Validating the R&S Squadron and the Future of Reconnaissance

After the opening months of combat operations in both theaters, Afghanistan and Iraq, manned ground-reconnaissance elements struggled to find a role as insurgents went to ground. Open enemy formations no longer existed; however, land-owning units still needed surveillance assets to conduct multidimensional reconnaissance of the areas of operation and villages they were trying to clear, hold and build. Early operations such as Anaconda and the hunt for al-Zarqawi proved that locating enemy positions required ground assets in addition to unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. Regional commands and battlespace-owning brigades need manned ISR assets to confirm intelligence, identify the next phase of the operation and determine if an area needs to be secured; unfortunately, using organic assets for these operations takes operational time and combat power, forcing the Army to relook its ground-reconnaissance assets in the war on terrorism. The battlefield surveillance brigade, of which there are currently three active and assigned to I, V and XVIII Corps, are the Army’s solution to the reconnaissance problem. Within the BfSB is the reconnaissance and surveillance squadron, consisting of a headquarters and headquarters troop, two scout troops and a traditional long-range surveillance company. The R&S squadron was, in theory (as with all Army units), designed for conducting detailed reconnaissance and developing the situation for higher headquarters (Figure 1). Adapting task organization According to Field Manual 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, the R&S squadron is only fully capable of conducting area reconnaissance and local security. All other tasks, both reconnaissance and stability operations, require the squadron to be reinforced by additional combat power and enablers (FM 3-20.96, Paragraph 1-4). To enter the counterinsurgency fight – and reality – before deploying to Operation Enduring Freedom 10-11, the 1-38 R&S Squadron, 525 BfSB, Fort Bragg, N. C., adjusted its organic task organization to better fit the current fight. First, lack of organic fires proved an unacceptable risk in a theater where patrols depend on it daily. Through operational-needs statements and extensive cross-planning with other brigades, the squadron was able to train 11Bs and one 88M to fill a five-gun 60mm platoon. Another addition to the task organization was administrative control of the brigade company support to provide forward-support logistics and maintenance services to the squadron. The squadron fire-support officer was able to certify multiple 13Fs as Joint fires observers, giving the squadron more capabilities. The deployed task organization was better, but it still lacked the combat power and support to justify owning battlespace (Figure 2). FM 3-20.96 states that the R&S squadron can conduct all other surveillance tasks minus recon-in-force with additional assets Validating the R&S Squadron and the Future of Reconnaissance by CPT Joshua T. Suthoff and CPT Zachary S. Byrnes and “when enemy forces do not jeopardize mission accomplishment” (FM 3-20.96, Paragraph 1-4). In the COIN environment of Afghanistan, in theory, the R&S squadron should be able to conduct all forms of reconnaissance demanded of a corps reconnaissance asset. Based on the size of patrols currently conducted in theater, this is a valid assumption. Veterans of the squadron from the previous Operation Iraqi Freedom surge could see higher headquarters’ most likely course of action: a corps asset would be used as an economy-of-force in the campaign for Kandahar City and surrounding areas. These veterans knew that military planners looking to fill battlespace and gaps in forces only look at assigned military occupational specialties and not a unit’s mission-essential task list. The idea of economy-of-force and filling battlespace gaps does brief well in morning commander’s update assessments, but ground truth is usually different. An R&S squadron only has four maneuver platoons between the two scout troops to conduct combat patrols with additional taskings, like quick-reaction force and perimeter guard, that come with “real estate” in theater. The additional taskings can take an R&S squadron’s combat power from 100 percent to 75 percent or 50 percent on any day. Round hole, square peg As the deployment continued, the squadron assumed a battlespace about the size of Connecticut with multiple fixed combat outposts. To maintain an effective presence throughout the AO, the requirement to maintain multiple outposts and operational coordination centers forced the creation of more platoons “out of hide.” B/1-38 was able to use its mortar section to create three 15- to 19-man platoons, again changing the task organization of the squadron back to a more traditional reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition modified table of organization and equipment. Collaborating with the Afghan Border Patrol for daily patrols was necessary to give the platoons additional combat power, but also increased cooperation and understanding between the two units. The addition of a third platoon allowed two platoons to operate along the flanks of the fixed security site, giving the 60- man troop a much bigger appearance than it actually had. Manpower adjustment was constantly necessary to ensure that platoons had enough personnel to meet guard-force requirements or upcoming mission needs. The commander of B/1-38 (one of the authors) had to constantly relook his intelligence preparation of the battlefield and decide if a 15-Soldier patrol, kilometers away from QRF and barely within the range of medical-evacuation facilities, was necessary. The small platoons were successful because they forced every member of the platoon to stay engaged, knowing each position was critical. The troop was able to maintain a three-platoon set for the last six months of the OEF deployment. Issues The current use and organization of the Army’s R&S squadron is not acceptable or feasible on four points. Point 1: mission assignment. The armor, infantry and military-intelligence branches are watching deployments of the BfSBs/ R&S squadrons to justify the units and ensure they meet mission requirements. However, any assumptions made would be Figure 1. Doctrinal task organization of the R & S squadron.

