1 Hughes, CAPT Wayne Jr., U. S. Navy, Fleet Tactics, Theory and Practice, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1986. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, February 2008. 5 Army Modernization Plan 2012, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, May 2011. 6 Since pi = circumference (C) divided by diameter (D), and we know that the diameter is twice the radius (R), it follows that C = 2*R*pi. However, we are only interested in the landward side of the circumference, which is the perimeter (P), so divide by 2 and we determine that P = pi *

R. Finally, we approximate pi as three and somewhat understate the rate at which the linear maneuver space expands. 27