Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan: Army and Marine Corps Differences retired MG Toney Stricklin

(Editor’s note: In this article, retired MG Stricklin, former commander of the Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, makes a case to maneuver commanders for more use of the M-982 Excalibur. In the article immediately following this one, COL Gene Meredith and other writers assigned to Fort Sill’s Fires Center of Excellence give a more cautionary view of Excalibur. Both articles are presented here for consideration.) Our country has engaged in along and costly war for the last decade. During this time, the enemy affected many of the U. S. military forces’ operational changes. These changes enable our forces to adapt to an enemy grounded in a 12th-Century tribal culture and capable of executing a 21st-Century insurgency. The U. S. Army and Marine Corps continue to spearhead our nation’s efforts on the ground. While taking the fight to our enemies in forbidding terrain and circumstances, the Army is also going through significant organizational and training adaptations. The changes mean to prepare us for the war we fight today as well as future wars. Unfortunately, these Army-level, top-down, directed changes have unintended consequences. For instance, these changes affect the Field Artillery Branch’s ability to defeat adversaries in future wars. Some of the problems include fire-support coordination and organizational changes made over the past decade to Army field-artillery units, which have had unintentional consequences on the employment of precision munitions such as the M-982 Excalibur in theater. The USMC, which of course is not subject to the Army’s organizational changes, employs the M-982 in Afghanistan at a significantly higher rate than the Army does. This is worth further examination by Army maneuver commanders. For example, over the six-month period of October 2010 to April 2011, Army maneuver commanders employed the M-982 11 times in Afghanistan. Over the same period, USMC commanders fired the M-982 149 times. (Rates have also remained consistent over recent months.) The discrepancy in using the M-982 is an interesting statistic given that the weapon is equally available to both services. Since USMC commanders herald the M-982’s effectiveness – in fact, indicating that the M-982’s success exceeds their expectations – this article addresses several things:

• One aspect of the changes affecting the Army in Afghanistan, contrasting it with how USMC field-artillery units are thriving in the same environment; and

• The difference in how the Army and Marine Corps employ the M-982. In researching this article, I focused on all aspects of why the Army does not employ the M-982 at the same rate as the USMC. Employing Excalibur Typically, engagement of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan occurs in areas and locations where potential for col-Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan: Army and Marine Corps Differences by retired MG Toney Stricklin lateral damage is certain. The M-982 gives maneuver commanders the organic capability to deliver the precision necessary to avoid civilian casualties and minimize collateral damage. GEN David Petraeus pointed out the importance of precision when he released his guidance Aug. 3, 2010, for conducting counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. “We can’twin without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” he said. “Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate, which is exactly what the Taliban wants; do not fall into their trap. We must continue our efforts to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.” The Marine Corps embraced the M-982’s accuracy, lethality and ability to minimize collateral damage. Some of Excalibur’s advantages:

• The M-982 reduces the logistics tail, which in the past required mountains of “dumb-iron” munitions.

• The M-982 performs well against targets where collateral damage must be minimal and the target is accurately located. In scenarios with “troops in contact” and situations where friendly forces are within 100 meters of the target, the M-982 limits collateral damage.