Organic to

Sniper Organic to HHT 12 false because the currently deployed BfSBs and squadrons own battlespace. The correct action would be to assign the R&S squadron an operations box for a period time, where it answers regional intelligence requirements, and then is assigned anew ops box. During this time, tactical and civil-affairs IRs (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety and other, or SWEAT-MSO, and areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events, or ASCOPE) of an area can get a response and returned to that regional command. A regional command could then assign specific units to the AO, such as a CA team with prefocused projects, based on the R&S squadron’s SWEAT-MSO and ASCOPE assessments. This type of reconnaissance would serve as a better economy-of-force for neglected areas, allowing enemy and friendly local nationals to be surprised by the sudden appearance of an unknown unit in their village. Ideally, the R&S squadron is prepositioned at a main contingency-operations base (for example, Balad, Speicher, Bagram Airfield or Kandahar Airfield), where it can quickly slice elements to regional commands preparing for offensive and/or clearing operations. With air assets in close proximity, LRS teams can fly to outlying areas to answer priority intelligence requirements and observe named areas of interest. Scout troops should remain light, relying on a few heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks to move additional equipment forward to requesting brigades. Until the squadron is used as a reconnaissance asset – i.e., moving forward to the next clearing operation or stationed on the Afghanistan/Pakistan or Syria/Iraq border – there will be no validation of the R&S squadron METL. Point 2: task organization. The current task organization does not provide what a corps reconnaissance asset should have for reconnaissance-based tasks. The squadron can only slice LRS platoons/teams or small troops to combatant commands for a small scout addition with limited operational time. Under the proposed task organization (Figure 3), entire troops with LRS teams can split to conduct mounted and dismounted reconnaissance over multiple NAIs. The troops could internally provide QRF, infiltration/exfiltration and interdiction teams to the overall LRS capability. These sliced elements could screen, feint or determine the forward edge of insurgent operations. In addition to kinetic operations, sliced elements or the entire squadron could be sent to areas where intelligence is lacking and conduct a zone reconnaissance to determine if additional forces are necessary. The addition of organic fires is critical for any unit operating outside of supporting-fires range. Under the proposed organization, each LRS platoon has an insertion specialty that would allow it to focus its dwell time on maintaining certification and perfecting its insertion technique. With three active R&S squadrons in the Army today and additional National Guard elements, the squadrons could rotate through theater every 18-24 months. Troops can split for contingency operations around the globe. Longer dwell periods would allow LRS elements to ensure all teams are proficient prior to deployment. LRS elements could also stay certified longer if Army personnel management closely monitored the permanent-change-of-station of highly qualified and trained noncommissioned officers. Allowing the unit to select its members would also increase its proficiency and reduce the squadron’s time training Skill Level 1 tasks. Point 3: risk aversion and equipment needed vs. equipment supplied. The war on terrorism has seen the continual progression and literal growth of the Army’s combat vehicles. M1025 humvees changed to M1114s and M1151s as additional armor was added in the name of saving lives, but the protection came at the expense of situational awareness. Maxx-Pros and mine-resistant all-terrain vehicles are the pinnacle of crew protection against mines and improvised explosive devices, and the abso-Figure 2. Deployed task organization. 1-38

ADCON to 1-33 (-) Squadron Control

DS 13 lute worst reconnaissance vehicles on the battlefield. These vehicles on a kinetic battlefield are the first to draw main gunfire. During the deployment, the squadron was equipped with MATVs that were too heavy to conduct reconnaissance in certain types of terrain where lighter vehicles could operate. The MATV platform has decent gas mileage but still requires more JP8 fuel, which complicates logistics resupply for extended reconnaissance missions. The squadron faced a reconnaissance mission where the weight and gas mileage of an MATV acted as a constraint to mission accomplishment. Since the loudness and size of a MATV acts as a daily constraint for stealthy movement across the battlefield, the squadron must have lighter armored vehicles or all-terrain vehicles with the mandate to operate them. Getting mission-appropriate vehicles through supply channels is just half the battle, however; getting approval to operate less-armored vehicles in today’s risk-adverse Army would be an achievement in its own right. What is harder to attack: a large vehicle restricted to roads or a lighter vehicle moving freely about the terrain? Lighter “soft skin” vehicles or all-terrain vehicles are not always the answer, but – like any vehicle or piece of equipment – simply a means to accomplish the mission. Since the squadron was a battlespace owner, it had no priority over other units for lift support. Lack of priority for lift support further hinders reconnaissance troops and especially the LRS company’s ability to plan and conduct operations. Lift support is scarce and unreliable, and last-minute changes or loss of lift support disrupts operational cycles. Even the support from one team of UH-60 Blackhawks or CH-47 Chinooks would greatly increase the reconnaissance ability of LRS or scout teams. The LRS teams are currently on paid airborne status, with some teams being high-altitude, low-opening qualified and certified. LRS and Special Forces teams perfected HALO insertions during Vietnam. However, LRS does not fall under a Joint Special Operations Command, so any form of airborne operation would be out of the question and considered ludicrous. If LRS is to retain airborne status, then airborne operations need to remain a viable and supportable option. What is the least obvious insertion to the enemy: a pair of UH-60s landing in a landing zone, four military vehicles stopping in an area for awhile or a night tailgate jump from a CH-47 passing through the airspace? Again, airborne operations are not always the answer but a means to accomplish the mission. The common thread through equipment issues, lift support and airborne operations is today’s risk aversion/risk mitigation obsession. Doctrine designs LRS and scouts to operate in small teams ahead of the main body. An NAI that took two LRS Soldiers in Vietnam to reconnoiter now takes a team of six to eight. Doctrine also significantly reduces the distance from an observation post to its QRF in the name of safety and deniability in the event of casualties. The authors do not suggest taking unnecessary risk, but surveillance is an art that enemies must buy into to be effective, and it is, by nature, more dangerous than regular combat operations. Point 4: change to METL. What is the future of reconnaissance? It is somewhere between unmanned sensors and lying in a hide site. The 1/38 Squadron had great success by using un- 1-38