• With the M-982, “danger-close” is a technique that may be no longer necessary. Army reports indicate that units are surprised and disappointed when the M-982 does not destroy the target building. The engineering of other munitions destroys structures and kills its inhabitants. In the M-982, the engineering provides a precision kill without destroying the structure or infrastructure surrounding the target. 4 differences Loss of Army’s fire-support coordinators. After much research, I believe that the single greatest impediment for why Army maneuver units do not employ the M-982 consistently is the loss of fire-support officer functionality at brigade combat team and division levels. This is evident in the loss of the Army’s senior fire-support coordinators in BCT and division headquarters, and the elimination of the division’s fire-support element. Although organic FSOs remain assigned to the BCT and division, their experience, training and access to senior maneuver commanders is not as effective as were senior FSCOORDs. In today’s organizations, FSOs may not function as the full-time fire FSO on a day-to-day basis. The changes of the Army modular force structure eliminated the brigade fire-support element from the direct-support artillery battalion and made it organic to the BCT. The Army’s decision to inactivate its division and corps artilleries eliminated the FSCOORD for divisions and corps that make up many joint-task-force organizations. Those colonels (formerly division-ar- 16 Excalibur: 2 views tillery commanders) and brigadier generals (formerly corps-artillery commanders) who served as the senior FSCOORDs had the training, experience, confidence and access to the senior maneuver and JTF commanders that our current field-artillery commanders do not. The senior FSCOORDs’ credibility had a profound impact on brigade, battalion and company commanders’ ability to employ and deliver indirect fires for their units. Simply stated, the lack of senior FSCOORDs inhibits the tactical and operational understanding that U. S. Army maneuver commanders need to employ the M-982 and other precision munitions at the appropriate time and circumstance. This is not an indictment of the U. S. Army or our field-artillery commanders. Instead, it points to a significant gap regarding support relationships between senior commanders and multiple organizations. As the U. S. Army made its modularity decisions a few years ago, I confirmed that it was the intent of senior Army leaders to later review the sweeping organizational changes made and address any unintentional repercussions. Changes in FSCOORD structure created significant ramifications across the Army and the BCT. Review of all my evidence suggests that today’s maneuver commanders and the FSOs serving in BCT and higher headquarters have significantly less functionality and expertise today than in similar organizations 10 years ago. Lack of organic assets. Fire support is not the only inhibiting factor affecting M-982 employment. To use a combat capability effectively and consistently, it must be readily available to the maneuver commander regardless of weather, time of day or availability of other assets. Another reason why Army units do not use the M-982 more is that infantry BCT commanders do not have an organic weapon capable of firing the LW155mm howitzers in their modified table of organization and equipment. Many IBCTs, however, have task-organized in Afghanistan and include an LW155mm howitzer battery. Research indicates that the Army lacks instruction on the delivery of the M-982 in the IBCT during pre-deployment training cycles at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. By contrast, the USMC uses a system that provides full M-982 delivery capability. The LW155mm howitzer is their direct-support cannon system. With the Non-Line-of-Sight-Launch System terminated by the Army and no LW155mm howitzers to fire the M-982 in the IBCT, the Army, in its IBCT, has no organic means to employ precision munitions. We have instead relied heavily on close-air support to deliver precision munitions. Composite field-artillery battalions may be the only near-term solution for the Army now. Field-artillery precision munitions should complement tactical air and attack helicopters and provide the maneuver commander scalable engagement options for a variety of targets. This also gives the maneuver commander a 100-percent organic capability, day or night, good or bad weather, 24/7 to deliver precision attacks at the designated time and place of his choosing regardless of support availability. Lack of responsive airspace command and control. Another significant factor affecting M-982 employment in Afghanistan is airspace command and control. Some may argue this is the most significant factor. The Marine Direct Air Support Center is responsible for coordinating direct-air-support missions, along with the Fire Support Coordination Center. As a result, the USMC’s FSCOORD measures associated with artillery and air support are much less complex than what the Army has to deal with. Marine Corps M-982 missions sometimes clear at the battalion/ regimental combat team. In opposition, the Army elevates clearances to the Air Support Operations Center/Coalition Air Operations Center or International Joint Command in Afghanistan. For Army troops in connection with this coordination, procedure is clearly non-responsive to the maneuver commander’s needs. However, the position of units also affects why USMC commanders are likely to employ the M-982 against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In the north, the Army must contend with many more command layers than the Marine Corps does, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the east, Army units have CAS only 10 minutes away, which creates an overreliance on that asset. (There is no guarantee our nation’s next fight will readily have CAS only 10 minutes away.) Organic delivery means must be available for Army/JTF commanders. Too expensive? Finally, in a discussion about why Army units are hesitant or unwilling to employ the M-982, I was surprised to hear a young former FSO say the M-982 is so expensive that he was hesitant to use it. This is an example of a training issue with an easy resolution. Young officers and noncommissioned officers need to understand that once the institutional Army procures a munition for employment in combat, its cost is not a factor in the “how best to kill the enemy or save U. S. lives” decision process. The M-982 does not cost $100,000 per round. The cost of the M-982 1A is now $80,000 and 1B is $40,000 – it is cheaper than the Army would like, but procuring it in quantities that will reduce individual unit cost is still difficult. Do our officers and NCOs think about the lifecycle costs of employing precision munitions from the U. S. Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy tactical bombers who support them? I do not think that enters the tactical or operational calculus of whether or not to employ air-delivered precision munitions. So why should it be a factor in employing the M-982? USMC experiences with Excalibur The comments Marines made extolling the M-982’s accuracy, speed and lethality to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces were impressive: “Always on target.” “Two [Joint Direct Attack Munitions] missed the target; called in Excalibur and had a ‘shack.’” “Accurate to a gnat’s a__.” “At the end of the day, my [commanding officer] always asks, ‘What’s the status of my Excalibur inventory?’” “I fired at max range with a cold tube and still had a 10-meter hit.” “I had eight bad guys in a building. Excalibur went through the roof and got them all.” “It has given new life to the field artillery. No collateral damage.” Perhaps the most telling story came from election day in Afghanistan: the Taliban attacked two forward-operating bases simultaneously. “We called in Excalibur on one of the targets, at about 100 meters from us, and had a direct hit. Because of the accuracy, not only did the Taliban retreat from our FOB, but also from the other one as well.” And, finally, “We had eyes on our high-value target with Scan Eagle but couldn’t get him, even with a gunship. He went into a small courtyard and we hit him with an Excalibur, with no collateral damage to the surrounding buildings.” The last and most important comment made by a Marine was, “Excalibur saves Marines’ lives.” 17

Acronym Quick-Scan BCT – brigade combat team CAS – close-air support FOB – forward-operating base FSCOORD – fire-support coordinator FSO – fire-support officer Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, is capable of this, but the JRTC does not allow the IBCT to fire the M-982 during training. These are five modest changes that if incorporated will enhance our BCT’s effectiveness and save lives today and in the future. Reprinted with permission from Fires, January-February 2012 edition. Retired MG Toney Stricklin served 32 years as a commissioned officer and commanded the U. S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, OK, from July 1999 to August 2001. He is chairman of the consulting firm TDRS LLC. Appointed by former Secretary of the Army Pete Geren as civilian aide to the Secretary of the Army, Oklahoma (West), 2008-2010, he was subsequently appointed by Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin to the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education in 2011. 5 changes needed The M-982 is a very accurate and effective munition, and there are some steps the Army should immediately undertake to make it more responsive to maneuver commanders. First is to repair the functionality loss of fire-support coordination in the Army. We need senior field-artillery officers as FSCOORDs responsible for advising, training and mentoring maneuver commanders on the employment of fires. Secondly, the Army must develop a less cumbersome and more responsive airspace coordination process. When the process cannot support troops in contact, it is ineffective and must be fixed. Thirdly, IBCTs must have an organic weapon to employ precision munitions. Equipping changes must make the LW155mm howitzer organic to the IBCT. Finally, as units prepare to deploy to Afghanistan, it is essential that they train as they fight by firing the M-982. The National IBCT – infantry brigade combat team JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center JTF – joint task force NCO – noncommissioned officer USMC – United States Marine Corps