Scuba

Mortars Mortars Mortars Figure 3. Proposed task organization. 14

ADCON – administrative control AO – area of operation ASCOPE – areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events BCS – brigade company support BCT – brigade combat team BfSB – battlefield surveillance brigade CA – civil affairs COIN – counterinsurgency FM – field manual HALO – high altitude, low opening HHT – headquarters and headquarters troop IR – intelligence requirement ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JFO – joint fire observer LRS – long-range surveillance MATV – mine-resistant all-terrain vehicle METL – mission-essential task list MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NAI – named area of interest PIR – priority intelligence requirement QFR – quick-reaction force R&S – reconnaissance and surveillance SWEAT-MSO – sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety and other Acronym Quick-Scan leader of B Troop, 1-38 Cavalry, 525 BfSB. A graduate of the Reserve Officer’s Training Program at Gonzaga University in Spokane, WA, in 2008, his military schooling includes the Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course and Army Reconnaissance Course at Fort Knox, KY, as well as Airborne School at Fort Benning, GA, in 2009. manned ground sensors and other intelligence platforms to find, fix and finish Taliban attempting to move through the AO. These methods were not traditional reconnaissance or battlespace missions but were adapted by on-ground commanders. Unfortunately, training on these types of missions in garrison would be extremely difficult based on resources and equipment. In addition, scout/LRS Soldiers who operate forward of battle or in isolated areas need to be JFO-certified to stay relevant. In conclusion, battlespace-owning brigades involved in COIN operations cannot commit organic combat forces to answer PIRs and watch NAIs. The R&S squadron with the current deployed task organization or the one proposed by the authors could answer these IRs and help decide the next phase in the operation. Developing the situation for the higher commander will allow him to decide how and when he will employ his forces. Planners will continue to debate the value of ground-reconnaissance assets and misuse them. Currently R&S squadrons cannot answer the METL question until sent forward to confirm with the proper equipment and support. CPT Josh Suthoff commands B Troop, 1-38 Cavalry, 525 BfSB, at Fort Bragg, NC. He previously served as plans officer, 1-38 Cavalry, 525 BfSB; assistant S-3, 1-33 Cavalry, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne, Fort Campbell, KY; executive officer, B Troop, 1-33 Cavalry, 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne; and platoon leader, B Troop, 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne. His military schooling includes Ranger School, Scout Leader Course, Engineer Captain’s Career Course, Air Assault and Airborne schools. CPT Suthoff holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in psychology from the University of Missouri in Columbia, MO, and a master’s of science degree in geological engineering from Missouri University of Science and Technology. CPT Zach Byrnes is the executive officer of B Troop, 1-38 Cavalry, 525 BfSB, Fort Bragg, NC. He previously served as platoon

• All 19D/11B team leaders and up are Ranger-qualified;

• The squadron is allowed to recruit 19/11s directly from post in-processing (three-day selection process);

• 19Ds are trained as JFOs;

• The unit is on jump status;

• Schools available: HALO, scuba, mountain, survival, sapper, Ranger, Pathfinder, Jumpmaster;

• The unit has an MTOE mortar platoon;

• Each LRS platoon has insertion/operating specialty;

• The LRS platoon leader slot remains a junior captain;

• The HHT and S-3 has three majors (executive officer, future-operations officer and current-operations officer) and two captains (insertion/extraction officer and plans officer);

• The squadron (internal QRF) is able to observe six NAIs at any time, with scout platoons acting as QRF/ interdiction;

• The squadron (external QRF) is able to observe 15 NAIs; Concepts of operation and highlights of changes to R&S squadron MTOE:

• The squadron can conduct route, area and zone reconnaissance;

• Troops can be cut to different regional commands;

• With the three current R&S squadrons active, squadrons could rotate through theater on a one-year to six-month basis;

• Ideally, the squadron’s headquarters is the same location (for example, Kandahar Airfield) for each deployment and then attached as needed;

• The command using the squadron provides maintenance and logistics support;

• Potentially, three regional commands could have dedicated reconnaissance assets for conventional or COIN fight. 15